This dyad belongs to the conflict Guinea: Government
Summary of conflict Guinea: Government
The governmental conflict in Guinea was closely tied to regional instability and developments in neighboring countries. The rebels, RFDG (Rassemblement des Forces démocratiques de Guinée; Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea), sought to oust the perceived undemocratic regime of Guinea and received strong support from Liberia’s President Charles Taylor. Following heavy fighting in 2000 and 2001, the conflict de-escalated and became inactive, while talks on the regional level improved security cooperation in Guinea’s neighborhood.
Regional instability and the emergence of RFDG
Guinea's post-independence history has been characterized by a receding economy and intolerant and repressive regimes. In the early 1990s, Guinea embarked on a democratization process, and a civilian-military transitional council replaced the military regime. However, the process was hampered with difficulties, and despite the holding of elections, politics have continued to be dominated by the leader of the former military regime, Col. Lansana Conté. The government's relations with both the armed forces and the political opposition were tense and, at times, violent. In both 1996 and 1998, there were attempts at overthrowing the Conté regime with force.
Aside from the tense domestic situation, Guinea also suffered from its geographical location. Placed in an extremely volatile region, where conflicts had raged during more than a decade, Guinea was up until 2000 a haven for roughly 500 000 refugees from war-torn Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, borders in the region are porous, and aside from refugees crossing them, so do rebel groups and foreign government troops. During the 1990s and early 2000s, relations between the countries in the region were extremely tense with accusations and counteraccusations concerning the provision of logistics and bases for the enemies of each state being the norm.
As Charles Taylor seized power in Liberia in 1997, relations with that country went especially bad. Until then, Guinea had supported Liberia's previous regime of late Samuel Doe, and in the early 1990s, Conté had sent in troops to stop Taylor's private army from seizing Monrovia. Since then, Conté and Taylor had been at loggerheads and the presence of Liberian rebel group ULIMO – K (United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia – Alhaji Kromah faction) on Guinean soil was an open secret. Also active in the volatile border region of the countries was the Sierra Leonean rebel group RUF (Revolutionary United Front), supported by Taylor and opposed by Guinea. In September 2000, fighting erupted in southern and south-eastern Guinea, in the region bordering Liberia and Sierra Leone. Numerous hit-and-run attacks were reported, but throughout the month, it remained unclear who the perpetrator was. However, in mid-October, a spokesperson for a previously unknown rebel group, the RFDG (Rassemblement des Forces démocratiques de Guinée; Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea), claimed responsibility for the armed activity.
Very little is still known about the rebel organization. Initially, it was unclear whether or not the group even existed or if it was a mere front for Charles Taylor's Liberia, as claimed by the government. By now, it is, however, reasonably clear that - aside from Liberian troops fighting Liberian rebels on Guinean soil - a new, domestic group emerged in 2000. Different names were used in reports on the Guinean rebels, further confusing the situation. It appears as if they all referred to the same set of leaders, though. Therefore it can be concluded with reasonable certainty that reports talking about UFGN and UFDG actually indicated the same rebel movement. The core of the group was made up of Guinean officers who fled the country after the failed coup attempt in 1996. Major Gbago Zoumanigui and Nfaly Kaba, alias Fotoulaye, were the directors of RFDG, with Zoumangui heading the armed wing and Kaba the political one. When the organization first surfaced, a man named Mohamed Lamine Fofana, whose identity was previously unknown, claimed to be its spokesperson. It is now widely believed that he is the same person as Nfaly Kaba. The aim of the movement was clear: the overthrow of President Conté and the establishment of true democracy, as opposed to the existing - in their view - technical democracy. Throughout the conflict, long-time President Conté and his government made up the government side in the conflict.
