General information
Part of Conflict: Israel: Southern Lebanon
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1985-02-28
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: The creation of Hezbollah was the result of a wide variety of factors. The Shiite community in southern Lebanon at first welcomed the Israeli invasion in 1982, since it expelled the PLO which had been involved in clashes with local actors, primarily Amal. A combination of hard-handed Israeli occupation, the rise of Shiite religious awareness and Iranian influences however facilitated the growth of Hezbollah from dissident Amal (a left-leaning secular Shiite party) and Lebanese National Resistance fighters. Iranian Revolutionary Guards, sent to the Bekaa Valley in 1982 helped set-up the Hezbollah and the organisation, being inspired by the Iranian government’s leader Khomeini, began propagating Islamic rule through clerics. Hezbollah’s structures existed as early as 1983, but it was not until 1985 they officially stated their goals. The Hezbollah Charter of February 1985 outlined the organisation’s three main goals: 1) putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and Western imperialist influences (primarily American and French), 2) the creation of an Islamic government in Lebanon, and 3) the destruction of the state of Israel and the establishment Islamic rule over Jerusalem. Hezbollah’s concept of ‘Lebanese territory’, it must be added, includes not only territory placed within Lebanon’s sovereignty and occupied by Israel, but also territories demarcated to be within Israel itself, such as the annexed Shebaa Farms and Seven Villages areas in northern Israel. This places the incompatibility within both Lebanon and Israel.
Date of first use of armed force: 1985-07-01
Comment on date of first use of armed force: Although there were incidents of violence between Israel and Hezbollah before 1985, such as the Israeli air-strike on Amal and Hezbollah positions on 4 January 1984, the first violent incident directed at Israeli interests after the statement of Hezbollahs goals occurred in late June or early July 1985. At that incident it was reported that Hezbollah hijacked a TWA flight and took passengers with Jewish-sounding names as hostages.
First Battle Related Death: 1986-08-01
Comment on First Battle Related Death: The reports immediately after the date of Hezbollahs stated goals are too unclear regarding perpetrator and the circumstances around the attacks to find an exact date for the first battle-related death. By September 1986, when Hezbollah had begun turning its attention from American and French targets towards Israeli and South Lebanese Army (SLA) targets, there was a high probability that the clashes between Hezbollah and Israeli military units (present to ‘advise’ SLA militia forces) resulted in the first battle-related death.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1990-07-10
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: The Government of Israel-Hezbollah dyad first exceeded the 25 battle-related deaths threshold on 10 July 1990, when an IDF attack on the south Lebanese village of Jarjouh, in Iqlim al-Touffah district, killed 10 Hezbollah fighters.
Note however that the records pertaining to anti-Israeli Hezbollah activities before this date are somewhat unclear, and that it is possible that the dyad exceeded the 25 deaths threshold at an earlier stage.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: Hezbollah (Sometimes Hizbullah or Hizbollah, among other variations) was founded in 1982 in conjunction with Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon. The group was characterized by an Islamic, Anti-Zionist ideology. While the group was founded sometime in 1982, Hezbollah’s first publicly expressed concerns over conflict issues appeared in a 1985 letter which became foundational to the group’s ideology, guiding principles and method of warfare. The first conflict goal issues pertained to changing Lebanon into an Islamic state and the destruction of Israel. It should be noted that Hezbollah have since the earliest stages of the conflict insisted that the establishment of an Islamic state should be a voluntary decision left to the Lebanese people, only to be enacted should the majority support it. Hezbollah remained mostly consistent in its pursuit of the previously stated conflict goal issues, though it did briefly decide that it would no longer pursue transforming Lebanon into an Islamic state in 1996, that change was quickly reverted. Hezbollah also increased the total number of conflict goal issues over the course of the conflict. The new issues do not appear to represent an ideological shift but could likely be attributed to Hezbollah’s organizational expansion and increased influence, epitomized by its transition into having both an armed branch and a branch serving as a political party. Of the located conflict goal issues, four appear to have received a more frequent mention and been raised by the group over a longer period of time, relative to other issues. The first of these are the establishment of an Islamic state. Though the group did briefly state that they were no longer pursuing such reforms, it has by in large been a heavily emphasized, recurring issue. Stating in 2004 “Hizbullah does not wish to implement Islam forcibly, but rather in a peaceful and political manner, which gives the majority the chance to either accept or refuse it”. Economic reforms, electoral reform and public services also received frequent and continual mention, relative to other issues.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The earliest located conflict dynamics issues were raised in the 1985 letter and pertained to atrocities and abuses committed against the Muslim population, Israeli military conduct and expelling Israeli forces out of the occupied territory. Hezbollah claimed that “They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our sanctuaries and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst massacres against our umma”. Hezbollah continually raised many of the same issues throughout the conflict. Particularly common among conflict dynamics issues were allegations of atrocities and abuses, demands for Israel to withdraw their forces from occupied territory, release of prisoners and for the removal of foreign influence, most often in reference to Israeli or US involvement. While most issues in the conflict dynamics tier were raised in a moderately continuous fashion, a few issues received significantly more attention, and were raised at a much higher frequency and could therefore be classified as the main issues for the group. Most significant of these were decreased foreign involvement via the withdrawal of foreign forces, as well as atrocities and abuses. Hezbollah would often discuss themselves as being leaders of the resistance and in doing so, expelling Israel was a core issue and later, a great source of pride, for the group. In 2004, Hezbollah described this notion as follows “The seed of resistance is also sowed deep in the ideological beliefs of Hizbullah, a belief that is expressed in the struggle against the Zionist occupation of Lebanon”.