General information
Part of Conflict: Sri Lanka (Ceylon): Eelam
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1976-05-14
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: The record relating to the early phase of the Tamil militancy is unclear. The above date refers to the passing of the Vaddukoddai resolution, which was the first official call for the establishment of a separate state of Tamil Eelam, covering the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. It reads that "the reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam [...] has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this country". It was signed by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), an alliance dominating the political Tamil leadership in the mid 60s. The LTTE and its early predecessor, the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), started out as pure military outfits, and it is difficult to find early political statements specifying their distinct view on the actual realization of Tamil self-determination. The small, but concerted militant struggle of the Tiger movement was however, from its beginning in the mid-70s, known for pursuing the more extreme goal of Tamil independence, also at a time when the more moderate political leaders did not publicly share this view. At the time of the Vaddukoddai resolution the links between TULF and the LTTE was known to be strong, with the leader of the LTTE present at the Vaddukoddai convention and Uma Maheswaran, one of the central persons in the TULF leadership, becoming political leader in LTTE the next year.
Date of first use of armed force: 1975-07-27
Comment on date of first use of armed force: The records relating to the early phase of Tamil militancy are unclear, especially regarding the first embryonic structures of armed separatism taking hold in the 70s. Several incidents of violence and armed clashes between Tamil youth and the police are reported to take place from the mid 70s. The degree of organisation among the perpetrators and the records of the events are, however, not clear. Among such incidents are the riots in Jaffna, 16 August 1976 and LTTEs alleged involvement in January 1978, in the assassination of a TULF MP, who had switched allegiance to the ruling party. The first use of armed force that the LTTE as a established group officially claimed responsibility for was the killing of a police patrol on its way to a LTTE training camp on 7 April 1978. At the same time that the LTTE made this statement they also acknowledged several past acts of violence, among them the assassination of the Mayor on Jaffna on 27 July 1975. This date is before the formal establishment of LTTE on 5 May 1976, but the same rebel structures under the leadership of Prabhakaran are known to be active under the name Tamil New Tigers from 22 May 1972. This assassination is thus recorded as the first use of armed force.
First Battle Related Death: 1975-07-27
Comment on First Battle Related Death: The records relating to the early phase of Tamil militancy is unclear, especially with regard to the first embryonic structures of armed separatism beginning to take hold in the 70s. Several incidents of violence and armed clashes between Tamil youth and the police are reported from the mid 70s and onwards. The degree of organisation among the perpetrators and the records of the events are not clear. Among such incidents are the riots in Jaffna, 16 August 1976 and LTTEs alleged involvement in January 1978, in the assassination of a TULF MP, who had switched allegiance to the ruling party.
The first use of armed force that the LTTE as an established group officially claimed responsibility for was the killing of a police patrol on its way to a LTTE training camp on 7 April 1978. At the same time that the LTTE made this admittance they also acknowledged several past acts of violence, among these the assassination of the Mayor on Jaffna on 27 July 1975. The LTTE was not formally established before 5 May 1976, but the same rebel structures under the leadership of Prabhakaran from 22 May 1972. The assassination is thus recorded as the first battle-related death.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1984-09-01
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: On 1 September 1984 five policemen were killed in an explosion at Thikkam, Jaffna. These deaths added to events in attacks on police and military during the year added upto 25 battle-realted deaths.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) was a rebel group that fought the Government of Sri Lanka. The group was established in 1976. It combined radical nationalism for the ethnic Tamil minority with socialist elements. The group was first listed as active in the UCDP in 1984. The first conflict goal statements could already be documented one year prior to that in 1983. In that year, the group stressed unemployment, lacking access to higher education, as well as the imposition of an alien language as the root causes for their fight towards radical change. The group claimed that due to mounting oppression, the only way to achieve this change was armed struggle for independence.
The LTTE expressed a wide range of conflict goal issues which allows to discern trends over time. A large constant here were the repeated calls for independence which could be documented multiple times from 1983 until 2009. Further, the group over several decades made statements regarding harsh living conditions. This partly referred to malnutrition amongst children, but the LTTE also criticized a lack of computers and education access due to an economic embargo by the Government of Sri Lanka. While most documented conflict goal issues were expressed repeatedly over time and remained constant, a call for a socialist state could only be documented once in 1986, when the group declared that the government as well as the constitution of an independent Eelam would be socialist.
