This dyad belongs to the conflict Chad: Government
Summary of conflict Chad: Government
Civil war has been a feature of Chadian life for almost the entire post-independence period. There is an immense ethnic diversity within the country, and these divisions have been exacerbated by a tradition of factionalism. Since 1966 Chad has experienced civil war in almost all years, with successive governments being challenged by a myriad of rebel groups wanting to bring on reform of the country.
Initiation of civil conflict (1966-1972)
Civil war has been a feature of Chadian life for almost the entire post-independence period. There is an immense ethnic diversity within the country, and these divisions have been exacerbated by a tradition of factionalism. Historically, there has been animosity between the mainly Muslim north and the more Christian and animist south. This animosity was further reinforced by a negligent French colonial administration and even if the current conflict has evolved to surpass the simplified north-south dichotomy, it remains at the core of the conflict and can still be used by opportunistic politicians.
The first civil conflict in Chad lasted from 1966 to 1972. The armed conflict was launched by Frolinat (Front de liberation nationale du Tchad, National Liberation Front of Chad) in 1966 in order to bring down the autocratic government of Francois Tombalabye. Tombalbaye’s policies, taking over after independence from France, focused attention to the more Christian south and thus neglected the Muslim north. Frolinat was launched to counter what they termed the secessionist and sectarian leanings of this government. In 1971 Frolinat became beset by internal dissention and splits, leading to the creation of two splinter groups; the First Liberation Army and the Second Liberation Army, who also fought against the government of Chad.
The launch of FAN and Habré’s ascent to power (1976-1988)
After independence, the then politically dominant southerners controlled the central government. The politically marginalized north launched a Libya-backed rebellion and in 1973 Libya became directly involved by annexing the Aozou Strip on the Chad-Libya border. After a brief rule by an interim government including both northerners and southerners, Forces armées du nord (FAN), a northern anti-Libyan rebel movement under the leadership of Hissèn Habré, seized power in Ndjamena in 1982. The rest of the 1980s was characterised by continued conflict, now with even more external intervention, as Libyan troops supported the rebels and France came to the aid of the Habré government. Thus, at the eve of the timeframe in focus here, the country was in chaos, with a number of different rebel groups challenging the government.
Rebel groups and governments in the 1990s and 2000s
Between 1989 and 2003, two distinct governments can be discerned in Chad. The regime in power until December 1990 had, as described above, ruled the country since June 1982. It was led by authoritarian president Habré, a northerner who ruled the parts of the country under his control with an iron hand. In December 1990, Habré was ousted from power by another northerner, albeit from a different ethnic group: Idriss Deby. Deby and his former guerrilla group MPS (further described below) initiated a transition to democracy, and for the first time since the immediate post-independence period, a state structure could be discerned. However, the transition to democracy has proved to be protracted and the Deby regime has displayed authoritarian characteristics. Apart from being opposed by numerous rebel groups, the regime has also been challenged from within, and the threat of military coups has been ever-present.
A myriad of rebel groups have fought the Chadian government at any one time during the period studied here. In 1989 and 1990, prior to the ousting of president Habré, there were no less than four armed opposition groups active: the Islamic Legion, a military faction, later to be known as the Revolutionary Forces of 1 April, Mouvement pour la salvation nationale tchadienne (Mosanat) and Mouvement Patriotique du salut (MPS). The Islamic Legion had fought the Chadian government since its creation in Libya in 1987. Its fighters were conscripts drawn from both foreign workers residing in the country and from Chadian areas controlled by Libya, and the main aim of the movement was to destabilise Chad. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and his predecessor, Idris Deby, led the Military faction that turned on the government in 1989. During the late 1980s, ethnic tensions had mounted in the armed forces and there was a growing feeling among some groups that president Habrés sub-clan was unfairly favoured. This proved useful for Deby, when rallying the disaffected troops. However, the coup was aborted and the coup makers fled to Sudan, where they adopted the name the Revolutionary Forces of 1 April and made an announcement calling for liberty, justice and democracy in Chad. The following year, the movement merged with the little-known Mosanat, creating the MPS, which subsequently launched an invasion from Sudan and seized power in Ndjamena in December 1990.
