General information
Part of Conflict: Somalia: Government
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 2006-07-21
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: In a radio broadcast on 21 July 2006, the newly appointed chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS), Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, declared that the Somali transitional government led by Abdullahi Yusuf was an Ethiopian puppet-regime that did not look after the interests of the Somali people. He argued that the presence of Ethiopian military near the parliament base of Baidoa was an infringement of Somali sovereignty and called on the Somali people to wage a holy war against Ethiopians and their servants (i.e. the government) in Baidoa.
This statement manifested a change of policy for the organization following its change of name to SICS from the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) on 25 June 2006, where the chairmanship also had been passed on from Sheikh Hussein Sherif Ahmed to Aweys. In a press statement from 6 June 2006, the SCIC had denied any ambitions to fight the government and its aim was to create security in Somalia against warlords and terrorists. Similarly, on 22 June, spokesmen from the government and the SCIC had officially acknowledged the legality of each others jurisdiction.
Even though the present organization only had been established in 2004, the idea of installing a system of co-ordinated Sharia (Islamic law) courts in Somalia was originally launched by 30 religious leaders (ulama) in Mogadishu in February 1991. Even though the first militia created (Horseed, or “vanguard”) quickly disintegrated, the idea led to the organization Majma’ (Majma’ ‘Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya, The Assembly of Islamic Scholars of Somalia), created by Sheikh Mohamed Ma’alim Hassan. The Majma’ distanced itself from involvement in politics which made some members leave to create ASWJ (Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a) that joined forces with the USC Aideed faction for some months in 1991-92. After that, the weakened ASWJ mainly continued as a forum for co-ordination between Sufi communities in southern Somalia.
The first Islamic court in Mogadishu was established in the Madina district in 1993, but the establishment of several Islamic courts in north Mogadishu by Sheikh Ali Dheere in the following year popularized the concept. Ali Dheere and the then-President Ali Mahdi both belonged to the Abgal subclan of Hawiye clan, and the court militias became the de-facto police force in the area. In the years that followed, other clans followed the example and established Sharia courts in other parts of Mogadishu. By 1998, the courts acknowledged the need to create a joint organization, as their respective jurisdiction was based on clan affiliation. Mainly to administer prisoner exchanges, the Sharia Implementation Council (Golaha Fulinta Sharee’ada Islaamka) was formed in 2000 with Ali Dheere as chairman. The council had close connections with the 2000-03 government and lobbied that the courts should be absorbed into a national judiciary.
In 2004, chairmen of ten Mogadishu courts created the SCIC (Golaha Sare ee Makhamaddaha Islaamiga). The membership included the majority of sub-clans in Mogadishu and incorporated important figures from both the Majma’ and the ASWJ. One of the latter, Sheikh Hussein Sherif Ahmed, was elected as chairman of the organization. Sherif had originally served in an Islamic court in the city of Jowhar before he moved to the Sii Sii sharia court in northern Mogadishu. In May 2004, the SCIC established a centrally administered armed force to which each court had to supply a proportion of its’ local militias.
When the name changed from SCIC to SICS on 25 June 2006, Sherif became the head of the executive shura, while Aweys became the new chairman. Aweys was a former colonel of the Somali army who eventually became a militia commander in USC faction. In April 1991, Aweys defected to join the Islamic militia AIAI (Al-Itihaad al-Islaami) and he served as the head of its military wing in June 1991- August 1992 (approx.). In 1998, he participated in establishing the islamic court of Ifka Halane, and he had also been secretary general for the Sharia Implementation Council, the pre-cursor to SCIC.
Date of first use of armed force: 2006-08-22
Comment on date of first use of armed force: Following the announcement of the organizations opposition to the Somali government, SICS chairman Aweys invited the forces of all warlords into joining the organization. On 22 August 2006, SICS launched intensive military training for some 600 recruits in Hilweyne, 20 kms north of Mogadishu, with the intent of creating a military force capable of overthrowing the Baidoa-based government and the Ethiopian troops supporting it.
