This dyad belongs to the conflict Israel: Southern Lebanon
Summary of conflict Israel: Southern Lebanon
The conflict between Israel and rebel groups operating out of Lebanon with a view to ending Israeli occupation and recovering “lost” lands in the Lebanese south is inextricably linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Lebanese civil war. During assualts against the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) in the 1970s and 1980s Israel seized and occupied Lebanese territory. This occupation has since been challenged by several Lebanese armed groups, foremost of these being Hezbollah.
On 8 October 2023, a day after the start of Israel – Hamas war, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah reignited when Hezbollah launched missiles at the Shebaa Farms area. In response, Israel launched airstrikes and artillery bombardments in Lebanon. Violence was initially concentrated to Southern Lebanon, but extended to the rest of the country in September 2024. On 1 October 2024, Israel launched a ground invasion of Southern Lebanon.
Following a ceasefire agreement reached in late November 2024, levels of violence decreased considerably. Nevertheless, Israel continued to carry out strikes against Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure in Lebanon throughout 2025, while both sides accused each other of violating the ceasefire agreement.
The occupation of Southern Lebanon and the roots of conflict
The conflict between Israel and rebel groups operating out of Lebanon with a view to ending Israeli occupation and recovering “lost” lands in the Lebanese south is inextricably linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Lebanese civil war.
Lebanon received independence from France in 1946 after a period as a French mandate dating back to the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Lebanon was created as a multi-confessional state, with politics being finely balanced between Sunni, Shia and Maronite religious communities. A number of factors, such as the dispute over the sharing of political power between the religious communities, the influx of large numbers of Palestinian refugees following the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts, and worsening socio-economic conditions, contributed to the start of an intrastate conflict over government power in Lebanon which lasted roughly between 1975-90. This conflict, pitting shifting alliances of political and religious groups against each other, lasted until 1990. It came to a halt when Syria defeated Maronite General Michel Aoun, the last obstacle to the implementation of the Taif Accords of 1989, which stipulated changes in the political power sharing between the religious communities in the country.
Southern Lebanon during the Lebanese conflict, roughly being constituted by the land south of the Litani River from north of Tyre in the west to Shaba in the east, was predominately inhabited by poor Shia Muslims, Palestinian refugees and a minority of Christians who lived close to the Israeli border. Historically the southern Shiites were politically disenfranchised, with political and economic power being focused mostly in the hands of the Maronites or the richer, more urbanized, Sunnis.
Relations between displaced Palestinians and the Shiite community of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley were also tense due to the massive influx of these refugees as a consequence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 1975 up to 300 000 Palestinians could be found in southern Lebanon. The main Shiite political group in this territory around the same time was Harakat Amal, a religiously defined (yet primarily secular) and left-leaning political group that employed militias against Palestinian refugee fighters during the civil war.
The PLO, having been ousted from Jordan in 1971, had a strong presence in southern Lebanon from where it launched attacks on Israels northern frontiers. Such offensive activities, linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, prompted Israel to launch Operation Litani in 1978, effectively pushing PLO fighters north of the river to relieve pressure on the northern settlements and prop up its ally in the Lebanese civil war, the mainly Christian South Lebanon Army (SLA). The bulk of the Israeli army withdrew following UN Security Council resolutions (which also established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL), leaving the SLA to hold territory in its wake. Hostilities between Israel and the PLO continued however, this time peaking in the Israeli offensive labelled "Operation Peace of the Galilee" in 1982. Israel engaged Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian fighters in combat, pushing as far north as Beirut. Upon defeating the PLO, which was evacuated to Tunisia, Israel withdrew most of its army from Lebanon, leaving behind a small contingent and effectively occupying what they labelled as a security zone in Southern Lebanon, as well as hanging on to territory claimed both by Syria and Lebanon (such as the Shebaa Farms area, conquered in 1967 and annexed in 1981). This security zone, controlled by a residual force of Israeli soldiers and the Israeli-supported SLA, occupied approximately 10% of Lebanese territory, as well as some areas claimed by Syria.
