SUMMARY
Patani, a region where more than 75 percent of the population is Muslim and the majority speaks Malay as their first language, is located on the border to Malaysia. Initiatives by the Thai government to impose Thai language and customs have been met with resentment in the region. Since 2003, separatists demanded independence or extended autonomy for the Patani region. A number of different rebel groups have been active during the years but most have pursued distinctively different political objectives and have often suffered from substantial infighting. Both sides of the conflict have violated human rights. However, the level of violence in Thailand has in recent years continued on the downwards trend.
2025
The conflict between the Thai government and the Patani Insurgents remained active in 2025. All violence was recorded in the southern provinces of Thailand, with a majority of the violence taking place in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat province. A few events were also recorded in Songkhla province. The type of violence is consistent with previous years and consisted largely of shootings and explosions from planted explosives such as IEDs. As during previous years, peace talks between the parties continued throughout 2025, leading to a preliminary agreement in December aimed at resolving the conflict. BRN, the largest insurgency group, did, however, express continued concern for the dialogue process.
IN DEPTH
A brief background
Thailand, or its precursor the Kingdom of Siam, has effectively controlled the territory of former Patani Darussalam (Kingdom of Patani) since the late 18th Century and it became subjected to direct rule in 1902. In modern times, part of the former Patani belongs to Malaysia and the rest has become the Thai provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and Satun. In the first three of these provinces, located on the border to Malaysia on the eastern coast of Thailand, more than 75 percent of the population is Muslim and the majority speaks Malay as their first language. Several initiatives have been launched to impose Thai language and customs but these have often been met with resentment in the region.
The start of the insurgency in Patani
A popular uprising in February-April 1948 was suppressed and led to a refugee flow into Malaysia as Thailand declared a state of emergency. Tensions remained in the following decade and as soon as the state of emergency was abolished, insurgent organisations started to form during the 1960s. These early organisations, of which some remains active, consisted of groups such as BNPP (in 1986 renamed BIPP; Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani, Islamic Liberation Front of Patani), BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional, National Revolutionary Front), and PULO (Pertubuhan Perpaduan Pembebasan Patani, Patani United Liberation Organisation).
These and other groups launched occasional attacks on government and civilian targets during the 1970s, often together with communist guerrillas or criminal gangs. In 1980, BRN split into two factions and yet another split followed in 1984. One of the new factions, BRN Ulama, renounced violence while the other two, BRN Coordinate and BRN Congress, continued their sporadic attacks. In the most potent group at the time, PULO, infighting also led to defections until the group eventually formally split in 1995. The breakaway faction, New PULO, wanted to minimise the loss of life but to pursue more constant activity. Also in 1995, some Patani natives returned from fighting with the mujahideen in Afghanistan and formed the group GMIP (Gerakan Mujahideen Islami Patani, Islamic Mujahideen Movement of Pattani).
Exiled leaders for the different groups had sometimes met in Malaysia since 1989 as part of a political umbrella called Majelis Permesyuaratan Rakyat Melayu Patani (MPRMP, Patani Malay Peoples Consultative Council). In mid-1997s, PULO, New PULO, and GMIP wanted to revitalize the joint command under the name of Bersatu ("Unity"). Between August 1997 and January 1998, they launched an offensive against state officials which led to nine deaths. The response by Thai and Malaysian police led to the capture of many leaders in the groups while several others fled into exile in Europe or Arab countries.
Armed conflict in Patani
There have been several different insurgent organisations active in Patani but most have pursued distinctively different political objectives and have often suffered from substantial in-fighting. Thus, even though some low-intensity fighting has been reported in many years, there have not been reports of more than 25 battle-related deaths in any given year prior to 2003.
Sporadic attacks resumed in 2001 but most were directed against infrastructure and did not lead to many casualties. No groups claimed responsibility for these actions even though they towards the end of the year seemed to become better centrally coordinated. It is believed that the exiled PULO leadership had limited influence on the ground, and the BIPP were supposedly not active. The current Patani insurgents are allegedly directed by younger members of BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C) but also include activists from New PULO, GMIP, and the other BRN factions. The current military structure was established with the help of the BRN-C youth wing Pemuda ("youth") and consist of village-based militant groups calling themselves Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani ("Patani Freedom Fighters") or RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil, "Small Group Tactic"). Even though the current insurgency from the outside seems to consist of several different independent groups, the general strategy is centrally planned.