With the regime now being led by Deby and MPS, new actors appeared on the opposing side. In late 1991, a rebel group called Mouvement pour la démocratie et le development (MDD), largely consisting of fighters loyal to former president Habré, invaded Chad from Nigeria. The next new actor on the scene was Conseil de salut national pour la paix et la démocratie (CSNPD), which appeared in 1992. The movement had its base in the southern part of the country, and listed a number of demands. First and foremost, it called for a referendum to be held on a federal structure for Chad. Furthermore, CSNPD demanded for the feared Republican Guard to be withdrawn from southern Chad and for damages to be paid to victims of the tribal massacres which took place during the groups first active years. Two more groups appeared in 1992: Comité national de redressement (CNR) and Front national tchadien (FNT). The leader of CNR, col. Abbas Koty, had previously been Minister of Public Works and Transport, but after only a year in office withdrew his support to Deby and launched a rebellion in eastern Chad, accusing the president of being dictatorial and nepotistic. FNT, for its part, fought in the northeastern part of the country, aiming to create an Islamic state in the region of Oudai.
In 1994, Forces armées pour la République fédérale (FARF), emerged in the southern prefectures of Logone Orientale and Logone occidental. This group was led by Laokein Bardé, who had formerly been allied to CSNP, but who opposed the accord the latter group had signed with the government. FARF openly harboured federalist aspirations, which posed a specifically serious threat to the government as the movement operated from an area where oil had been discovered. The next rebel group to appear was Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad (MDJT), which launched its armed struggle in October 1998. Based in the northern Tibesti prefectures, the group is seeking to topple the sitting government, accusing it of being authoritarian and corrupt.
External support and conflict dynamics
The most important external actors supporting the government during the Habré era, was the United States and France. The US provided extensive support to the Habré regime as a part of its strategy to contain Libya and, if possible, remove Colonel Ghadafi from power. Traditionally, Chad has had close relations with France, the former colonial power, and as mentioned earlier, in the early 1980s, France sent troops in aid of the Habré regime. Like the US, France too was aiming to stop Libya from gaining an upper hand in the region. However, during the last year of the decade, French policy changed somewhat in response to events in Eastern Europe. When Habré traduced Frances endorsement of African democratisation, France withdrew its support to the Chadian regime and did not come to Habrés aid when MPS launched its invasion. Support to the Deby regime was forthcoming through most of the 1990s, as France provided both military equipment and military training.
As indicated above, Libya played an important role in the Chadian conflict during the 1970s and until the mid-1980s. Even if its interference was much more overt during these years, it continued to be an important feature until late 1990. After being ousted from much of Chad in 1987, Libya favoured a more indirect way of influencing events in the neighbouring state and began supporting the newly established Islamic Legion. When the Revolutionary Forces of 1 April merged with Mosanat, creating MPS, Libya provided the new movement with financial, logistic and military support. In fact, around 40% of MPSs armaments came from Libya. With the advent of Deby government, relations with Libya improved, even if strains persist. During the early years of the period, support to the rebels was also forthcoming from Sudan, albeit of a more indirect character, as Sudan allowed both the Islamic Front and MPS to have rear bases on its territory. Indeed, Sudan continued to function as a safe haven for at least one rebel group, FNT, even after Habré was overthrown. However, it is unclear if the Sudanese government actively allowed the rebels to use its territory, or if they were just unable to prevent the group from doing so. The same uncertainty applies when it comes to the role of neighbouring Niger, Nigeria, Algeria, Cameroon and Central African Republic, which have all harboured rebel groups on their soil at some point in time. However, rear bases have in some cases been effectively cut off as e.g. Chad, Niger and Nigeria in 1998 made a joint offensive in the Lake Chad region in order to clear the area from rebels.