A clear main conflict goal issue for the LTTE was its struggle for independence. Calls for independence could be documented in 15 years in total over several decades and with radical emphasis. Notably, the documented issues indicate that the group did not see room for compromises here and clearly expressed that the “creation of an independent state was the only path open to the Tamil people” and that “our people are determined to live as free human beings with dignity and prepared to face any form of suffering to be independent”. Another main issue, though documented with less frequency, were calls relating to the basic needs of the Tamils. These were made multiple times between 1983 and 2009. They referred to multiple living conditions that the LTTE described as unacceptable. Partly the group was very specific here and described conditions such as lack of food. Yet, it also made general statements and declared that people need to “lead a life worse than animals”.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: The first conflict dynamic issues by the LTTE could be documented in 1986. In that year, the group made statements concerning collective targeting through the Government of Sri Lanka: "Our houses became our graves … our villages became cremation grounds. The Sinhalese racist demons slowly take over our ancient land. On our own soil, where we were born and have lived since time immemorial, our people are turned into refugees, into slaves; they are being destroyed." The emphasis on “Sinhalese racist demons” outlines that the LTTE saw the conflict with the Government of Sri Lanka also as an ethnic conflict between the Tamil and Sinhalese ethnicities.
The LTTE voiced a range of conflict dynamic statements over a long period of time and thus some trends can be discerned. A key issue for the group were different forms of collective targeting. The largest constant here mark statements about targeting of Tamils in general, which could be captured multiple times between 1986 and 2009. The group also made statements concerning the political targeting of LTTE members through the Government of Sri Lanka. Yet, these were voiced with less frequency, only in 2005 and 2008. The group further made a range of demands regarding decreasing or increasing foreign involvement. These were mostly documented in the 2000s, and more statements related to an increase in foreign involvement than a decrease. The group for example called for foreign mediators as a starting point for negotiations. It also expressed that a potential ceasefire could only function in case international observers would monitor it.
One clear main conflict dynamic issues could be identified for the LTTE. Most notable were the group’s statements about collective targeting against members of the Tamil ethnicity through the Government of Sri Lanka, which the group raised multiple times and called an “ongoing genocide of the Tamils”.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first conflict resolution issue by the LTTE was documented in 1984. In that year, the group voiced opposition towards negotiating with the Government of Sri Lanka. Here, the LTTE through its chief ideologue Anton Balasingham emphasized that it was not interested in discussing federal ideas with the Government of Sri Lanka.
Over time, the group’s opposition to negotiations softened. While most statements opposing negotiations were documented in the 1980s, calls for negotiations could be coded from 1995 till 2009. LTTE also multiple times called for a ceasefire. The group furthermore made statements regarding the structure of negotiations, such as the wish to hold talks in Europe. Additionally, the group voiced skepticism and disapproval towards its own disarmament process.
Despite initial fundamental opposition to negotiations in the 1980s, the groups call for negotiations, can be seen as a main conflict resolution issue. While suspicion towards the Government of Sri Lanka remained enormous, the group repeatedly expressed a “willingness to take part in direct, unconditional talks” with the government. Another main issue, which was, however, expressed less frequently were calls for having a ceasefire. These were sometimes expressed as general calls, but also were part of conditions by the rebels who demanded that as a “goodwill gesture the government should declare a ceasefire”, along with other demands.
Type of conflict issues: *Conflict Goal Issues: * Basic needs, Children’s rights, Citizenship reforms, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Socialist state, Disband para-military forces, Economic reforms, Federalism, Freedom of expression, Freedom of movement, Gender rights, Human rights, Independence, Land reforms, Language rights, Law and order, Oust full executive, Public services, Reform judicial system
*Conflict Dynamics Issues: * Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, Collective targeting: political, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Removal of foreign mediator, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of political support, IFI: Foreign mediator, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Political support, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
*Conflict Resolution Issues: * Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for ceasefire, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Call for truth and reconciliation processes, DDR issues, Opposition to negotiations, Opposition to peace agreement, Peace agreement implementation, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1 |
| Best | 1 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1976
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1984
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 54 |
| Best | 53 |
| Low | 53 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1985
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 441 |
| Best | 289 |
| Low | 286 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1986
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1987
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1002 |
| Best | 1002 |
| Low | 2 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1988
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 25 |
| Best | 25 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1989
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 34 |
| Best | 34 |
| Low | 34 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1990
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4600 |
| Best | 3561 |
| Low | 3561 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1991
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6787 |
| Best | 6432 |
| Low | 6432 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1992
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4247 |
| Best | 4091 |
| Low | 4091 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1993
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2347 |
| Best | 2075 |
| Low | 2075 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1994
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 746 |
| Best | 657 |
| Low | 657 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1995
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5062 |
| Best | 4755 |
| Low | 4748 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1996
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4254 |
| Best | 3868 |
| Low | 3868 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1997
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3959 |
| Best | 2880 |
| Low | 2880 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1998
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4419 |
| Best | 3762 |
| Low | 3762 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
1999
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2616 |
| Best | 1882 |
| Low | 1882 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2000
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 4155 |
| Best | 2525 |
| Low | 2525 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2001
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1145 |
| Best | 1144 |
| Low | 1144 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2002
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 6 |
| Best | 6 |
| Low | 6 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2003
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 46 |
| Best | 29 |
| Low | 17 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2004
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 18 |
| Best | 17 |
| Low | 3 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 90 |
| Best | 88 |
| Low | 88 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2845 |
| Best | 1970 |
| Low | 1970 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3070 |
| Best | 2494 |
| Low | 2391 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 9917 |
| Best | 8262 |
| Low | 8262 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 13702 |
| Best | 10165 |
| Low | 10136 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Sri Lanka): n/a
Side B (LTTE): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1975 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1976 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
1984 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All counts are conservative. Deaths are only attributed to groups when group name has been explicitly stated. High estimates should still be treated as very conservative estimates, and not as “real†high estimates as there are numerous unclear events not included where most of these should probably be included for LTTE.
