This dyad belongs to the conflict Central African Republic: Government

Summary of conflict Central African Republic: Government

The conflicts over the government in Central African Republic (CAR) have been generated by a mix of political, ethnic, and religious issues. They have been fueled by the easy access to guns acquired across the border with Chad and Sudan. The country has seen many coups and attempted coups. In 1993, Patassé became the first democratically elected president of the country. He inherited an army primarily made up of ethnic opponents to him. With backing from Chad, François Bozizé took over power with a coup in 2003. His rule saw many rebellions and peace attempts, and in the end, he was ousted in March 2013 by the Seleka alliance. The Seleka leader Djotodia was, in turn, forced to resign in January 2014 due to the sectarian violence that had spread over the country. Catherine Samba-Panza was elected interim president by the National Transitional Council later that month. Since the elections in 2015, Faustin Touadéra has ruled as president.

The Central African Republic: Government conflict continued throughout 2025 but remained below the intensity of war, causing approximately 200 battle-related deaths. The government fought three armed groups, the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), its breakaway the Coalition of Patriots for Change-Fundamental (CPC-F), and the Military Coalition for the Salvation of the People and Recovery (CMSPR). In a significant de-escalation, two of the most powerful rebel groups, the UPC and the 3R, signed a Chad-mediated ceasefire in April 2025 and were formally dissolved in July, although lower-level violence persisted. The UN peacekeeping mission MINUSCA, which has operated in the country since 2014, had its mandate renewed for a further year in November 2025. The Africa Corps, which took over the operations of the Wagner Group and is controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence, remained active in support of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra's government. As a result, the Government of Russia is considered a secondary warring party to the CAR government in the state-based conflict, along with other MINUSCA troop-contributing countries. In December 2025, Touadéra was returned for a third term in elections the main opposition rejected as fraudulent.

Background to the conflict

The Central African Republic (CAR) gained independence from France in 1960. Its post-independence years have been characterized by instability and numerous attempts at unconstitutionally seizing power. After a decade of military rule under General André Kolingba, growing domestic pressure led to the establishment of a multiparty system in 1992. One year later, Kolingba lost the country's first democratic elections to Ange-Félix Patassé of the MPLC (Mouvement de Libération du Peuple Centrafricain: Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People). The political system remained unstable through the 1990s, as social tensions were exacerbated by salary arrears and a general economic decline. Political unrest mounted, and in 1996–97, there was a string of army mutinies. Traditionally, political parties in CAR have been rooted in regional and ethnic loyalties. During the 1990s and early 2000s, ethnic polarization and mobilization increased throughout society. In the national armed forces, this was made evident by tensions between the highly partisan presidential guard and the regular army, with the former mainly consisting of soldiers from president Patassé's Souma ethnic group and the latter of Yakoma soldiers. In May 2001, the tensions exploded, with a faction of Yakoma soldiers mounting a coup attempt.

The May 2001 coup attempt

On the night of 27 May 2001, a loose-knit group of mutinous soldiers, not operating under a name, attempted to oust the sitting president Ange-Félix Patassé in a coup. The increased ethnic polarization during the preceding years had led to growing resentment among the Yakoma soldiers, as they perceived the Presidential guard as enjoying preferential treatment. Their supposed leader was the former military ruler and fellow Yakoma, André Kolingba, but the extent of his involvement remains unclear.

The coup attempt was fairly limited in scope, with most of the fighting taking place within a short period and in a restricted geographical area. After the initial attack on the presidential residence, there was intense shelling of the capital's southwestern districts, where the rebels were hiding. After two weeks of fighting in Bangui, the government troops had seized control of the entire city. A manhunt against Yakoma families commenced, leading to some 80 000 civilians fleeing the capital, along with the rank and file rebels. Kolingba, for his part, sought refuge in Uganda.

François Bozizé’s ascent to power (2002)

The ramifications of the failed coup attempt of May 2001 continued to be felt in the country through late 2001. One of its main consequences was the dismissal of the Army Chief of Staff François Bozizé in November, due to allegations regarding his involvement in the coup. Bozizé refused the arrest. As some 300 supporters from the armed forces defected to join his struggle, the new opposition movement, fighting the government in the conflict's second phase, was created. The forces of Bozizé grew considerably through the remains of the year, with soldiers from the earlier coup attempt joining the struggle.