The 1990s and early 2000s has been characterised by fighting in various parts of Chad, the locus of the violence changing as regionally based rebel groups has formed and disappeared. In the first years of the period, most fighting occurred in the eastern parts of the country, as MPS launched their invasion from Sudan. During the early and mid-1990s, fighting proliferated and by 1992 violence had struck eastern, western, southern as well as north-eastern Chad. As FNT signed a ceasefire agreement, CSNPD signed a peace agreement and CNR seemed to simply disappear in late 1994, the following two years saw a dramatic decrease in violence. The areas hit by fighting subsequently diminished in the late 1990s. During a few years most fighting occurred in southern Chad, where FARF continued their struggle for a federal Chad The locus of fighting changed yet again in 1999, with most violence occurring in the northern Tibesti region where MDJT are based. Even though the intensity in the fighting has not reached the level of the catastrophic 1970s and 1980s, both sides in the conflict has reportedly committed gross human rights violations, including rapes, mass executions and beatings. In fact, one of Chads first human rights organisations in 1993 accused the Republic Guard of conducting a genocide campaign in the south.
Negotiations and peace agreements
During the two years preceding Debys ascent to power, no attempts were made to resolve the conflict through negotiations. However, under Deby there have been numerous negotiation efforts, involving most neighbouring countries as mediators at some point in time. Typically, the talks have revolved around compensation and job offers to those willing to come out of the bush, rather than more substantial political changes, however. In a sense, the government has attempted to buy peace. This focus has been mirrored in the multitude of accords reached between 1992 and 2003. They all include similar provisions: the right of the armed movement to transform into a political party, the integration of the fighters into the national armed forces and the involvement of rebel leaders in government agencies. However, as the large number of accords implies, negotiated agreements in Chad have a tendency to be broken just as easily as they are signed. Either the rebel group renegades on its promises, or it turns out that the government has signed an agreement in view to improve their position in fighting. Nevertheless, some of the accords signed have actually proved durable, and as a result, FARF, FNT and MDD are no longer active.
In 2000, Deby initiated talks with the, at the time, on´ly remaining active rebel group, MDJT. The negotiations were held in Sirte, Libya, and Ghadafi was reportedly instrumental in bringing them about. However, no progress was made until January 2002, when a, for the conflict typical, peace agreement was signed. Following the traditional Chadian pattern, the agreement broke down after only a few months, with both sides accusing the other of violating the accord. Subsequently, fighting ensued and in September 2002, MDJTs leader, Youssouf Toigoimi was killed. This event caused splits within the movements, resulting in a faction under Brig. Gen. Adoum Togoi breaking away and signing a ceasefire agreement with the government. The accord was, however, rejected by the mainstream MDJT. Negotiations between MDJT and the Government restarted in 2004 and continued in 2005 and lead to the signing of a peace agreement 18 Augusti 2005. The name of the agreement is Yebibou agreement 2005 and it contained twelve points, the first being the establishment of an immediate ceasefire followed by the suspension of all military actions.
Increasing involvement in and by Sudan (2005-)
The situation in Chad during 2005 was volatile with spill-over effects from the Western Region of Sudan-Darfur to the adjacent Eastern part of Chad. Several soldiers deserted from the national army and new rebel groups were formed, but the information regarding this is very scarce. On 18 December 2005 the largest clash during the year occurred when a column of 40 rebel vehicles rolled into the isolated desert border town of Adré. A newly formed rebel group called RDL- Rally for Democracy and Liberty claimed responsibility for the attack. The details of what really happened in Adré are uncertain, the rebels say they seized the town but the government denies this. Also the number of causalities is unclear but independent sources say that about 100 died. The origin of RDL is unclear, the Government of Chad says that RDL is a Sudanese militia and holds Sudan entirely responsible for the attack. One reason for these accusations is that the attack was launched from the Sudanese territory of Darfur. However, the leader for RDL, Mohammed Nour, said that President Deby had become corrupt and an even worse leader than the ousted Hissene Habre and because of this Nour had decided to engage into armed opposition to try to remove President Idriss Deby from power.