Comment on Active: The LTTE carried out a number of attacks throughout the year, often located in the northern part of Sri Lanka. The group also made use of landmines.
In August they announced a change of tactics – they would no longer engage in hit-and-run attacks, but instead employ a sustained campaign of guerilla-warfare.
There were also reports of government forces attacking Tamil targets, allegedly in response to rebel-actions, calling the discipline of the armed forces into question. However, the extent to which LTTE-actions provoked this response is not clear. It should be noted though, that the LTTE was the most active Tamil group at this time.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1985 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All counts are conservative. Deaths are only attributed to groups when group name has been explicitly stated. High estimates should still be treated as very conservative estimates, and not as “real†high estimates as there are numerous unclear events not included where most of these should probably be included for LTTE.
Comment on Active: The LTTE carried out a large number of attacks, located primarily in the northern and eastern parts of the island. Tactics used included landmine-attacks and ambushes. During the year, there were also some more direct battles taking place between the LTTE and state-forces.
Reports of forceful attacks continued to be reported, for instance following the LTTE-attack on Anuradhapura in May. People who were, or were thought to be separatists were executed on more than one occasion.
Between June and September there was a ceasefire between the government and all militant groups, LTTE included. This ceasefire was not adhered to to any great extent however.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Starting on 8 July, negotiations took place between the government and umbrella-group ENLF (although the groups included in ENLF sent their own representatives) as well as the PLOTE and the TULF. The negotiations were held in Thimpu, capital of Bhutan, under Indian auspices.
The government negotiating team proposed creating district councils, enjoying jurisdiction over certain issues. The northern districts would be made into a separate province.
The Tamil groups on their part rejected the government proposals and made a joint statement, pointing out 4 principles to be followed in resolving the incompatibility: “1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation.
- Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
- Recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation.
- Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their country.” This standpoint was in turn rejected by the government-side.
The talks were put to an end in August, after reports of security-forces breaking the ceasefire currently in effect in Sri Lanka.
India attempted to get the peace-talks back on track again, and met with both the ENLF and the Sri Lankan government. In October, this led to a renewal of the ceasefire that had been in effect (albeit violated) between June and September. However, in early November the ENLF withdrew from the talks.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1986 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All counts are conservative. Deaths are only attributed to groups when group name has been explicitly stated. High estimates should still be treated as very conservative estimates, and not as “real†high estimates as there are numerous unclear events not included where most of these should probably be included for LTTE.
Comment on Active: The LTTE was behind several attacks throughout the year; tactics included laying out landmines as well as carrying out more regular attacks. The group came to enjoy extensive control over parts of the Jaffna-district, and in March was reported to be in de facto charge of law and order, despite governmental presence. In September came reports of the LTTE setting up a parallel administration.
Governmental forces also carried out a number of attacks during the year, notably in May when government forces carried out an operation aimed at reclaiming the control of Jaffna-town in the north. After a few days the government proclaimed almost full control, however 2 days later the LTTE announced that it had taken back what had been lost.
During the year was also reported a change in battle-field location; the conflict came to be more centred on the eastern parts, after the northern parts had come to be dominated by the LTTE.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In late December an unofficial government-delegation met with the LTTE in a town located on the Jaffna-peninsula. While there is some unclarity regarding the subject of the talks there is one account stating that the government-delegation was tasked to find out what the possibilities were to start new talks. The LTTE stated that talks would not be initiated if 3000 Tamil prisoners detained without trial were not released first.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1987 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All counts are conservative. Deaths are only attributed to groups when group name has been explicitly stated. High estimates should still be treated as very conservative estimates, and not as “real†high estimates as there are numerous unclear events not included where most of these should probably be included for LTTE.
