This dyad belongs to the conflict Sierra Leone: Government
Summary of conflict Sierra Leone: Government
The conflict over government in Sierra Leone began as RUF (Revolutionary United Front) launched a rebellion from neighbouring Liberia in 1991. In 1997, RUF entered into an alliance with AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council), which managed to topple the government through a coup and establish a short-lived AFRC/RUF government before being ousted by an alliance loyal to the former government. The conflict, which was eventually ended through a negotiated settlement, was notorious for the gross atrocities committed against civilians.
Corruption, autocracy and the emergence of RUF
Sierra Leone became independent from the British in 1961. During colonial rule, the British had applied their most common mode of administration, using indigenous structures of power and governance to employ an indirect rule where local chieftains received the patronage of the colonial master to control the population. Such a manner of governance failed to create strong state structures, and instead gave rise to powerful patterns of patrimonialism - patterns that continued to be present when Sierra Leone reached independence. The patrimonial system that prevailed after independence, in turn, began to feed endemic corruption and ethnic tensions, giving rise to the emergence of small cliques of economic and political elites, usually based around the capital city of Freetown. Sierra Leone's vast natural resources (primarily diamonds and timber) fell victim to this ineffective economic system, which failed to accumulate hard currency for the state, undermining the state's capacity to deliver public goods.
This extractive economic system joined hands with the autocratic rule of the All Peoples Congress (APC) government, which instituted a one-party rule in 1978 after a few years of turbulent democracy and military coups. These two sets of factors collaborated to create a country that lacked a developed industrial and agricultural sector, any effective and legitimate bureaucracy, and democratic freedoms. The APC government's fear of military coups also contributed to the creation of a small, weak and impoverished army, wrecked by factionalism and ethnic patronage. Attempts to liberalize the economy in the 1980s failed to solve the problems of Sierra Leone, and instead fed into the systems of patronage and corruption, while at the same time downscaling public spending; destroying education, agriculture and social security networks. Thus the stage was set for trouble in the early 1990s, with a weak and fractionalized army, a corrupt and unpopular autocratic government, plenty of opportunities for illicit natural resource extraction and hordes of unemployed and frustrated youth.
RUF (Revolutionary United Front) launched its rebellion in Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991, invading from neighboring Liberia, which was wrecked by the civil conflict initiated by warlord-cum-President Charles Taylor. At first, viewed by the government as a simple spill-over from Liberia, it soon became obvious that the Taylor-backed RUF was a force to reckon with.
RUF was led by a former army corporal, Foday Sankoh, who had been trained for insurgency in Libya during the 1980s, where he had also met Liberia's Charles Taylor, who would become involved in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil conflicts. RUF proclaimed that its aim was to overthrow the corrupt leaders of the government, liberate the country's peasantry and institute a multiparty democracy. The group, clearly identifying relevant grievances, however, appears to not have adopted an ideology of its own, or have any real ideological underpinnings except for the ouster of the government. It is thus not possible to place the movement in any ideological category or outline its preferred policies above seizing power. RUF 's goals of instituting democracy, ridding the country of corruption and freeing the peasantry however soon stood in stark contrast to the massive human rights violations committed by RUF against those civilians it had stated to be its constituency.
From the very outset of the rebellion, Sankoh's RUF movement received support from the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) leader Charles Taylor in Liberia. Taylor lent soldiers as well as arms and safe havens to Sankoh's troops, who were initially based in Liberia. Sankoh's and RUF 's links to Liberia and Charles Taylor were many, and also included the illicit sale and smuggling of diamonds to Liberia, and into the pockets of Taylor himself, in return for arms, supplies and other types of support. Taylor was a primary driving force in the creation and the sustenance of RUF. Furthermore, continuous cash flows came from Libya throughout the conflict for arms procurement, and also other logistical support. It has been suspected, based on Muammar al-Gaddafi's political vision of revolution in West Africa, that Libya directly aided and abated the creation of RUF. Burkina Faso also acted as a supporting party to RUF, providing the movement with valuable supplies throughout the conflict.
The various governments of Sierra Leone that held power throughout the conflict received support from a number of sources. The NPRC (National Provisional Ruling Council) government (1992-1996) was supported by ECOWAS troops mainly from Nigeria and Guinea (coded as a third party intervention), and Kabbah's government (1996, 1998-2002) received military support and other assistance from the UK.
