This dyad belongs to the conflict Sri Lanka (Ceylon): Eelam
Summary of conflict Sri Lanka (Ceylon): Eelam
Sri Lanka has been torn by violent conflict between its governmental forces and militant Tamil forces fighting for a separate state since 1984. The conflict has pitted the Sinhalese majority against the minority Tamils, and has its roots in discriminatory post-independence legislation. Despite attempts to solve the conflict through negotiations, it proved very intractable. In 2009, the conflict was ended through a decisive victory of the government over the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).
Background to the conflict
The rise of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka should be understood in the context of the nationalist politics pursued after the country’s independence in 1948. Already at that point the Tamil political leadership expressed fears that the unitary constitutional arrangements of the newly established state would not give minorities adequate protection against the possible discriminatory consequences of majoritarian Sinhalese rule. The identification of the state with Sinhalese interests became even more evident in the constitution of 1972, which stipulated the primacy of Sinhala and Buddhism - the language and religion of the Sinhalese majority. Discriminatory education and language policies frustrated many, especially the Tamil youth, and deepened their distrust of national politics. Following these developments a new militancy emerged within Tamil politics in the early 1970s. The militarisation was also accompanied by a radicalisation of the Tamil political leadership, which became manifest in the Vaddukoddai resolution of May 1976 - the first formal call for the establishment of separate state of Tamil Eelam covering the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. The constitutional status of this predominantly Tamil area in the northeast of the island has remained the core incompatibility throughout the violent insurgency.
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), one of the primary parties to the conflict was formally established by Vellupillai Prabhakaran in May 1976. It shared the political platform of the Vadukoddai resolution, but was from the start a purely military outfit, setting out to pursue separatist demands through violent means.
The early years of militant activity, 1983 – 1987
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) initiated a violent insurgency through a number of sporadic military attacks and political assassinations during the latter half of the 1970s. Regular fighting did, however, not erupt until 1983. An LTTE ambush on 23 July of that year claimed the lives of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers. The incident triggered an extremely violent riot in the central parts of the country, where retaliatory attacks were estimated to have killed between 500 and 2000 Tamils. The more or less tacit complicity of the Sri Lankan army during the events boosted recruitment to the Tamil militant groups. The above events mark the onset of the civil war, and the beginning of the period often referred to as “Eelam War I”.
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the formation of several armed separatist groups, apart from LTTE, TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation) and EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front) are notable, but intense intra-factional fighting in the 1980s virtually destroyed the more inexperienced and undisciplined challengers to LTTE hegemony. It became known as one of the worlds most sophisticated armed rebel groups. It was organised along the lines of a conventional army, with ground forces, a naval arm, a small air force and special trained commando units, including the elite-trained suicide-cadres called the Black Tigers. During the 1980s the LTTE (as well as groups such as TELO and EPRLF) quite blatantly received secondary support from the Tamil-led government of the Indian state Tamil Nadu. In 1991 the Indian government fired the Tamil Nadu government on the grounds of its allegiance to the rebels. As a result, during the 1990s, LTTE had to rely on a wide network of offices and cells across the globe to raise funds from the Tamil diaspora and to organise the procurement and movement of weapons.
The Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka, 1987-1990
Indian involvement in the conflict has not been limited to secondary support from the political leadership in Tamil Nadu. During the 1980s India more or less supported the Tamil demand for far-reaching self determination, and the Indo-Sri Lankan accord from 1987 provided for the establishment of a regional provincial council in the Tamil areas and the disarmament of Tamil militants. The IPKF (Indian Peacekeeping Force) was subsequently deployed on the island to guarantee the implementation of the political solution and a cessation of hostilities. The Indo-Sri Lanka accord, however, did not include LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), and soon after IPKF arrived it became deeply entangled in regular warfare with the Tamil Tigers. With 75-90 000 troops engaged in fighting on the territory, IPKF is recorded as a peacekeeping force here, as this was its original mandate. By 1989 LTTE had become severely weakened, and a process of accommodation was underway between the primary warring parties. This included a permanent cease-fire arrangement and measures to "transform" LTTE into a legal political party able to compete in provincial elections. As a conciliatory gesture the government agreed with LTTE in demanding the departure of IPKF in mid-1989. The last IPKF troops withdrew from Sri Lanka in March 1990.
Resumed hostilities despite moves towards peace, 1990-2000
Within three months after IPKFs (Indian Peacekeeping Force) withdrawal full-fledged fighting had resumed. Intense inter-factional fighting exhausted the previously Indian-backed more moderate Tamil alliance and left LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) unchallenged to progressively take over the area abandoned by IPKF. This offensive in 1990 initiated what has become known as “Eelam War II” and during this period LTTE moved in to take control over nearly the whole Jaffna peninsula in the north. Its newly established political wing, the Peoples Front of Liberation Tigers, set up a parallel civilian administration and ran a de facto state in the area up until 1995.
Negotiations were initiated in 1994 after a change of central government paved the way for fresh peace moves. The parties met on several occasions between October 1994 and January 1995, discussing measures to redress the most immediate humanitarian consequences of the war. The parties also agreed on the first formal ceasefire in over four years. During the spring, however, it became increasingly clear that the parties had different agendas for the talks. While the government wanted to address the core incompatibility of the conflict in a parallel process to the implementation of humanitarian measures, LTTE wanted a more gradual process where political talks were conditioned on the governments demonstrated willingness to accommodate LTTE. The tension culminated when LTTE asserted that the government had failed to take the necessary steps. On 18 April 1995 LTTE ambushed two navy boats, thus unilaterally ending the ceasefire and initiating the most violent phase of the conflict since 1983.
The resumption of violence implied a marked shift in government policy, from stated willingness to accommodate to a "war for peace" strategy, aimed at knocking out the military capacity of LTTE. The "Eelam War III" did bring important military victories to the government army, which recaptured the LTTE stronghold, Jaffna, in 1996. The late 1990s were dominated by intense fighting and advanced military rearmament on both sides. In the north the LTTE fought a largely conventional war against the armed forces, while it pursued a guerrilla insurgency strategy in the east, which was combined with a bombing campaign against political and economical targets in the south.
The peace-process, 2000-2006
By late 2000, war fatigue could be observed on the part of the Tamil Tigers, which declared a unilateral ceasefire in December. The government did not reciprocate, and negotiations were inhibited by the governments insistence on unconditional talks. By the end of 2001, Norwegian shuttle diplomacy had helped to put the peace process on track again. After initial talks, LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe signed a memorandum of Cessation of Hostilities on 22 February 2002. This was followed by formal peace-talks in the latter half of the year, addressing humanitarian issues and the reconstruction and normalisation of the war-affected areas. The LTTE also reiterated its declared willingness to accept a political solution short of an independent state, such as far-reaching autonomy within a unitary Sri Lanka.
The peace process reached an impasse when LTTE suspended its participation in April 2003, accusing the Sri Lankan government of trying to marginalise the organisation, and in protest against slow implementation of previous decisions regarding development and reconstruction of the north-east. The negotiations were consequently deadlocked due to differences over the agenda. While LTTE wanted the talks to be based on their 31 October 2003 proposal on an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), the government insisted that the focus had to be on long-term peace.
Political upheaval within the government party as well as internal splits in the LTTE further aggravated the process. Having been at odds with the government over the peace process, the President on 4 November 2003 suspended the national parliament and took control over three ministries (information, defence, and police), which resulted in a political crisis between Prime Minister Wickremasinghe and President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Amidst political power struggles, elections were held in April 2004, nearly four years ahead of schedule. The presidents UPFA (United Peoples Freedom Alliance) won 105 out of 225 parliament seats, but failed to secure an overall majority. Former opposition leader Mahinda Rajapakse was appointed new Prime Minister. In March the same year, LTTE suffered an internal split, when the rebel groups military leader in the east, "Colonel" Karuna, broke away over alleged differences with LTTE leader Prabhakaran.
Shattered hopes for peace in 2006
Hopes were raised in early 2005 that the tsunami disaster could help pave the way for increased cooperation and lasting peace. Instead, the situation deteriorated during the year. The Norwegian mediators did not manage to get the parties back to the negotiating table and the elections in November brought the more hard-line Prime Minister to the Presidential post, further widening the gap between the parties. Fighting between LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the break-away Karuna-faction affected the relationship between the rebels and the government in a negative way, as LTTE accused the government of aiding Karunas group and thus fighting a proxy war in the east. The government vehemently denied this. Tensions increased even further with the assassination of the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister in August. LTTE was blamed, but denied the charges. By the end of the year, the situation deteriorated even further. Sri Lankan troops were subject to Claymore mine attacks on a few occasions and the death toll mounted.
The deteriorating situation of 2005 continued in early 2006, with continuous Claymore mine attacks on Sri Lankan troops, blamed by the government on LTTE. This period is referred to as “Eelam War IV”. The new President Mahinda Rajapakse, whilst publicly stating that he wanted to pursue a negotiated settlement, adhered to a two-pronged strategy, urging LTTE to enter negotiations, while at the same time retaliating against LTTE attacks on security personnel. Norway responded to the deteriorating situation by arranging talks in Geneva in February, with the aim of reaffirming and strengthening the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002. Promises were made to this end, but results were nowhere to be seen. Events took a turn for the worse in April, when LTTE attacks in Colombo prompted retaliation by the Sri Lankan air force. New talks were set for July, and the clashes abated somewhat. The July talks never took place, and the same month LTTE cut off the water from the Mavil Aru sluice gate, prompting the Sri Lankan army to attack LTTE cadres occupying this strategic target. By this time the Ceasefire Agreement existed only on paper. The reopening of the sluice gate after its capture by the government did nothing to stop clashes and the government responded to this state of war by closing off the A9 highway, effectively placing the Jaffna peninsula under siege and prompting a humanitarian crisis in the north with hundreds of thousands of civilians being affected. Violent clashes continued throughout the year, most prominently with a ferocious, yet failed, government offensive in Jaffna. Talks in October in Geneva failed to stop the deteriorating situation, and in September the Ceasefire Agreement suffered further setbacks when LTTE insisted on sending home all Ceasefire Agreement monitors from EU countries.
The armed conflict continued unabated in 2007. A series of major ground offensives by the Sri Lankan army during the first half of the year brought the eastern part of the country back under government control for the first time since 1994. LTTE was severely weakened by the government offensive, but continued to launch Claymore mine attacks dealing a severe blow to government forces. In spite of heavy fighting, the ceasefire agreement remained officially in place throughout the year, as none of the parties wanted to be blamed for its demise. On 2 January 2008, however, the government announced that it had decided to abrocate the ceasefire agreement with LTTE as of 16 January 2008.
After the ceasefire had been abrocated the conflict escalated rapidly and drastically. All through 2008 heavy fighting, at land and at sea, occurred between Sri Lankan troops and LTTE. Both sides also allegedly targeted civilians. In September 2008, the army launched a major military offensive aimed at capturing the only remaining rebel-held areas in the northern parts of the country.
Defeat of LTTE and end of the civil war, 2009
On 19 May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapakse formally declared that the more than 25 year long civil war in Sri Lanka was over and that it had ended in victory. On the previous day, Lt-Gen. Sarath Fonseka, chief of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) proclaimed that the army had dealt the final decisive blow to LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and that the group was defeated. He also announced that LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran’s body had been found. There were however conflicting stories regarding the death of the rebel leader. Some reports claimed that he was killed when he tried to escape the small conflict zone while other claimed that he had been captured and then killed. On 17 May, two days before the President’s speech, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, LTTE chief of international relations, announced that LTTE recognised defeat and that they would end their fighting in order to avoid further civilian deaths.
The Sri Lankan government’s victory in mid-May was preceded by intensive fighting that claimed thousands of civilian lives. In the beginning of January, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) had captured the town of Kilinochchi and a week later also retaken the strategically important Elephant Pass that connects the Jaffna peninsula with the mainland. The Sri Lankan Army continued to capture LTTE military bases and the group was pushed further and further east into an ever-smaller area. During the last month of fighting, the rebels were confined to narrow patch of land on the east coast. The final battles took place on a less then 1 sq. km coastal land in the Mullaitivu district. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), almost the entire political and military leadership of LTTE had been killed by the end of the war. Furthermore, in August 2009, LTTE’s international leader and the possible successor to Prabhakaran, S. Pathmanathan was arrested.
Following increased international pressure due to concerns about the large number of civilians trapped in the conflict zone, the Sri Lankan government in January declared no-fire zones, so called “safety zones”. Both the government and the army on several occasions accused LTTE of preventing the civilians from leaving the combat zone, using them as human shields. LTTE on the other hand repeatedly claimed that SLA did not respect the no-fire zone and that hospitals and other facilities were shelled on a number of occasions. In June, the Foreign Minister claimed that the army was not responsible for a single civilian death and put the full responsibility for civilian deaths on LTTE. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government strongly criticised BBC and other foreign news agencies for spreading false information about civilian casualties. The UN and ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) were also accused by the government of exaggerating the situation of the civilians in the conflict zone. On 15 May, the UN estimated that about 7000 civilians had been killed in the fighting between 20 January and 7 May. The Times claimed on 30 May that according to unreleased UN documents, the figure had risen to 20 000 by 19 May. According to The Times, 13 000 of these had been killed in May alone.
Throughout the period of fighting in 2009, the government banned all journalists from the conflict zone and only allowed ICRC to work in the area. UN and other aid agencies were eventually given restricted access to the government camps for displaced Tamils, which came to hold up to 280 000 civilians. Following the end of the war, UN and other aid agencies as well as several countries called upon the government to open the camps and allow access to aid agencies. However, the camps remained closed for several months, with the motivation that rebels hiding in the camps needed to be identified. According to ICG, these camps were overcrowded and the conditions did not meet international standards. Towards the end of 2009, about 147 000 Tamils were reported to have been released from the camps. However, in the beginning of January 2010, the UN stated that there were still 110 000 civilians remaining in them. According to the Sri Lankan government, all camps would be closed by the end of January 2010.
The termination of the conflict between the LTTE remained an important topic in 2010. Especially the investigations into war crimes committed in the final months were highly debated. After mounting international pressure on the government, it set up a committee of inquiry. This committee was only mandated to look into the reasons for the failure of the 2002 ceasefire between the government and the LTTE and was thus widely criticized. Ban ki Moon responded by setting up his own panel to look into the accountability for the crimes committed, yet the government refused to cooperate with this panel. The faith of the Tamil Tigers is unknown. In Sri Lanka, they have so far not reappeared. Foreign cells however remain active, and are striving to form a transnational Tamil Government. Three broad groups control the remaining factions: a US group said to be headed by V. Rudrakumaran; a UK group, controlled by Aruththanthai Emmanuel of the WTF (World Tamil Forum) and a Norwegian group under Perinpanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyavan.