Comment on Active: Government forces carried out offensives in the north during the first three months of the year. Between 26 May and 10 June, they notably carried out “Operation Liberation”, aimed at the north-eastern parts of the Jaffna-peninsula where the LTTE held positions. The operation succeeded in capturing Velvettithurai, Point Pedro, and later the area surrounding Atcheveli. This operation caused heavy civilian suffering. The LTTE reportedly largely left Jaffna leaving the civilians at the mercy of the security forces resulting in large numbers of civilians killed. According to Anton Balasingham of the LTTE, this year saw the first use of the Black Tiger suicide squad. This attack is said to have been a component of the counteroffensive launched in response to the government’s “Operation Liberation”.
The year also saw a continuation of LTTE-attacks. However following the entry of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) the main part of LTTE fighting came to be directed at them. The Indian force quickly seized control over Jaffna.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: While negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE did not take place, the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement (Indo-Lanka Accord) was signed by Sri Lankan President Junius Jayewardene and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi on 29 July.
The agreement outlined the short-term merger of the Eastern and Northern provinces into one unit, the longer-term future of which would be determined through a referendum. Further the agreement called for a cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of Tamil militant groups, which was to be immediately followed by the governmental forces withdrawing to their camps. The agreement also stipulated that India would assist in implementing its terms by providing military assistance if required, and that it would make sure its territory was “not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka”.
The LTTE was not party to the agreement and there are differing accounts regarding whether or not the LTTE endorsed the agreement (or if the group did, the extent to which this was a voluntary decision). In light of this it should be mentioned that Anton Balasingham, theoretician and political advisor of the LTTE, claimed a secret “Gentlemen’s agreement” was reached between the LTTE and Rajiv Ghandi prior to the official signing of the Accord. This agreement allegedly guaranteed the LTTE a dominant role in an interim administration in the new north-eastern province and stipulated that complete disarmament under the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord would not be necessary in practise. Moreover the Indian government undertook to supply the LTTE with money and weapons. In return the LTTE would not oppose the Accord between the Sri Lankan and Indian governments. However, Balasingham himself states that this agreement was secret, and due to its sensitive nature, impossible to put into writing. Hence this piece of information is unconfirmed.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1988 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The vast majority of the fighting occurred between the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) that had been present in Sri Lanka since October 1987, and the LTTE. The first Sri Lankan attack on the LTTE since the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement (late July 1987) took place in mid-April. As a result of talks between India and Sri Lanka in March, it was determined that Sri Lankan forces would cooperate with the IPKF in the east.
The main scene of fighting came to be the eastern parts of the country. Batticaloa become the main stronghold for the LTTE following the IPKF’s capture of Jaffna the previous year.
In early September, President Jayewardene announced that the northern and eastern provinces would be merged together in accordance with the agreement of 1987, and that elections to a provincial council would be held. The LTTE refused to partake in the political process.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During the year Indian representatives spoke with both LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. In January, Indian Prime Minister Ghandi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene discussed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987 and possibilities of a withdrawal of the Indian Peacekeeping troops present in the country. Talks with the LTTE, which were often unofficial in nature, concerned the possibilities of a ceasefire.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1989 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The first formal peace talks between representatives of the central government and the LTTE were conducted on 11 May 1989, in an attempt to find a political solution to the problem. On 28 June the LTTE decided to transform its temporary ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lankan army into a permanent cessation of hostilities. In response the government announced that it would collaborate with the LTTE to secure the withdrawal of IPKF from Sri Lanka. Following months of peace talks with the government, the political wing of the LTTE was recognized as a political party by the commissioner of elections, under the name the Peoples Front of the Liberation Tigers. Negotiations also commenced between the Indian and Sri Lankan government, and the latter announced that it wanted the IPKF to withdraw by mid 1989. The last IPKF soldier left Sri Lanka on 24 March 1990.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1990 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: On 23 February the Premadasa government, which had been in office since 1988, initiated a second attempt at peace talks with the LTTE, following the first round of peace talks in late 1989. A fragile peace was thus maintained while the government and LTTE discussed the holding of fresh elections in the north-eastern provincial council, in which the political wing of LTTE could participate. On 10 June 1990 the fighting, however, resumed and the 14 month old ceasefire and the accompanying peace talks came to an end.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1991 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1992 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: SIPRI estimate excluding civilians