Even though there was a lack of officially acknowledged foreign support to the warring parties, the conflict in Guinea is clearly very international - or at least regional - in character. All the evidence at hand indicates that RFDG (Rassemblement des Forces démocratiques de Guinée; Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea) received aid from President Lansana Contés archenemy, Liberia's President Charles Taylor, throughout the build-up period, even if well-informed sources question how much real control Taylor in Monrovia subsequently had over the forces fighting far away in Guinea. There were also indications that cooperation took place between RFDG and RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in the battles and that deliveries of weapons were made from Burkina Faso to the rebels. The government of Guinea, for its part, was reportedly backed by ULIMO – K fighters, further mirroring the regional web of alliances.
Conflict dynamics and a regional solution
The primary parties to the conflict were the Government of Guinea and the RFDG (Rassemblement des Forces démocratiques de Guinée; Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea). During the conflict, the situation in the densely forested and mountainous border region was perplexed, and it was not always clear who was fighting whom. In the initial phase of the conflict, it appears as if there were two fronts: one on the Sierra Leone border, not far from the capital Conakry, and another further southeast, on the border to Liberia. Whereas the fighting on the south-eastern front at this time seemed to largely be a Liberian affair, with Liberian government troops mounting cross-border raids against Liberian rebel bases within Guinea, the fighting south of Conakry involved the elusive RFDG movement. This division is, however, not absolute, and in 2001 this pattern could no longer be clearly discerned.
RFDG and RUF (Revolutionary United Front) troops had early victories, launching cross-border attacks from Sierra Leone. Since the attacks happened relatively close to Conakry, the Guinean government troops deployed heavily in the area, eventually managing to push the rebels back across the border. Subsequently, in 2001 most of the fighting on this front occurred in a RUF held area in north-western Sierra Leone. In January and February the same year, fighting escalated on the Liberian border when a government offensive was launched against rebels in the city of Guekedou. Simultaneously, all along the border, the government troops engaged in burning miles of grass and trees to try to wipe out the brush that concealed rebel fighters.
Authorities made an already confusing situation even more chaotic by handing out guns to civilians in a bid to stop the rebels from entering the country. In a situation where hostility towards the thousands of refugees in the country was mounting, as they were all viewed as potential rebels, this led to numerous human rights abuses. Furthermore, the conflict also trapped the refugees. Due to rebel positions behind them, they were unable to return home, and they could not go further into safer areas of Guinea since the Guinean authorities suspected that large population movements might conceal rebel maneuvers. This led to what UNHCR termed as its most severe humanitarian crisis at the time.
No official negotiations took place between the two warring parties, but there appear to have been clandestine attempts at ending the conflict peacefully. In mid-2001 Nfali Kaba stated in an interview that secret negotiations with the government had indeed taken place, but that these had failed to lead to any progress. Despite the lack of substantial negotiations between the Government of Guinea and RFDG, talks on the situation in the country and how to contain it were held, albeit without the participation of the rebels. Due to the internationalized character of the conflict, these negotiations played an important part in the eventual solution of the Guinean conflict.
In August 2001, a groundbreaking meeting was held between the foreign ministers of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, where a decision was reached to re-activate a Joint Security Committee. Furthermore, discussions were held in preparation for a summit between their presidents, aimed at ending the conflict in the border regions. During the following months, a number of meetings were held both of the Joint Security Committee and between the foreign ministers, where further discussions on the subject took place. In February 2002, a summit between the presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia was held in Rabat under the auspices of Morocco's King Mohammed VI. The meeting led to an accord in which the presidents affirmed their commitment to "total security along their common borders" and also called for the repatriation of refugees and assistance to displaced persons. After this summit, regular meetings among the three governments took place at different levels, mainly concerning the implementation of the Rabat Accord. It is important to note, however, that the inter-state relations in this region for years were defined by promises easily made, but just as easily broken.
Despite the lack of talks directly involving the rebels, the conflict de-escalated. There were isolated reports of fighting near the border with Liberia in 2002, but there was a definite decline in violence during the year, and the conflict was no longer active after 2001.