First Battle Related Death: 2006-09-18
Comment on First Battle Related Death: The territory controlled by SICS expanded quickly without any fighting as the several local warlords joined the organization and established Islamic courts in its territories. By early October, SICS had established control over the city of Buurhakaba, some 30 kms from Baidoa. On 9 October, some 200 government troops attacked the city and clashed with a local SICS militia where one rebel was killed and three wounded. When SICS had mobilized its main forces in the area to reclaim control of the city, the government forces withdrew.
The government had previously accused the SICS for involvement in double bomb blasts targeting the parliament building in Baidoa on 18 September that killed 11 people. These accusations were denied by SICS.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 2006-10-24
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: Following repeated minor skirmishes along the front lines, the first substantial battle took place on 24 October 2006 near the city of Bu’aale, some 170 kms south of Baidoa. The government had supposedly established a training camp in the area and some 26 hours of clashes resulted in almost 50 deaths.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: The Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia/Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC) was a Somalian rebel group that emerged in 2006 as a coalition of several Islamic Courts under the name of Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), which was later transformed into the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS) and was finally incorporated into the umbrella group Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), creating a new group called the ARS/UIC. The group pronounced its first conflict goal issues during 2006, when they called for the creation of an Islamic state with Sharia law to establishing law and order in Somalia. They also called for Muslim and cultural rights to be respected, whilst calling for gender rights and freedom of expression to be restricted. Furthermore, the group called for the ousting and resignation of the current transitional government of Somalia. Finally, they also called for Somali regions of Ogaden to be reintegrated into Somalian land, stating that “The Somali flag bears a star with five sides and all five should be returned to the fold of Islam.”
For the following years of conflict, when the SICS were integrated into the ARS creating the ARS/UIC, emphasis on establishing Sharia law and an Islamic Somali state continued, as did desires to protect religious- and cultural rights and establish law and order. The ousting of the interim government was also mentioned in 2007, but not in 2008. Issues of corruption and human rights were also coded in the two last years of the conflict but were not heavily emphasized.
The main issues coded by the project of ARS/UIC were creation of an Islamic State, the establishment of Sharia law, and the protection of Muslim religious rights. These were continuously and frequently coded throughout the conflict and were heavily emphasized to the point where they became central goals of the group.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: During the first year of conflict, SICS, which would later be transformed into ARS/UIC, released several statements pertaining to conflict dynamics. The group accused the government of conducting attacks against civilians, whilst stating that they would not attack the government unless they were attacked first. Furthermore, the group placed much emphasis on the international community, calling for the removal of foreign influence, financial support, forces, and military support. They also called upon the international community to assist Somalia with humanitarian aid, and to support the group through foreign influence and political support.
Throughout the conflict, both accusations of atrocities and abuses as well as calls toward the international community of ceasing support for the Somali interim government and instead supporting the, now, ARS/UIC were continuously and frequently made. The ARS/UIC also began calling for international courts to conduct investigations into human rights abuses, particularly calling upon the UN. Calls toward the UN to assist in monitoring to prevent abuses were also made throughout the conflict. The group also began calling for the release of prisoners, and for displaced people to be returned to their homes.
Throughout the conflict, the main issues raised by the ARS/UIC were the accusations of atrocities and abuses committed by government forces and calls to the international community to withdraw support from the government. The calls for international monitoring of the conflict and of investigations of international courts were also heavily emphasized by the group.
Conflict Resolution Issues: During the first year of conflict, SICS released statements pertaining to three conflict resolution issues. The group called for negotiations to be held with the government, and called for national dialogue throughout multiple sections of society to enable them to choose for themselves what they wish to be done with the country. Furthermore, the group called for the government to compensate the people who had been affected by the conflict, particularly compensating people whose property had been stolen.
These issues would be continuously raised by the ARS/UIC as well throughout the conflict, and the group would also introduce further conflict resolution issues as the conflict progressed. For the last two years, calls for accountability and investigations were made in tandem with calls for compensation. Whilst the group continued to call for negotiations, factions of the ARS/UIC would also occasionally be opposed to them or set conditions for negotiations to happen, particularly the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia.
The main issues for the ARS/UIC were the calls for national dialogue and compensation for people who had been victims of the government’s forces and settlers. The question of negotiations also became a heavily emphasized and frequently discussed issue for the group. All of these conflict resolution issues were continuously raised by the group with heavy emphasis.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Bureaucratic setup, Change judicial system, Constitutional issues, Corruption, CPS: Islamic state, Cultural rights, Economic reforms, Electoral fraud, Executive power-sharing, Freedom of expression, Hold elections, Human rights, Irredentism, Law and order, Opposition to share power in the executive, Oust full executive, Public services, Reform parliament, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on freedom of expression, Revenues from natural resources, Rule of law
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Collective targeting: ethnic, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, DFI: Withdrawal of financial support, DFI: Withdrawal of military intervention/foreign forces, DFI: Withdrawal of military support, IFI: Humanitarian aid, IFI: International court/tribunal/investigation, IFI: International monitoring, IFI: Military intervention/foreign forces, IFI: Military support, IFI: Political support, IFI: Support from diasporas/foreign fighters, IFI: Use of foreign influence, Military conduct, Release of prisoners, Return of refugees/IDPs
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Call for ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Compensation/restoration, National dialogue, Opposition to negotiations, Opposition to peace agreement, Peace agreement implementation, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
2006
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1293 |
| Best | 547 |
| Low | 463 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Somalia): Government of Ethiopia
Side B (ARS/UIC): Government of Eritrea
2007
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2046 |
| Best | 1546 |
| Low | 1528 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Somalia): Government of Ethiopia
Side B (ARS/UIC): n/a
2008
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 436 |
| Best | 207 |
| Low | 203 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Somalia): Government of Ethiopia
Side B (ARS/UIC): n/a
Peace agreements
Name of peace agreement: Djibouti Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-08-19
Comment of peace agreement: Peace process agreement
The 19 August 2008 marks the official signing of a 9 June political agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS).
The agreement provides for the cessation of hostilities within 30 days and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, a question at the core of the conflict incompatibility. The parties agreed to request that the United Nations (UN) deploy an international stabilisation force within 120 days. The agreement also provided for the establishment of a High Level Committee, to pursue issues of political cooperation between the parties, as well as a Joint Security Committee, to develop and follow up the implementation of security arrangements.
The Djibouti Agreement followed two rounds of talks, and was the first in a series of cooperation documents and agreements. In accordance with the Djibouti Agreement, a third round of talks took place on 25-26 October 2008, resulting in two political documents based on the work of the Joint Security and High Level committees. “Modalities for the Cessation of Hostilities between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)” drafted arrangements for a ceasefire to become effective on 5 November, the relocation of Ethiopian troops deployed to Somalia, the impending transition of security-related tasks from Ethiopian troops first to AMISOM forces and later to the anticipated UN force to Somalia, as well as including the first modalities for a joint TFG/ARS security force. A second political document, the “Joint Declaration on the Government of National Unity and the Expanded Parliament”, reiterated the commitment to political cooperation on behalf of the parties.
However, discrepancies between the parties of the talks and the actors on the ground made the implementation of political progress difficult. In fact, the peace proceedings that had intended to marginalise hard-liners with a broad-based coalition of moderates caused rifts on both sides. As a consequence, agreements forged in the talks had little bearing for the developments on the ground.
Signatories: The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)
Witnessed by: The Observer States France, United Kingdom, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Djibouti
The Observer Groups, African Union, League of Arab States, Organization of Islamic Conference, European Union
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
The peace agreement was signed in Djibouti on 19 August 2008, in the presence of several third parties.
Third parties: United Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, mediated the negotiations, which were hosted by the Government of Djibouti.
Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: Representatives from regional organisations such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the League of Arab States (Arab League), as well as representatives of Somali civil society and business, attended the deliberations as observers.
Comment of Duration: While the agreement held with the Djibouti faction of the ARS and saw Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed elected President of the TFG in January 2009. The Asmara faction of the group rejected the agreement and continued to fight. In February 2009 the ARS-Asmara joined the newly formed Hizbul Islam and then ARS/UIC disappeared as a dyad.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Joint Declaration between the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-10-26
Comment of peace agreement: Peace Process Agreement
This short declaration establishes the parties' commitment to implementing the Djibouti Agreement and to pursuing reconciliation and political cooperation, aimed at resolving the incompatibility. The parties agree to continue talks and to address political cooperation and joint responsibility for assuring security.
Signatories: Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (signatures illegible)
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed in Djibouti on 26 October 2008.
The other active rebel groups in Somalia were not party to this agreement.
Comment of Duration: While the agreement held with the Djibouti faction of the ARS and saw Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed elected President of the TFG in January 2009. The Asmara faction of the group rejected the agreement and continued to fight. In February 2009 the ARS-Asmara joined the newly formed Hizbul Islam and then ARS/UIC disappeared as a dyad.
Full-text peace agreement
Name of peace agreement: Decision of the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2008-11-26
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement
In line with the peace process launched with the 19 August 2008 Djibouti Agreement, a fourth round of talks began on 22 November 2008. The talks resulted in a power-sharing deal between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). The agreement provided a framework for the establishment of a Unity Government, consisting of members drawn from both the TFG and the ARS.
The parties agreed to expand the parliament with an additional 200 seats for ARS-members, as well as with 75 seats allotted to members of the Somali civil society, including women as well as members of the Somali diaspora and business community. A UN-facilitated working group was established in order to develop detailed plans for structures for the Unity Government, which it would submit to the High Level Committee, established through the Djibouti Agreement.
In order to accommodate the changes necessary in line with this agreement and others, the parties agreed the new provisions would be embedded in the Transitional Federal Charter as amendments. The Transitional Period was extended for an additional two years, starting from August 2009. Thus, the 26 November agreement advanced the Somali peace process through settling part of the incompatibility, but its limitation to the transitional period renders it a partial peace agreement.
Signatories: Ahmed Abdisalaan Adan of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Abdirahman A. Warsame of the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)
Witnessed by: Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah United Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Hamud A. Suldan Minister of Religious Affairs and WAQF Government of Djibouti
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement
The peace agreement was signed in Djibouti on 26 November 2008, in the presence of several third parties. ARS had a leadership struggle in May between the part of the group headquartered in Djibouti and the one with headquarters in Asmara. This agreement was signed by the Djibouti faction. In October however field-commanders from both wings agreed to not let the leadership struggles impact the armed struggle and the armed forces remained united.
Third parties: United Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, mediated the negotiations, which were hosted by the Government of Djibouti.
Comment of Duration: While the agreement held with the Djibouti faction of the ARS and saw Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed elected President of the TFG in January 2009. The Asmara faction of the group rejected the agreement and continued to fight. In February 2009 the ARS-Asmara joined the newly formed Hizbul Islam and then ARS/UIC disappeared as a dyad.
Full-text peace agreement
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 13 |
| Best | 13 |
| Low | 10 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Somalia): n/a
Side B (ARS/UIC): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
2006 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The Ethiopian government claimed its forces had killed between 2000-3000 ""islamists"" during the government offensive in December. However, according to hospital sources collected by the International Red Cross, the fighting had led to ""hundreds"" of casualties and some 850 injured had been treated in hospitals in Mogadishu and Baidoa."
Comment on Active: The Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (SICS) defeated competing warlords in Mogadishu and expanded its territory by alliances with local militias throughout the year. In July, SICS declared their intent to overthrow president Abdullahi Yusuf, citing the governments use of Ethiopian military assistance as a betrayal of the Somali people.
After skirmishes and occasional temporary advances over the frontline in late October and November, a large-scale Ethiopian-supported government army was mobilized for an offensive in December. In the scope of a few weeks, the government troops overran SICS who lost many of its local militia allies and withdrew to Mogadishu, before the organization dissolved itself on 27 December.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Most of the talks between the two parties took place before they had started using armed force against each other. The two sides met in June in a meeting sponsored by the Arab League in Khartoum, Sudan, which concluded with an agreement that recognized "the legality of the transitional government and the presence of SICS."
Talks were scheduled to resume on 15 July but were postponed until early September. Then, the two sides met again and agreed to eventually form a unified army. The next rounds of talks were scheduled for 30 October.
Fighting had started and when the parties met in Khartoum, the talks collapsed on 2 November. A few days later, the speaker of the parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, travelled to Mogadishu in an attempt to schedule new talks. On 5 November, SICS agreed to Adans proposal but the official government response was that the peace initiative was not sanctioned policy. On 11 November, the government declared that there would be no more negotiations.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "It should be noted that it was very difficult to distinguish the actors on the rebel-side in 2007 as SICS remnants (later elements loosely attached to the ARS/UIC), Hawiye clan militias, and other armed groupings fought side by side. Also, the reporting often did not differentiate between these different armed groups, and therefore the battle-death figure may include violence not related to the ARS/UIC. However, to the extent possible, such events were sifted out.
The discrepancy between best and high was largely due to the fact that the high estimate includes rebel causality figures from the Ethiopian side that may be deemed as biased."
Comment on Active: The violence persisted after the dissolution of the administrative wing of SICS on 27 December 2006. However, remnants of SICS withdrew to the southern reaches of Ras Kamboni, Kismayo and Afmadow in the Lower Juba region, where they fought against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)/Ethiopian coalition. On 8-9 January the USA carried out air strikes in that part of Somalia in an attempt to target al-Qaida operatives fighting alongside SICS. In late January the SICS security chief, Sheik Muktar Abu Mansur urged the Somalis to “stand by the Mujahidins [milita] of the Islamic courts”, indicating that the military wing of SICS was still active.
During the spring, SICS waged an “urban guerrilla-style” insurgency in primarily Mogadishu. There were near-daily gun, grenade and mortar attacks on government targets and Ethiopian troops, but very often civilians got caught in the cross fire or were the victims of the common and imprecise mortar shelling. As the SICS administrative wing had been dissolved, the umbrella organisation began to operate out of its sub-groupings. Thus four components linked to SICS took responsibility for violent attacks in the spring: Altawahid Brigades and Jihad in Somalia, Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRMLM and Shabaab. Hawiye clan militia (disgruntled over the Darod-clan dominated TFG) also partook in the insurgency. In March and April forcible disarmament attempts by the TFG and Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu, provoked a surge of violence in the capital.
Starting in July the TFG held a 1 ½ month national reconciliation conference with participants from all clans. The conference was, however, frequently disrupted by targeted attacks against the participants and conference venues by the insurgents. A month prior to the national reconciliation conference, the TFG granted amnesty to both SICS leaders and fighters in a move to incite the SICS to join the conference. The SICS turned down the overture and chose not to participate. Instead, a similar process was held in Asmara, Eritrea in September with the Somali anti-Ethiopian and anti-TFG elements where SICS participated. At the end of this summit called Somali Congress for Liberation and Reconstitution, a new umbrella organisation was officially launched, ARS (Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia).
From the day that the ARS was announced, 14 September 2007, SICS and its political leadership is understood as having been subsumed in the new, broader alliance. The SICS leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was voted chairman of the alliance 191-member central committee, in which SICS got 40% of the seats. The more militant SICS leader, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, initially took no formal role in the ARS, but was present for and participated in its formation and pledged his support.
The violence persisted after the ARS was launched in September. Insurgents gaining territories in Hiiraan and Galgaduud regions marked an expansion in the conflict, but Mogadishu remained the main battle-ground for the insurgency. The capital was also the scene of the worst fighting in the second half of 2007, which took place after the corpses of Ethiopian troops killed in fighting were dragged through the city streets amidst cheering crowds. The Ethiopian military presence responded by indiscriminate shelling, taking a heavy civilian toll.