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1993 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1994 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Starting in mid-October 1994, four rounds of talks were conducted between different government teams, led by the Secretary of the President, and a four-member LTTE delegation. The first three rounds of talks took place on 13 October 1994, 2 January and 14 January 1995, respectively. These first negotiations focused on redressing the most immediate effects of the war, such as easening the governments economic embargo of the northern town of Jaffna. The parties also signed an agreement on freezing of all military positions, starting from 8 January. This agreement on cessation of hostilities included many of the provisions of a regular ceasefire, such as monitoring committees and restrictions on movement of combatants. The contentious feature was however, the final clause under which the only condition for either side to terminate the agreement was the delivery of at least 72 hours notice. By the conclusions of the forth rounds of talks it became apparent that the two sides had different agendas regarding what should be the initial steps and the pace of the peace process, and on 18 April 1995 the LTTE withdraw from the negotiations. The next day they attacked two Sri Lanka navy-boats, thus unilaterally ending the cessation of hostilities. This initiated the most violent phase of the conflict since 1983.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1995 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The fighting between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE intensified. In December the army achieved a major victory in capturing the city of Jaffna and subsequently much of the Jaffna peninsula, thus ending the LTTE hold on the northern province.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The second and third rounds of the talks first initiated in October 1994, were held on 2 January and 14 January, respectively. These talks lead to a mutual agreement of cessation of hostilities, starting from 8 January 1995. By the third round of negotiations, the differences between the two sides clearly began to emerge. The government took a multi-track approach to the negotiations: willing to discuss confidence-building measures such as lifting of embargos, but also keen to move forward on the agenda to find a political solution. LTTE on the other hand wanted the government to demonstrate its willingness through the implementation of confidence-building measures, before proceeding on the core incompatibility. On 16 March, before the fourth rounds of negotiations, the LTTE put forward an ultimatum of measures to be taken before the negotiations could proceed. The government rejected to fulfil some of these demands. Following several rounds of deadlocked negotiations, with both sides accusing each other of making unreasonable demands, the LTTE withdraw from the peace process on 19 April, and the next day fighting resumed.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1996 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1997 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1998 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: On 6 September 1998 LTTE offered to recommence peace talks, insisting, however, on third party mediation. The governments rejected any negotiations with the LTTE, stating that several measures needed to be taken before talks could be initiated. One reason for the governments reluctance to negotiate was the lack of a political consensus within the Sinhala polity on the acceptable terms of negotiation with the LTTE
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
1999 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2000 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: In mid-February the Norwegian government accepted the request from the Sri Lankan President and the LTTE to serve as a mediator in the conflict. On 24 December the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire as a prelude to talks with the government. The government initially refused to accept the LTTEs offer.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2001 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: On 24 December 2000 LTTE declared a month long ceasefire, but the government did not reciprocated. The LTTE still chose to extend the ceasefire on three occasions, ending on 23 April 2001. On 24 December 2001, a new ceasefire was declared by the LTTE to pave the way for peace moves by the government. The government reciprocated the gesture, and on 27 December the Sri Lankan prime minister formally requested Norway to facilitate peace talks with the LTTE.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2001-12-31
2002 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: LTTE leader Prabhakaran and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe signed the Norwegian brokered Memorandum of Understanding (Mou) on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities on 22 February 2002. The agreement committed the two parties to maintain a separation of forces, refrain from offensive manoeuvres and allow for the unimpeded flow of most items between the areas under their respective control.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2003 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Several incidents resulted in battle-related deaths, despite the ongoing ceasefire between the parties in the dyad."
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The forth round of negotiations were held in Thailand 6-9 January. The parties discussed high-security zones, resettlement of Tamil civilians and developmental work. Following a suggestions from the Jaffna army commander that the LTTE should lay down their weapons in exchange for re-settlement of the civilians in the high-security zones, the LTTE withdrew from the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization, in protest.
The fifth session of peace negotiations were held in Berlin 7-8 February. The parties discussed incidents in the sea resulting in causalities, humanitarian and rehabilitation activities in the north and east and human rights.
The sixth round of peace talks were held in Japan 18-21 March. Discussions focused on sea conflict,
The LTTE suspended the talks on 21 April, with allegations against the government that they were trying to "marginalize our organization in approaching the international community for economic assistance".
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2003-12-31
2004 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: No negotiations, although several negotiation attempts by the Norwegian mediators.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. This is due, not to poor reporting, but to difficulties in determining who is carrying out the violence. The rebels almost by default deny any involvement in attacks and breaches of the ceasefire. However, as most analysts and country experts deems the LTTE to be the ones responsible, the conflict is coded as active for 2005. The figure given is the sum of all attacks attributed to LTTE not only by news sources but also by analysts and country experts."
Comment on Active: In 2005, the conflict between the LTTE and the government became active again, after a year of relative calm. The situation deteriorated throughout the year. Fighting between the LTTE and the break-away Karona-faction affected the relationship between the rebels and the government in a negative way, as the LTTE accused the government of aiding Karona’s group and thus fighting a proxy war in the east. The government vehemently denied this. Tensions increased even further with the assassination of the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister in August. LTTE were blamed, but denied the charges. By the end of the year, the situation deteriorated even further. Sri Lankan troops came under claymore mine attacks on a few occasions and the death toll mounted.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Despite persistent efforts by the Norwegian mediators to restart the peace process, there was no break-through during 2005. Since April 2003 the peace negotiations have been stalled over disagreement on the agenda. While the rebels want the talks to be based on its demands for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), the government insists that the focus has to be on long-term peace.