From November 2001 to mid-2002, it remained unclear to what extent Bozizé and his men posed a threat to the CAR regime, as his ambitions remained unknown. However, in September 2002, Bozizé openly vowed to oust President Patassé from power, accusing the president of plundering the country and ruling out the possibility of power change through elections, as this would be too time-consuming. During these months, armed incursions from Chad by men loyal to Bozizé occurred continuously, which is why relations between the two neighbors soured considerably, and regional actors interfered to prevent further deterioration of regional security.

In late October, the conflict escalated significantly as Bozizé's men returned to Bangui. After a few days of heavy fighting, leaving parts of Bangui destructed, the pro-government forces managed to fight the rebels back from the capital. However, Bozizé's forces retained control over parts of northern CAR through the end of the year. In 2003, amidst a continued deployment of CEMAC peacekeepers (see the section "Foreign military and third party involvement 2001–2003"), Bozizé's forces once again entered Bangui, this time encountering little resistance from government forces. Bozizé, after declaring himself head of state, dissolved the national assembly and suspended the Constitution, all the while assuring both internal and external concerned actors that these actions only constituted a temporary suspension of democracy and that he intended to return the country to democracy by January 2005.

While there were no negotiations between Bozizé and the government during the conflict, other types of attempts at resolving the conflict by peaceful means were plentiful. Apart from dispatching the two peacekeeping missions from CEN-SAD and CEMAC, respectively (see the section "Foreign military and third party involvement 2001–2003"); regional players met on numerous occasions from mid-2001 and onwards, mainly focusing on diffusing the simmering dispute between CAR and neighboring Chad, which – in turn – was a consequence of Bozizé's rebellion. Further contributing to the escalation of animosity between the two countries was the presence of Abdoulaye Miskine – whom the Chadian authorities believe to be a former Chad rebel leader – in the CAR army.

After Bozizé had seized power, the new regime launched a reconciliation process in the country. Between 15 September and 15 October 2003, a national dialogue brought almost all the country's political actors and civil society together. For one month, the delegates discussed and made recommendations on issues including truth and reconciliation, politics and diplomacy, economy and finances, defense and security and education, social affairs, and culture. Through its relative openness, the regime gained both increased public support and international recognition.

Foreign military and third-party involvement (2001–2003)

There was significant foreign involvement in the conflict from its outset, as the government relied heavily on external military aid. Soon after the fighting erupted in May 2001, some 100 Libyan troops were sent to support the government. Most of these were sent back in mid-June, but a small contingent stayed on in the country and later became the backbone of a regional peacekeeping force (discussed below). Libya had a number of reasons for supporting the Patassé government. For one, Patassé had, through his rule, maintained warm relations with Ghaddafi. Furthermore, Libya had an interest in upholding a strong presence in the country, as this enhanced Tripoli's' diplomatic and military influence in the Congo Basin and put pressure on Chad sandwiched between CAR and Libya. Apart from the Libyan support, Patassé also received direct military assistance from the Congolese rebel group MLC (Mouvement pour la libération du Congo), which contributed between 150 and 700 troops. The MLC fighters were active on the government side in both the 2001 and the 2002 fighting. It is commonly assumed that this support was given as MLC controlled territory along the Obangui River, on the border of the two countries, and had been allowed to move supplies through CAR territory.

Whereas the military faction that first challenged the regime did not have any external backers, the forces of François Bozizé received crucial support from neighboring Chad. After resisting arrest in November 2001, Bozizé and his core supporters took refuge in Chad, where they were granted asylum and could freely launch attacks into CAR.

The further external military intervention came in 2002, in the form of two different peacekeeping forces, sponsored by two regional organizations, CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel and Saharan States) and CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community). In December 2001, CEN-SAD held an extraordinary summit in Khartoum, where it was decided that a small contingent was to be dispatched to CAR in view to safeguard the democratically elected institutions of the country. Thus, the following year both Sudan and Djibouti sent troops to CAR, where they joined the already present Libyan force. However, the CEN-SAD mission was highly criticized by both other regional actors and the domestic opposition, with the former advocating more dialogue and the latter calling the CEN-SAD troops a "make-believe peacekeeping force," serving as a mere front for Libyan interests in the country. By the end of 2002, the CEN-SAD force was replaced by a peacekeeping mission from CEMAC, set to number some 350 troops from Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Mali.