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The 1985 letter also contains the first conflict resolution issues located by the project. Specifically Hezbollah raised the issue of accountability in regards to the atrocities committed against the Muslim and Christian population as well as made clear their intention to not accept any form of agreement with Israel, writing, “We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated”, further explaining that they do not accept recognition or even implied recognition of “the Zionist entity”. Hezbollah raised fewer issues on the conflict resolution tier but showed remarkable consistency in the few issues they did raise. Most interesting perhaps, and indicative of the group’s character and conviction, was the consistency with which they voiced opposition to negotiations. Of the coded conflict resolution issues, opposition to negotiations was most frequently raised issue, as well as the issue which received most emphasis. It appears as though Hezbollah placed great importance and belief in the inevitability of success of the intifada and the righteousness of their cause. Already in 1985 the group stated: “We vigorously condemn all plans for negotiation with Israel, and regard all negotiators as enemies, for the reason that such negotiation is nothing but the recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine”.
Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Basic needs, Childrens rights, Citizenship reforms, Civil rights, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Other/undefined system, Decentralization, Economic reforms, Education system: culture, Education system: increase religion, Electoral reform, Executive power-sharing: interim, Foreign policy reform, Freedom of expression, Hold elections, Land reforms, Protection of cultural heritage, Protection of natural resources/the environment, Public services, Referendum, Religious rights, Water resources
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: ethnic, Call for collective targeting: other group, Call for collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of international monitoring, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, DFI: Withdrawal of sanctions, IFI: Military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Political support, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for ceasefire, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Opposition to negotiations, Opposition to peace agreement, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1985
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1986
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 23 |
| Best | 20 |
| Low | 18 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1990
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 45 |
| Best | 42 |
| Low | 42 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1991
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 31 |
| Best | 28 |
| Low | 28 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 120 |
| Best | 87 |
| Low | 87 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 186 |
| Best | 124 |
| Low | 124 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 120 |
| Best | 82 |
| Low | 71 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 88 |
| Best | 74 |
| Low | 71 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 104 |
| Best | 96 |
| Low | 94 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 96 |
| Best | 88 |
| Low | 88 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 56 |
| Best | 54 |
| Low | 54 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 42 |
| Best | 41 |
| Low | 41 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 27 |
| Best | 27 |
| Low | 27 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2 |
| Best | 2 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2002
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2003
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3 |
| Best | 3 |
| Low | 3 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 8 |
| Best | 8 |
| Low | 8 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1406 |
| Best | 1242 |
| Low | 1230 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5 |
| Best | 5 |
| Low | 5 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 14 |
| Best | 14 |
| Low | 14 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2016
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2019
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 6 |
| Low | 6 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2020
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 1 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2021
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2023
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 141 |
| Best | 139 |
| Low | 139 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5184 |
| Best | 4362 |
| Low | 4007 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
2025
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 339 |
| Best | 337 |
| Low | 337 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Israel): n/a
Side B (Hezbollah): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1985 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1986 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: During July 1993 Israel conducted an extensive offensive operation against Hezbollah which led to the majority of the people killed that year. Although Israel targeted guerrilla groups other than Hezbollah (active in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the group was the main target of Operation.
