This dyad belongs to the conflict Sri Lanka (Ceylon): Government
Summary of conflict Sri Lanka (Ceylon): Government
The conflict over government in Sri Lanka dates back to 1971, when JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna; People’s Liberation Front) launched their first attacks on the government with the aim to oust seize power. The government responded with tough repressive measures that led to a high number of casualties and an end to the insurrection. The JVP later re-emerged in the late 1980s and in 1989, the conflict escalated drastically. The rebellion was, however, once again thwarted through a military victory by the government in 1990.
The JVP and the 1971 insurrection
The Sinhalese, Maoist JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna; People’s Liberation Front) emerged as a political movement in 1965. Under the leadership of Rohana Wijeweera it subsequently grew into an organised political party and took on an increasingly public role from the mid-1970s and onwards. At the time of JVPs early mobilisation, several other parties, which described themselves as leftist and socialist, already existed in Sri Lankan politics.
JVP existed as a small underground movement from 1965, and under the leadership of Wijeweera, subsequently grew into the shape of a revolutionary political party. The movements first "educational classes" were conducted in secrecy in early 1969,
It was, however, not until april-1970 that the JVP took on a public role, supporting the United Front coalition in the 1970 elections. It commenced its organised activity in the later half of the year, with the distribution of a written manifesto in the form of the central party organ "Vimukhti" and mass meetings at public places. The date of the groups first stated goal of the incompatibility is, on the basis of this information, set to August 1970, as this is the first time they propagated their goal of a socialist revolution outside their own audiences with public rallies, under the name JVP.
Initially identified simply as the "new left," JVP was popular primarily among the unemployed and rural youth, capitalizing on the alleged "class betrayal" of the existing leftist-coalition in their collaboration with the government, and on their lack of a revolutionary purpose. The first political "classes of indoctrination" were conducted in 1969, and were based on the well-known "five lectures" considered to form the political platform of the JVP. These were i) the capitalist economic crisis, ii) neo-colonial independence, iii) Indian expansionism iv)the left movement and v) the path of the Sri Lankan revolution. In the 1970 elections JVP supported the United Front coalition, but soon after the new governments inauguration the JVP intensified its violent rhetoric in a public campaign, claiming that a revolution was necessary to save Sri Lanka.
The insurrection itself broke out in March 1971, when the government of Sri Lanka uncovered far-reaching violent plans made by the JVP to capture government power. Government measures to curb the mounting insurrection were soon taken and involved the detention of 4000 suspected JVP members, among them Wijeweera, in March 1971. The tension culminated on 5 April 1971 in a coordinated attack on police stations and government buildings by JVP members, in an attempt to seize power from the United Front government. A state of emergency was imposed and the government forces had within a few weeks ruthlessly repressed the ill-prepared insurrection. The bulk of the fighting stood in relatively rural areas, such as the ones around Anuradhapura, Kagalla and in the Sabaragamuwa province.
The estimated number of casualties varies between 1200 and 10 000 - the majority of them suspected JVP-associates and not actual armed combatants. The armed conflict thus terminated through a clear victory for the government side.
The second insurrection (1989-1990)
JVP leader Wijeweera and other leaders that had been captured in the 1971 insurrection were released by President Jayawardene in 1977. Subsequently, the JVP re-emerged as a dissident force within the Sinhala community in early 1987, but had contested elections as far back as 1982 (gaining 4% of the vote). The reconstituted JVP was a considerably different force than the one that had launched its insurrection in 1971. Since then almost the entire leadership (except for Wijeweera) had been replaced and its support base had become more firmly entrenched not only in the rural areas but also the urban areas of Sri Lanka. The party had also become almost the sole representative of Sri Lanka’s historically relatively strong Marxist tradition.
Following on the so-called ‘communal riots of 1983’, where many Tamil civilians were massacred by Sinhalese mobs, the JVP became banned by President Jayawardene, with the President blaming (with some justice) that the JVP had been the main instigator and perpetrator of the violence against the Tamils. This act of proscription was an important factor in the JVP’s adoption once again of a violent revolutionary rhetoric and goals. The movement thus went underground under the hierarchic leadership of Wijeweera. The group gained considerable strength in the months following the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987 (concerning the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict), which it claimed conceded too much authority to the Tamil minority in the north. President Jayawardene’s acceptance of this accord appeared to many to be an invitation to the dangers of ‘Indian imperialism’ that the JVP warned of in its political platform. The core incompatibility remained that of governmental power, but the call for a socialist revolution was now cloaked in a more Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist rhetoric than in the early 1970s. In early 1987 the JVP began to stockpile arms and funds and assassinating rival political leaders. An active infiltration of the armed forces and police also begun.
The violent campaign led by JVP and its military wing (the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya; People’s Patriotic Organization) against the accord accelerated sharply in the run up to the presidential elections in late 1988, with a series of disruptive strikes, violent riots and acts of sabotage. Violence escalated further in connection with the general elections in early 1989, and the period was marked by some of the worst fighting to date as the JVP attempted to make a final push to take over power. Tactics employed by the JVP included attacks on military installations in both rural and urban areas, labour strikes, assassinations, sabotage of infrastructure and bombings of government buildings. Throughout early 1989 it looked as if though the JVP would actually have a chance to seize government power.
However, when in August the JVP adopted the strategy of deliberately targeting families of the Sri Lankan army, this triggered a ferocious counter-offensive from the government that effectively crushed the JVP rebellion by the end of the year. This counter-offensive did not only include actual military fighting, but also hard-handed killings of people merely suspected of being JVP supporters or sympathizers. The JVP’s threats to attack the families of the security forces was also, to a certain degree, carried out. ALthough thousands of people were killed throughout the 1989-1990 armed conflict many of these fell victim to one-sided violence and were not killed in actual battles.
The most serious setback for the JVP insurgency was the killing of Wijeweera and his principal deputy in November 1989 while in custody. By February 1990 the security forces had killed or detained 7 of the 8-member JVP politburo and over 25 area and districts leaders. Some 6 700 suspected JVP members were also allegedly held in detention and the JVP was subsequently virtually destroyed as a political force.
The power relations between the primary parties was highly asymmetrical. Little is known about the military capacity and organisational structure of the JVP cadres, but the number of armed cadres was estimated to be between 1 200-3 000. The government of Sri Lanka commanded an active army of about 22 000 to deal with these insurgents. The large presence of Indian troops fighting the Tamil insurgency in the north during the late 1980s implied that Sri Lanka could focus on fighting the JVP insurgency in the south.
Despite its military advantage, it was, however, the government that demonstrated the most willingness to try to find a political solution to the conflict. As a conciliatory gesture to the JVP and the LTTE alike the government in January 1989 repealed the state of emergency that had been in force since the riots of May 1983, but re-imposed it as JVPs renewed campaign of violence peaked in June. The governments invitation to political talks, accompanied by unilateral ceasefire declarations on 12 April and 21 September were rejected by JVP.
The conflict ended in 1990 with what must be termed an unconditional military victory by the government as the entire leadership of the JVP had been killed or captured. The JVP did, however, reappear as a credible political force in provincial elections in 1999, and retained a crucial political position as a supporting party to the PA government in 2001. It has been one of the fiercest resistors within the Sinhala community of a peace agreement with LTTE.
