UCDP

General information

Part of Conflict: India: Nagaland

Date of first stated goals of incompatibility: 1980-01-31
Comment on date of first stated goal of incompatibility: The original manifesto of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland was issued in 1980 and remains the basic statement of the incompatibility. The "Solemn Declaration of the Existence of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)", issued on 31 January 1980, declares the "unquestionable sovereign right of the Naga people over every inch of Naga territory", and advocates the "dictatorship of the people" within a socialist state of Nagaland. Furthermore, the armed struggle for a free Nagaland is said to be undertaken in the name of God; "Nagaland for Christ". The manifesto is signed by General Secretary T.H Muviah, Chairman Isak Chisi Swu and Vice President S.S Khaplang. On 2 February 1980, the NSCN declared themselves the "Government of the Peoples Republic of Nagaland."

The NSCN was the formal breakaway by Khaplang, Muviah and Swu from the organisational ranks of the NNC (Naga National Council) which had previously been active in the conflict. Following the 1975 Shillong Accord in which remaining underground NNC leaders agreed to stop fighting, some hardcore militants met in August 1978 and denounced the NNC policy and leadership of Angami Phizo. In March 1979, Khaplang had been elected president of the "NNC Federal government" by a "national assembly" held in Laimang.

Following accusations by Vice President Khaplang that Muviah and Swu were planning to surrender to India, Khaplang’s forces overran the NSCN Council headquarters in Burma on 30 April 1988. The attack was followed by months of clashes between the breakaway faction led by Khaplang (referred to as NSCN (K)) and the NSCN leadership of Muviah and Swu (hereafter renamed NSCN (I-M)).

On 7 July 1989, Muivah and Swu published an official document that confirmed that Khaplang had been expelled from the NSCN (I-M): “We tell you the virtue of power lies in upholding the truth or else it is cause: History shall witness the most nefarious bloodshed in our time wrought by the treacherous savage S.S. Khaplang the like of which is condemned forever and you can never alter the verdict try as you may. We declare the National Socialist Council of Nagaland will not bow down whatsoever to the treacherous power monger nor condescend to his underworld standards. We shall gladly hold our ground to the last and it no longer admits for argument. Every Naga must know that our politics is to fight eternally if India and Burma do not keep their hands off Nagaland.”

Date of first use of armed force: 1982-08-24
Comment on date of first use of armed force: Rebel activity near the Burma border was reported as early as 4 August 1978 and several NSCN rebels were allegedly killed in encounters with Burmese soldiers in the early months of 1982. The rebels do not state their incompatibility until January 1980, and the first verified incident where NSCN use armed force against the government is on 24 August 1982. Tree soldiers of the security force were then killed in an NSCN-ambush in Mon district.
First Battle Related Death: 1982-08-24
Comment on First Battle Related Death: Three soldiers of the security force was killed and six injured in an NSCN-ambush in Mon district on 24 August 1982.

Date when dyad reached 25 battle releated deaths: 1992-08-05
Comment on date when dyad reached 25 battle related deaths: The total number of battle-related deaths crossed 25 after Naga insurgents killed 13 security forces in an ambush at Mahur on 5 August 1992. During the preceeding months, in total 24 members of security forces and rebels had been killed in various clashes.

Conflict issues

Conflict Goal Issues: The National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isaac-Muivah (NSCN-IM) was a rebel group in mainly India that originated from the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) that formed in 1980. After internal conflict in 1988, Isaac Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah formed the NSCN-IM faction, while S. S. Khaplang formed the NSCN-K faction. As the NSCN-IM traces its origins back to the NSCN, the first pronounced conflict goals issues concerned independence as a Socialist state and an economic system that was based on Christianity: “Nagaland for Christ”. The socialist and religious demands were only coded once in 1980. Calls for an independent Nagaland persisted through the 1990s. However, as the independence claim also encompassed constitutional protection of parts of neighboring Manipur the mere public mention of the territorial claim during the negotiations received backlash from the Government of India. Which occurred as Muivah expressed the right for self-determination of Nagas in Nagaland, a demand shy of independence which the group previously renounced. Besides calling for self-determination and cultural rights, the group opposed elections in the region from 1997 to 2000. It also raised the issue of alleged ballot stuffing. The main issue NSCN-IM seems to have been independence, even if the issue was publicly dropped during the negotiations in the late 1990s and replaced by a call for autonomy. While opposition to elections was more frequent, the contentious nature of the territorial claim both vis-a-vis the central Government of India and the regional leadership in Manipur might explain the groups decision to drop the issue during the period in which the group was engaged in negotiations with the Government of India.