UFDR enters the fray in 2006

After three years of relative calm, the conflict in CAR erupted once again in 2006. In October of that year, some of those who had helped Bozizé to power in 2003 broke away from the president's fold and created the rebel group UFDR (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity). Complaining that Bozizé's policies were exclusionist and that the central government had not shared wealth generated by the country's natural resources with the ethnic groups outside of its political and ethnic base, the leaders of UFDR demanded power-sharing.

Clashes between UFDR and the government occurred on several occasions during the fall of 2006 and killed between 45 and 170 people. The fighting took place in the northern part of CAR, bordering Chad and Sudan. The Bangui government accused Sudan of backing the rebels, but the Khartoum government denied this. The government, for its part, received logistical support from the French military.

On 13 April 2007, negotiations between the government and UFDR resulted in the signing of a peace agreement in the city of Birao. Under the accord, a ceasefire was stipulated to come into effect immediately. Furthermore, the Birao agreement provided for the demobilization and integration into the armed forces of UFDR troops, for blanket amnesty, and for the two parties' participation in a national dialogue aiming to solve the country's political troubles. The ceasefire was respected until December 2012 (see section The Séléka Rebellion).

Two years of talks (2007–2008)

Despite the successful Birao peace agreement, signed between the CAR government and the rebel group UFDR (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity), the situation in the country remained tense in 2008. This was mainly due to activities by some smaller rebel groups that have never become active in UCDP data since fighting between them, and the government has not crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold, notably APRD (Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie: People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy) and FDPC (Front for the Central African People). Both these groups have conducted small-scale attacks on government targets during the past few years and, at times, entered into negotiations with the Bangui regime. In 2008, apart from continued low-level fighting, both these groups, together with UFDR, joined a negotiation process that eventually resulted in the signing of a peace agreement in June 2008. However, by August, all three groups withdrew from the peace process due to disagreements over an amnesty bill.

Throughout the fall, amidst increased armed attacks in the north, attempts were made to restart the process. Eventually, it was agreed that an "inclusive political dialogue" would be held in Bangui. After some delays, the process was finally initiated on 8 December, bringing together the government, the rebel groups, opposition groups, members of the civilian population, and former CAR president Ange-Felix Patasse. After over a week of talks, the parties reached an important compromise on 19 December, agreeing on a pact for a consensus government to rule until the next scheduled presidential election in 2010. It also cemented an existing ceasefire and included provisions for demobilization and disarmament of former rebels.

CPJP enters the fray

After two years of relative calm, a new rebel group called CPJP (The Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace) took up arms against the Government of Central African Republic in 2009. This group was based in the northeastern part of CAR that borders Chad and Sudan's volatile region of Darfur (sometimes this region is referred to as "the triangle of death"). The region was characterized by cross-border dynamics with rebels (and bandits) from different countries going in and out of the region. CPJP demanded president François Bozizé step down because he had betrayed and abandoned his population. The founding leader of CPJP is Charles Massi, who served as a defense minister in Bozizé's government between 2005 and 2008. In January 2010, Charles Massi was killed under uncertain conditions; his supporters said that he was tortured to death by the government, but this could not be independently confirmed. Despite the death of Massi, the CPJP rebellion continued under the leadership of Massi's successor Abdoulaye Hissene. The fighting consisted of relatively small-scale attacks in the northeastern part of the country. CPJP continued to clash with the government in February–April 2011. However, after this period of armed battles, the group opened the door to negotiations with the government. These negotiations led to the signing of a peace agreement with the government on 12 June 2011. After this accord was signed, no more fighting between the government and CPJP was reported.

The Séléka Rebellion

In December 2012, a new rebel group called Séléka started a rebellion in northern CAR. Séléka was an alliance of the former CPJP, UFDR, and CPSK groups. Séléka fought against President Bozizé as he had dishonored the peace agreements of 2007 and 2011. Another stated reason for the rebellion was that Séléka deemed Bozizé's administration to be characterized by favoritism and tribalism. The fighting started on 10 December, and the rebels quickly won numerous military victories and captured several cities in the northern part of the Central African Republic. To protect the government, Chad sent a few hundred troops to fight together with the government's troops. Considering the weakness of the Central African Republic army, this support was essential, and Séléka did not manage to take the capital in 2012.

To solve the conflict, peace talks were held between the Séléka and the Bozizé Government in Libreville under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). These talks resulted in the signing, on 11 January 2013, of the Libreville Agreements, which provided for transitional and power-sharing measures. But the agreements soon broke down, and fighting resumed. On 24 March 2013, Séléka seized the capital, Bangui, forcing President Bozizé to flee the country.