Patterns of violence and atrocities against civilians
RUF committed gross atrocities against civilians during the conflict, becoming infamous for cutting off the arms and hands of innocent civilians (mass amputations began in the mid-1990s in relation to the elections that were held), while at the same time transforming from a fledgling rebel group into what might be viewed as a criminal organization. Many theories have been put forward to explain RUFs brutal amputation and civilian targeting strategies, ranging from penalizing those who had voted in the elections that brought Kabbah to power in 1996 (such people had indelible ink on their fingers), through pure irrationality that became institutionalized within the movement, to desperate acts to show resolve perpetrated when the rebels appeared to face defeat. RUF also looted and burned villages and towns, and during the conflict employed forced labor to mine diamonds that were then smuggled out of the country to pay for the war and enrich its leaders and backers. Rape and murder were rampant when RUF attacked cities and villages, which it did more often than attacking regular troops. The group also made use of forced conscription, expanding its ranks through coercing men and young boys to join the movement, often through fear, or by brutalizing them through making them kill other civilians - sometimes their own families. Young women were also forced into the movement, sometimes as fighters, but more often to become bush wives, in essence, the sexual property of RUF fighters.
The government of Sierra Leone also committed atrocities, killing civilians suspected of supporting RUF or even being sympathetic to them, and carrying out looting, pillaging and raping in areas struck by the conflict. Large portions of the Sierra Leonean army were disloyal and unprofessional, and would engage in many of the same activities as RUF, sometimes even collaborating with the group to loot and plunder. Government forces were also involved in the illicit mining and smuggling of diamonds, presumably for personal profit. The military juntas that seized power during the conflict also resorted to drafting children into volunteer forces to fight RUF, recruiting among the poor urban youth. These juntas also engaged in the shooting of protesters and democracy activists, as well as persecuting critical journalists and the political opposition.
The dynamics of fighting throughout the conflict involved few direct battles, with RUF instead targeting civilian locations, which they looted, plundered, and torched. Government forces, at times, did the same, being underpaid, unprofessional and undisciplined. In the early stages of the conflict the fighting was concentrated to the diamond-rich districts in the eastern and southern parts of the country, presumably since these resources could be used to purchase arms and for personal gain, for both the army of Sierra Leone and RUF. Fighting later spread to engulf almost the entire country, including the capital of Freetown.
RUF on the offensive: the first phase of the conflict, 1991-1996
Following RUF 's invasion in March 1991, the eastern Kailahun district of Sierra Leone fell to the rebels after only one month of fighting, and the RUF opened up a second front in the Pujehun district. RUF soon proved to be a tough adversary for the only 3000 men strong army of Sierra Leone, forcing the army to retreat.
After initial setbacks, the Sierra Leonean army went on the offensive in late 1991 with the arrival of Guinean troops, and also expanded the number of troops in its army. Also, ULIMO (United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia) forces, ousted from Liberia by President Charles Taylor, attacked RUF in late 1991, and scored some successes, pushing back the rebels from Pujehun. With the government side reinforced by Guinean troops and new recruits, the fighting reached a stalemate at the beginning of 1992, with neither party willing or able to deal a final blow. During 1991 one-party rule was abolished in Sierra Leone, and elections were to be held in July of 1992 to establish a democratic regime. Such elections did not materialize, however, as disgruntled soldiers staged a coup in April 1992, forming the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), a military junta headed by Captain Valentine Strasser.
The junta announced that the war was to continue. The minor opportunities for dialogue that materialized were soon squandered, and the fighting restarted after a brief lull. The NPRC government soon suffered setbacks, with RUF gaining territory and lucrative diamond mines in the east throughout the summer and autumn of 1992. Most of these territories were retaken in October by the government, which initiated punitive actions against local leaders and residents for their alleged collaboration with RUF. The government kept up its offensive, and at the end of 1993, RUF had suffered massive defeats, even being ousted from its eastern stronghold. The rebels were, however not defeated, and used a unilateral ceasefire declared by the government to regroup and counterattack in early 1994, reclaiming the mining district of Kono and territories in the east. The discipline of the army had all but collapsed by this time, with soldiers taking orders by day, and acting as bandits and rebels by night (earning the nickname "sobels"). This complete lack of discipline, coupled with RUF 's reign of terror, plunged the war-affected areas of the country into utter chaos.
