This dyad belongs to the conflict Australia, United Kingdom, United States - Iraq
Summary of conflict Australia, United Kingdom, United States - Iraq
In 2003, USA, Great Britain and Australia launched a joint full-scale invasion of Iraq, with the aim to oust the sitting President Saddam Hussein. The invasion, launched outside of UN auspices, was motivated by the belief that Iraq continued to withhold weapons of mass destruction. The war was won by the coalition in less than one month, but despite stabilisation and reconstruction efforts, widespread violence has persisted in Iraq.
Background to the conflict
The war between Iraq and the coalition of USA, Great Britain and Australia can in some aspects be traced back to the 1991 Iraq-Kuwait conflict (also called the Gulf War). For more information see interstate conflict Iraq – Kuwait. After that conflict ended, there was a heated debate in the US about whether it should have tried to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power. The end of the Gulf War also saw the US-allied forces creating a “no-fly zone” in northern and southern Iraq (to protect the Kurdish and Shiite populations, respectively), as well as UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687, demanding the dismantling of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and payment of war reparations from oil revenue. While Iraq accepted the terms of the resolution, it increasingly inhibited the inspectors’ efforts to the point that the inspectors withdrew in December 1998, asserting that Iraq was not cooperating with their work.
It was not until in January 2002, when US President George W. Bush famously named Iraq as part of the “axis of evil”, that the situation in Iraq became increasingly salient for the US government. By November, the UNSC passed Resolution 1441, which gave Iraq a last chance to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction or face “serious consequences”. Iraq accepted the resolution and UN inspectors subsequently resumed their work. By the beginning of 2003, the US and its allies increased diplomatic pressure to pass a new UN resolution authorising military action against Iraq for non-compliance of Res. 1441, convinced that Iraq continued to hide its weapons program. With a number of Western countries, such as France and Germany, vehemently opposed to any military action in Iraq, Great Britain played an especially important role for the Bush administration, serving as a bridge to Europe and demonstrating that the US was not acting unilaterally.
Unable to muster enough UNSC votes to pass a new resolution, (as well as the implicit threat by Russia and France to veto such a resolution), the US and its partners decided to take military action outside of UN auspices, forming a “coalition of the willing.” This coalition consisted of combat troops from USA, Great Britain and Australia, with secondary support from dozens of other countries. This support took various forms, such as diplomatic backing, fly-over privileges, specialised chemical/biological response teams, etc. On 17 March 2003, Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein that he must leave the country by 19 March or be overthrown by an armed invasion. While the US had earlier condemned the Hussein government and called for regime change, this is the first date in which it does so in connection to the threat of use of armed force.
The stated motives for invasions
The Coalition’s motivation for the invasion of Iraq was ostensibly the fact that it believed that Iraq maintained stocks of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical and biological weapons (though the actual threat posed by Iraq remains a matter of heated debate). Another primary issue at hand when the Coalition invaded Iraq was the question of who should control the government of Iraq (one report suggested that the US had, in fact, made plans for a post-Saddam Iraqi government as early as in January 2003). US officials also made a number of statements in the months leading up to the war seeking to link Saddam Hussein to global terrorism and the al Qaeda network. Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, on the other hand, asserted that Iraq believed that the US-led attack was based on oil concerns, as well as a desire to protect Israel (Iraq publicly supported Palestinian fighters).
The invasion of March 2003
When Saddam Hussein failed to comply with the Coalition’s ultimatum by 20 March 2003, the US launched missile attacks on selected targets in Baghdad. Strategic air attacks were followed by a ground attack from the south. A smaller northern front was established using Turkish fly-over privileges (Turkey declined to allow the US to base troops on its soil) and Kurdish allies. The main coalition drive pushed north from Basra, and by 9 April took Baghdad. At this point the war was effectively over, though the last pocket of resistance (in Tikrit) was not eliminated until 14 April. On 1 May the US declared an end to major combat operations.