The leader of the Séléka, Michel Djotodia, took office and suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Government of National Unity, the National Assembly, and the Constitutional Court, and commenced to rule by decree. Djotodia was officially sworn in as Head of State of the Transition on 18 August 2013.

After the fall of Bangui, violence spread over the country, and there were reports of religious killings. (For more information, see anti-Balaka–ex-Séléka non-state conflict and one-sided violence by the groups involved). On 11 January 2014, interim President Michel Djotodia was forced to resign due to sectarian violence.

Following Djotodia's resignation, Catherine Samba-Panza ruled as Interim President until early 2016. In 2015, general elections were held to replace the National Transitional Council that had elected Samba-Panza, giving way to Faustin Touadera's presidency that began on 30 March 2016.

After several years of inactivity, the Central African Republic: Government conflict became active again in 2018, its first active year since 2013. The renewed fighting stemmed from direct confrontations in May 2018 between joint MINUSCA and FACA units and fighters of the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) in Ouaka prefecture. The incompatibility between the UPC and the government dated back to 2016, when the UPC leadership demanded so many governmental positions in exchange for peace that it would have substantially restructured the government.

The conflict remained active in 2019, mainly because of a major confrontation between the UPC and the government around Bambari, in Ouaka prefecture, in January. On 6 February 2019, the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, also known as the Khartoum Accord, was signed in Bangui, with the UPC among the signatories. Further clashes between the two sides occurred over the rest of the year, though none matched the scale of the January fighting.

In early 2020, the conflict was driven mainly by confrontations between the UPC and the government. From April 2020, several rebel groups that had signed the Khartoum Accord announced that they were suspending their participation in the national unity government formed after the agreement. Tensions rose to a worrying level, and in November 2020 a UN Security Council resolution extended MINUSCA's mandate for a further year. Alongside MINUSCA's efforts to restore state authority, Russia sent military instructors to support government forces and Rwanda deployed troops to fight the rebels. The situation deteriorated sharply after the Constitutional Court rejected Bozizé's candidacy for the presidential election scheduled for late December 2020. On 15 December, six rebel groups (MPC, the UPC, FPRC, 3R, anti-Balaka Mokom, and anti-Balaka Ngaissona) declared themselves united against the government under the banner of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). The government accused Bozizé of plotting a coup with the coalition, and on 31 December, days after the vote, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra dismissed three rebel leaders from the government, signaling the end of the Khartoum deal.

In 2021, the conflict came close to the threshold of war. Just under 1,000 battle-related deaths were recorded over the year, mainly from incidents involving the CPC and the UPC, leaving the country on the verge of war by UCDP's intensity definitions. The Khartoum Accord remained ineffective, and the CPC continued to clash not only with government forces but also with MINUSCA and the Wagner Group. In April 2021 the UPC, one of the coalition's most prominent members, withdrew from the CPC, but it formally rejoined by the end of the year.

The conflict persisted through 2022, causing nearly 700 battle-related deaths. The CPC sustained its campaign against the CAR government, launching attacks on key urban centres and clashing with government forces, MINUSCA, and the Wagner Group.

In 2023, the CPC remained active and the conflict caused more than 250 battle-related deaths. The government continued to rely on support from MINUSCA and the Wagner Group, and despite the death of the Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in a plane crash in August 2023, the group maintained its presence in CAR.

The conflict continued in 2024, causing approximately 200 battle-related deaths. The CPC maintained its campaign against the government, clashing with both government forces and the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSCA. During the year, the Africa Corps, which had taken over the operations of the Wagner Group, remained active in CAR in support of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra's government.

The conflict continued throughout 2025 but remained below the intensity of war, causing approximately 200 battle-related deaths. The government fought three armed groups, the CPC, its breakaway the Coalition of Patriots for Change-Fundamental (CPC-F), and the Military Coalition for the Salvation of the People and Recovery (CMSPR). In a significant de-escalation, two of the most powerful rebel groups, the UPC and the 3R, signed a Chad-mediated ceasefire in April 2025 and were formally dissolved in July, although lower-level violence persisted. MINUSCA had its mandate renewed for a further year in November 2025. The Africa Corps remained active in support of Touadéra's government. As a result, the Government of Russia is considered a secondary warring party to the CAR government in the state-based conflict, along with other MINUSCA troop-contributing countries.