In April 1994, RUF continued its offensive, launching its first attack into the Northern Province of Sierra Leone, marking a geographical spread of the conflict. In January 1995, RUF took the bauxite mines in Sierra Rutile, grabbing the last of the government's main sources of revenue. This disastrous situation for the NPRC government made calls for peace talks appear in late 1994. In December 1994, the government also asked the UN to use its good offices to ensure a peaceful settlement, and the UN began small-scale contacts with the warring parties. These overtures were rejected by Sankoh, and by early 1995 Sierra Leone was on the brink of anarchy due to RUF 's battlefield successes. The government attempted to turn the tide by employing private security firms in early 1995, and also made use of the Nigerian and Guinean troops stationed in the country as part of an ECOWAS force. The notorious South African private security firm Executive Outcomes, a battle-hardened crack mercenary force, was hired in May 1995. These mercenaries trained Sierra Leonean troops, recruited Kamajors militias (traditional hunters) into their ranks, and engaged RUF in combat. These actions turned the tide somewhat, and by the end of 1995, rebel activity was partially under control once more. With a manner of control having been established across the country, the military junta government began moves to hold elections, so as to reinstate civilian rule, with the support of the UN. Elections were held in March 1996, and brought Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the Sierra Leone Peoples Party candidate, to power as president. During the reign of Strasser and his successor, peace talks had been initiated with RUF, and these ended in a peace accord in Abidjan on 30 November 1996. Under the stipulations of the peace agreement, the RUF would be transformed into a political party. Its soldiers would receive amnesty, and there would be countrywide reforms in the army and a future equitable distribution of natural resources.
The May 1997 coup and its aftermath: AFRC and RUF in power
Implementation of the November 1996 Abidjan Agreement, aiming to resolve the conflict between the government of Sierra Leone and RUF, soon became fraught with difficulties. Political instability ensued, and in May 1997, rebellious soldiers of the Sierra Leonean army, under the command of Major Johnny Paul Koroma, seized power in a bloody coup. The move was partly motivated by the desire to avoid the demobilization process stipulated under the Abidjan Peace Accord. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, the elected president, fled to Guinea, and Koroma formed a military junta: AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council). It is difficult to pinpoint any real policies or visions being driven by Koroma's junta, and to a large extent, the coup appears to have been carried out for personal gain. Koroma also announced that RUF was part of his movement and not his enemy. As a result, RUF soldiers entered Freetown to join AFRC, and the war was declared to be over. Foday Sankoh (at the time imprisoned in Nigeria) became the Vice Chairman of AFRC. The coup turned out to be the peak of a long-standing collaboration between disloyal elements of the Sierra Leone army and RUF, the two groups now taking up the position as the government from 25 May.
The AFRC junta fell out with the Kamajors militias, made up of traditional hunters since it feared the militias growing popularity and power in the south and south-east. Koroma, after seizing power, proclaimed the Kamajors militias to be illegal, and the Kamajors in turn vowed to restore Kabbah to power. The army had been engaged in fighting with the Kamajors even before the coup, clashes which appear to have been carried out by the same disloyal elements of the army that overthrew the Kabbah government and joined hands with RUF. The Kamajors militia thus became a warring party against the government created by AFRC after the coup in May 1997, with fighting after that date taking place between the AFRC/RUF government and the Kamajors.
The Kamajors groups were established primarily in the southern and eastern parts of Sierra Leone. The groups were formed around the concept of traditional hunter-warrior society, constituted by people of mainly Mende ethnicity, and organized themselves as a means of self-defense for eastern and southern communities; defense both from RUF and from unruly government forces. This began as early as 1992, and the Kamajors defense forces grew in 1996 when the government willingly trained and armed such outfits. Kamajors troops had first attacked the RUF in 1992, and engaged the AFRC/RUF government in 1997 and 1998 to reinstate Kabbah.
Although forced into exile, Kabbah was not defeated. Being aligned with the Kamajors against the AFRC/RUF government, Kabbah also mustered support from Nigeria, which initiated armed action to have Kabbah reinstalled as president. Under ECOMOG flag (together with the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Ghana), Nigeria began in July 1997 to lead the campaign to restore Kabbah to power. These efforts lead to the Conakry Peace Plan that was signed between Kabbah and the AFRC in October 1997 to allow for a transition back to democracy and the deployment of ECOMOG peacekeeping forces, but the junta effectively stalled its implementation. By January 1998, as many as 10 000 Nigerian troops were stationed in Sierra Leone, and together with the Kamajors, military action began against the AFRC junta. The AFRC/RUF alliance could not withstand this coordinated onslaught; it lost its position as Government of Sierra Leone when it was ousted from the capital on 13 February. In March 1998, Kabbah was officially reinstated as the elected President of Sierra Leone while Sankoh was flown to Freetown from Nigeria. He was put on trial and convicted to death for treason. The UN, to secure the peace, sent in approximately 70 military observers (the UNOMSIL mission), in July of 1998.
Final phase of conflict (1998-2000) and negotiated settlement
Although AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) and RUF were ousted from power in early 1998, the war was not over. The AFRC/RUF alliance remained and put up tough resistance against the government forces and their allies in the eastern parts of Sierra Leone. After President Ahmed Tejan Kabbahs return to power, the Kamajors militias continued to support him, and once again turned their attention to battling RUF. The group, however, is not coded as a warring party after 1998, as they supported the government when Kabbah returned to power.
In January 1999, ostensibly to avenge their oust from Freetown and to free the imprisoned RUF leader Foday Sankoh, AFRC and RUF launched a new attack on the capital, codenamed Operation No Living Thing. Contrary to what was initially widely held and reported in western media, it has been concluded by the Sierra Leone Truth Commission that this operation was not led by RUF. Rather, it was initiated by the AFRC, more specifically by a faction led by one Solomon A. J. Musa, in a last-ditch attempt to overthrow the Kabbah government and re-establish the military junta. According to these findings, RUF only joined the campaign after it had already been set in motion. The rebels surprised the Nigerian forces as they infiltrated the city, seized control of much of Freetown, and went on a two-week killing spree in the city, murdering civilians, raping women and looting and burning indiscriminately. These events marked the peak of the atrocities committed against civilians during the conflict. After three weeks, the Nigerian forces and the CDF (Civil Defence Forces, which included the Kamajors) had beaten back the rebels and taken back Freetown.
Following the attack on Freetown, heavy international pressure began to be put on the Kabbah government to negotiate a peaceful settlement with RUF. The US, the UN, and the UK became more strongly involved. This pressure brought an unwilling President Kabbah to Togo's capital Lomé, where peace negotiations were held in April and May. Sankoh was released, and the RUF and the government signed the Lomé Peace Agreement in Togo in July 1999. The accord called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, an amnesty for those involved in the war, and made Sankoh chairman of the commission for strategic minerals, in effect giving him administrative control of the country's diamond mines. He was also made Vice President of Sierra Leone under the agreement, and RUF was given seats in the government and parliament. AFRC was not present at the negotiations and did not sign the agreement, having been more or less destroyed as a separate outfit following the January 1999 attack on Freetown.
The events of early 1999 and the signing of the peace agreement also resulted in stronger action by the UN, which as part of the Lomé agreement, mandated a sizeable international peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) to replace the significantly smaller UNOMSIL mission established in 1998 and the mainly Nigerian ECOMOG forces. The establishment of UNAMSIL was authorized in October 1999, and Nigerian ECOMOG forces were evacuated in May 2000.
The Lomé agreement, however, did little to satisfy RUFs aspirations, and it soon became obvious that Sankoh was not abiding by the stipulations of the peace deal. Implementation of the disarmament process was slow, and Sankoh had begun to challenge the authority of both President Kabbah and the UN forces. After the Nigerian ECOMOG troops had left in May 2000, RUF began attacking UNAMSIL troops, culminating in the kidnap of several hundred UN troops in an ambush. Sankoh's dash for control of the country was however foiled by large-scale civil society protests and the arrival of battle-hardened and well-equipped British forces that aligned themselves with the remnants of the Sierra Leone army to battle the resurgent RUF. Sankoh was captured once again, and the UN peacekeepers were released from their place of captivity in Liberia. UNAMSILs mandate was also updated to allow for stronger action, and its force numbers increased. Harsher measures to stop RUF disturbances of the peace agreement were taken, and some skirmishes ensued throughout 2000 between UNAMSIL and RUF forces.
The military action of British forces, RUFs disastrous fighting with the government of Guinea in September 2000 to early 2001 and the strengthened UNAMSIL presence combined to finally break the back of RUF. The rebels began, under the leadership of Issa Sesay, after Sankoh's capture, to cooperate with the Lomé peace agreement and the Abuja agreement, which was signed in November to reaffirm the earlier accord that had been disrupted by the May 2000 disturbances. Consequently, the disarmament process began to gain pace, and in January 2002, a total of 72 490 combatants had been disarmed, marking the official end to the war.
In May 2002, general and presidential elections were held in Sierra Leone, with President Kabbah once again emerging victorious. Sankoh died in prison before being brought to trial, accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the reformed RUF (which after the disarmament process had become a political party) failed to gain parliamentary seats in the elections. Liberian ex-President Charles Taylor, who had been strongly involved in the launch and sponsoring of RUF, was in 2006 handed over to the Special Court of Sierra Leone by Nigeria, where he had been exiled, to be tried for war crimes in relation to RUFs war in Sierra Leone.