Conflict Dynamics Issues: The only and main conflict dynamics issue that the project has been able to locate for NSCN-IM was the accusation of abuses perpetrated by the Government of India.
Conflict Resolution Issues: The first coded conflict resolution issue was a call for negotiations in 1996. A call repeated up until 2001. As the group singed a ceasefire agreement with the Government of India, it accused the Government of violating the agreement and called for it to abide by it. Another issue voiced by NSCN-IM was for the negotiations to take place at the “highest level” and outside of India. In 2001, the group sought to extend the ceasefire to include parts of neighboring states, with the claim that it should cover all places where Nagas were to be found. The main conflict resolution issue seems to have been negotiations, as it was the most frequent and persistent issue.

Type of conflict issues: Conflict Goal Issues: Autonomy, Change economic system, Constitutional issues, CPS: Socialist state, Cultural rights, Electoral fraud, Independence, Opposition to elections, Religious rights

Conflict Dynamics Issues: Atrocities and abuses

Conflict Resolution Issues: Call for ceasefire, Call for implementation/abiding to ceasefire, Call for negotiations, Structure of negotiations

Annual information

This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.

1980

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1982

Estimated Fatalities
High	3
Best	3
Low	3

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1990

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1991

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1992

Estimated Fatalities
High	47
Best	47
Low	47

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1993

Estimated Fatalities
High	128
Best	92
Low	92

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1994

Estimated Fatalities
High	69
Best	60
Low	58

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1995

Estimated Fatalities
High	95
Best	95
Low	95

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1996

Estimated Fatalities
High	40
Best	40
Low	40

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1997

Estimated Fatalities
High	37
Best	37
Low	37

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1998

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

1999

Estimated Fatalities
High	2
Best	2
Low	2

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2000

Estimated Fatalities
High	30
Best	30
Low	18

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2001

Estimated Fatalities
High	18
Best	18
Low	18

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2002

Estimated Fatalities
High	11
Best	11
Low	11

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2003

Estimated Fatalities
High	1
Best	1
Low	1

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2005

Estimated Fatalities
High	10
Best	10
Low	10

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2006

Estimated Fatalities
High	2
Best	2
Low	2

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2007

Estimated Fatalities
High	1
Best	1
Low	1

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2008

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2009

Estimated Fatalities
High	14
Best	8
Low	5

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2010

Estimated Fatalities
High	1
Best	1
Low	1

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2011

Estimated Fatalities
High	8
Best	8
Low	8

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2012

Estimated Fatalities
High	6
Best	6
Low	6

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2013

Estimated Fatalities
High	3
Best	3
Low	2

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2014

Estimated Fatalities
High	18
Best	14
Low	11

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2015

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

Peace agreements

Name of peace agreement: Framework Agreement between the Government of India (GOI) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)
Date when warring parties signed the agreement: 2015-08-03
Comment of peace agreement: Partial peace agreement

This agreement, which was not made public until in 2020, is a framework agreement emerging from rounds of talks and renewed ceasefire agreements since 1997.

In 2015 it was reported that it was a 33 point framework agreement which reportedly contained a separate budget and provisions for shared sovereignty, flag, passport, Supreme Court, currency, restricted-access areas, army training, recognition of Nagas' history, a "no-war" policy in Nagaland, demilitarization along the Line of Control, and foreign policies. India will make a special arrangement for the Nagas in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur in return NSCN-IM will drop its demand to merge these areas with Nagaland.

It was expected that there would be a future final agreement.

The agreement published in 2020 was much shorter and mainly provided a framework for negotiations where the parties recognized the other side's position and where they respected the the people's wishes for sharing the sovereign power.
Signatories: Government of India: RN Ravi NSCN-IM: Lt. Isak Chishi Swu Chairman NSCN Th. Muivah General Secretary NSCN
Comment of signatories: Dyadic peace agreement signed on 3 August 2015. Signed by the Government of India and NSCN-IM.

Comment of third parties role in peace agreement: The agreement is said to be signed in the presence of the Indian Prime Minister.

Comment of Duration: In 2020 NSCN-IM publicly revealed the content of the agreement that had been signed in 2015 and accused the government representative Ravi of omitting the key word "new" in a version of the agreement when sharing it with other Naga groups.

Full-text peace agreement

2016

Estimated Fatalities
High	3
Best	3
Low	3

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2017

Estimated Fatalities
High	2
Best	2
Low	2

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2018

Estimated Fatalities
High	5
Best	5
Low	5

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2019

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2020

Estimated Fatalities
High	7
Best	7
Low	7

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2021

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2022

Estimated Fatalities
High	2
Best	2
Low	2

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2023

Estimated Fatalities
High	1
Best	1
Low	1

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2024

Estimated Fatalities
High	0
Best	0
Low	0

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

2025

Estimated Fatalities
High	3
Best	3
Low	3

Secondary Warring Support:

Side A (Government of India): n/a

Side B (NSCN-IM): n/a

Dyad Archive

This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.

1980 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

1982 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1990 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1991 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1992 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Low estimate. This includes violence by both factions of the NSCN directed against the government. The news reporting does not make it possible to separate casualties caused by the NSCN- IM and the NSCN-K. After the split between the two groups in 1988, the NSCN-K faction established its stronghold among the Konyak Naga tribe in northern Nagaland and across the border in Myanmar. The NSCN-IM was dominated by the Thangkul Naga tribe and established its bases in southern Nagaland and five hill districts in neighboring Manipur. This geographic division contributed to making the NSCN-IM more active in clashes against the Indian government. Furthermore, throughout the 1990s, the latter group emerged as the more dominant force in the insurgency.

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1993 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1994 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1995 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: An informal process of dialogue commenced in mid 1995 when the then prime minister met the NSCN (I-M) leadership in Paris, and later offered to hold unconditional talks with the Naga rebel outfits.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1996 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO

Victory: NO

Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 1997-08-01
Comment on Termination: On 1 August 1997 a ceasefire agreement between the government and the NSCN (I-M) went into effect.

1997 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: Several unfavourable factors collided to put pressure on the NSCN (I-M) by early 1997; the success of the governments counter-operations in the north-east; the arrest of several prominent persons in the NSCN leadership; Myanmars hostile attitude towards NSCN activity on its territory and Indo-Bangladesh cooperation on preventing rebel-activity along its joint border; and lastly, the hostile Khalang-faction of the NSCN growing increasingly stronger under the alleged patronage of the local state government.

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Leaders of the NSCN faction, Issac Swu and T.H. Muivah met the prime minister on 3 February, and allegedly expressed willingness to reach a negotiated settlement to the Naga issue. Peace talks, initiated by the government, began in late July, and concluded with the announcement of a three-month ceasefire between the parties, starting from 1 August 1997. No political questions were, however, addressed in these initial talks. The ceasefire was subsequently extended for further three months, starting from 25 October 1997. The government also offered an unconditional ceasefire to the other insurgency groups in early August.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

1998 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

1999 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: The first formal talks of the conflict, held in a third country, took place between the Government of India and the NSCN collective leadership. The talks in Amsterdam took place under the facilitation of Netherlands’s government. Second and third rounds of talks were held in September and November, where more substantive issues relating to the incompatibility were on the agenda.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2000 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: A tense issue in the negotiations was related to the geographical area wherein the ceasefire would be applicable. No document relating to the ceasefire in 1997 enumerated the territorial aspect. For NSCN an extension of the ceasefire beyond the present state of Nagaland was a springboard to the realisation of the concept of a greater Nagaland, which also comprises parts of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and western Burma. On 26 August 2000 the NSCN (I-M) leadership gave an ultimatum to the government that unless the ceasefire was not implemented to all Naga-inhabited areas, the NSCN would not be obligated to continue the ceasefire. The centre replied that it would consider such an extension, but that it should not be seen as a step towards recognition of a "greater Nagaland".

Victory: NO

Terminated: YES
Type of termination: Ceasefire
Date of termination: 2000-12-31
Comment on Termination: The ceasefire between the two sides, signed in 1997, was still in force in 2000. In late July 2000 it was extended for yet another year. It was, however, violated on several occasions. An impasse in the peace-negotiations came after disagreement on the issue of operation of the ceasefire, as the NSCN demanded it to hold within all Naga-inhabited areas.

2001 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Two rounds of peace talks between the government and the NSCN (I-M) leadership took place in Thailand 12-14 June. These discussions resulted, in line with NSCN (I-M) demands, in the extension of the ceasefire "without territorial limits", i.e. that it would comprehend all Naga dominated areas in the northeast. This infuriated the local politicians and popular opinion in the affected neighbouring states, which felt its territorial sovereignty threatened. They feared that the major scope of the ceasefire would encourage the NSCN (I-M) in its demand to carve out a "Greater Nagaland" from the neighbouring states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Riots and civil disobedience followed, and on 27 July the government had to revoke this phrase.

On 7 December 2001 representatives of the parties met in Japan, where both sides affirmed their determination to reach a political settlement.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2002 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Peace talks were held in the Netherlands in August 2002. The talks were of some success: the ceasefire between the primary parties was extended for one more year and the parties reaffirmed their commitment to find a political settlement.

New Delhi also lifted a 12-year ban on the NSCN in November to pave the way for its leaders to return to India for negotiations in 2003.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2003 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: India and NSCN-IM have had a bilateral ceasefire since August 1997; this year it was extended until 31 July 2004. Additionally, India and NSCN-K, which have had a ceasefire since 2001, agreed to extend it until 28 April 2004.

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: India and NSCN-IM have had a bilateral ceasefire since August 1997; this year it was extended until 31 July 2004.

Two rounds of negotiations were held between the Indian government and NSCN-IM in 2003. The first round, held in New Delhi in January, was of great symbolic value, as NSCN-IM leaders Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah visited India for the first time in 36 years. They met with top Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Vajpayee. Talks ended without any breakthrough, as the two parties continued to disagree over NSCN-IM’s demand for a “greater Nagaland.” Both parties, however, stated that they were satisfied with the progress of the talks and they would continue formal negotiations. A second round of talks was held in Amsterdam in September. The second round focused on less contentious issues, such as devolving more power to Nagaland.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2005 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations between the NSCN-IM and the government continued throughout the year, with dozens of rounds of talks taking place both in India and Thailand (where some NSCN-IM leaders are based). In July NSCN-IM extended its ceasefire with India for only six months instead of a year, out of frustration at the lack of progress in talks and Indias reluctance to give ground. Despite their frequency, the talks remained deadlocked, as Indian officials were unwilling to meet NSCN-IMs demands for Naga unification. By the end of the year, Naga leaders complained about the pace of the negotiations and threatened to not renew the ceasefire when it expires on 31 January 2006 if its demands were not met.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2006 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations between the NSCN-IM and the government continued throughout the year, with several rounds of talks taking place in India, Amsterdam, and Thailand. As in 2005, the talks remained deadlocked. In October, talks failed due to the governments rejection of NSCN-IMs demand for self-governance. Another thwarted NSCN-IM demand included a call for third party intervention in the peace talks, especially by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. The NSCN-IM also reportedly sought a separate ‘Naga constitution’ under the special federal relationship in the peace talks with the Union Government at Amsterdam. At the end of the year, the ceasefire held, but no progress had been made in the negotiation process.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2007 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: NSCN-IM and the government held several rounds of peace talks throughout the year but failed to reach any substantive agreement beyond the extension of the ceasefire. NSCN-IMs wish to have a Dutch mediator from the NGO Kreddha was ruled out by India, which insisted on purely bilateral talks.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2008 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2009 Dyad Archive

Comment on Active: Only sporadic clashes between NSCN – IM and security forces took place in 2009, and the fighting did not reach the level of an armed conflict.

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations between the government and NSCN – IM continued during 2009. In July, the parties held talks in New Delhi where practical issues regarding the implementation of the ongoing ceasefire were discussed. In November, the government presented a set of proposals for settling the conflict. While not immediately accepting the proposals, NSCN – IM declared that they were acceptable as a basis for further negotiations.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2010 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiations: During 2010, the Union Government and National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) held talks. The Union home ministry officials have maintained that the negotiations would continue.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2011 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: A meeting between five NSCN-IM delegates, the president of India and the minister of interior took place in March and was positively viewed afterwards as a step towards dialogue and trustbuilding. Following a period of tensions in May 2011, negotiations resumed. In December, the secretary-general of the NCSM-IM announced his intention to declare an honourable agreement between the parties in talks with the Indian government. He furthermore stressed the government had to initiate respective action in response to insurgents' claims and demands.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2012 Dyad Archive

Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Due to the ceasefire between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM, lethal encounters were rare in 2012. However, patrolling security forces occasionally clashed with NSCN-IM fighters. These clashes resulted in 6 fatalities.

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations between Government representatives and NSCN-IM occurred regularly. NSCN-IM eaders Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah held talks in New Dheli with the central governments representative, R S Pandey. Negotiations became tense in April, when NSCN-IM rebels kidnapped several Assam Rifles (security forces) personnel and issued a new set of demands. The NSCN-IM eventually released their hostages unharmed. In the third quarter of 2013, progress in negotiations was achieved after a meeting between parliamentarians from the Assemby of Nagaland and the Indian Prime Minister where the parliamentarians signaled openness to give up seats before the next elections as a step towards a peace agreement. While the armed groups in Nagaland expressed support for reconciliation, some based this willingness on the establishment of Naga sovereignity. Throughout the final quarter of 2012, further informal meetings and negotiations took place.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2013 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: On 22 April the NSCN-K and the government jointly agreed to extend the ceasefire agreement that would have expired on 28 April for another year. The ceasefire agreement between the NSCN-KK and the government was also renewed for another year. In negotiations NSCN-IM presented a proposal for greater autonomy, though they at the same time affirmed that they had not abandoned their demand for independence and sovereignty. NSCN-IM and the government held direct talks in Delhi in November.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2014 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: In 2014, the government of India concluded the Lenten Agreement in March with Naga insurgent organisations not involved in the armed conflict recorded by the UCDP. According to the Lenten Agreement a Naga National Government should be formed.

In the year direct negotiations were held with NSCN-IM in July. The government did not want peace talks with the other armed groups as long as the peace process with NSCN-IM was ongoing. NSCN-K rejected any form of agreement with the government.

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO

2015 Dyad Archive

Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiations: Negotiations between the Government of India and an ailing leadership of NSCN-IM resulted in a Framework Peace Agreement signed on 3 August 2015.

The text and provisions of the agreement was kept secret by the two sides; in December, the NSCN-IM leadership made a statement indicating that the government recognized Naga's "sovereign power over their identity", a vague formulation that does not make

Victory: NO

Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated

2016 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2017 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2018 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2019 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2020 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2021 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2022 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2023 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2024 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

2025 Dyad Archive

Terminated: NO

Uppsala Conflict Data Program

Department of Peace and Conflict Research

UCDP

Government of India - NSCN-IM