The number of attacks, and the number of casualties, increased during 2003 but the government mainly blamed the violence on criminals. Following a large and well-coordinated attack on an army camp on 4 January 2004, the government started boosting its troop strength in the provinces. Even though the government made some offers of allocating development funds to the region and building sport facilities in affected areas, the main response was to employ military force. The Thai authorities have been criticised for alleged use of torture in interrogation and extrajudicial killings of civilians, which has increase the tension between the population and the armed forces in the region. Following the overthrow of the Thai government by the military on 19 September 2006, there were attempts to initiate negotiations and promote development in the region. However, emergency rule in the region was not removed and the conflict continued unabated, the level of violence peaking that same year.
The general trend from 2007 to 2010 is that conflict intensity decreased. In 2010 the number of fatalities was the lowest since the first recorded year of activity, 2003. The lowpoint in 2010 might be partially explained by the fact that the situation in Thailand was quite tumultuous during the months of April and May 2010 due to intense protests that were held in Bangkok. This affected, in terms of reporting, the conflict in southern Thailand as there was a significant drop in reported deaths during the Bangkok protests. The conflict again escalated in 2011-2013, the level of violence recorded in 2013 almost matching that of the previous peak years of 2005-2007. The recorded violence followed a similar pattern as during previous years, namely that of drive-by shootings and home-made bombs. Compared to the years immedieately preceding it, in 2013 the insurgents have increased the number of larger-scale attacks using bombings followed up with small arms fire. 2013 was also the first year that formal negotiations took place between the Government of Thailand and BRN-C.
From 2014 onwards the conflict has been active every year, with the yearly conflict death tolls somewhat stabilizing at a lower level. The attacks and clashes that have occurred are relatively minor, except for one shooting at a security checkpoint in 2019 which accounted for roughly a fourth of that year's conflict fatalities. In April 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic swept the world, the main insurgent group of the Patani insurgents (the BRN) announced a unilateral ceasefire citing the threat posed by the virus. The level of violence decreased dramatically in the months which followed, before increasing again in the autumn. The conflict continued to be the main driver of violence in Thailand for several years, with the level of violence remaining relatively low. In 2024, as in previous years, the organized violence consisted of small scale clashes and attacks, such as small roadside bombs and shootouts between government forces and insurgents. This development continued in 2025. The fatalities recorded consisted, on the government's side, mostly of police officers and rangers targeted in attacks by the insurgents. Among the Patani Insurgents, the fatalities stemmed from insurgents killed during shoot-outs with security forces during security operations and raids.
Non-military targets of violence
The Patani insurgents have deliberately targeted civilians in the conflict. Masked gunmen on motorcycles have attacked local businesses, village leaders, and government employees such as teachers and sanitation workers. Furthermore, bombs have been placed in hotels, train stations and restaurants as well as in the vicinity of police and army installations. Most of the fighting in the conflict has been hit-and-run attacks but there has also been occasional large assaults aimed in particular against police posts.
A specific pattern of violence that can be seen is the targeting of teachers as they are seen by the insurgents as representatives of the state. Since religion is an important divide in this conflict the issue of schools has become a symbolic issue. The Muslim populations in the southern provinces of Thailand have voiced their grievances concerning the Thai school system opting for an alternative religious schooling for their kids. This has led to a situation where teachers in the state run schools are specifically targeted because of the symbolism of the Thai state interfering with the upbringing and schooling of the Muslim youths. The pattern of targeting teachers in the state schools has led to a situation where teachers are escorted by military contingents on their way to and from the schools. This situation has led to an intensification of attacks directed towards teachers and people affiliated in some way with the school system.
Foreign support
The government has made repeated accusations that neighboring Malaysia is supporting the Patani insurgents. These claims have been denied and the two countries have made several declarations about jointly improving the control over the border. More substantial claims have been made that some Thai insurgents have received training in Indonesia, especially in the region of Aceh, but it has not been clarified to what extent this has taken place as part of a planned support of the Thai insurgency.
Negotiations
Initially, there were few attempts of negotiations in the conflict as the insurgent leaders were unwilling to reveal their identity. Offers of mediate in the conflict have been received from the United Nations and the governments of Sweden, Germany, and Brunei without resulting in any formal talks until 2013. In 2006, some contacts were made between representatives from several insurgent organizations and mid-level army staff to explore a potential agenda for future talks. These talks had been assisted by the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir and the organization Perdana Global Peace Organization (PGPO). Even though there were rumors that a ceasefire was on the table, the talks broke down without being followed by any official negotiations. New rumors of negotiations emerged in 2008 but these were each time dismissed and officially there was no rapprochement between the parties. In 2013, formal peace talks were held for the first time between the Thai government (represented by the National Security Council) and a Patani insurgent group named Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C).
The 2013 talks were held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and were facilitated by the Malaysian government. The Thai government and BRN-C signed a general consensus document on a "Peace Dialogue Process" on 28 February 2013. Three rounds of talks have been held since in March, April and June during which a reduction of the violence has been discussed. In addition, the BRN-C has released demands on Youtube several times during the peace process, including reference to territorial demands. A crucial factor which delayed further peace talks was the political unrest in Bangkok against the government of Yingluck Shinawatra. During 2014 yet another coup d'état ousted then prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the military stepped in and assumed power. The new government did not manage to resume the talks, and the violence in the south did not come to an end. The conflict continued to be active, albeit the levels of violence has declined, the reporting from the deep south region has also declined, indicating that there might be a discrepancy between the levels of violence reported and the actual level of violence taking place. Yet another factor is that there has been significant events in Bangkok, military coups, and the death of king Bhumibol Aduuladej, the long reigning monarch of Thailand in 2016. These events have dominated the reporting and left little space for the events taking place in the deep south regions of the country.
In January and March 2020, two rounds of formal peace dialogue were held for the first time in years. No agreement resulted from the talks, and the COVID-19 pandemic prevented further face-to-face meetings between the parties. However, back-channel talks during 2021 resulted in some progress as the parties in November 2021 agreed on a protocol to discuss a reduction in violence and a commitment to political solutions to the conflict.
The peace talks continued throughout 2022, where the Thai government and the largest Patani insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi National (BRN) met at several occasions in Germany and in Malaysia. They discussed both ceasefire agreements, and the future status of the Patani region. A change compared to earlier negotiations is that the BRN started opening up to a solution to the conflict that is within the framework of the Thai constitution. Thus, the parties were working towards a resolution that does not necessarily include formal independence from Thailand. However, another Patani insurgent group, PULO, have opposed changing the secessionist demands, and wants to join the negotiations. During the spring of 2022, negotiations resulted in a 40-day ceasefire called the Ramadan Peace Initiative, that was upheld by both the government and the BRN (although broken by PULO, as a statement after being excluded from the talks).
In February 2023, the Thai government and the largest Patani Insurgent group, Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), created a plan to come to an agreement. Contrary to 2022, peace dialogues between the parties were put on hold after a round of successful peace talks in February, where they established the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace, JCPP. BRN discontinued its participation in engagement in peace talks in March, claiming that it awaited the new government after the elections in May. Throughout 2023, peace talks were put on hold. Peace talks between Thai government and BRN resumed in February 2024, but failed to produce any agreements.
As during previous years, peace talks were ongoing between the Thai government and BRN in 2025. There were initiatives from both sides separately, such as a unilateral initiative from the Thai government to reduce hostilities during Ramadan, or the ceasefire proposal submitted to the Malaysian dialogue facilitator by the BRN. Neither initiative, however, was accepted by the other. The two adversaries did reach a preliminary agreement in December with objectives aimed at resolving the deep south insurgency, but BRN expressed concerns that domestic political instability could hinder the dialogue process.
