SUMMARY
Fano (sometimes spelled Fanno) was an ethno-nationalist militia, based in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. Having fought together with the Ethiopian government in the war against TPLF, the two allies turned on one another after Addis Ababa signed a peace agreement with the Tigray group, and in 2023 they became embroiled in an armed conflict.
The term Fano can loosely be translated to freedom fighter in Amharic. There have been several incarnations of a Fano movement historically and the present one claims to draw on the traditions of particularly the one mobilized to repulse the Italian fascist occupation from 1935 to 1941. The most recent version of the movement traced its roots to the youth-led mass protests in the Amhara region in 2016 against the former TPLF-led regime, which, combined with similar protests in the Oromiya region, eventually served to bring Abiy Ahmed to power in 2018. Many of the present-day Fano leaders were incarcerated during the years of protest, but with Abiy’s ascent to power, they were released as part of a mass amnesty for political prisoners. With that, they began putting together armed militias, which were the embryos of the present-day large forces. At the time, these were subsequently used to fight on behalf of the government, growing increasingly powerful.
The different versions of Fano, past and present, all claim the same purpose of defending the Amharas people. The early forms of the present version of Fano were clearly used to do just that, being deployed in areas outside of Amhara proper, where the Amharas people constituted a minority that was perceived to be under threat. With the advent of the Tigray war, the scope of the group’s ambitions grew, and it became a vehicle for Amhara territorial ambitions, seizing control over and occupying these disputed areas. Over time, and linked to developments in the war against TPLF, the pro-Amhara rhetoric become coupled with a an increasingly anti-government stance. After the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022, which ended that war, the split was a fact; the Amharas considered themselves to have been betrayed by their former allies, accusing the government of plotting to hand back the contested areas that they had seized during the war. During the spring of 2023, tensions between the two escalated further when Abiy Ahmed disbanded the Amhara Regional Special Forces (ARSF), a paramilitary and gendarmerie unit of the Ethiopian armed forces. Amhara leaders argued this would leave the region defenseless against TPLF and OLA, an Oromo armed outfit fighting the government in Oromiya, south of Amhara, thereby further cementing Fano’s raison d’être. Anti-government sentiments on the rise, the following months saw numerous statements by the various Fano factions regarding their dual goals: pushing out all government forces from Amhara, and establishing local rule, as well as to overthrow Abiy's government and amend the constitution.
As indicated earlier, Fano was not a uniform movement, but rather consisted of several geographically separate factions, each with its own leader. Over time these factions made numerous attempts to create a unified command structure and a single political wing. The first attempt at an overall political leadership structure was launched on 20 May 2023 by Amhara opposition politician and journalist Eskinder Nega, who opted to leave politics and instead establish the Amara Popular Front (APFr), with the aim for it to serve as a common front for all Fano factions. However, APFr failed to garner the support of all Fano groups, and subsequently collapsed. Nega made a new attempt in May 2024, when he launched AFPO, meant to function both as a political wing and a coordination body of the armed factions. However, Nega once again failed to convince the Fano movement at large to unite under this banner. Militarily, the new group was dependent on semi-autonomous regional commanders based in Shewa, like Meketaw Mamo and Baye Kengaw, and it had no single unified battlefield command.
In May 2025, a new merger framework was launched, meant to bring existing militias under a single command structure. Named AFNF, it included large Fano groups from Gojjam, Welo, Gondar and Shewa. More specifically, the main groups joining the umbrella were Gojjam Fano Command under Zemene Kassie, the so-called East Amhara Fano under Mire Wodajo (Mihretu Wodajo), the Gondar Fano Command (Amhara Fano Unity / Gondar Front) under Habte Wolde and Shewa Fano Command under Desalegn Siasbeshewa and Meketaw Mamo. Led by a 13-member central command, AFNF became the most operationally coherent umbrella during 2025. Nevertheless, unity remained partial and most real fighting power stayed with regional commanders and local cell networks.
Fano’s area of operation during the conflict against the government extended throughout the Amhara region. However, while most parts were hit in some way, it seems as if Gujjam was the epicenter of the violence. Furthermore, the militia also made incursions into neighboring regions. As mentioned above, prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 2023, it was used in areas where Amhara populations were perceived to be under threat, first across the border in Benishangul-Gumuz region’s Metekel zone to the west of Amhara, and also in Oromiya region to the south. With the advent of the Tigray war in 2020, the militia fought alongside the Ethiopian military, especially in areas disputed between Amhara and Tigray regions. As such, the group quickly occupied Wolkayit/Western most Tigray and Raya-Alamata/Southern-most Tigray, the first of which is a breadbasket and of great strategic importance, contested between the Tigray and Amhara people for decades.
The exact strength and size of Fano was not known, but it is clear that it waxed and waned over the years. The first exponential growth took place when the group became involved in the war against TPLF in 2020. The armed conflict gave the militia the opportunity to mobilize and arm itself as well as to build camps and organize training. During the fighting, the group was furthermore allowed to keep the weapons that they seized in particularly Wolkayit/Western Tigray. Fano’s fortunes shifted when there was a lull in the Tigray war in the spring of 2022. By that time the government had seemingly begun to see the militia as a potential threat which had become too powerful and too outspoken in its defense of Amhara interests, and started to crack down on it. Fighters were disarmed and some faction leaders, such as senior Fano leader Zemene Kassie, arrested. A year later, in the spring of 2023, Fano received a new windfall with the previously mentioned disbandment of the Amhara Regional Special Forces. It is estimated that about 60 per cent of the 30 000 strong force defected and joined Fano in the bush (some analyst claim that ARSF had in fact numbered some 100 000 and that one third of them left), thus increasing the latter’s strength significantly by bringing both trained and equipped fighters.
As indicated above, the position of Fano vis-à-vis other actors has changed significantly over the past few years. First and foremost, it went from being armed by- and allied to the government, to fighting against it. During the Tigray war, Fano also received military training from Eritrea, and some analysts argue that ties forged at that time still remain, and that there may be ways for the militia to bring in supplies across the Sudan border. More recently, some outlets reported about alliances being formed with armed actors in Benishangul-Gumuz region. Fano’s overall relationship with both TPLF and OLA has also shifted dramatically over the past few years, going from hostility and fighting to a potential tactical alliance against the government. Nevertheless, as the self-proclaimed defenders of the Amhara people, it seems as if the group’s main supporter remained the Amhara population at large, both within and outside the region. Gaining the people’s trust during the Tigray war, Fano continued to deepen its support base among the population by playing on anti-government sentiments tied to e.g. the Wolkayit/Western Tigray question. As such, the both received monetary support from the diaspora, and invaluable assistance from the local population in many areas of Amhara, where the latter provided safe havens and shared information.
