SUMMARY
In 2023, the populous Amhara region became the scene of a war that pitted the government against the Fano militia. The eruption of the armed conflict was the crescendo in the deterioration of the relationship between regime in Addis Ababa and the Amhara population in general and Fano in particular, which had gained traction with the signing of the peace agreement between the government and TPLF in late 2022. Having been allied to and fought together with the government against common enemy TPLF, Fano felt betrayed by the accord, fearing that Amhara would be forced to give up all the contested land that they had seized during the war. In April 2023, the Amhara Special Forces (ASF), a paramilitary and gendarmerie unit of the Ethiopian armed forces, were ordered to disband, further increasing tensions. Anti-government sentiments on the rise, the following months saw numerous statements by the various Fano factions regarding their dual goals: pushing out all government forces from Amhara, and establishing local rule, as well as to overthrow Abiy's government and amend the constitution.
Already at a high intensity level in 2024, 2025 saw the number of fatalities increase by 75 % to over 3800. As the year progressed, Fano demonstrated increased operational synchronization among previously decentralized militias, launching a number of major offensives. The government, for its part, responded with intensified counterinsurgency campaigns, escalating its use of drone warfare even more.
IN DEPTH
Long-standing tensions with Tigray create fragile alliances
The background to the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Amhara Fano militia is closely connected to developments in the war that erupted in neighboring Tigray region in 2020. The conflict in Tigray pitted the government against the armed forces of TPLF, the ruling party in the region at the time, and in the entire country between 1991 and 2018. Coming to power in 1991, TPLF had turned Ethiopia into an ethnic federation, which it proceeded to rule with an iron fist, alienating many of the other ethnic groups in the country. The Amharas were among the regime’s fiercest critics, citing multiple grievances, among which was the claim that TPLF had annexed Amhara land and incorporated it into Tigray. The areas in question were Wolkayit/Western most Tigray and Raya-Alamata/Southern-most Tigray, the first of which is a breadbasket and of great strategic importance, and they had been contested between the Tigray and Amhara people for decades.
In 2018, large-scale popular protests against TPLF's domination of the political life of the country eventually led to a change in government and Abiy Ahmed came to power, initially appearing to usher in an era of political reform. There was animosity between the new and former rulers from the start, and tensions increased over time, as the new prime minister strove to re-centralize all state powers in Addis Ababa and dismantle the multi-ethnic federation. While the Amharas were also becoming increasingly wary of Abiy, their mutual antipathy towards TPLF took precedence and together with Eritrea, they formed an anti-TPLF alliance as the war erupted in November 2020. The Amhara Regional Special Forces (ARSF) and the Amhara Fano militia subsequently quickly occupied the contested territories, and went on to fight alongside the national army, ENDF, and Eritrean forces over the following years.
The alliance crumbles
The Tigray war progressed in fits and starts and during periods of less intense fighting, cracks started to appear in the Fano-government alliance as the regional government made attempts to disarm and arrest some factions of the group. Even top commanders, such as senior Fano leader Zemene Kassie were targeted and this caused many Fano factions to break off its cooperation with the ENDF and go underground. When the last phase of the Tigray war erupted in late August 2022, the only Fano faction still fighting alongside the government was East Amhara Fano, the rest were under crackdown, mostly in prison or on the run, trying to organize in the forests or mountains. In November, the government and TPLF signed a peace agreement, leaving their former Amhara partners feeling betrayed. The latter had not been party to the peace talks leading up to the accord, and accused the government of having agreed to hand back the contested areas to Tigray, thus stabbing their former allies in the back.
Amid sustained attempts to disarm Fano, relations continued to deteriorate between the Amhara region and Addis Ababa in late 2022 and early 2023. Fano remained staunchly against the idea, arguing that them disarming would leave the region defenseless against TPLF and OLA, an Oromo armed outfit fighting the government in Oromiya, south of Amhara. Furthermore, they demanded guarantees that Wolkayit/Western-most Tigray and Raya-Alamata/Southern-most Tigray would remain under Amhara control. In April 2023, things took a turn for the worse, when it was announced that the ARSF were to disband, causing outrage. The decree to disband the regional special forces applied to all states in the federation, but many Amhara saw it as being targeted especially towards them. It is estimated that about 60 per cent of the 30 000 strong force defected and joined Fano in the bush (some analyst claim that ARSF had in fact numbered some 100 000 and that one third of them left), thus increasing the latter’s strength significantly by bringing both trained and equipped fighters.
While there had been both violent popular protests and armed skirmishes over the first months of the year, it seems as if the disbanding of the ARSF was the spark that eventually lit the fire of armed rebellion. The anti-government rhetoric became increasingly pronounced and the different Fano factions began releasing statements outlining their aims and goals, making it clear that they intended to use armed force to both push all federal troops out of Amhara and establish local rule, as well as to overthrow Abiy's government and amend the constitution.
Armed rebellion amid attempts to create unity
As indicated earlier, Fano is not a unitary actor, but consists of several geographically separate factions. Many of these cooperate and conduct joint operations, but so far, they have been unable to establish a common political front. There have been numerous attempts at this, however, such as the launching of the Amara Popular Front (APFr). Amhara opposition politician and journalist Eskinder Nega announced its creation om 20 May 2023, stating that the intention for it was to serve as a common front for all Fano factions. While APFr failed to garner the support of all Fano groups, Eskinder was able to gain a foothold in Gujjam, where there was a vacuum due to the government’s arrest of Zemene Kassie (see above).
Having announced APFr and clearly stated its anti-government intentions, Eskinder became a sought-after target for ENDF and in late May, there was a show-down in and around a monastery in Debre Elias woreda, East Gujjam. ENDF claimed that they had received intel confirming that Eskinder was present in the monastery and that its facilities were used as a training camp for his men. Over five days there was heavy fighting, leaving many killed and dozens wounded, but Eskinder managed to escape.