After the tsunami disaster in late 2004, hopes were raised that the tragedy could help pave the way for increased cooperation and lasting peace, giving the two warring parties a common enemy. Most contact between the parties during the first months of the year thus concerned tsunami relief, putting conflict related issues at a back-burner. However, instead of leading to improved relations, the discussions regarding the distribution of the foreign aid heightened tensions between the rebels and the government.
In July the truce came under increasing pressure as rebels traveling through government held territory came under attack by unknown armed men. The situation deteriorated further when Sri Lanka’s foreign minister was assassinated in August. The government blamed the rebels, but the rebels denied the charges. During the autumn violence increased in the east and the truce appeared to be in great danger. Amidst these developments, Norway attempted to get the parties together for talks, but failed as LTTE and the government were unable to agree on a location for negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. This is due not to poor reporting but to difficulties in determining who is carrying out the violence. The rebels almost by default deny any involvement in attacks and breaches of the ceasefire (saying it is ""civilian groups"" who are carrying out the attacks). However, as most analysts and country experts (as well as SLMM) deems the LTTE to be the ones responsible, the conflict is coded as active for 2006."
Comment on Active: The deteriorating situation of 2005 continued in early 2006, with continuous Claymore mine attacks on Sri Lankan troops, blamed by the government on the LTTE. The new President, Rajapakse, whilst publicly stating that he wanted to pursue a negotiated settlement, adhered to a two-pronged strategy, urging the LTTE to enter negotiations, while at the same time retaliating against LTTE attacks on security personnel. Clashes in the east between the LTTE and the Karona faction also sparked anger amongst the LTTE, claiming that the government was supporting these anti-LTTE forces. Norway responded to the deteriorating situation by holding talks in Geneva in February, with the aim of reaffirming and strengthening the CFA of 2002. Promises were made to this end, but results were nowhere to be seen. Events took a turn for the worse in April, when LTTE attacks in Colombo on the army HQ prompted retaliation by the Sri Lankan air force. Artillery duels and ground clashes followed in May and June, albeit at a lower level in anticipation of July peace talks that were eventually aborted. In July the LTTE cut off water from the Mavil Aru sluice gate, depriving tens of thousands of civilians of drinking water. In an attempt to brake this siege, which was finally successful, the Sri Lankan army bombed and attacked the LTTE cadres holding the sluice gate, and by this time the CFA existed only on paper. The reopening of the sluice gate did nothing to stop clashes, which occurred in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa to name but a few places. The government responded to this state of war by closing off the A9 highway through the Vanni to the rebel stronghold of Killinochi and Jaffna, effectively placing the peninsula under siege and prompting a humanitarian crisis in the north. Violent clashes continued throughout the year, an example being a ferocious, yet failed, government offensive in Jaffna. The LTTE also brought the war to the Sri Lankan heartlands, through attacks as far south as the historical city of Galle. Further ceasefire talks in October, in Geneva, failed to stop the fighting as the LTTE and the government wrangled over the reopening of the A9 highway and security guarantees for aid shipments to Jaffna. In September the CFA suffered further setbacks with the LTTE’s insistence of sending home all observers from EU countries. As of late 2006 the frontline was frozen with few territorial gains having been reached by either side. As a result of the fighting hundreds of civilians died, hundreds of thousands were displaced, and many more faced a humanitarian disaster as aid failed to reach the Jaffna peninsula in large enough quantity.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE held two rounds of talks in 2006, out of a scheduled three rounds. The first round took place 21-23 February in Geneva, where Norway acted as the facilitator. The talks were aimed at reaffirming and strengthening the implementation of the waning CFA of February 2002, which had come under attack following violence in January and February. No new initiatives came out of this meeting, during which the LTTE attacked the government for alleged support of the eastern Karona faction. The promises made by the parties in relation to the CFA yielded little effect in the months that followed. The conflict worsened through April and May, and both parties agreed to procedural talks to be held in June or July in Oslo, talks that never materialized and were subsequently aborted as the LTTE delegation refused to talk with the government. Following heavy military clashes in August both parties in September agreed to unconditional talks under Norway’s mediation. Talks were set, and held, in Geneva in late October. The talks had no set agenda, but the mediators still struggled to reach agreement on any specific issue. The talks soon stumbled over the contentious issue of the A9 highway between Colombo and Jaffna, closed off by the government and inflicting a crippling siege on aid and food to the northern parts of Sri Lanka. The LTTE wanted the highway reopened, whilst the government insisted on shipping in aid by sea and wanting LTTE security guarantees that such shipments would not be attacked. Mutual rapprochement proved to not be forthcoming, and the LTTE stated their reluctance to return for more rounds of talks without a firm guarantee on the reopening of the land route to Jaffna. No further talks were subsequently held in 2006.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. This is due not to poor reporting but to difficulties in determining who is carrying out the violence. The rebels almost by default deny any involvement in attacks and breaches of the ceasefire (saying it is ""civilian groups"" who are carrying out the attacks). However, most analysts and country experts (as well as SLMM) deems the LTTE to be the ones responsible."