Harakat Amal initially held a relatively neutral stance towards the Israeli presence, since it supported their actions against Palestinian militants. However, as Israel attempted to solidify its grip on the security zone through the creation of an occupation-type administration, anti-Israeli sentiments began to grow amongst pro-freedom Shiite activists, most notably among Amal and Lebanese National Resistance fighters. Amal leader Nabih Berri began to oppose the Israeli occupation, and Hezbollah began to take form from the Lebanese National Resistance and dissident members of Amal around 1982.
Hezbollah grew in southern Lebanon as a result of the Israeli occupation, a growing Shiite religious awareness and strong support from the newly established Shiite government in Iran. Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrived in the Bekaa Valley as early as 1982, and were pivotal in the establishment of Hezbollah. The organization was, in contrast to Amal, fiercely religious, based on the teachings of the Iranian leader Khomeini. Hezbollah fighters attacked Western, Israeli and SLA targets from around 1983, but it was not until 1985 that the organization became official, publishing their goals of creating an Islamic theocracy in Lebanon (a goal that was not to be reached by force or coercion), the destruction of Israel and the regaining of all Lebanese lands from Israeli and imperialist occupation. After the civil war Hezbollah gained prominence in Lebanon not only for its resistance against Israel, but also for its vast network of socio-economic charities.
Resistance to occupation and the armed conflict
Hezbollahs incompatibility with Israel concerns the Israeli grip on territory that Hezbollah sees as constituting southern Lebanon. Territories and land-stretches held by Israel and sought after by Hezbollah are, primarily, the security zone (until 2000) the Ghajar village (straddling the border between Israel and Lebanon), the Seven Villages area (in northern Israel), the springs of the Wazzani River and the Shebaa Farms. Some of these areas have been returned to Lebanese sovereignty, most notably the security zone, which was vacated in 2000. This withdrawal was also certified by UN observers.
The Shebaa Farms area, which rose to the forefront of the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel after 2000, was captured by Israeli forces in 1967 during the war against Syria. Both Syria and Lebanon have staked claims to this piece of territory, which was formally annexed by Israel in 1981. The Seven Villages area was demarcated to be within British Mandate for Palestine in the 1920s, and later within Israel, but is by Hezbollah viewed as rightfully belonging to Lebanon. From this follows that the incompatibility is territorial, and located both in Lebanese and Israeli territory. It is also important to note that the destruction of Israel as a political entity is high up on Hezbollah's agenda, meaning that the territorial incompatibility is not the only grudge held by this group. Hezbollah also retains close links to the Palestinian issue, supporting the establishment of Palestine in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel proper. Hezbollah has, however, also stated that they would not oppose an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Hezbollah and Israel have never negotiated over their incompatibility.
Hezbollah's conflict against Israel throughout the Lebanese civil war had no great intensity, and was essentially characterized by low-level guerrilla attacks and bombings, aimed not only against Israel and the SLA, but also against French and American targets. The dynamics of the conflict however changed with the termination of the Lebanese civil war and the relative stability that followed. By this time what was initially supposed to be a buffer against PLO forces (the so-called ‘security zone') striking northern Israel had become a buffer zone against the Hezbollah. Whilst all Lebanese militias were supposed to disarm following on the Taif Accords that ended the Lebanese civil war Hezbollah were allowed to continue to bear arms in their struggle against Israel under the aegis of being the national resistance. This arrangement had the tacit support of Syria, which continued to have a large military presence in Lebanon and effectively controlled it after the civil war. Hezbollah's ties with both Syria and Iran are strong, with these countries having provided Hezbollah with support throughout the years. The Lebanese governments stance on Hezbollah is one of support, albeit not active support through means of soldiers or equipment. Several Lebanese governments have accepted Hezbollah's struggle as being a "national interest" and a "national resistance", and there were no attempts by the Lebanese army to disarm the Hezbollah guerrillas.
Skirmishes along the security zone frontier were common during the 1990s, with Hezbollah acquiring ever more military capabilities in its struggle to reclaim Lebanese lands. Hezbollah (and Amal, but to a lesser extent), attacked Israeli and SLA patrols and border posts, whilst Israel continuously retaliated, often by artillery and air strikes; but sometimes also by means of land incursions.
