SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between the Greater Sahara section (ISGS) of IS and the Tuareg self-defense group MSA was fought in the context of the conflict between the former and the Malian state, active from 2017 onward. Furthermore, this non-state conflict is also closely interlinked with the non-state conflicts GATIA-IS and GATIA, MSA-IS, as well as tied to one-sided violence carried out by all these parties.
Mali has been the scene of high levels of organized violence since the early 2010s. State-based conflicts in the country were to some extent a product of a lack of state presence in different areas, and over time, the conflicts as such served to limit state presence even further. Large section of the population thus found themselves living in extremely insecure surroundings, engulfed by armed conflict as well as ethnic mobilization and violence. In this context, the responsibility to provide security many times fell on non-state actors such as MSA. MSA was a militia based among the Daoussak Tuaregs, and had its roots in the separatist CMA, which had fought the Malian state in a territorial conflict over the status of the Azawad area of northern Mali.
Despite the fact that MSA had a separatist outlook, the group became an important ally of the Malian government in eastern Mali’s Menaka region, when the latter found itself embroiled in a state-based conflict against the Islamic State’s Greater Sahara section in 2017. As the Malian state had a limited presence in the area, it came to rely on help from MSA as well as GATIA, another Tuareg militia, to stave off attacks from the jihadist group. This coalition was often joined by the French Barkhane force that was also aiding the Malian government. When the group fought alongside the army (and France), the violence recorded by UCDP is regarded as being part of that intrastate conflict. However, in addition to fighting together with the Malian armed forces, MSA also faced IS on its own, in a non-state conflict. Furthermore, at times the group fought IS together with GATIA, and the latter also faced the jihadists on their own. These three non-state conflicts were all part of the same context, and thus closely interlinked. During long periods of time, the Barkhane force, MSA and GATIA were the main players in opposing IS in the eastern part of the country.
In early 2017, a few months prior to the start of the non-state conflict, there was a war of words between the leaders of the two organizations. Initially, Abubakr al-Baghdadi of MSA made several declarations about al-Saharaoui on social media, stating that “the local Daoussahak tribal community does not welcome al-Saharaoui’s men in the Ménaka”. The then-leader of IS’ Greater Sahara section, Abu-Walid al-Saharaoui, subsequently responded in an audio message, where he accused MSA of being servants of France, and threatened to exterminate the Daoussak Tuaregs. This exchange points to the fact that the escalating violence in eastern Mali in general, and Menaka region in particular, was connected to – and fed into- ethnic tensions between the Tuareg and Fulani populations. The Islamic State’s Greater Sahara section – drawing most of its support from the Fulani – viewed the Tuareg as MSA and GATIA supporters, and carried out one-sided attacks against their villages, which caused the two militias to step up activities even further, both in attacking IS, but also in targeting Fulani villages in one-sided killings. As IS began to suffer military set-backs at the hands of MSA and GATIA, they often retaliated through targeted killings of important members of the organizations, as well as further one-sided attacks on Tuareg villages.
The non-state conflict between MSA and IS is first included in UCDP data in 2017. In mid-October of that year, IS carried out an attack on a key MSA commander in Menaka town, killing him alongside two more MSA fighters. With that, the conflict crossed the 25 fatalities threshold for the first time.