Comment on Active: The armed conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE showed no sign of deescalation in 2007. Violent clashes continued at an unabated pace, claiming the lives of hundreds of civilians and displacing hundred thousands of people from their homes.
The government side saw some significant advances during the year. In January the government announced that they had captured the LTTE’s eastern stronghold of Vakari, after prolonged shelling. After a series of ground offensives by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), the government in July declared that it had driven the rebels from the last of their eastern strongholds. This brought the east of the country back under government control for the first time since 1994. The LTTE hence lost the control over coastlines and harbors, which allowed the rebels to take in supplies from Southeast Asia and to launch maritime attacks against government forces.
Meanwhile, LTTE actions added a new deadly dimensions to the conflict. In March the LTTE launched its first air strike, using a single-propeller plane to drop bombs on an air force base next to the international airport in Colombo, killing three soldiers. The LTTE are thus the only known rebel group with an army, navy and an air force. In a decisive incident on 2 November, 2007 the leader of LTTEs political wing and spokesperson S. P. Thamilselvan was killed in a air strike by the Sri Lankan government forces. At the end of 2007 the LTTE still dominated large areas of the north of the country, and there was no signs that the LTTE was militarily defeated.
The peace process showed no sign of renewal. In late February 2007, the Tamil Tigers announced that the truce, which came into existence in 2002, was non-existent and that they resumed their armed struggle for statehood. Officially, however, the cease-fire agreement remained in place throughout the year, as none of the parties wanted to be blamed for its demise. On 2 January 2008 the government announced that it had decided to abrocate the cease fire agreement with LTTE as of 16 January 2008.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: It should be noted that there are great difficulties involved in estimating the number of deaths in the conflict between the government and LTTE. Journalists and neutral observers are not allowed in the conflict zone and both sides have traditionally inflated enemy casualties. The number given as best estimate is almost exclusively based on army information whereas LTTE given figures have been included in the high estimate. It should also be noted that the government, during some weeks in October-November 2008 stated it would no longer render public their own nor rebel casualties wherefore there is a gap in the information from this period."
Comment on Active: On 2 January 2008 the government announced its decision to abrocate the Norwegian arranged cease fire agreement with LTTE. After the cease fire had been abrocated the conflict escalated rapidly and drastically. All through 2008 heavy fighting, at land and at sea, occurred between the Sri Lankan troops and the LTTE. Both sides also allegedly targeted civilians. In September 2008, the army launched a major military offensive aimed at capturing the only remaining rebel held areas in the northern parts of the country. After months of heavy fighting, entailing a high number of casualties, the government had captured previous rebel strongholds such as Kilinochchi, the Jaffna peninsula and Mullaitivu. In April 2009 the army had restricted the area controlled by the LTTE to a small stretch of land north of Mullaitivu and the government claimed it was close to a military victory. The intensive fighting in 2008 and 2009 led to a humanitarian crisis as many civilian Tamils were trapped in the conflict zone.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "The number of battle-related deaths in Sri Lanka in 2009 is difficult to estimate since almost no figures of casualties could be independently verified. The Sri Lankan government banned all journalist from the conflict zone and only ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) was allowed to operate to some extent in the area. UN agencies and a few other aid agencies were eventually allowed limited access to the government camps for displaced persons. These camps came to hold more than 280 000 displaced Tamil civilians. Sri Lankan doctors working at hospitals inside the so called “safety zone†(proclaimed by the government to be a no-fire zone) released causality figures, but were accused by the Sri Lankan government of spreading false information and were later detained.
The Sri Lankan government repeatedly denied that civilians had been killed in the fighting and strongly criticised BBC and other foreign news agencies of spreading false information. The UN and ICRC were also accused by the government of exaggerating the situation for the civilians in the conflict zone. The Sri Lankan army claimed that they had done everything possible to prevent civilian deaths and blamed all civilian deaths on LTTE. They also accused LTTE of preventing civilians from leaving the combat zone in order to use them as human shields. Most notably, on 5 June, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama rejected the UN’s (and other agencies) high estimates of casualties and claimed that the Sri Lankan army was not responsible for a single civilian death.