The year of 2006 was the bloodiest year in Chad for a long time and was characterized by heavy fighting between Chadian government soldiers and several rebel groups. Clashes between the government and the different groups caused many casualties on both sides, as well as civilians, resulting in over 1200 battle-related deaths. The most noteworthy clash between rebels and the government took place on 13 April when Front Unique pour le Changement Démocratique (FUCD), a rebel coalition lead by RDL, tried to take control over the capital city Ndjamena. However, the government succeeded in repelling the rebels and remained in control over the city. Most of the other fighting took place in the eastern part of the country that neighbours on Darfur in Sudan. One reason for most of the clashes taken place in this locality was that the rebels were supported by Sudan and often attacked the governments forces from the Sudanese side of the border. Both Chad and Sudan supported their respective rebels throughout the year despite an agreement signed in Tripoli in February that stated that this support should cease. Eastern Chad was also victimized by attacks by the infamous Janjaweed and by severe fighting between different non-state actors.
Even though the rebel groups shifted alliances and were not united they all shared the same ambition, to oust Idris Debý, the current president of the country. In June 2005 a referendum was held to change the two-term constitutional limit. This referendum resulted in a yes, enabling Déby to be a candidate in the May 2006 elections. Déby won this election but the election was boycotted by the opposition, stating that it was not free and fair. This increased the oppositions view of Déby as a dictator and they continued to fight to get him out of office. That Debý was allowed to take place in these elections was a major reason for the formation of the Rassemblement des forces démocratiques (RAFD) in April 2006.
In October 2006 a new rebel movement was formed by three different rebel groups, one of them being FUCD. The new rebel movement was called Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (UFDD). After fighting within the UFDD for about a month the FUCD started negotiations with the government and on 25 December 2006 the parties signed a peace agreement. These negotiations and the following peace agreement were not seen as valid among the other parts of UFDD. This resulted in FUCDs breakaway from the UFDD alliance. After this agreement was signed UFDD and RAFD decided to unite and continue fighting against president Déby. In 2007 the conflict in Chad continued in a similar way as the two earlier years. Sudanese support to the Chadian rebels and Chadian support to rebels in Sudanese Darfur was also in 2007 a decisive factor. Many rebel groups were involved in clashes against the government during the year but reliable information off these clashes was lacking therefore just the UFDD rebel group was active in 2007. In the end of October a Libyan brokered peace agreement were signed between the Chadian government and four different rebel groups (including UFDD). However, after a month the rebels took arms again stating that the reason for this was the lack of implementation of the agreement.
In early January 2008 the currently three largest Chadian rebel groups, UFDD, UFDD Fondamentale and RFC, decided to form an alliance to better fight the President Idriss Déby. The alliance was led by the largest of the groups, UFDD and the name of the alliance was Alliance National (AN), National Alliance in English. In early February they attacked NDjamena and nearly toppled the sitting regime. This was by far the most important, and deadly, incident in 2008 but fighting also took place throughout the year in Eastern Chad. The Chadian rebels are strongly supported by the Sudanese government and the attack on NDjamena was part of the ongoing Chad-Sudan proxy war. This warfare means that Sudan supports rebels in Chad and Chad supports rebels in Sudan. In May 2008 JEM (a Darfurbased rebel group supported by Déby) attacked the capital of Sudan, Khartoum and this was seen as a revenge on the AN attack on NDjamena. In January 2009 eight former rebel groups formed a joint group called UFR led by Timam Erdimi. In May this Sudanese backed group attacked government forces in eastern Chad. However, URF were defeated and during the rest of the year the fighting were more small-scale. However, no negotiations took place and no peace-agreement signed leading to that the conflict in Chad was active as of the end of 2009.
Decreased tension between Chad and Sudan
Since 2005 Chad and Sudan has been involved in a proxy war against each other. This means that both governments have supported each other’s rebels in attempts to oust the other government. The most high-profile cases of this were the rebel attacks in NDjamena and Omdurman/Khartoum respectively during the spring of 2008. During these years several attempts to decrease the tension between the two countries have been carried out but all of these endeavors have had meager results. However in January 2010 the two governments signed an agreement to not support each other’s rebels. This agreement decreased the support given to the rebel groups substantially. The improved relations were also shown in that the Chadian president, Idriss Déby visited Khartoum and Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir visited NDjamena. The latter was highly controversial as he was accused for genocide by the International Criminal Court. The improved relations between Chad and Sudan weakened the Chadian rebels and many of them decided to negotiate with the government and some of them signed a ceasefire.
