SUMMARY
FLA (Front de libération de l'Azawad: Azawad Liberation Front; originally CSP-PSD, and subsequently CSP-DPA), was an armed movement based in northern Mali, whose origins had clear links to developments in the previous territorial conflict between the Malian government and CMA, and the subsequent peace process. As the above name-changes suggest, the organization went through a number of transformations, which affected its goals, structure and ethnic composition.
The population in northern Mali is divided between a number of different ethnic groups, the main one being the Tuaregs, followed by Arabs, Fulani, and Songhay. There are deep divisions between these groups; they do not share the same culture or traditions and they have different interests and political agendas. These divisions have been exacerbated by the Malian state’s divide-and-rule tactics in the region. One distinct question of contention between these groups concerns the establishment of a separate state in the northern part of Mali, Azawad. While this is something that especially parts of the Tuareg community have been fighting for, sections of the Arab population and the Fulani and Songhay oppose the idea, fearing that it would mean living under Tuareg domination. Divisions run deep also within the Tuaregs group. Tuareg society has traditionally been hierarchical, with nobility and vassals. There is a history of tension and competition between the different sub-clans, and this came to the forefront in the context of the armed conflict between CMA and the Malian state in the 2010s. The main group within the separatist rebel coalition CMA - MNLA - was primarily made up the Ifogha sub-group, the Tuareg nobles who have ruled over other Malian Tuaregs since the colonial era. Thus, many of the other sub-groups viewed the independence-project with skepticism. Especially the Imghads, traditionally vassals, were opposed to the idea of an independent north, instead seeking autonomy within Mali and strong development aid from the central government. When the 2012 phase of the conflict started, separatist Tuareg MNLA (later CMA) quickly seized large swaths of territory, forcing the Malian army to retreat, and the other ethnic groups in the region, as well as certain Tuareg sub-groups acted quickly: a number of new armed groups were created, and already established militias – such as the Songhai Ganda Iso – were mobilized. During the subsequent peace process, the various northern groups were eventually able to group themselves into two main camps: CMA (separatists) and Platform (pro-Bamako).
When the first iteration of FLA emerged in 2021, as CSP-PSD, it was conceived as a broad umbrella bringing together groups that had previously been divided between the CMA and Platform camps. Initially, the new alliance was merely intended to strengthen the northern groups’ bargaining position in the fledging peace process. However, as the process reached a deadlock in late 2022, the groups within CSP grew increasingly close. The main chasm between CMA on the one hand, and the largest among the Platform groups, GATIA and MSA on the other, appeared to be on the verge of being bridged, mainly due to the latter’s loss of faith in the country’s new junta. In January and February 2023, the alliances’ military Chiefs of Staff subsequently made moves to establish a joint command structure and shared headquarters, as well as permanent military bases, and with that, the movement became an actor in UCDP data.
The goals of the group shifted over time, something that coincided with it changing its name. As indicated above, it emerged as a means to strengthen the position of the northern groups vis-à-vis the state within the peace process. As the peace process faltered and eventually broke down completely, this changed. After hostilities had erupted in August 2023, leaders from the northern alliance began making public statements about the situation in the country, outlining their aims and goals for the present military campaign. In a statement from 10 September 2023, CSP chairman at the time, Alghabass Ag Intalla, confirmed the alliance’s view that the north was to remain under their control, emphasizing that they would "henceforth adopt all measures of self-defense against the forces of this junta throughout the entire territory of Azawad" and declared open hostilities against the regime. This pointed to a clear focus on the Azawad territory, along the same lines as the previous separatist movements. However, a couple of days later, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, the leader of the part of GATIA that still remained within CSP (the former had suffered a split earlier) announced that the alliance was also fighting to oust the junta ruling the country, highlighting the disparate goals of the member organizations. The shift in focus from implementation of the peace agreement to the defense of the people of Azawad was cemented when the movement changed its name to CSP-DPA (Cadre stratégique pour la défense du peuple de l’Azawad) in April 2024. In late November of that year, the group changed its name yet again – now becoming FLA – and adopted a much clearer nationalist and separatist program, openly calling for the total liberation of Azawad.
The different iterations of what came to be FLA had different leaders and structures. Starting out as CSP-PSD, the initial president was Bilal Ag Acherif, a key Tuareg separatist with a background as one of the founders and first secretary-general of MNLA (the main component of CMA). After his first term, the presidency appears to have operated on a rotating or consensus-based system among the major member movements rather than a permanent single-leader structure. Sometime in 2022, Bilial was replaced by Alghabass Ag Intalla, who had previously had ties to Ansar Dine, the Islamist Tuareg-led movement, and unlike Bilal, he was viewed as straddling both nationalist and Islamist currents. In April 2024, when the group changed its name to CSP-DPA, Bilal resumed his role as president, a position that he retained also when the group took the name FLA in November of that year.
Organization-wise, the movement also changed significantly over the years. As indicated above, it originated as a broad coordinating framework, not a unified movement. During this iteration of the movement, the constituent groups largely kept their own chain of commands, identities and agendas. This changed in April 2024, when the old umbrella structures CMA and Platform were formally dissolved. Leadership became increasingly centralized, and the group became more of a wartime coalition command structure. However, it was still not a completely unified force, but rather a coalition of semi-autonomous battalions. Turning into FLA in November of that year, the consolidation process went one step further still, and instead of simply coordinating multiple armed movements, a unified national liberation front was created.
With the name- and organizational changes, the ethnic composition of the group altered as well, becoming more distinctly Tuareg centered over time. At the outset, CSP-PSD included groups based among multiple northern communities, such as Arab groups, Songhai and Fulani, along with several Tuareg sub-groups, both “nobles” and “vassals”. As the goals of the group changed and became more outspokenly separatist, the ethnic composition became narrower. While some Arabs and vassal Tuareg sub-groups, remained, the movement became increasingly dominated by the “noble” Ifoghas Tuaregs. This process continued with the launch of FLA, which was even more clearly associated with a shared Azawad nationalist identity centered on Tuareg (Ifoghas) political- and military leadership.
The conflict fought by CMA during the 2010s had resulted in the government being routed from the north in general and Kidal town in particular. Thus, on the eve of the present conflict, then-CSP-DPA effectively controlled or dominated several areas in northern Mali, especially around Kidal town and parts of the broader Azawad region. The large-scale fighting during the fall of 2023 – while initially characterized by a series of attacks on army positions in northern- and central Mali – subsequently led to that area of control diminishing quickly, and by the end of the year the rebels had withdrawn to isolated pockets still under their control in the northern-most part of Kidal region, on the Algerian border. Subsequently, the northern-based rebels turned to guerilla warfare, carrying out ambushes, planting landmines and making use of increasingly sophisticated drones. This was mainly done in the Kidal region, but also the Timbuktu region to the south saw some military activity. Furthermore, the group fought the al-Qaida-loyal jihadi group JNIM in the Segou region’s Niono cercle, which was indicative of its geographical reach.
At the time of the birth of CDP-PSD, Mali as a whole was going through a very tumultuous period and the group co-existed with two other armed actors challenging the government; JNIM and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISPP). However, due to the incompatible nature of the secular FLA and the two jihadist organizations there was, at least initially, little coordination among them, but rather outright hostility and at times fighting. While this continued to be the case when it came to IS, the group’s relationship with JNIM was much closer and more ambiguous. Drawing from partly the same constituent groups, some commanders knew each other personally, and tribal and family ties overlapped. Furthermore, JNIM was much more open to compromise, and during 2025 the two conducted negotiations on a tactical alliance. While no such agreement was confirmed during the year, the two groups at times seemed to cooperate, or at least coordinate militarily. Aside from ties to other non-state actors, there were allegations of support from Ukraine to the rebels. While some claims were confirmed, such as that of intelligence sharing, others, like that of Ukrainian drone training, were widely reported but never officially confirmed.