On May 15, the UN estimated that about 7000 civilians had been killed in the fighting between 20 January and 7 May. The Times claimed on 30 May that according to unreleased UN documents, the figure had risen to 20 000 by 19 May. According to The Times, 13 000 of these had been killed in May only. In total, the UN estimated that between 80 000 and 100 000 people had been killed since the start of the conflict in 1972. Rajiva Wijesinha, permanent secretary at the ministry of disaster management, dismissed all such figures and claimed that between 3000 and 5000 civilians had been killed by LTTE in 2009.
On 22 May, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse announced that since the beginning of the last phase of the war (July 2006), over 6200 from the security forces had been killed. The total military death toll since 1981 amounted to about 23 800. Since July 2006, the army had killed 22 000 LTTE troops while 9000 had surrendered, according to the Defence Secretary.
Based on reports from various aid agencies and news agencies, UCDP’s best estimate of the number of battle-related deaths in Sri Lanka for 2009 is 7544. The low estimate is 7486 and the high estimate is 8926. Considering that the UN estimate of 7000 civilians killed between 20 January and 7 May does not cover the entire period of fighting in 2009 and that the Sri Lankan government rarely stated their own casualties during 2009, the actual number of battle-related deaths is likely to be considerably higher. LTTE also rarely stated their own losses, mostly reporting civilian casualties caused by army shelling."
Comment on Active: Following the Sri Lankan Army’s (SLA) capturing of LTTE’s political capital Kilinochchi and the strategically important Elephant Pass, that connects the Jaffna peninsula with the mainland, LTTE was pushed further east in the Mullaitivu district. SLA advanced quickly and LTTE was further and further east into an ever-smaller area. On 5 April, SLA captured the last LTTE-held town, Puthukkudiyiruppu. During the last month of fighting, the rebels were confined to narrow patch of land on the east coast. The final battles took place on a less then 1 sq. km coastal land in the Mullaitivu district.
On 25 January, SLA captured LTTE’s last stronghold, the coastal town of Mullaitivu. Despite the heavy fighting that led up to the seizure, the town was almost deserted when the army entered. Also Kilinochchi was virtually deserted when the troops had entered the town a few weeks earlier.
Besides, capturing LTTE-held towns, SLA also seized LTTE’s largest airstrip, located in the jungle in Mullaitivu district, as well as LTTE’s naval base, including one complete submarine. Despite the capturing of what according to SLA was LTTE’s last airstrip, two LTTE plans carried out a night bombing raid on Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital. Two people were reported killed and about 50 people were injured.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During the months of fighting in 2009, both warring parties were urged on several occasions by e.g. the USA, the EU, Norway, India and the UN to declare a ceasefire and initiate negotiations. On 4 February, the USA and the UK called for a ceasefire and to give humanitarian agencies access to the conflict zone. Both the Sri Lankan government and LTTE rejected this appeal. On 23 February, LTTE suggested a ceasefire but refused to hand over any weapons before entering into any talks. The government immediately rejected this proposal. According to the government, any ceasefires would only allow LTTE to regroup and civilians would not be let out of the conflict zone by LTTE.
Victory: YES
Victorious side: A
Comment on Victory: The 25 year long civil war in Sri Lanka ended in victory for the Sri Lanka government in May 2009.
On 17 May 2009, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE chief of international relations, announced that LTTE recognised defeat and that they would end their fighting in order to avoid further civilian deaths. On the following day, Lt-Gen. Sarath Fonseka, chief of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), proclaimed that LTTE was defeated and that the final battle of Sri Lanka’s long civil war was over. Finally, on 19 May, President Mahinda Rajapakse formally declared the war to be over in his opening speech for a new session of Parliament.
Comment on Victorious Side: Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Comment on Total Battle Related Deaths: Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Victory
Date of termination: 2009-05-19
Comment on Termination: The 25 year long civil war in Sri Lanka ended in victory for the Sri Lanka government in May 2009. After LTTE had admitted defeat and the Sri Lankan government formally declared the war to be over in mid-May, there was no signs of renewed LTTE military activity.
Comment on Termination Date: On 17 May 2009, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE chief of international relations, announced that LLTE recognised defeat and that they would end their fighting in order to avoid further civilian deaths. On the following day, Lt-Gen. Sarath Fonseka, chief of the Sri Lankan Army, proclaimed that LTTE was defeated and that the final battle of Sri Lanka’s long civil war was over. Finally, on 19 May, President Mahinda Rajapakse formally declared the war to be over in his opening speech for a new session of Parliament.
2014 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2018 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO