SUMMARY
The conflict between the Malian government and the rebel alliance CSP-PSD (subsequently CSP-DPA, and in late 2024 FLA ), was in a way a continuation of the territorial conflict over Azawad – the northern regions of the country – which was fought 2012 – 2015 between the Malian government and the Tuareg rebel coalition CMA. However, a key difference between the two was that alliance CSP was - at least initially – more broad-based than the one fighting in the previous conflict, fighting for goals that were wider. The conflict over Azawad was ended by the signing of a peace agreement in 2015, but developments both during the conflict, and after it had terminated played an important role in the lead-up to the present conflict.
In 2025, the conflict continued, albeit at a low-intensity level. There were no large-scale battles like the one in Ti-n-Zaouatene the year prior, but the year saw several clashes, ambushes, and drone strikes. A notable development was the escalation of drone usage also by the rebels. While the first confirmed battlefield use was in mid-2024, 2025 saw both more numerous- and more advanced drones, with the rebels utilizing FPV and fibre-optic-guided suicide drones. Another important development was the growing signs of a tactical alliance between FLA and JNIM; the two groups have different goals, but share the same enemy and were negotiating joint operations and the expansion of an earlier non-aggression arrangement.
IN DEPTH
Background: the conflict over Azawad
The northern part of Mali – referred to as Azawad by the Tuareg, the main ethnic group in the area - is sparsely populated and deep in the Sahara Desert. Historically, the North in general, and the Tuareg in particular, have been both economically and politically neglected. This neglect has been compounded by severe drought and a brutal, southern, military presence. Dissent has been expressed numerous times since independence, but until the 1990s, the government managed to repress it.
The population in the area is divided between a number of different ethnic groups, with the majority group being the Tuareg, followed by Arabs, Fulani, and Songhay. There are deep divisions between these groups; they do not share the same culture or traditions and they have different interests and political agendas. These divisions have been exacerbated by the Malian state’s divide-and-rule tactics in the region. One distinct question of contention between these groups concerns the establishment of a separate state in the northern part of Mali, Azawad. While this is something that especially parts of the Tuareg community have been fighting for, sections of the Arab population and the Fulani and Songhay oppose the idea, fearing that it would mean living under Tuareg domination. Divisions run deep also within the Tuareg group. Tuareg society has traditionally been hierarchical, with nobility and vassals. There is a history of tension and competition between the different sub-clans, and this came to the forefront in the context of the armed conflict. The main group within the separatist rebel coalition CMA - MNLA - was primarily made up the Ifogha sub-group, the Tuareg nobles who have ruled over other Malian Tuaregs since the colonial era. Thus, many of the other sub-groups viewed the independence-project with skepticism. Especially the Imghads, traditionally vassals, were opposed to the idea of an independent north, instead seeking autonomy within Mali and strong development aid from the central government. When the 2012 phase of the conflict started, separatist Tuareg MNLA (later CMA) quickly seized large swaths of territory, forcing the Malian army to retreat, and the other ethnic groups in the region, as well as certain Tuareg sub-groups acted quickly: a number of new armed groups were created, and already established militias – such as the Songhai Ganda Iso – were mobilized.
During the process leading up to the signing of the peace agreement, attempts were made to bring together the plethora of armed organizations, but divisions were too deep. However, after diplomatic wrangling, the various northern groups were eventually able to group themselves into two main camps: CMA and Platform. The former included MNLA, MAA-Ould Sidatti, HCUA, CM-FPR II and CPA, all of which were pro-independence, whereas the latter was made up of MAA, CM-FPR and GATIA, a self-defense militia mainly drawn from the Imghad community, which all sought national unity. During the process leading up to the launching of talks, as well as during the entire negotiation process, there was intermittent fighting between the two camps, as they scrambled for positions of strength, control of territory and the main trafficking routes. By mid-2015, the peace process – called the Algiers Process due to Algeria’s role as mediator – had borne fruit and all groups in both camps, as well as the government had signed the accord. The northern region was granted some autonomy, fighters from the armed groups were to be integrated into the security forces in the north and the accord also stipulated that the northern region’s representation in state institutions was to be improved.
CSP is created and the 2021 coup
Implementation of the accord proceeded slowly and with difficulty. While the conflict between the government and CMA did not erupt again, the relationship between CMA and the Platform camp remained hostile, with intermittent fighting between the groups in different constellations. This situation persisted over the following years, as the two camps competed for territorial control, while in parallel, remaining within the agreement and participating in the fledgling implementation process.
United in their frustration by the delays in the implementation of the peace agreement, the two camps eventually came together in May 2021, establishing the CSP, the Permanent Strategic Framework. Initially, the new alliance was merely intended to strengthen the northern groups’ bargaining position in the Algiers process, but the fact that they were now united, with a broad ethnic base, made other actors apprehensive.
Parallel to this, Bamako saw upheavals. In 2020, popular protests against the regime erupted, partly linked to the deteriorating security situation in the country, caused by the ongoing conflicts between the government and the two Islamist groups JNIM and IS’ Sahel Province (ISSP). As the protests gained in strength, the demonstrators began calling for the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and on 18 August, the military seized power in a coup. Only nine months later, on 24 May 2021, a mere three weeks after the founding of CSP, a new coup took place, ousting the civilian transitional government that had briefly ruled the country. Subsequently, Colonel Assimi Goïta took over as interim president of the country and with that, the Algiers process became even more difficult. Not only was the new junta apprehensive because of the new northern alliance, which it feared would change the power balance in the process, it had a more militant outlook, emphasized the country’s territorial integrity and included people with a long history of being against the 2015 agreement. For CSP, which had controlled northern Mali since 2015, all this caused serious concern, and amidst rising tensions, the process eventually reached a deadlock in December 2022.
During the fall of 2022, as the Algiers process was faltering, the groups within CSP grew increasingly close. The main chasm between CMA on the one hand, and GATIA and MSA on the other appeared to be on the verge of being bridged, mainly due to the latter groups’ loss of faith in the junta. Over the past few years, GATIA and MSA had been key allies of the government in its conflict against IS, fought mainly in the Menaka region in north-eastern Mali, and as the government had a very limited presence in the area, the two militias bore the brunt of IS’ onslaught. This put pressure on the alliance, with cracks appearing and GATIA and MSA moving closer to the other groups under the CSP umbrella. In January and February 2023, the alliances’ military Chiefs of Staff subsequently made moves to establish a joint command structure and shared headquarters, as well permanent military bases.
MINUSMA starts to withdraw and the conflict erupts
In 2023, things happened quickly. The junta’s relationship with the west had been strained from the start, and only continued to deteriorate over time. In 2022, Goïta had demanded the withdrawal of the French troops that had been in the country since 2013, assisting in the conflict against the jihadists, and in June 2023, the junta requested that the UN mission in the country – MINUSMA, withdraw. When the pull out began the following month, the buffer between the government-controlled south and the northern part of the country, under CSP disappeared, and things were brought to a head. The issue of who would seize control over those MINUSMA’s bases located in areas claimed by the northern groups quickly became the main bone of contention, with the junta viewing this as an opportunity to reassert control over the north, while CSP argued that that would be a serious breach of the Algiers agreement.
As the date of MINUSMA’s withdrawal from Ber, near Timbuktu, drew closer, the war of words heated up and both sides prepared for renewed fighting. In August, the conflict subsequently erupted, as both sides vied for control of Ber. After a few days of fighting, which also involved the JNIM, fighting the government in a conflict over government power, the Ber base was seized by the army.
In the wake of the violence, leaders from the northern alliance began making public statements about the situation in the country, outlining their aims and goals for the present military campaign. While first indicating their readiness to launch new attacks, they called for all civilians in the north to keep away from military facilities and convoys, they then went on to emphasize that they would "henceforth adopt all measures of self-defense against the forces of this junta throughout the entire territory of Azawad" and declared open hostilities against the junta. The leader of the part of GATIA that still remained within CSP (the former had suffered a split earlier), Fahad Ag Almahmoud subsequently made a statement that clearly showed that the aim of the CSP was wider than that of CMA during the previous conflict, when he said that the group was fighting to oust the junta ruling the country.
In parallel to this, the rebels launched a series of attacks on army positions in northern and central Mali. Notably, the alliance was able to inflict significant losses on the army in Bourem, Gao region and temporarily seized control of the army outposts in Léré, in Timbuktu region and Bamba, Gao region. The army’s initial response was to carry out numerous airstrikes on rebel positions, but it also began increasing the number of troops in the area.
The convoy from Gao and the capture of Kidal
By early October, it was clear that the junta was set to begin its attempt to reassert the Malian state’s sovereignty over the entire country. Together with its Wagner Group allies, it assembled a column of around 800 soldiers in 100 Malian army vehicles and set off from Gao towards Kidal, the stronghold of CSP, out of government control since 2012. The convoy quickly ran into trouble, with rebels harassing it as it made its way north. The continued attacks and clashes slowed the army’s progress, and frustrated, it sought revenge on the civilian population, in one infamous attack beheading 17 men on the village square in Ersane, Gao region on 5 October. After intense fighting between Tabankort and Anefis, the column eventually captured the latter on 7 October, subsequently staying put, waiting for reinforcements.
While the convoy was camped in Anefis, the army’s next step was to drop dozens of Malian soldiers and Wagner militia in Tessalit, some 200 km north of Kidal, where MINUSMA had a base that was being evacuated. CSP was also present in the surroundings and by mid-October, the town and its environs saw sporadic clashes. On 21 October, the Tessalit camp was evacuated and a convoy of MINUSMA troops began travelling toward Gao. Military equipment that could not be brought along was destroyed. The army quickly moved in and occupied the camp. A couple of days later, MINUSMA left their base in Aguel'hoc, between Tessalit and Kidal, which was taken over by CSP. Simultaneously, the Blue Berets began to prepare to depart Kidal, two weeks ahead of schedule, due to the deteriorating security situation. The last troop eventually left the on 31 October, and CSP swiftly moved in to take control.