After two months of intermittent fighting, violence exploded in early August, when Fano managed to seize a number of large towns in the Amhara region, and a state of emergency was declared. For a while, the regional government – controlled by the Prosperity Party (PP) – appeared to be on the brink of collapse, with key officials fleeing to Addis Ababa, for fear of being attacked. While Fano was eventually pushed out of the towns by mid-August, they continued to make incursions into urban centers through the rest of the year. A pattern emerged whereby the insurgents would seize a town and remained there for a few hours or up to a day, attacking prisons and releasing prisoners, and carrying out assassinations of people associated with the regional government, and then retreating to the countryside when ENDF reinforcements arrived. This proved to be very difficult for the armed forces to protect itself against. Another frequent tactic used by Fano was ambushes along the roads linking the main towns of the region, effectively cutting them off for periods of time. Attempting to shift the tide, the government increasingly made use to drones, a strategy that had proven effective in the war against TPLF.
From late 2023, it seemed as if Fano’s response to this was to shift away from large-scale attacks on towns, involving many fighters, instead splitting up in smaller groups and relying more on ambushes and assassinations. However, the first half of 2024 also saw some temporary incursions into main towns, such as Debre Birhan and Gondar in early January, and Amhara capital Bahir Dar and Shewa Robit in early March.
In mid-march 2024, a top Fano commander in South Gondar named Wubante Abate was killed in fighting. A substantial set-back for South Gondar Fano, this spawned the launch of a revenge operation named after the commander, involving numerous attacks in Gondar and Gojjam, purportedly leaving hundreds of ENDF soldiers captured and many killed.
A push by Fano followed by a counter-offensive
Half-way into 2024, Fano launched a new offensive, with an initial focus on Gondar and Gojjam, in the western part of the region. However, operations soon multiplied in the region in general. The group succeeded in seizing control of some rural areas, and with multiple attacks on key roads, it also managed to disrupt the region’s transport network. In late August, West Gondar zone saw an escalation in fighting, with Fano targeting the C34 road, connecting Gondar town to Sudan. They inched closer to Metema, a critical border crossing, and by early September, were able to seize it temporarily. There were heavy clashes along the border and Ethiopian soldiers were forced to flee, with some taking refuge on Sudanese territory. Fano also attacked a number of larger towns, such as Gondar, which saw intense urban fighting intermittently in September and October, as well as Debark and Finote Selam.
In October, ENDF launched a big counter offensive and thousands of troops entered the region. Aside from the increased troop presence, the offensive also brought with it an even more indiscriminate use of airstrikes; there seemed to be no precautions regarding the civilian population. A notable example was the death of some 50 children in October, in areas around Bahir Dar, when helicopter- and drone strikes targeted schools and administrative buildings, where Fano have tended to take shelter. Some weeks later, three drone strikes hit densely populated areas in the West Gojjam village of Arge, including the market, school and health center. Heavy fighting was ongoing at the time, and the strikes killed more than 15 Fano fighters, but also resulted in at least 24 civilian fatalities. While the government had declared all-out war on Fano with the launch of the offensive and announced that the aim was to crush the insurgency, this was not achieved. As the offensive petered out, it was clear that it had failed to make any substantial progress; no major Fano commanders were captured or killed, and the group seemed to retain its capabilities.
Consolidation and continued escalation
One, for ENDF, unintentional consequence of the October 2024 offensive was an intensification of Fano’s unification process. The movement had been fragmented from the outset, with internal fighting and power struggles, but in parallel to this, there had been concerted efforts to unite all factions under one command structure. The October 2024 offensive seems to have demonstrated to many Fano factions that the movement’s decentralized networks were vulnerable to concentrated military pressure, underscoring the need for tighter coordination. By May 2025, four major regional Fano factions — Gojjam, Wollo, Gondar, and Shewa — formally unified under the AFNF with a central command. While one major Fano sub-group – AFPO – remained outside the structure during the rest of the year, the increased coordination achieved nevertheless bore fruit. As coordination improved, Fano became better at launching simultaneous attacks, disrupting highways and military supply routes, and pressuring multiple areas at once. This forced the ENDF to spread its forces more widely and made federal counterinsurgency operations more difficult.
The year was marked by alternating Fano offensives and ENDF counteroffensives. The largest Fano campaign of 2025 was Operation Adem Ali (also called “Operation Aba Nadew), which AFNF and allied factions launched in North and South Welo in late September. It continued until to 10 October and marked a major escalation in the conflict. The offensive was important since it signaled Fano‘s intent to move from guerrilla warfare into a conventional war; the group captured territories and tried to enter main towns, almost succeeding in seizing Weldiya, Dessi, and Kobo and managing to enter Gashena, all major towns in Welo. Furthermore, the offensive initially showed Fano’s growing operational coordination since AFNF cooperated with AFPO elements for the first time. However, both these developments were only temporary. Overall, the Fano movement underestimated their internal divisions, and internal fighting erupted, weakening the operation. The movement also failed to come up with an effective strategy to defend themselves from Ethiopia’s air force. Drone strikes were conducted on an almost daily bases and the group suffered heavy losses. After the end of the operation, ENDF launched renewed law enforcement operations in West and North Gojjam, Awi, and Welo, focused on reopening roads, retaking district centers, and disrupting Fano logistics.
Despite several important developments during the year, the overall balance of power remained the same; ENDF retained major advantages in airpower, drones, artillery, and control of major towns and state institutions while Fano remained strongest in rural and mountainous areas and still struggled to permanently hold large urban centers. As 2025 came to an end, neither side was close to defeating the other militarily.