The fact that the war was won in less than a month is indicative of the imbalance of power between the two opposing forces. Coalition troops deployed in the Gulf numbered over 450 000, with reports suggesting that around 150 000 were in Iraq at any given time. Iraq had approximately 433 000 troops before the war, but was at a serious technological disadvantage. The Coalition was able to make extensive use of air strikes and aerial surveillance; moreover, it had a far more sophisticated and extensive artillery at its disposal. Coalition bombing campaigns, designed to “shock and awe” opposing forces, combined with ground troops convinced many Iraqi soldiers that they were fighting a losing battle and they deserted by the thousands.
The US had hoped that the onset of a Coalition attack would be the catalyst for an Iraqi uprising against the regime, which would spare the Coalition the prospect of potentially messy urban warfare. This did not occur, and the US faced unexpectedly stiff resistance in some areas, with small Iraqi militia groups employing hit-and-run raids as a key tactic. Iraqi forces also reportedly sometimes posed as civilians and attacked coalition forces after they let their guard down. This tactic is illegal under international law because of the repercussions it has for civilian populations. Despite unexpected setbacks, it took only from 5-9 April for the Coalition forces to definitively take Baghdad.
Estimating the number of battle-related deaths
It is difficult to assess the total fatalities from the war, mainly due to the fact that fighting was intense and widespread. While most people appear to have died from the ground war, in small-arms fire, one of the most controversial aspects of the fighting was the use by coalition forces of cluster bombs, which have a far deadlier effect on civilian populations than precision-guided munitions. In addition to the nature of the violence, it is also difficult to determine fatalities because of Islamic customs that require that the dead to be buried quickly; many individuals were buried without ever being taken to the hospital or reported dead to any authority. There was, however, a great deal of international interest in the war and many studies were carried out after the end of hostilities to determine the extent of the fatalities. UCDP estimates about 100 combat deaths for coalition forces; 4800-6400 Iraqi military fatalities; and 3200-4300 civilian fatalities. Our total range is 8200-15 100, with a best estimate of 8200 for total Iraqi fatalities (both Iraqi military and civilians). The total estimate for all parties, then, is 8300- 15 200 (including Coalition forces). While there are reports that suggest higher numbers, many of them include “war-related deaths,” such as disease and other health-problems due to the breakdown of infrastructure. UCDP only includes in its estimates those deaths that are directly related to battle and the use of armed force.
Continued widespread violence despite stabilization efforts
After the US declared an end to major combat operations on 1 May 2003, Coalition forces began a “stabilization and reconstruction” phase, forming a Provisional Coalition Authority (PCA), led by the Coalition, and an Iraqi Governing Council consisting of a mixture of Iraqi opposition leaders. While PCA and the Governing Council made plans for the creation of a sovereign Iraqi government by June 2004, as well as a constitution and eventual elections, slated for the end of 2005, the reconstruction efforts developed slowly. Iraqi citizens remained frustrated by the lack of basic infrastructure provisions like electricity, as well as the overall lack of security in the country. In many areas, criminality was rampant, a number of ethnic conflicts threatened to break out, and the threat of increased political violence loomed.
While the interstate war between Iraq and the coalition forces was definitively over, violence continued in Iraq. Unknown forces conducted regular strikes against Coalition troops, as well as against other Westerners in Iraq. The most tragic example was the bombing of the UN headquarters on 19 August 2003, leading to the deaths of 22 people. These forces, believed to be a mélange of regime loyalists, disaffected Iraqis, terrorist groups and foreign fighters, conducted a type of guerilla warfare that was extremely difficult for Coalition forces to defend against. Moreover, this type of warfare often led to accidental attacks on the civilian population, which engendered increased Iraqi resentment against the occupying forces. While the opposition did not yet appear to be formally organised, their attacks demonstrated an increasing sophistication and organisation. These opposition groups posed a major threat not only to Coalition forces, but also to the prospect of security and reconstruction in Iraq.
While the interstate conflict had been terminated in 2003, coalition troops remained in Iraq even after a sovereign Iraqi government had been established in 2004. They subsequently supported the newly created government militarily in the intrastate conflict that eventually erupted in 2004. For more information see the “Iraq” section under “War & minor conflict”.
