General information
Type of Incompatibility: Territory
Comment on Type of Incompatibility: The conflict is concerned with the territory of Patani (Malay spelling) which primarily concerns the administrative provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani (Thai spelling), Yala and Songkhla in Thailand.
Different insurgent groups have made somewhat different demands on their preferred status of the region, mainly focusing on independence or some form of autonomy.
A document outlining the declared goals of the current Patani insurgents outline the goal of an independent muslim country, Patani Darulsalam.
Territory: Patani
Date of first stated goal of incompatibility: 1960-12-31
Comment on date of first stated goals of incompatibility: The first main group intending to take up arms against the Thai government was originally formed in 1960, but after a crackdown by Thai intelligence in 1961 it only formally became active in 1963. After many of the first leaders were arrested, Ustaz Abdul Karim Hassan instigated the group that was influenced by the socialist-influenced nationalism of Indonesia under Sukarno. The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN; National Revolutionary Front) was created with the aim of establishing an Islamic Republic of Patani. BRN originally focused on building a strong political organization through controlling Islamic schools, so called ponoh, in the region but the group also quickly declared itself ready to cooperate with any other anti-Thai organisation. After numerous splits, the name BRN is presently used by three different factions: BRN-Ulama, BRN-Congress, and BRN-Coordinate.
One of the early splinter groups from BRN led to the formation of Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) by Tengku Abdul Jalal in 1971. The BNPP wanted to create a bigger role for Islam than the pan-Malaysian nationalism of BRN, but also to revive the royal authority. The ideology of the group later shifted to the faction influenced by religious leaders and it changed its name to Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP; Islamic Liberation Front of Patani). It is unclear whether the BIPP has been involved in any incidents after 2002.
A group of Patani students in India was organised by Tehgku Bira Kotanila (Kabir Abdul Rahman) in 1967 as the Pertubuhan Perpaduan Pembebasan Patani (PULO; Patani United Liberation Organisation). PULO wanted to distance themselves from the religious element in the BNPP and BRN and pursued a secular nationalism. In 1995, a faction broke off from the organisation and created the New PULO.
In 1995, some 25-30 Patani natives returned from having fought with the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Nasoree Saesang (alias Awae Kaelae, Poh Wae, or Haji Awe), they decided to revive a small group, the Gerakan Mujahidin Patani, that had briefly existed in 1986-1993. The newly formed Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP; Islamic Mujahidin Movement of Patani) wants to create an independent Patani state, but has also reportedly called for jihad and support for al-Qaeda in the fight against the USA.
Date of first use of armed force: 1961-01-01
Comment on first use of armed force: The early leadership of BRN had to abandon their planned armed revolt after Thai intelligence had discovered their activities and arrested most of its leadership. Those who evaded arrest fled to Malaysia, and the subsequent BRN revolt was muted and a failure.
Date of first battle related death: 1965-01-01
Comment on first battle related death: The early Patani insurgents pursued at strategy in the 1960s with the intent of making it difficult for the Thai authorities to govern the region. It is unclear when the first battle-related death was registered, especially since the Patani insurgents’ also maintained sporadic co-operation with criminal gangs in the area and remnants of the Communist Party of Malaysia.
It is difficult to disaggregate who was responsible for the violence in the region in the 1960s, as the government only referred to problems with banditry and potential communist guerrillas. There was some separatist violence in the years 1965-1968 and an increase in activity during the second half of 1969 when the government applied the air force against suspected communist camps.
Date of conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: 2003-10-27
Comment on conflict reached 25 battle releated deaths: Following decades of skirmishes, the insurgent movement seemed to increase its ability in late 2001. A simultaneous attack on five different police posts in three different provinces on 24 December 2001 could be seen as an indicator of a new strategy by the rebels. The attacks became increasingly common throughout 2002 even though the rebels seemed to prefer raids on police posts to capture weapons, or bombs against infrastructure that rarely led to large amounts of casualties. Clashes intensified further in 2003, when Patani insurgents increasingly started attacking smaller police and army posts on a few occasions each month. In the end of October 2003 insurgents attacked police stations in the Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala provinces. These operations led to the casualties in the dyad reaching more than 25 deaths on 27 October 2003.
Annual information
This section contains annual information systematically collected by the UCDP.
