This dyad belongs to the conflict Russia (Soviet Union): Caucasus Emirate
Summary of conflict Russia (Soviet Union): Caucasus Emirate
The fall of the Soviet Union gave rise to separatist movements in the Caucasus leading to armed conflict over the territory of Chechnya. As the conflict continued into the 2000s Islamist tendencies within the Chechen pro-independence movement became stronger while nationalist tendencies waned. Simultaneously, the conflict spread to large parts of the North Caucasus. This dual development culminated in the abolishment of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate under Islamist leadership, in 2007.
Between 2007 and 2013, a string of near-daily incidents including skirmishes, low-level fighting and bomb-attacks claimed hundred of lives yearly, with the insurgency taking the form of a weakly connected network of insurgent groups (jamaats) brought together by Doku Umarov, the groups' charismatic leader. The insurgency affected almost all of Russia's Caucasus areas, extending from Chechnya, Ingushetia and Ossetia to Dagestan, Kabarda-Balkaria and even as far as Tartarstan.
Umarov's death in 2013 marked a turning-point for the group. While a relatively orderly succession followed, Russian forces stepped up their operations against the group, managing to eliminate a series of rebel leaders at both central and local leaders.
Further weakening the group were influences from Syria and Iraq, where the Caucasus Emirate was significantly involved as an ally of al-Nusra, seeing significant contestation from the more powerful Islamic State. This led to IS's ideology being imported to the Caucasus, with many jamaats deserting the Caucasus Emirate in favor of IS.
By 2015 the group was basically in disarray, with nearly all of the most powerful leaders and members pledging allegiance to the Islamic State's Caucasus province. Further, the Russian government managed to kill the top leadership of the group on two occasions, in April and August 2015, leading to a scramble for power, further desertions to IS and further reduction in the resources and power of the group.
Practically, by September 2015, the Caucasus Emirate was described to exist only as a small scattering of militants in Dagestan, missing both leadership or a functioning organization. For information on the continued conflict in the Caucasus, see Russia: Islamic State.
Background - Evolution from the conflict over Chechnya
The North Caucasus is one of the most ethnically diverse regions in Russia. About 40 ethnic groups of Turkic, Iranian and Caucasian origin inhabit the Russian republics of Adygeia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan. The majority of them are Sunni Muslims.
During the era of the Soviet Union, several of these ethnic groups had their own autonomous republics. Among them were the Chechens. When several former Soviet republics became independent upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, local political leaders in Chechnya also started promoting independence. They proclaimed the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) in 1991 and seized key government buildings. However, this proclamation failed to win international recognition and Chechnya became part of the Russian Federation. The Russian government regarded the separatists as a challenge to the territorial integrity of the country and launched a large-scale military offensive in Chechnya in 1994 (see Russia (Chechnya)).
As the armed conflict escalated again in 1999 and continued into the 21st century, Islamist tendencies in the Chechen pro-independence movement became stronger. At the same time, the resistance movement expanded to large parts of the North Caucasus and leading figures among the Chechen rebels, such as Shamil Basayev, developed ties to Islamic communities based in neighbouring Russian republics.
These trends became more pronounced in the mid-2000s and the Islamic communities, called Jamaats, became locally based centres of Islamist opposition to the Russian authorities. Many young men joined their ranks because they had bleak economic prospects, lacked systematic education and were suffering from war traumas from the deaths of relatives and peers. The heavy-handed tactics of the Russian security forces against alleged militants and repression against practicing Muslims further spurred the growth of radical Islamism in the North Caucasus.
2007-2013: conflict over the Caucasus Emirate
The proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate by ChRI-President Doku Umarov, on 7 October 2007 marked the movements final departure from Chechen nationalism. Umarov abandoned the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and declared himself Emir Abu Usman of the Caucasus Emirate. According to Umarov, the Russian Republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria were provinces of the Caucasus Emirate. However, he did not define clear borders. Instead, all "historical lands of Muslims" should be reclaimed after the "expulsion of the infidels" and the introduction of Sharia law in the North Caucasus.
Secular forces in the Chechen resistance movement led by the ChRI-"foreign minister" Akhmed Zakayev protested against the proclamation of the Emirate and dissociated themselves from Umarov. However, Zakayev reportedly lacked control over paramilitary activity in the North Caucasus. Thus, although the Chechen nationalist movement still existed, the armed conflict against Russian authorities appeared to be dominated by the religious extremist forces since 2007.
The establishment of the Caucasus Emirate by Umarov was endorsed by Jamaats that were responsible for a large share of the violence in the North Caucasus. Prominent examples were the Dagestani Shariat Jamaat that pledged allegiance to Umarov in 2007 and the Islamic Jamaats in Ingushetia. Thus, Chechens no longer constituted a majority among the resistance ranks in the North Caucasus. However, although formally acting under the leadership of Umarov, the Jamaats continued to operate autonomously and at least partly responded to specific local grievances.
The rather loosely connected Forces of the Caucasus Emirate failed to establish control over any substantial part of the territory of the North Caucasus for a longer period of time. They often avoided direct collisions and mainly launched hit-and-run operations on local security personnel. However, starting in the autumn of 2008, they proceeded to launch attacks on a larger scale and conducting simultaneous attacks in different locations. They also increasingly used suicide bombings inside and outside to the North Caucasus region. Among the most devastating recent suicide bombings were e.g. the attack in Moscow-St. Petersburg train in November 2009, the attack of three suicide bombers on the parliament building in Grozny, Chechnya, in October 2010 and one-sided attacks killing dozens of civilians in Moscow metro stations in March 2010, Domodedovo Airport in January 2011 and Volgograd Railway Station in December 2013 (see also one-sided violence section in the database).
The typical response of local Russian government authorities was the launching of "mop up" operations (so-called "Special Antiterrorist Regimes"), blockading all accesses into villages and checking passports in all houses in order to identify and arrest or eliminate suspected militants. Yet another strategy was to influence rebels by exposing their families, especially parents, to pressure. Russian forces were also found responsible for disappearances, abductions and other human rights violations committed in the context of the conflict. Neutral observers (such as the Caucasus Knot NGO) indicate significant levels of police abuse in the area, including indiscriminate labelling of civilians as terrorists, torture and extrajudicial killings, abusive arrests and searches etc.
There have not been any negotiations in the conflict over the Caucasus Emirate. The level of violence increased substantially during 2008 and again in 2009 remaining at the level of several hundreds of deaths in the following years. However, the conflict displayed geographical variations in intensity. As such, Dagestan replaced Chechnya in 2009 as the hotbed of rebel activity, becoming the Russian republic subject to the highest level of violence. Kabardino-Balkaria, a formerly peaceful region, reached similar levels of violence to Chechnya after 2011 while North Ossetia exhibited a decline in activity to almost no violence in 2013. Regions previously untargeted by rebels, such as the traditionally stable and wealthy Stavropol Territory and Karachay-Cherkessia became targets of rebel activity in 2012 and 2013.
2013- : Decline
In September 2013 Doku Umarov died due to what his supporters claim was food poisoning. His death came just a few months after making statement where he called for attacks against the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games.
While initially a relatively orderly succession ensued, Umarov's death did start the decline of the group. On one hand, the Russian government intensified their "mop-up" operations, using the lack of leadership in the Caucasus Emirate as a way to impair the organization. On the other hand many jamaat leaders, free to do as they chose and no longer bound by personal ties to Umarov decided to further engage in the conflict in Syria by sending fighters to Syria, mostly to fight alongside Al Nusra, further reducing the power and influence of the group in the Caucasus.
By late 2014, fighters returning to the Caucasus from Syria and Iraq began to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State and form new insurgent cells instead of returning to fight for the Caucasus Emirate.
In the same time, targeted killings of jamaat leaders by the Russian government broke the orderly succession of what was already a loosely tied organization built on personal ties to Umarov, leading to contests over leadership and infighting in the Caucasus Emirate.
Seeing the unraveling of the existing networks of power and allegiance that composed the Caucasus Emirate, whole jamaats were pledging allegiance to the Islamic State, leaving the Caucasus Emirate. One of the first such group defections was that of the "Dagestani Emirate" through its leader, Abu Muhammad, practically taking away the most powerful cells on the organization on 19 December 2014.
By 2015 the group was basically in disarray, with nearly all of the most powerful leaders and members pledging allegiance to the Islamic State. Further, the Russian government managed to kill the top leadership of the group on two occasions, in April and August 2015, leading to an even more bitter scramble for power, further desertions to IS and further reduction in the resources and power of the group.