Comment on Active: Hezbollah-Israeli retaliatory attacks increased during 1992, with Israel targeting top-Hezbollah leaders and Hezbollah targeting Israeli communities in the northern Galilee. In response to this increase in the intensity of the Hezbollah’s attacks the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) launched ‘Operation Accountability’ in the summer of 1993. During the operation the IDF shelled Shiite communities in southern Lebanon and launched extensive air-strikes on Hezbollah targets and Lebanese infrastructure, sending hundreds of thousands of civilians fleeing north towards Beirut. The expressed goals of the operation were to eradicate the threat of Hezbollah guerrillas towards the northern settlements and to disrupt civilian life to pressure the Lebanese government to act against Hezbollah. Fighting lasted for seven days, and ended with the oral agreement the neither party would attack the other’s civilians.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: On 3 June the Israeli Defense Force conducted an air raid on a Hezbollah base, killing as many guerrillas.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Despite the understandings reached in 1993 that Hezbollah and Israel would both refrain from attacking the other’s civilians and urban centres, skirmishes and retaliatory action continued throughout 1994 and 1995 in response to perceived violations of these understandings. The conflict boiled over after Hezbollah retaliated the death of three Lebanese civilians through launching missiles into the northern Galilee; prompting the launch of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’. As in 1993, albeit on a larger scale, the IDF used air strikes and artillery shelling against the Hezbollah and Lebanese infrastructure. Losses were mainly civilian, peaking in the IDF shelling of a UN outpost in Qana, killing over 100 civilians. The blitz lasted for approximately sixteen days and ended with an American brokered ceasefire understanding, as in 1993 establishing certain ‘rules of the game’ for both parties; again banning direct attacks on civilians and firing from civilian positions. The understanding also established an international Monitoring Group to monitor ceasefire violations.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: There were probably more than twice as many battle-related deaths 1997 as the minimum 25 above; deaths are however unclear.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The actual number of battle-related deaths were probably much higher than the best estimate above, but exact numbers are difficult to establish. A few of these were probably incurred during clashes with Amal or other guerrilla forces but the mainstay could be attributed to Hizbollah since the other groups were comparatively inactive 1998.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations were held this year.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 1999-12-31
Comment on Termination: During 2000 less than 25 battle-related deaths resulted from that year\'s clashes. The main reason for this was the Israeli withdrawal from its security zone in southern Lebanon in May 2000. During 2001 there were only sporadic cross border raids and shelling. One important incident during 2001 was the execution of three Israeli soldiers that had been kidnapped by Hezbollah during 2000. The 2002 clashes did also leave fewer than 25 people killed.
2000 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2002 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Assessing the number of deaths in the 2006 conflict is complicated, mainly due to the vast amount of strikes carried out by the Israeli army and the noise this creates for event based coding, the lack of reliable sources on confirmed deaths in these strikes, and also the problem of unreliable sources for the deaths of Hezbollah fighters.
The majority of recorded deaths are civilian casualties, mainly in Lebanon. The IDF report that 117 soldiers were killed, and Hezbollah admitted that approximately 200 of its fighters were killed.
Many civilians also died in one-sided attacks, but these deaths are not included in these estimates."
Comment on Active: Since the Israeli retreat from its ‘security zone’ in southern Lebanon in 2000 the conflict with Hezbollah had seen a sharp decrease in activity, with only minor skirmishes along the border disturbing the relative calm. In 2006, however, the conflict rapidly escalated when on 12 July Hezbollah guerrillas attacked across the Lebanese border into Israel, capturing two IDF soldiers and killing several more under cover of intense Katyusha rocket fire. Just as Israel responded militarily to the abduction of Gilad Shalit on the Gaza border, Israel launched heavy military action against Hezbollah. The ensuing confrontation lasted from 12 July to 14 August, when it ended through Security Council Resolution 1701. The Israeli blockade of Lebanon ended in mid-September. Activity in this dyad was marked by heavy warfare, with the Israeli military forces attacking Hezbollah and Lebanese infrastructure by air, sea and land, attacking as far north as Beirut and Tripoli. Tens of thousands of shells were launched by artillery, thousands of sorties were flown and infantry and tanks pushed inwards towards the Litani River in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah on its part engaged the IDF in close combat in villages and strongholds in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa valley, using a combination of highly trained Islamic Resistance fighters and locally based veterans of earlier wars, taking advantage of their knowledge of the terrain and being entrenched in complex underground bunker systems. Hezbollah also fired thousands of Katyusha rockets against Israeli troops and urban centres. Katyushas struck as far south as Nazareth and Tiberias, killing and wounding several civilians. Likewise, the IAF’s bombings in Lebanon killed many civilians, and severely damaged roads, bridges, seaports and airports. After the clashes had ended with Security Council Resolution 1701, an expanded UNIFIL presence arrived in southern Lebanon, along with deployments of the Lebanese army.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: True to form Hezbollah and Israel held no direct negotiations with each other during the course of the conflict in the summer of 2006 . Israel’s top brass met with several foreign diplomats, most notably the US’s Rice to discuss the conflict, and Lebanon’s Siniora also held frequent contacts with the UN, France, the US and other countries in attempts to secure a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange between Hezbollah and Israel. The UN appointed a mediator to work with the issue of a prisoner exchange, but no breakthroughs were reached, and the circumstances of this mediation are unclear.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2006-08-14
Comment on Termination: A ceasefire was declared and took hold on 14 August 2006. Some minor incidents took place thereafter, but in general the parties stuck to the ceasefire, which thus ended activity in the conflict.
2007 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2015 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2016 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2018 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2019 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2020 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2021 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2023 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2024 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2025 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: Following a ceasefire agreement reached in late November 2024, levels of violence decreased considerably. Nevertheless, Israel continued to carry out strikes against Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure in Lebanon throughout 2025, while both sides accused each other of violating the ceasefire agreement.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Throughout 2025, Israel and Lebanon participated in US-mediated ceasefire-monitoring talks established under the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. Discussions focused on the implementation of the ceasefire, Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon, detainee issues, and border security arrangements. Hezbollah did not participate in the negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated