General information
Part of Conflict: Nigeria: Government
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 2005-02-01
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: According to most accounts, the Islamic sect Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad emerged in 2002 or 2003. In February 2005, one of the top leadership figures of the group, Aminu Tashen-Ilimi, conducted an interview with AFP during which he stated that the aim of the group was to carry out an armed struggle to set up a puritanical Islamic government. These goals were reaffirmed by the group’s leader Mohammed Yusuf as clashes broke out in late July 2009.
Date of first use of armed force: 2009-06-09
Comment on date of first use of armed force: According to a Nigerian analyst with the International Crisis Group the conflict was spurred by an event when a member of the Joint Security Task Force fired at members of the Muhammed Yusuf Islamic sect in Maiduguri, after failing to obey traffic rules while in a funeral procession.
The first real clashes between Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad fighters and security forces took place on 26 July 2009, in Bauchi city.
First Battle Related Death: 2009-06-09
Comment on First Battle Related Death: According to a Nigerian analyst with the International Crisis Group the conflict was spurred by an event when a member of the Joint Security Task Force fired at members of the Muhammed Yusuf Islamic sect in Maiduguri, after failing to obey traffic rules while in a funeral procession. In the disturbance the police shot and killed 14 members of the group, prompting Yusuf to vow retaliation.
The first real clashes between Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad fighters and security forces took place on 26 July 2009, in Bauchi city. In these clashes, some 40-50 people, mainly Boko Haram members, were killed.
Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 2009-07-26
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: The first clashes between Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad fighters and security forces took place on 26 July 2009, in Bauchi city. In these clashes, some 40-50 people, mainly Boko Haram members, were killed.
Conflict issues
Conflict Goal Issues: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), previously known as Boko Haram, was an Islamist rebel group fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria. The group officially emerged in 2002 and became active in conflict in 2009. Throughout the conflict, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad allied itself with and pledged allegiance to several other rebel groups, most notably AQIM occasionally between 2009-2015, and IS from 2015, although non-IS aligned splinter groups of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad were formed in 2016 as well. During the first year of conflict, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad stated several conflict goal issues. In 2005 a future leader of the movement called for the protection of religious rights through ridding society of immorality and infidelity. In 2009, the group called for the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law, for the establishment of law and order in Nigeria, and for gender rights to be restricted through constitutional reform to prohibit Western ways of life including: “the rights and privileges of women, the idea of homosexuality, lesbianism” as well as “terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants, multi-party democracy”.
As the conflict progressed, the establishment of an Islamic state, change of the judicial system to Sharia law, and protection of Muslim religious rights were continuously emphasized by Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad. The group also made occasional remarks calling the Nigerian government blasphemous, calling for the removal of the constitutions of Nigeria and Cameroon, stating its opposition to democracy, calling for increased religious prevalence in the school system, calling for the protection of Mosques, and for the protection of Muslim’s human rights. Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad also called for the ousting of the Nigerian government and for the religious rights of non-Muslims and non-believers to be restricted.
The main conflict goal issues of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad were the establishment of an Islamic state and the governance of Sharia law in Nigeria. These issues were continuously stated throughout the conflict and were heavily emphasized to the point that they were central to the group’s existence.
Conflict Dynamics Issues: In 2009, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad accused the Nigerian government of massacring unarmed civilians and called for the removal of Western influence over Nigeria. The group also called for collective targeting against political opponents and people of other religious convictions: “we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of sharia in Nigeria”.
As the conflict progressed, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad continuously reemphasized calls for collective targeting of non-believers, called infidels, non-Muslims, and atheists, as well as people who opposed the establishment of Sharia law in Nigeria. The group also frequently called for the removal of Western influence, particularly in the initial stages of the conflict. In occasional instances, calls were made accusing the government of intentionally targeting Muslim civilians with violence, and on two occasions Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad called for the release of political prisoners and prisoners of war.
The main conflict dynamics issues of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad were the calls for collective targeting of non-Muslims and the removal of Western influence over Nigeria. These issues were stated throughout the conflict, although removal of foreign influence was more prevalent in the initial stages of the conflict, and both were heavily emphasized.
Conflict Resolution Issues: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad stated two conflict resolution issues in 2011 and 2012, stating issues regarding the structure of potential negotiations mostly including direct talks with Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, the Nigerian President, without mediators present, and calling for the detainment and prosecution of political figures and ministers. These issues are also to be considered the main conflict resolution issues of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad.
Type of conflict issues: The coded conflict issues for this group are: Conflict Goal Issues: Blasphemy, Change judicial system, Constitutional issues, CPS: Islamic state, CPS: Opposition to democracy, Destruction of cultural heritage, Education system: increase religion, Human rights, Law and order, Oust full executive, Oust head of the executive, Oust local executive, Religious rights, Restriction of gender rights, Restrictions on religious rights
Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses, Call for collective targeting: other group, Call for collective targeting: religious, Collective targeting: religious, DFI: Removal of foreign influence, Release of prisoners
Conflict Resolution Issues: Accountability/prosecution/investigation, Structure of negotiations
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
2005
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): n/a
Side B (JAS): n/a
2009
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 835 |
| Best | 405 |
| Low | 402 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): n/a
Side B (JAS): n/a
2010
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 31 |
| Best | 18 |
| Low | 16 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): n/a
Side B (JAS): n/a
2011
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 547 |
| Best | 325 |
| Low | 267 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): n/a
Side B (JAS): n/a
2012
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1155 |
| Best | 811 |
| Low | 811 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Chad, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2013
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 2081 |
| Best | 1629 |
| Low | 1474 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Chad, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2014
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 5216 |
| Best | 4788 |
| Low | 4733 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Cameroon, Government of Chad, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2015
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 3025 |
| Best | 2703 |
| Low | 2703 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Chad, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2016
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 180 |
| Best | 164 |
| Low | 164 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Cameroon
Side B (JAS): n/a
2017
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 1113 |
| Best | 1062 |
| Low | 1060 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Cameroon
Side B (JAS): n/a
2018
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 455 |
| Best | 335 |
| Low | 322 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Cameroon
Side B (JAS): n/a
2019
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 384 |
| Best | 328 |
| Low | 320 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2020
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 527 |
| Best | 465 |
| Low | 406 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Cameroon, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2021
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 306 |
| Best | 276 |
| Low | 269 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Cameroon, Government of Chad, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2022
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 582 |
| Best | 428 |
| Low | 179 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2023
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 502 |
| Best | 464 |
| Low | 251 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2024
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 265 |
| Best | 225 |
| Low | 182 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Chad, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
2025
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 224 |
| Best | 199 |
| Low | 151 |
Secondary Warring Support:
Side A (Government of Nigeria): Government of Chad, Government of Niger
Side B (JAS): n/a
Dyad Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
2005 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2009 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The best and low estimates are based on disaggregated accounts of battles in different locations. Meanwhile, summary accounts often ranged as high as more than 800 deaths, but it is unclear whether these figures include one-sided violence and Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad members killed in custody.
Comment on Active: Violent clashes between the group Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (commonly refered to as Boko Haram) and Nigerian security forces broke out in late July 2009. The clashes began in Bauchi city, Bauchi state, after the rebels launched an attack against a police station. After this first eruption, clashes quickly spread to the neighbouring states Borno, Yobe and Kano. Fighting raged for four days, ending after the security forces lay siege to Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad’s base in Maiduguri, Borno state, and the rebel leader Mohammed Yussuf was captured and killed. Maiduguri reportedly saw the heaviest fighting during the brief but intensive struggle.
While the government reported that most of Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad’s members had been killed or captured, some managed to escape and later made threats of renewed violence. On 14 August, a statement signed by acting leader Mallam Sanni Umaru stated that the armed struggle would continue, warning that attacks would soon be launched all over Nigeria. However, no more attacks were reported during 2009.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: No or Low Activity
Date of termination: 2009-12-31
Comment on Termination: Following the harsh crackdown on Jama\'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad in 2009, little was heard from the group during the first months of 2010. However, rumours began to circulate that the group was preparing renewed armed actions and that it was cooperating with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Towards the end of 2010, there were reports of targeted attacks on security forces by suspected Jama\'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad members in northern Nigeria, mainly in Maiduguri; however, it could not be determined with any certainty that violence involving the group reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2010.
2010 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Towards the end of 2010, there were reports of targeted attacks on security forces by suspected Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad members in northern Nigeria, mainly in Maiduguri; however, it could not be determined with any certainty that violence involving the group reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2010.
Comment on Active: Following the harsh crackdown on Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad in 2009, little was heard from the group during the first months of 2010. However, rumours began to circulate that the group was preparing renewed armed actions and that it was cooperating with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Towards the end of 2010, there were reports of targeted attacks on security forces by suspected Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad members in northern Nigeria, mainly in Maiduguri; however, it could not be determined with any certainty that violence involving the group reached the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2010.
Negotiations: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Dyad Archive
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The discrepancy between the best and high figures is due to a number of attacks on government targets where Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihads responsibility was suspected but could not be confirmed.
Comment on Active: After a year of low activity, featuring only minor attacks that did not reach the threshold of armed conflict, Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad in 2011 intensified its attacks on state targets. In the first half of the year, attacks mainly followed the earlier pattern with small-scale attacks on police and other security targets, mainly in Maiduguri; however, as the year evolved, the group’s attacks became more sophisticated and spread to a larger geographic area. In June, they attacked the police headquarters in Abuja in an apparent suicide bombing using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VIBED), representing a major leap in technological sophistication; similar attacks followed, many of them outside the traditional operating area of the group. These changes in tactics prompted widespread concern that the group was receiving training and support from groups such as the al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Somalia’s Al-Shabaab.
The government’s response to the escalating violence comprised strengthened security force presence in Maiduguri and surrounding areas, while simultaneously offering talks and an amnesty to militants prepared to lay down arms. Negotiation offers were however met with high demands from Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad, and no talks appear to have taken place during 2011. Meanwhile, in late December President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in parts of northern Nigeria bordering Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During 2011, the government made repeated offers to begin dialogue with Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad. However, the group responded with setting demands for the commencement of such talks that were largely unacceptable to the government. On 13 June, the group declared it was prepared to lay down arms and begin talks under the following conditions: a stricter version of Sharia should be applied in the northern states, Borno state’s governor Kashim Shettima should resign, all detained members of the group should be released, politicians and security personnel involved in the 2009 crackdown on the group should be prosecuted, and a report established after the 2009 crackdown should be released. Following a statement by the Inspector General of Police the next day saying that the group’s days were numbered, Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad rejected dialogue altogether. Renewed attempts to initiate talks were made throughout the year, but with varying response from Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad, fuelling suspicions that the group had split into several factions.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2012 the conflict between the government and Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) escalated, both in terms of the number of people killed and in its geographical scope.
The year got off to a dramatic start, with the large-scale attacks on the northern town of Kano in January. On 20 January Boko Haram carried out its most complex attack to date, when it targeted security forces at eight different locations throughout Kano and subsequently exchanged gunfire with the police and military for several hours. In total at least 186 people died. After the attack, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency in 15 Local Government Areas (LGAs) across four states in the north.
Geography-wise, Boko Haram expanded its area of operations from Borno state, in the extreme north-east of the country, all the way to Sokoto state in the northwest, thus covering the full breadth of the country. In August, the group announced that it would also spread their struggle south, stating that their “Islamic revolution” was not limited to the northern states. While the threat was not realized during the rest of the year, there were growing indications that Boko Haram had managed to infiltrate Kogi State in the country’s North-Central Zone, which is much further south than previously recorded. Many analysts agree that by establishing such a presence, Boko Haram could use the state as a staging point for operations into southern Nigeria.
During the year Boko Haram carried out frequent attacks on the police and the military, engaging especially the latter’s elite Joint Task Force in bitter street battles. The group also targeted local government officials and customs officers, as well as stepped up its attacks on unarmed civilians (see the section on One-sided violence in the Encyclopedia for information on the latter). A new tactics adopted by the group was the systematic destruction of hundreds of telecom towers, whereby the security forces were unable to track down Boko Haram members. The security forces, for its part, carried out a number of offensives, especially during the last four months of the year, and were able to inflict serious losses on the rebels. Furthermore, more than ten commanders were either captured or killed during this period.
Another notable development during 2012 was the emergence of Boko Haram splinter group Jamaatu Ansarul Musilimina fi Biladi Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; commonly called Ansaru). Details about the group remain murky, but it seems clear that the reason behind its break from Boko Haram was the latter’s attacks on civilians.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: One of the main problems when it comes to negotiations between the parties is that Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) is a group with many faces; it is difficult to be sure that those entering into negotiations are in fact representing the main faction of the group, and not simply small groupings that have lost power struggles with the group’s leader Shekau. This was the case in e.g. August, when the government negotiated with a faction of Boko Haram led by Abu Muhammed. Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa subsequently announced that the faction was “fake” and this was substantiated by a security source who complained that the government was spending large sums of money talking to persons who were not able to influence Boko Haran to stop the violence.
The only negotiations that the main Boko Haram faction (i.e. the one led by Shekau) is known to have participated in during 2012 was mediated by Shaykh Ibrahim Datti Ahmed and took place in March. It was reported that Shaykh Ibrahim Datti Ahmed was able to earn Shekau’s trust due to the fact that he is the president of the Supreme Council for Sharia on which the late Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf served as Borno State’s representative. The initiative failed to bear fruit, however, as Shaykh Ibrahim Datti Ahmed soon withdrew from the process, citing doubts over the government’s sincerity, claiming that the government’s delegation leaked information to the media.
In December there were reports of new negations being initiated in Senegal. They were said to include President Jonathan’s adviser and minister of Niger Delta affairs, Godsday Orubebe, but it is unclear who represented Boko Haram, and, in turn, which faction he represented.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: In 2013 the conflict between the Nigerian government and Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) continued to escalate, crossing the 1000 fatality threshold for the first time and was subsequently labeled a war.
During the year Boko Haram’s operations once again came to focus mainly on its home area in Borno state, as well as neighbouring Adamawa and Yobe. The group was able to establish control and authority over some areas of Borno, destroying the national flag and instead raising their own black one. During this period they launched a number of bloody attacks on border towns, and state officials were forced to flee ten Local Government Areas of the state.
This took place amid rumors of ceasefire deals and the launching of a negotiations commission by the government. Neither of these attempts bore fruit, however, and violence continued to escalate on the ground. Subsequently, on 14 May, President Goodluck Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in the three northeastern states, declaring that the level of violence called for “extraordinary measures”. In addition, a large-scale military offensive was launched, with thousands of troops participating, supported by fighter jets. All telecommunications were suspended, which cut the area off from the rest of the country and made for difficulties in reporting. During the offensive, a militia emerged in Borno, sometimes called Civilian JTF (the military Joint Task Force was at that time in charge of military operations in the state) and sometimes “Yan Gora”. It consisted of local youths, armed with bows, arrows and axes but no guns. They were recognized by the military and given training and ID cards and was then used as a proxy militia (for more information on Yan Gora, see the Non-state Conflict section of the Encyclopedia). Furthermore, mass arrests were carried out as the army pushed the rebels out of towns and cities.
The offensive was initially deemed a success; as the Islamists were forced to retreat into semi-arid land on the northern border with Niger, and to the Mandara Mountains along the border with Cameroon, violence declined. However, Boko Haram proved resilient and attacks and killings soon intensified again. Aside from its usual targets, the group also declared all-out war against Yan Gora, which meant that the civilian population came to suffer even more. The group also stepped up attacks against schools (for more information on this, see the section on One-sided Violence in the Encyclopedia). With violence surging, the state of emergency was extended in November.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: As in previous years, one of the main problems when it comes to negotiations between the parties is that Jamaatu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) is a group with many faces; it is difficult to be sure that those entering into negotiations are in fact representing the main faction of the group, and not simply small groupings that have lost power struggles with the groups leader Shekau. Subsequently, it is exceedingly difficult to know whether any of the talks taking place during 2013 involved representatives from Boko Haram that were authorized by the leader of the group – Abubakar Shekau – to partake in negotiations.
There were, however, numerous reports of talks and ceasefire offers during 2013. In late January, for instance, Muhammed Abdulaziz Idris – a person believed to be Boko Haram’s second in command for southern and northern Borno state – announced a ceasefire on condition that detained members of the group be released and destroyed mosques be rebuilt. In mid-February the government announced that it was willing to accept the offer, stating that it was also willing to grant amnesty to Boko Haram members if Shekau publicly renounced violence. However, the violence continued unabated and in late February leaflets were distributed in Maiduguri in Borno state, dissociating Shekau from the ceasefire. Furthermore in early March Shekau himself rejected peace talks in a video, and distanced himself from Idris, the commander that had declared the ceasefire back in January.
In April Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan established a 26-member committee – formally called the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North – mandated to engage in talks with Boko Haram and to come up with a disarmament and amnesty framework. Chairman of the committee was Malam Kabiru Turaki, a minister of special duties in the Office of the President. Shekau’s reaction was quick. In mid-April he announced that his members had done nothing wrong to deserve pardon, and that his group should be the one to grant pardon to the federal government for the atrocities committed against Muslims.
However, over the following weeks some sort of negotiations seems to have been initiated, albeit with a Boko Haram faction with unclear links to the central leadership. Subsequently, on 8 July Turaki announced that the committee had reached an understanding with Boko Haram, that the latter had ordered their fighters to cease fire and that a formal agreement would follow soon. In what seemed like a confirmation of this, Imam Muhammadu Marwana, an influential Boko Haram member launched a statement in which he asked for the populations’ forgiveness. However, hopes were spurned yet again, as Shekau some days later denied that Boko Haram had entered into ceasefire negotiations with the government, stating that “"We dont know Kabiru Turaki, we have never spoken with him. He is lying”.
In November Turaki handed over the committee’s final report to the president, saying that key members of Boko Haram were open to peace talks. He also proposed for a fresh panel to be set up, something that the president accepted.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Dyad Archive
Comment on Active: 2014 has not been updated yet
Negotiations: YES
Victory: YES
Terminated: NO
2015 Dyad Archive
Victory: NO
Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Other
Date of termination: 2015-03-12
Comment on Termination: In July 2014, the Islamic State (IS) – a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – announced that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syrian and Iraq. Furthermore, it demanded the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, and declared that it would continue to seize land to expand its territory across the globe. When the caliphate was proclaimed, IS stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.”
On 7 March 2015, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) declared its allegiance to IS, after a nearly one-year-long “courtship process” (term as used by Jacob Zenn in his article Wilayat West Africa Reboots for the Caliphate, in CTC Sentinel on 21 August 2915). Five days later, on 12 March, the pledged was accepted by IS-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who also re-named the group Wilayat West Africa. With that, what had previously been Boko Haram became integrated into the Islamic State and the former group was rendered obsolete. Furthermore, the conflict over government power in Nigeria was terminated, and a new territorial conflict over the so-called "Islamic State" was initiated,
Comment on Termination Date: n July 2014, the Islamic State (IS) – a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – announced that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syrian and Iraq. Furthermore, it demanded the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, and declared that it would continue to seize land to expand its territory across the globe. When the caliphate was proclaimed, IS stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.”
On 7 March 2015, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) declared its allegiance to IS, after a nearly one-year-long “courtship process” (term as used by Jacob Zenn in his article Wilayat West Africa Reboots for the Caliphate, in CTC Sentinel on 21 August 2915). Five days later, on 12 March, the pledged was accepted by IS-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who also re-named the group Wilayat West Africa. With that, what had previously been Boko Haram became integrated into the Islamic State and the former group was rendered obsolete. Furthermore, the conflict over government power in Nigeria was terminated, and a new territorial conflict over the so-called "Islamic State" was initiated,
2016 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations in 2016.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations in 2017.
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2018 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations in 2018.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2019 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations in 2019.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2020 Dyad Archive
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: There were no negotiations in 2020.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2021 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2022 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2023 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2024 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
2025 Dyad Archive
Terminated: NO