One rebel group, PFNR, dismissed any negotiations with the government and continued to fight the government. The PFNR was founded in 2001 and was previously part of the UFR umbrella movement but 2010 was the first time it was active according to the UCDP coding rules. The fighting in 2010 was concentrated to the end of April and was located in the eastern part of the country that borders Sudan.
In 2011 the relation between Chad and Sudan improved further. This led to decreased support for rebel groups operating in the two countries. This resulted in a de-escalation of the fighting in Darfur (the Sudanese region that neighbor Chad to the east). In Chad the rapprochement between the governments of Chad and Sudan led to the rebellion against the regime in NDjamena died out resulting in that for the first time since 2004 there was no ongoing conflict in Chad.
Conflict re-ignites in the north
After the violent first decade of the 21st century, the years 2011-17 were relatively peaceful in the context of the conflict over government power. However, the fact that no group was able to take on the Chadian military did not mean that the underlying problems had been solved; discontent with the Deby regime remained rampant among the exiled opposition and trouble was brewing to the north, in Libya’s lawless southern Fezzan region. Here, numerous former rebels congregated in 2014, initially renting themselves out as mercenaries in Libya’s many conflicts, thereby obtaining arms and funding. Another source of income was trafficking people and narcotics.
Meanwhile, the wheels were set in motion for the formation of a new rebel group. Former UFDD-leader, Mahmat Nouri, in exile in France, ordered Mahmat Mahdi Ali, to start organizing Chadian fighters in the Fezzan region in an attempt to re-launch UFDD. Mahdi had also been a prominent figure in the Chadian conflict, both as a leading member of MDJT and, after a stint on the government’s side, as part of UFDD. Mahdi focused his recruitment efforts on his fellow Toubou clansmen, specifically on the Kreda and Kecherda sub-groups of the Gorane Toubou and succeeded in bringing these fighters under his personal control, rather than that of Mahmat Nouri, who was also a Toubou, but of the Anakaza sub-group of the Gorane. Thus, instead of re-launching UFDD, Mahdi in March 2016 announced the formation of FACT (Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad: Front for Change and Concord in Chad). The group quickly splintered along clan lines, however, as its Kreda clan fighters followed former UFDD spokesman Mahamat Hassani Bulmay into the new CCMSR in June the same year.
The two groups subsequently became embroiled in the Libyan conflict, lending their services to groups fighting against the Forces of the House of Representatives. This led to them being targeted by the latter’s air force, and by mid-2018, at least CCMSR had been forced south. In August, the group shifted its attention to the Chadian army, launching an attack on military positions near the Kouri Bougoudi gold mine in nortern Chad’s Tibesti region. With this, a new phase in the conflict over government power in Chad started, as the government responded by carrying out air strikes and launching a “clean-up operation” in the area. Aside from intermittent clashes, there was also a war of words between CCMSR and the government, with the former referring to the national army as “mercenaries and clan militia of Idriss Deby”, and the latter attempting to play down the threat posed by the rebels by referring to them as “a small group of terrorists”.
Chadian rebel group FACT (Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad: Front for Change and Concord in Chad) which is based in Libya, launched an attack on Chadian territory on 11 April 2021, the day of the Chadian presidential election. Major clashes between the Chadian government and FACT occurred on 17 April in the northern town of Mao, Kanem region, which led to killing 300 FACT rebels and 25 Chadian soldiers. During the fighting, then-President Idriss Deby was fatally wounded. Following Deby's death, the Chadian army launched an attack on FACT and subsequently claimed to have killed several hundred rebels. On 2 May, the army formed a Transitional Military council (TMC) which took over the power. The deceased President's son, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno was declared as the interim president.
In 2023, the conflict over government in Chad became active again, having been inactive in 2022. CCMSR clashed multiple times with the Government in the Tibesti region of Chad. On 4-5 June 2023, the two parties clashed in the Tibesti mountains which resulted in 23 rebels being killed. On 9 September 2023, CCMSR stormed a military post in the Tibesti region killing 6 soldiers, but were quickly repelled by the Chadian military which killed 29 militants.