1990
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1991
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1993
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1994
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1995
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
1997
Primary Parties: -
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Best | 0 |
| Low | 0 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2003
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 27 |
| Best | 26 |
| Low | 26 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2004
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 170 |
| Best | 164 |
| Low | 162 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2005
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 212 |
| Best | 205 |
| Low | 202 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2006
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 217 |
| Best | 212 |
| Low | 212 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2007
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 206 |
| Best | 197 |
| Low | 197 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2008
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 133 |
| Best | 130 |
| Low | 130 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2009
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 138 |
| Best | 138 |
| Low | 135 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2010
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 79 |
| Best | 76 |
| Low | 74 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2011
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 149 |
| Best | 143 |
| Low | 143 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2012
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 132 |
| Best | 131 |
| Low | 131 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2013
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 192 |
| Best | 189 |
| Low | 188 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2014
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 72 |
| Best | 68 |
| Low | 62 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2015
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 57 |
| Best | 57 |
| Low | 56 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2016
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 50 |
| Best | 50 |
| Low | 49 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2017
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 43 |
| Best | 43 |
| Low | 43 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2018
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 36 |
| Low | 27 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2019
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 55 |
| Best | 55 |
| Low | 54 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2020
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 47 |
| Best | 46 |
| Low | 37 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2021
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 38 |
| Best | 38 |
| Low | 30 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2022
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 29 |
| Best | 29 |
| Low | 23 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2023
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 30 |
| Best | 30 |
| Low | 19 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2024
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 36 |
| Best | 34 |
| Low | 28 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
2025
Primary Parties: Government of Thailand - Patani insurgents
Dimension: Internal
| Estimated Fatalities | |
|---|---|
| High | 37 |
| Best | 36 |
| Low | 19 |
Numbers include fatalities for all dyads both active and inactive for this year
Conflict Archive
This section contains annual information no longer systematically collected by the UCDP.
1990 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1991 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1993 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1994 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1995 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
1997 Conflict Archive
Terminated: NO
2003 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Occasional attacks on police posts occurred throughout the year. In 2002, these attacks led to around 20 battle-related deaths but this escalated somewhat in 2003. Most of the attacks seemed intent to capture weapons from the police.
Not directly related to the conflict, but much attention was given to the arrest of several members of the Indonesian organisation Jemaah Islaimiah (JI) in Thailand 2003. Three alleged members were arrested in June in Pattaya and were charged with plotting terrorist attacks on embassies and tourist attractions in Bangkok. In August, the reputed chief operative of JI, Hambali, was arrested in central Thailand after which the government claimed to have wiped out the JI-network in the country.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Low estimate: 26, High estimate: 28, Best estimate: 27
Occasional attacks on police posts occurred throughout the year. In 2002, these attacks led to around 20 battle-related deaths but this escalated somewhat in 2003. Most of the attacks seemed intent to capture weapons from the police."
Negotiations: NO
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2004 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: Most common were a large number of attacks on military and police, government officials and civilians by unidentified gunmen. The attacks occurred basically on a daily basis but did not always lead to any casualties. During the year, there was an upsurge in drive-by shootings performed by masked insurgents on the back of motorcycles but there were also a few cases when civilians or government officials were kidnapped and later found beheaded.
There were also a few large well-coordinated operations launched against army or police installations. These were accompanied by a several simultaneous smaller attacks elsewhere in the provinces.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Low estimate: 162. High estimate: 170, Best estimate: 164.
The estimate given above is only counting battle-related deaths. Both sides in the conflict also attacked civilians, so called one-sided violence, throughout the year."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were no official negotiations in the conflict, but there were suggestions that some members of Bersatu (an umbrella organisation that claimed it had nothing to do with the conflict) had low-level contacts with the Thai administration. It was reported that Bersatu demanded some representation in the regional government but it is unclear to what extent this was linked to the conflict.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Chile, Laos, Malaysia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Malaysia hosted talks between the Thai government and a Bersaut leader in July. During an APEC meeting in Chile in November, the Thai PM met US envoy Powell to dicuss the topic. On the side-lines of an ASEAN summit in Laos, a meeting took place between Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2005 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict remained active throughout the year with almost daily attacks on police and military, government employees, and civilians in the region. Most of the battle-related deaths occurred in drive-by attacks by masked gunmen on security forces but also targeting local defence volunteers and village leadership. In many cases, the attackers managed to capture weapons from their victims.
Another source of violence was the use of bombs but these rarely led to many battle-related casualties. The conflict was characterized of a large number of attacks that usually led to just one or a few fatalities each time.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Low estimate: 202. High estimate: 212. Best estimate: 205.
The estimate given above is not counting deliberate targeting of civilians, or one-sided violence, which was rampant in the region throughout 2005.
At the same time, due to the difficulty of identifying a specific organisation to the attacks, it is possible that some violence by non-insurgent related actors may be included in the estimate above."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: In late August, it was reported that there had been meetings between government officials and separatists about the potential for peaceful reconciliation. According to a low-level leader of PULO in Malaysia, the talks had been held in Lausanne, Switzerland, between 24-27 August. These contacts were flatly denied by the government.
Towards the end of the year, the exiled PULO leaders in Sweden offered their willingness to represent the Patani insurgents in peace talks. It is however unclear whether these PULO leaders have any connections with the activity on the ground. Furthermore, the Thai government rejected any possibility of negotiations with groups that have "killed innocent people."
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2006 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict remained active throughout the year with almost daily attacks on police and military, government employees, and civilians in the region. The government maintained emergency rule in the three provinces of Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani throughout the year. These measures allow increased powers for the government regarding detention and surveillance, as well as broad immunity from prosecution. The emergency measures were regularly criticized by human rights groups. Most of the battle-related deaths occurred in drive-by attacks by masked gunmen on security forces but also targeting local defence volunteers and village leadership. In many cases, the attackers managed to capture weapons from their victims.
Another source of violence was the use of bombs but these rarely led to many battle-related casualties. The conflict was characterized of a large number of attacks that usually led to just one or a few fatalities each time.
After the change in government following the military coup on 19 September, the new administration declared a willingness to open negotiations and find a peaceful solution to the southern conflict. The interim Prime Minister Surayud apologized for the hard-handed approach of the previous government, and the head of the army General Sondhi acknowledged that extrajudicial executions of suspected insurgents during the former Thaksin administration.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Low and best estimate: 214. High estimate: 218.
The estimate given above is not counting deliberate targeting of civilians, or one-sided violence, which was rampant in the region throughout 2006.
At the same time, due to the difficulty of identifying a specific organisation to the attacks, it is possible that some violence by non-insurgent related actors may be included in the estimate above."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were offers of mediation from Sweden, Germany, and the United Nations to initiate official peace talks, but the only meetings held in 2006 was between separatist leaders and local military officials.
The Thai government initially refused to participate in negotiations claiming that the insurgents were “terrorists”. In October, it was reported that meetings had been held in the preceding months where representatives from Bersatu, BRN, Pulo, BIPP (Islamic Liberation Front of Patani), and GMIP had met with Lt-Gen Vaipot Srinual and Gen Winai Phattiyakul of the Thai armed forces. The meetings had been held in Langkawi and Putrajaya, Malaysia, with the assistance of the organization Perdana Global Peace Organization (PGPO), headed by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir. The outcome of the meetings were that the insurgents had declared a willingness to discuss a potential agreement on the basis of more autonomy for the southern provinces, an amnesty for all insurgents, help with promoting economic development in the region, and allowing the use of Malay language in schools.
There was no response from the Thai government with regards to these suggested points for negotiations. After the change in government following the coup on 19 September, the new administration declared a willingness to open negotiations and find a peaceful solution to the southern conflict. Later in the year, however, the government concluded that it did not know with whom to negotiate and that no contacts had been established. In late December, a suggestion of opening negotiations in Brunei was dismissed by the Thai head of the army Gen Sondhi, who described the conflict as a domestic affair.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2007 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict remained active throughout the year with almost daily attacks on police and military, government employees, and civilians in the region. The government maintained emergency rule in the three provinces of Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani throughout the year. These measures allow increased powers for the government regarding detention and surveillance, as well as broad immunity from prosecution. The emergency measures were regularly criticized by human rights groups. Most of the battle-related deaths occurred in drive-by attacks by masked gunmen on security forces but also targeting local defence volunteers and village leadership. In many cases, the attackers managed to capture weapons from their victims.
Another source of violence was the use of bombs but these rarely led to many battle-related casualties. The conflict was characterized of a large number of attacks that usually led to just one or a few fatalities each time.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: "Low and best estimate: 197, high estimate: 206
The estimate given above is not counting deliberate targeting of civilians, or one-sided violence, which was rampant in the region throughout 2007.
At the same time, due to the difficulty of identifying a specific organisation to the attacks, it is possible that some violence by non-insurgent related actors may be included in the estimate above."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: There were rumours in early January of talks between low-level military commanders and insurgent leaders regarding a possible ceasefire. As the conflict continued unabated, these talks were appearantly unsuccessful and was not followed by any direct negotiations.
In late June, the Thai prime minister Surayud Chulanont claimed that he was still willing to hold talks with the Patani insurgents, but that the government had failed in identifying any of the core leaders of the insurgents.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2008 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict remained active throughout 2008 albeit on a somewhat lower level than the preceding years regarding casualties. The decline in casualties was most probably due to reorganisation of the military actions in the area. In October 2007 General Anupong was elected army commander and was given full powers to handle the violence in the south. He announced a plan where the first phase in 2007-2009 was designed to end violence by employing aggressive military actions. The general reorganised the military operations and there was an important increase in patrols and military check-points. There was also an increased recruitment of paramilitary rangers despite their reputation of involvement in human-rights abuses and corruption.
The majority of the battle related deaths in 2008 occurred in drive-by shootings or bombings of members of the security forces, police, local paramilitary and village officials. The conflict was characterised by a large number of attacks that usually led to just one or a few fatalities each time.
Emergency rule was constant in the provinces of Narathiwat, Yala and Patani as well as in parts of the Songkhla province and remained in position by the end of 2008. These measures allow increased powers for the government regarding detention and surveillance, as well as broad immunity from prosecution. In November 2007 the Internal Security Act (ISA) was adopted by the parliament. The act further increased the military’s scope of action. The emergency measures and the ISA were regularly criticised by human rights groups as tools to institutionalise the army’s political power.
The difficulties in identifying the organisational structure, leadership and demands of the insurgents remained. The Thai government officially did not take part in any talks with the insurgents.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimate given above is not counting deliberate targeting of civilians, or one-sided violence, which was rampant in the region throughout 2008. At the same time, due to the difficulty of identifying a specific organisation to the attacks, it is possible that some violence by non-insurgent related actors may be included in the estimate above."
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The difficulties in identifying the organisational structure, leadership and demands of the insurgents remained and led to misunderstandings regarding negotiations. In July 2008 the leader of the Ruam Chai Thai Chart Pattana party, a minor member of the governing six-party coalition, declared that he had met with a previously unknown group called Ruam Pak Tai Khong Prathet Thai (Thailands United Southern Underground group), claiming to represent the southern insurgents. This group later made a statement on national television announcing a cease-fire starting 14 July. Soon after, the cease-fire was dismissed as a hoax as the group did not represent the insurgency.
On 20-21 September the same year Indonesia hosted talks between General Kwanchart Klaharm, an advisor to the Ministry of Defense, and Muslim community representatives from the south. These talks initially seemed at least partly successful but were dismissed when the Thai government declared that Kwanchart did not participate as an official government representative. Also the insurgents denied taking part in these talks.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2009 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in the southernmost parts of Thailand followed the same pattern during 2009 as it had during previous years. The battle related deaths that were recorded were mostly the results of drive-by shootings, and occasionally, deaths following the remote detonation of homemade bombs. There was however a significant event during the early summer of 2009 that proved to be of importance for the region. On 8 June 12 people were killed in a local mosque as they participated in the Friday prayers, this was an incident that broke the pattern of single drive-by shootings and bombings. This incident prompted a series of retaliatory attacks that inflated the violence and increased the death toll. A large portion of the violence in the region was directed towards the educational system of the country. Teachers were often targeted, a tactic that led to the increased protection for school personnel. In many cases during 2009 there was violence directed towards convoys of teachers traveling under army protection. These clashes resulted in numerous deaths during 2009.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimate given above is not counting deliberate targeting of civilians, or one-sided violence, which was rampant in the region throughout 2009. These incidents are available under the “one-sided violence†menu. At the same time, due to the difficulty of identifying a specific organization to the attacks, it is possible that some violence by non-insurgent related actors may be included in the estimate above.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations were held during the year
Since the conflict in the south of Thailand, mainly in the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, and to a lesser extent, in Songkhla, was not, in 2009, led by a clearly defined group, but rather by a loosely put together group of Islamist insurgents aiming for a Muslim state in the southern region of Thailand negotiations were hard to arrange. The overarching group was the BRN-C (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate) a group that was, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), highly decentralized and owed little to outside influences. This fact contributed to the absence of negotiations during the year.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2010 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The activity in the southernmost provinces of Thailand followed the same pattern as previous years, namely that of drive by shootings, remotely detonated home-made bombs and killings of civilians related to the government. The events that were recorded for 2010 in this conflict are almost exclusively events with one or a few casualties; there are no recorded events in which there is large scale fighting with over five deaths. The primary targets selected by the Patani insurgents throughout 2010 have been teachers and Buddhist monks. The contingent of the Thai army that is stationed in the southern provinces has primarily concentrated their efforts on protection of these targeted groups.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The estimate given above is not counting deliberate targeting of civilians, or one-sided violence, which was occurred in the region throughout 2010. These incidents are available under the one-sided violence menu. At the same time, due to the difficulty of identifying a specific organization to the attacks, it is possible that some violence by non-insurgent related actors may be included in the estimate above.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: No negotiations were held during the year.
Since the conflict in the south of Thailand, mainly in the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, and to a lesser extent, in Songkhla, was not, in 2010, led by a clearly defined group, but rather by a loosely put together group of Islamist insurgents aiming for a Muslim state in the southern region of Thailand negotiations were hard to arrange. The overarching group was the BRN-C (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate) a group that was, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), highly decentralized and owed little to outside influences. This fact contributed to the absence of negotiations during the year.
Nevertheless there were indications of willingness to talk from PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization). PULO’s chief of foreign affairs stated that his organisation, representing the southern insurgents were willing to discuss the conflict matter with the Thai government. The spokes person who spoke from an undisclosed location in Sweden made references to the situation in Indonesia and the independence claims made by the Aceh region. He stressed the fact that dropping the independence claim was not an option, but that talks with the government should be held in order to reach common ground regarding other issues. The statements from the chief of foreign affairs should however be viewed with some caution, it is unclear as to what extent he represents the overall sentiment of the southern insurgency. It can however be seen as an indicator that there are elements within the insurgency that are open to the idea of negotiating with the Thai government.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2011 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: While the level of violence in Thailands southernmost provinces increased during 2011, the fighting largely followed the same patterns as in previous years. Most events that were recorded in 2011 consisted of drive by shootings and detonations of improvised explosive devices, resulting in one or two casualties. Only very few attacks lead to three or more deaths. Security forces and civilians representing the Thai state were the most common targets of the insurgent attacks who made up a large majority of the fatalities. The fatalities among the insurgents mainly resulted from gunfights following on attacks or search operations.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: Violence escalated during 2011 and the estimate was the highest since 2007.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: According to reports from the Advisory Council for Peace Building in the Southern Border Provinces, secret talks have been held during early 2011 between representatives from the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre and Pulo, one of the insurgent groups involved in the fighting.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2012 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict remained active in 2012, and the level of violence remained roughly equivalent to that of 2011. The insurgency continued to use drive-by shootings and improvised explosive devices to ambush members of the Thai security forces and other individuals connected to the Thai government. Insurgent attacks were frequent, but rarely resulted in more than three fatalities. Thai security forces retaliated against insurgents on several occasions by raiding suspected insurgent hideouts. These raids were relatively rare, however, and the Patani Insurgents continued to inflict far more fatalities than they suffered.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The fighting between Patani Insurgents and the Government of Thailand in 2012 resulted in slightly fewer fatalities than in 2011. However, the level of violence remains very high compared to most previous years. The insurgents continued to use explosives and firearms to ambush teachers, police officers, soldiers, and other individuals connected with the local and national Thai government. These attacks were frequent, though they produced less than 2 fatalities on average. The Thai security forces launched several raids throughout the year which also produced fatalities.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The Thai government admitted in 2012 that it was holding discussions withPattani insurgent groups. The talks were extremely limited, however. A government representative reported in August, "Right now we are holding peace talks with different insurgent groups but we are still not clear what they want".
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2013 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict remained active in 2013 and the level of violence increased relative to that of 2012. This was likely the result of increased targeting of state officials and decreased targeting of civilians by the insurgents. The insurgency continued to use drive-by shootings and improvised explosive devices to ambush members of the Thai security forces and other individuals connected to the Thai government. They have increased the number of larger-scale attacks using bombings followed up with small arms fire. A notable event was the storming of an army base. Thai security forces retaliated against insurgents on several occasions by raiding suspected insurgent hideouts. These raids were relatively rare, however, and the Patani Insurgents continued to inflict far more fatalities than they suffered.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The fighting between Patani Insurgents and the Government of Thailand in 2013 resulted in a highest number of fatalities since 2007. This was likely the result of increased targeting of state officials and decreased targeting of civilians by the insurgents, seemingly related to the peace talks between one of the Patani insurgent groups BRN-C and the Government of Thailand. The insurgency continued to use drive-by shootings and improvised explosive devices to ambush members of the Thai security forces and other individuals connected to the Thai government. The insurgents have increased the number of larger-scale attacks using bombings followed up with small arms fire. The Thai security forces launched several raids throughout the year which also produced fatalities.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The Thai government held peace talks with a Patani insurgent group named Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C). The talks were held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and were facilitated by the Malaysian government. The Thai government and BRN-C signed a general consensus document on a “Peace Dialogue Process” on 28 February 2013. Three rounds of talks have been held since in March, April and June during which a reduction of the violence has been discussed. In addition, the BRN-C has released demands on Youtube several times during the peace process, including reference to territorial demands. Since 13 June 2013, no peace talks have taken place. A crucial factor affecting the delay of further peace talks is the political unrest in Bangkok against the government of Yingluck Shinawatra.
2013 was the first time formal peace talks have been held between the Thai government and Patani insurgents.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Government of Malaysia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The Government of Malaysia has acted as a facilitator during the peace talks in 2013. The peace talks took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Apart from these talks, several bilateral talks between the facilitator and the two parties to the talks have taken place.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2014 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: There was a significant downtick in reported violence in the Deep South region of Thailand during 2014. This downward trend might have been increased due to reporting being focused on the political situation in Bangkok during the lead up to, and the aftermath of the military coup d’état that took place in May.
The events registered were small-scale attacks directed towards army and police installments in the southern regions. Another trademark of the activity was that of revenge attacks. A Muslim family was targeted in February, leading to the death of three young boys, this sparked several retaliatory attacks against police and military targets, as well as civilian targets associated with the government. Further controversies were recorded during the year, on one instance the Thai Army, by mistake, shot and killed a 14 year old boy. They planted a weapon on him, portraying him as an insurgent, a fact that surfaced leading to anger and resentment among the civilian population of southern Thailand. Another controversy during the year was the Thai Army’s decision to arm civilians in the southern regions. This led to extensive criticism, mainly from various human rights groups who argued that such a move only served to intensify and make the situation more dangerous.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: The figures for 2014 are the lowest since the conflict started, in 2003, 2014, and 2010 are the years with the lowest activity during the years that the conflict has been active. One reason for the low fatality estimate might be the political turbulence that was brought on in Bangkok as the military orchestrated a coup d’état in May. This might have down prioritized reporting from the conflict-ridden south. The effect of the military coup on the deep-south is still pending and the numbers presented might be revised as new information is available.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: The talks held between the Thai government and the Patani insurgent group BRN-C continued during 2014. They did not lead to any formal agreements and were hampered by the fact that the Thai government was overthrown by the Thai military in May 2014. After the change of power in Bangkok new efforts were made to reach an agreement to solve the issues in the conflict. These new efforts were however not successful and during the attempts attacks increased in the south.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2015 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: 2015 marked yet another year of conflict in the deep south region of Thailand. The number of fatalities continued to drop compared to previous years. There were a lot of small scale attacks reported, the violence was typically carried out by insurgents detonating homemade bombs, and/or conducting drive by shootings aimed at military personal.
The violence was confined to the southern regions of Thailand.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The Military junta that took power 2014 continued its efforts to find solutions to the insurgency in the south, the efforts have however been fruitless. The lack of a clear organisation has made it difficult to establish a credible counterpart to negotiate with.
Terminated: NO
2016 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in the southern regions of Thailand remained active during 2016, albeit at a lower level than previous years. The events in the conflict where confined to the southern regions of Thailand, there were however accusations that insurgents from the deep south were responsible for a series of bombing directed at the tourist industry in Thailand, namely a series of bombs in the holiday location Hua Hin town. The rumors that this was in fact the act of southern separatist has not been verified, and is therefor not part of the UCDP data.
Negotiations: NO
Comment on Negotiation: The negotiations that were initiated in 2013 broke down 2014 as the military forced then Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra out of office. The military regime has not expressed any willingness to engage the insurgents in negations.
Third party involvement: NO
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2017 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in Thailand’s deep south continued during 2017. The violence was largely carried out in small scale attacks, directed at police/military installations, as well as civilians representing the Thai state. The number of fatalities in 2017 dropped slightly compared to previous years.
Terminated: NO
2018 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in Thailand’s deep south remained active in 2018, with violence being confined to the southern most regions of Patani, Songkhla, Narathiwat and Yala. In 2018, the number of fatalities in the conflict decreased for the fifth consecutive year, now being at the lowest level since the start of the conflict in 2003. As during the most recent years, violence by the insurgents was mainly carried out in form of small scale attacks, such as drive-by shootings and small roadside bombs, targeting police and military installations as well as local village chiefs.
Terminated: NO
2019 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The conflict in Thailand’s deep south remained active in 2019, with violence being confined to the southern regions of Patani, Songkhla, Narathiwat, and Yala. During the previous years from 2015 to 2018, the Patani conflict had experienced a steady decline in the level of violence. However, in 2019, the conflict resurged with the biggest attack in years on November 5 when the insurgents targeted a security checkpoint in Yala province, leaving fifteen people dead. Other repeated though less deadly violence by the insurgents during 2019 was mainly carried out in the form of small scale attacks, such as drive-by shootings and small roadside bombs, targeting police and military installations as well as local village chiefs.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Geneva-based NGO "Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue" facilitated (back channels) the parties to form the agreement "The Berlin Initiative" where the Government of Thailand and the BRN agree to pursue dialogue again. The agreement formed the base of, and regulated, future negotiations.
Terminated: NO
2020 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2020, the conflict in Thailand's deep south remained active. The level of violence was slightly lower than in the year before, but did not decrease to match the recent low point of 2018. This despite negotiations between rebels and the government in January and March and a unilateral ceasefire due to the threat of COVID-19 announced by insurgents in April, which substantially reduced violence in the four months that followed. The violence was confined to the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala, with Pattani experiencing the largest share of conflict fatalities. In 2020 minor clashes and small scale attacks such as drive-by shootings and small roadside bombs accounted for all organized violence.
Comment on Yearly Battle Related Deaths: All events minor.
Closest thing to an outlier event is one on 2020-02-23 with 6 on Best.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Two rounds of so called formal peace dialogue between the Government of Thailand and the BRN, the leading group among the Patani insurgents, took place in January and March. No further talks were held, probably due to covid-19, and no substantial agreement resulted from this dialogue.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Malaysia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Malaysia hosted and facilitated the negotiations in 2020.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2021 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2021, the conflict in Thailand's deep south remained active. The level of violence was slightly lower than in the year before, but did not decrease to match the recent low point of 2018. The violence was confined to the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala, with Pattani experiencing the largest share of conflict fatalities. In 2021 minor clashes and small scale attacks such as drive-by shootings and small roadside bombs accounted for all organized violence. The negotiations held in January and March 2020 did not continue due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, back-channel talks during 2021 resulted in some progress as the parties in November 2021 agreed on a protocol to discuss a reduction in violence and a commitment to political solutions to the conflict. Formal talks resumed in January 2022.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In January and March 2020, two rounds of formal peace dialogue were held for the first time in years. No agreement resulted from the talks, and the COVID-19 pandemic prevented further face-to-face meetings between the parties. However, back-channel talks during 2021 resulted in some progress as the parties in November 2021 agreed on a protocol to discuss a reduction in violence and a commitment to political solutions to the conflict. Formal talks resumed in Kuala Lumpur in January 2022.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Malaysia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Although no formal talks were hosted by Malaysia during 2021, the Malaysian facilitator continued to be involved in the peace process.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2022 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2022, the violence was again confined to the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala, with Narathiwat experiencing the largest share of conflict fatalities. As in recent years, the organized violence has consisted of small scale clashes and attacks, mainly through small roadside bombs and shootouts between government forces and unaccompanied or few insurgents.
Peace talks between the Thai government and the largest Patani insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi National (BRN) have continued throughout the year. During the spring, this resulted in a 40-day ceasefire called the Ramadan Peace Initiative. Despite this positive development, the peace process remains fragile and slow-paced, nearly 10 years after the first formal negotiations of the conflict.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Peace talks between the Thai government and the largest Patani insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), continued throughout 2022, where the parties met in Berlin, Germany and in Malaysia. They discussed both conflict behavior, mainly decrease of violence and ceasefires, and the status of the Patani region.
A change since earlier negotiations is that the BRN has opened up to a solution to the conflict that is within the framework of the Thai constitution. Thus the parties are working towards a resolution that does not include formal independence from Thailand.
During the spring, negotiations resulted in a 40-day ceasefire called the Ramadan Peace Initiative. Despite this, the peace process remains fragile and slow-paced, nearly 10 years after the first formal negotiations of the conflict.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Government of Malaysia, Government of Germany
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The formal peace talks are held with an official Malaysian facilitator. Most dialogue between the parties have taken place in Kuala Lumpur, though at least one meeting was held in Berlin during the year.
Terminated: NO
2023 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2023, all fatality incidents were recorded within the active territorial state-based conflict between the Government of Thailand and Patani Insurgents. In 2023, the violence continued to be confined to the Patani region, the southernmost provinces of the country. The largest share of conflict fatalities occurred in Yala, Pattani, and most of all in Narathiwat. As in recent years, the organized violence has consisted of small-scale clashes and attacks, mainly through small roadside bombs, IEDs, and gunfights between government forces and the Patani Insurgents. Though peace talks occurred in 2022, which instigated a 40-day ceasefire, the situation changed in 2023. In February, the Thai government and the largest Patani Insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), created a plan to come to an agreement. Contary to 2022, peace dialogues between the parties were put on hold after a round of successful peace talks in February, where they established the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace, JCPP. BRN discontinued its participation in engagement in peace talks in March, claiming that it awaited the new government after the elections in May. Throughout the year, peace talks were put on hold. It was suggested that the BRN may have been experiencing internal struggle, as the delegation needed to continue peace talks, which entailed the making of concessions, whilst the military wing of the group still demanded independence.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: In February, the Thai government and the largest Patani Insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), created a plan to come to an agreement. Contary to 2022, peace dialogues between the parties were put on hold after a round of successful peace talks in February, where they established the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace, JCPP. BRN discontinued its participation in engagement in peace talks in March, claiming that it awaited the new government after the elections in May. Throughout the year, peace talks were put on hold.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Government of Malaysia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Dialogues have been held in Kuala Lumpur together with Malaysia's General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin. Malaysia has previously been a non-warring third party involved as a holder of the meetings during the peace negotiations (see 2022).
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
2024 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: In 2024, all fatality incidents in Thailand were recorded within the active territorial state-based conflict between the Government of Thailand and Patani Insurgents. The violence continued to be confined to the Patani region, the southernmost provinces of the country. The largest share of conflict fatalities occurred in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. As in recent years, the organized violence has consisted of small-scale clashes and attacks, mainly through small roadside bombs, IEDs, and gunfights between government forces and the Patani Insurgents. In February 2023, the Thai government and the largest Patani Insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), created a plan to come to an agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace, JCPP. BRN discontinued its participation in engagement in peace talks in March, claiming that it awaited the new government after the elections in May. Throughout 2023, peace talks were put on hold. Peace talks between Thai government and BRN resumed in February 2024, but failed to produce any agreements.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: Peace talks between Thai government and BRN resumed in February 2024, but failed to produce any agreements. The talks focused on technical details in the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace, JCPP, established in February 2023.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Government of Malaysia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: Peace talks were held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, facilitated by Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, a representative of the Malaysian government. In August 2024, Datuk Mohd Rabin Bin Basir was appointed as the new talks facilitator.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
2025 Conflict Archive
Comment on Activity: The territorial state-based conflict between the Thai government and the Patani Insurgents remained active in 2025. All violence was recorded in the southern provinces of Thailand, with a majority of the violence taking place in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat province. A few events were also recorded in Songkhla province. The type of violence is consistent with previous years and consisted largely of shootings and explosions from planted explosives such as IEDs. As during previous years, the peace talks between the parties continued throughout 2025, leading to a preliminary agreement in December aimed at resolving the conflict. BRN, the largest insurgency group, did, however, express continued concern for the dialogue process.
Negotiations: YES
Comment on Negotiation: As during previous years, peace talks have been ongoing between the government of Thailand and BRN, the largest insurgent group in 2025. There were initiatives from both sides separately, such as a unilateral initiative from the Thai government to reduce hostilities during Ramadan or the ceasefire proposal submitted to the Malaysian dialogue facilitator by the BRN. Neither initiative, however, was accepted by the other. The two adversaries did reach a preliminary agreement in December with objectives aimed at resolving the deep south insurgency, but BRN expressed concerns that domestic political instability could hinder the dialogue process.
Third party involvement: YES
Third party involvement names: Government of Malaysia
Comment on Third Party Involvement: The government of Malaysia has continued to be present as a dialouge facilitator between the government of Thailand and the Patani Insurgents.
Victory: NO
Terminated: NO
Type of termination: Not terminated