In the meantime, the column had started moving north yet again and by early November, it was clear that the army was gearing up for an outright attack on Kidal town. It began by carrying out numerous drone strikes over a few days, after which the column started closing in on Kidal. On 11-12 November, there was heavy fighting in the Alkite valley, some 20 km southwest of the town. Initially, the rebels were able to hold off the government forces, but on 14 November, they broke through and were able to capture Kidal. While this was celebrated as a triumph for the government, CSP did not surrender, but simply withdrew from the town and headed north, towards Abeïbara, not far from the border with Algeria.
Army offensives, airstrikes and a significant military defeat
Having suffered several military setbacks, CSP nevertheless claimed that they had chosen to leave Kidal for strategic reasons, and pledged to continue the armed struggle. Goïta for his part proclaimed that the mission was not yet complete, as that the aim was to recover and secure the integrity of all territory, without any exception. In mid-December, the convoy subsequently continued north, heading for Aguel'hoc. Just as two months earlier, the progression was slowed by ambushes and mines, but to a much lesser extent. On 20 December they were able to enter and seize control of the base without encountering any resistance.
The following few months were quiet, with the Tuareg group remaining in the isolated pockets still under their control in the northern-most part of Kidal region, on the Algerian border. However, as the year progressed, violence picked up yet again, and CSP forces seemed to attempt to infiltrate new areas. In April, it was reported that they had a presence in central Mali’s Segou and Koulikoro regions, something that was confirmed when fighting erupted between the group and JNIM, which traditionally controls large tracts of the area. There were also reports of CSP crossing over on Mauritanian territory, along with JNIM fighters, triggering cross-border raids by Malian and Russian troops.
Aside from these developments in central Mali, the conflict continued to be fought in the northern Kidal region. While the bulk of attacks were air-and drone strikes, which hit the civilian population hard, 2024 saw the largest battle to date in the conflict. In late July, a convoy of Malian and Russian troops left the town of Tessalit and embarked on a mission to re-take areas still under CSP control. Initially, they were largely unchallenged, but as they closed in on the rebels’ main stronghold in the area, the town of Ti-n-Zaouatene on the border with Algeria, they met organized resistance from the rebel forces and a three-day long running battle ensued. On the back foot and suffering losses, the convoy was eventually forced to retreat, and JNIM took the opportunity to ambush them from a high place, with CSP moving in from behind. The result was devastating for the allied force, which suffered between 60 and 90 fatalities, the deadliest loss for the Russians in the Sahel to date. The surviving troops managed to flee south, back to Kidal, and, chased by the Tuareg rebels, were forced to abandon their dead.
The immediate response to this defeat was a retaliatory airstrike on Ti-n-Zaouatene town. While the army claimed to have targeted a gathering of fighters, reports from the ground indicate that between six and 50 civilians were killed. The remainder of the year saw a number of similar strikes in the north, and CSP also acquired drones and were able to launch some attacks on military camps. On 1 December, the Malian regime scored a big victory, as they were able to target a high-level gathering of the rebels. Some 180 officials and members of CSP had assembled in the Ti-n-Zaouatene area between 26 and 30 November, holding consultations that eventually resulted in the decision that the different groups allied under the CSP umbrella would dissolve and merge to into a single political-military entity, now called the FLA (Front de libération de l'Azawad). Remaining at the location after the meeting, they were struck by three coordinated drone strikes, which killed seven or eight high-level leaders, such as Fahad Ag Almahmoud, the leader of the GATIA faction allied with the separatists, and Choguib Ag Attaher, tribal chief of the Idnane Tuareg community. Four months later, in early April, the rebels suffered yet another blow, as another key leader, Inkinane Ag Attaher, was captured by Nigerien troops along the Niger-Nigeria border.
Despite these setbacks, FLA continued its armed struggle. There were no large-scale battles like the one in Ti-n-Zaouatene, but the year saw several clashes, ambushes, and drone strikes. A notable development was the escalation of drone usage also by the rebels. While the first confirmed battlefield use was in mid-2024, 2025 saw both more numerous- and more advanced drones, with the rebels utilizing FPV and fibre-optic-guided suicide drones.
Reports throughout 2025 suggested that the FLA was reorganizing and strengthening its operational capacity, particularly in remote desert areas where state authority remained weak. Analysts and regional observers also noted growing signs of a tactical alliance between FLA and JNIM; the two groups have different goals, but share the same enemy and were negotiating joint operations and the expansion of an earlier non-aggression arrangement.