At times the skirmishes and exchanges of fire boiled over into more serious fighting, such as the 1993 “Operation Accountability” and the 1996 “Operation Grapes of Wrath”, where Israel employed large-scale aerial and artillery attacks to deter Hezbollah fire against northern Israeli settlements. Mutual recriminations regarding who retaliates against whom in response to civilian deaths were common during these years. In response to the civilian suffering caused by strikes and retaliatory strikes between the parties, certain rules of the game evolved through a series of ceasefires reached after the 1993 and 1996 flashpoints. It was tacitly agreed that neither party would retaliate unless the other party targeted the others civilians deliberately. Nevertheless, flare-ups of fighting on a larger scale have caused, on both sides, much civilian suffering and large numbers of refugees fleeing north in Lebanon, and southwards in Israel.
The steady flow of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) casualties in the security zone during the late 1990s caused a shift in Israeli public opinion regarding the usefulness of this territorial buffer zone. In May 2000 the IDF evacuated the security zone in southern Lebanon, prompting the quick demise of the SLA proxy militia and a take-over of the area by Hezbollah forces. The Lebanese Army did not deploy in any significant manner in the areas previously held by the IDF. Through this evacuation Israel claimed to have fulfilled the Security Council Resolution of 1978, demanding Israel's withdrawal from "all Lebanese territories". Hezbollah, and other political elements in Lebanon, did however not share this view, stating that Israel still occupied Lebanese lands, most prominently in the Shebaa Farms area, and that thus the resistance would continue. The UN, however, accepted the Israeli stance.
The Israeli withdrawal led to a few years of calm, and the conflict was not active between 2001-2005.
In 2006, during the height of Israeli-Palestinian clashes of that summer, the conflict with Hezbollah reignited. The abduction of two IDF soldiers along the Israeli-Lebanese border on 12 July, and the pounding of Israeli urban centers in the north by Katyusha rockets, prompted a fierce Israeli response, with armed forces striking roads, bridges, airports, villages, cities and Hezbollah strongholds; even as far north as Beirut and Tripoli. Hezbollah inflicted some severe losses on IDF forces and also killed around 40 civilians, but the toll on Lebanon was harsh, with death-estimates ranging between approximately 800 and 1400 (killed in both battle-related and one-sided violence). The conflict demonstrated that Hezbollah was no longer a small-scale guerrilla operation, but an effective fighting machine, armed with thousands of surface-to-surface rockets. Even though the kidnapped soldiers were not returned to Israel, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was passed in mid-August, establishing a cessation of hostilities and mandating an increased UNIFIL (a United Nations mission in Lebanon established in 1978) presence between the Blue Line and the Litani River in southern Lebanon. Both sides claimed victory in the conflict, but the results of the fighting can perhaps be viewed as inconclusive, with the conflict itself not having been solved, but with a shaky ceasefire in place.
No armed activity took place between Israel and Hezbollah 2007 - 2022, and the conflict continued to be terminated by the August 2006 ceasefire. Israel, however, revamped its armed forces as a result of the less than satisfactory outcome of the fighting in 2006. Likewise, Hezbollah built new defense installations in southern Lebanon, just north of UNIFIL's peacekeeping area, in anticipation of new bouts of fighting. In Hezbollah’s view the incompatibility has not been resolved through Israel’s withdrawal beyond the UN’s border demarcation line.
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah reignited on 8 October 2023, just one day after Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, when Hezbollah launched missiles at the Shebaa Farms area in solidarity with Hamas. In response, Israel initiated airstrikes and artillery bombardments against Hezbollah positions in Lebanon. Throughout the following months, cross-border attacks and retaliatory strikes persisted, but it was not until September 2024 that the conflict escalated to levels not seen since the 2006 Lebanon war.
A turning point came in mid-September 2024, when suspected Israeli involvement was reported in the detonation of thousands of so-called “pagers,” wireless telecommunications devices. These incidents disrupted Hezbollah’s communications infrastructure and were immediately followed by an intense barrage of Israeli airstrikes across southern Lebanon. The violence quickly spread beyond the border region, destabilizing broader areas of Lebanon. On 1 October 2024, Israel launched a ground invasion of Southern Lebanon, seeking to push Hezbollah forces away from its northern border and establish a security buffer zone.
Following a ceasefire agreement reached in late November 2024, levels of violence decreased considerably. Nevertheless, Israel continued to carry out strikes against Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure in Lebanon throughout 2025, while both sides accused each other of violating the ceasefire agreement.