The level of command exercised by ARS leadership on insurgents on the ground was difficult to discern. But while the opposition alliance represented both moderate and more militant views, it appeared clear there were elements in the leadership of the new umbrella formation who continued to promote and coordinate the violent opposition to the Somali government.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: After the surge of violence in Mogadishu which started in late March after a forcible disarmament attempt by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Ethiopian forces, Hawiye clan elders and the Ethiopian military officials negotiated a truce on 24 March 2007. However, the same elders also called on the immediate withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and asked that the Somali government troops to leave Mogadishu for northern Somalia until a national army is formed. The ceasefire was violated on a near-daily basis, but the cease-fire agreement was further strengthened by a negotiation committee recently appointed by Hawiye subclans and the Ethiopian army officers in early April. At the committee’s meeting on 3 April, both sides agreed on several provisions besides strengthening the ceasefire agreement which had been reached previously. One provision was to send two members from each side to the front lines where the fighting took place on the following day as well as allow both sides to gather and bury the dead bodies scattered in different zones in Mogadishu. Also those wounded in the fighting would be cleared to be taken to the hospitals.
After yet another escalation of violence in April, Hawiye clan elders rejected a renewed cease-fire request by the Ethiopian troops, stating “whenever fighting escalates, they request a ceasefire, then they break the truce by initiating fighting. No matter what they say, we will never accept to enter into any negotiation with them again”. Following that statement, there was no reporting of mediation attempts from the clan elders.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: It should be noted that it was difficult to distinguish the actors on the rebel side in 2008, as ARS/UIC, Al-Shabaab, Harakat Ras Kamboni, and many other insurgent actors fought side by side. The reporting often did not differentiate between these different armed groupings, and it is therefore likely that ARS/UIC forces have been involved in incidents other than those which they are attributed."
Comment on Active: 2008 was characterised by an increase in the strength of the insurgency, and the idea of installing a system of Sharia (Islamic law) courts in Somalia remained strong. The insurgency also expanded in terms of scope, with attacks taking place in many locations outside of Mogadishu. The tactics of the warring parties have become increasingly severe and often indiscriminate, with devastating implications for the Somali civilian population. A campaign of assassinations targeting security- and TFG-officials, and NGO-workers, has led to an increased lawlessness and volatility. The insurgency also grew in complexity, with actors previously subsumed in a broader alliance increasingly acting out of its sub-groupings. Overall, the insurgency was characterised by a more militant and radical Islamism than that previously pursued by SICS.
ARS/UIC attacks claimed during the year mainly took place in Mogadishu. However, fighting involving ARS/UIC forces was also recorded in Bay and Hiiraan regions, the latter where the ARS/UIC clashed with Ethiopian and TFG forces over strategic regional capital Beled Weyne. Due to the fluid allegiances of the group, it is likely that ARS/UIC forces have been involved in incidents other than those which they are attributed, either through their collaboration with other groups or because of the limitations in reports from the country in making distinctions between the many components of the insurgency.
In political developments, UN-hosted negotiations between the ARS and the TFG mid-2008 and onwards brought promise, but its impact was limited by the refusal of radical elements to participate. The presence of Ethiopian troops remained the most divisive issue, and effectuated a split in the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), between ARS/Djibouti who agreed to negotiations and the more hard-line ARS/Asmara who refused to as long as Ethiopian forces of “occupation” remained on Somali soil. The Djibouti Agreement, reached on 9 June but formally signed on 19 August, included provisions for a ceasefire but failed to be fully implemented. This was reflected in the failure of the political leadership to reign in insurgents on the ground, among whom some supported negotiations and others did not. Sheikh Abdirahman Ise Adow, spokesman of UIC forces fighting on the ground in Somalia, publicly vowed to continue the fight against government-aligned troops. In fact, a majority of attacks claimed by ARS/UIC fighters during the year occurred in May and onwards, after the ARS split was a fact.
During the year, the level of command exercised by ARS leadership on insurgents on the ground was difficult to discern. Since the ARS-split, ARS/Asmara was said to maintain a military command, which ARS/Djibouti did not, as well as maintain troops on the ground benefiting from their material and financial support. The extent to which ARS/Asmara, under the leadership of Al-Shabaab founder Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, exerted control over violent developments on the ground is not entirely clear. Despite divisions among the leadership, ARS/UIC military efforts on the ground remained largely unified and coordinated. Nevertheless, the highly decentralised nature of the organisation, as well as the fact that the forces on the ground are mainly anchored in local communities and sub-clan allegiances, means that there is often disjunction between the activities on the ground.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In May 2008, the United Nations (UN) launched a Djibouti-based peace initiative for Somalia, bringing together the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). Talks were mediated by the UN Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Forging a peace deal between the ARS and the government was thought to isolate more hard-line actors on the ground, notably Al-Shabaab.
The ARS decision whether or not to engage in negotiations split the opposition alliance. While a majority of ARS leaders were willing to participate in the reconciliation process, other ARS-members-hard-liners, such as Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Hassan Turki-remained in Asmara, backed by the Eritrean government who also opposed talks. The central dividing issue was the presence of Ethiopian troops: ARS/Asmara faction refused talks as long as they remained on the ground. The main faction, led by ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, committed to reach the same objective peacefully. Engaging in talks can be seen as the mainstream ARS faction, ARS/Djibouti, moving towards a purely political agenda. Adamantly opposed to talks was Al-Shabaab, who does not recognise the Somali government. UIC forces on the ground were divided on the issue of negotiations.
The proceedings are said to have been difficult, with delegates refusing to deliberate in person. Nevertheless, the negotiations succeeded in bringing about the 11-point Djibouti Agreement, a ceasefire agreement signed on 9 June 2008. ARS and TFG representatives formally signed onto the agreement on 19 August 2008. The terms agreed were for parties to bring clashes to an end within 30 days, at which point a 90-day ceasefire would ensue. Parties also agreed to request the UN to authorise and deploy and “international stabilisation” force within 120 days, and for Ethiopia to have completed its troop withdrawal prior to that point. The ARS also agreed to condemn the violence perpetrated on the ground, and to disassociate itself from any actor breaking the ceasefire, including ARS/UIC-remnants and Al-Shabaab militia.
Despite being a positive step, the Djibouti Agreement was met with skepticism. The time-table for the deployment of a potential UN force was unrealistic, few believed Ethiopia would withdraw its troops completely, and it was clear that ARS/Djibouti was unlikely to be able to deliver a ceasefire on the ground. Indeed, a peak in the violence could be discerned following the signing of the agreement, including attacks on behalf of ARS/UIC forces.
Two additional rounds talks facilitated by the UN and the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took place in the latter half of 2008-added can also be competing initiatives, such as the talks facilitated by the Arab League in Egypt earlier in the year-discussing such issues as the modalities of the ceasefire implementation, the formation of a joint ARS-TFG security force and, towards the end of the year, an ambitious plan for a power-sharing government. This final round of deliberations resulted in an agreement, Decision of the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement. However, discrepancies between the parties of the talks and the actors on the ground made the implementation of political progress difficult. In fact, the peace proceedings that had intended to marginalise hard-liners with a broad-based coalition of moderates had caused rifts on both sides. As a consequence, agreements forged in the talks had little bearing for the developments on the ground. As the talks progressed, the insurgency continued to grow stronger.
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Peace Agreement
Date of termination: 2008-11-26
Comment on Termination: On 26 November 2008 The he Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) signed an agreement providing for power-sharing between the two. In January 2009 ARS was formally integrated into the TFG-parliament.
However the peace negotiations made ARS to break into two. ARS-Djibouti and ARS-Asmara. In early 2009 the Asmara faction joined forces with other Islamist groups to form a new alliance, Hizbul Islam. The group, composed also of Harakat Ras Kamboni, and the smaller groups Jabhatul Islamiya and Anole, appeared to have started to collaborate as early as January 2009, before their official launch on 4 February 2009.
2009 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: The newly formed Islamist alliance, Hizbul Islam, brought together ARS/UIC (Asmara faction), Mu’askar Ras Kamboni, Jabhatul Islamiya and Mu’askar Anole. On 4 February the groups announced their intention to merge to jointly fight the government. In Mogadishu clashes, the umbrella group was found to collaborate with Al-Shabaab. Mid-2009, however, relations soured and the two groups began battling each other in southern Somalia.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: Shortly after the formation of Hizbul Islam, there were indications that at least elements in the group were willing to talk with the government. For example, the group is said to have agreed to talks through Hawiye traditional elders. However, it is unclear whether the talks took place, and shortly thereafter, major clashes erupted in Mogadishu.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
