This dyad belongs to the conflict DR Congo (Zaire): Government
Summary of conflict DR Congo (Zaire): Government
The Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) has experienced recurrent violent conflict over government since its independence from Belgium in 1960. The conflict over government has been characterized by large-scale involvement of external actors, high levels of violence, and persistent contest over political authority and territorial control, particularly in the eastern provinces. Competition over natural resources has shaped local conflict dynamics and has contributed to prolonging the conflict.
The level of violence in the conflict over government in DR Congo increased in 2025, driven primarily by intensified confrontations between government forces and AFC, a political-military alliance formed in 2023 whose main armed force was M23. During 2025, AFC expanded and consolidated its territorial control across parts of North and South Kivu, including strategic urban centers such as Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira. The conflict continued to have a significant regional dimension. The conflict between the Government of DR Congo and AFC were interconnected with broader regional rivalries, particularly involving Rwanda and Burundi. Rwanda continued to support AFC, while Burundi supported the Government of DR Congo. In parallel, the continued presence and activity of FDLR-FOCA as well as RED-TABARA contributed to overlapping conflict dynamics. Another notable development in 2025 was the emergence of CRP as an active actor in the DR Congo government conflict. The Government of DR Congo and CRP engaged in fighting over villages along the shores of Lake Albert.
The eastern rebellion (1963-1967)
When Congo gained independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, the new government was led by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu. The new country was immediately challenged by various secessionist movements, and the leadership soon broke down and the government was split between the three leaders: Lumumba, Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu. On 17 January 1961 Lumumba was assassinated, and in the aftermath, the United Nations (UN) organized a conference that resulted in a new central government led by Cyrille Adoula.
The country continued to be marked by unrest in various parts, notably in Katanga and South Kasai. In September 1963, the Parliament was dissolved. During the turmoil, CNL (Conseil national de libération, National Liberation Council) was formed on 3 October 1963, with the aim of overthrowing the Adoula government and decolonising the country from foreign powers. CNL was based in Congo Brazzaville and had a socialist orientation. In 1964, a rebellion was launched on many fronts notably in Kwilu, Central Kivu, North Katanga and Upper Congo. In Kwilu, CNL was represented by the Jeunesse movement led by Pierre Mulele. In January 1964, they attacked government installations and missionary outposts in the region. In February, the Jeunesse controlled over a third of the province, and the government declared it a prohibited zone.
In Kivu, the Simbas, led by Gaston Soumialot started a rebellion on 15 April 1964. They attacked Bukavu and other administrative centres in the region. The Soumialot-led rebellion also spread to North Katanga. After occupying Albertville (Kalamie) Gaston Soumialot announced the formation of a provisional government of CNL (Eastern Section), with himself as President and Laurent Kabila as Vice-President. Likewise, a provisional government was set up in western Congo by Pierre Mulele. In August the government had a major setback when CNL captured Stanleyville (Kisangani) in Upper Congo on 5 August 1964. In Stanleyville the “Peoples Republic of the Congo” was proclaimed on 7 September and in a broadcast Soumialot declared that he was the new Lumumba. This provoked a reaction from western powers with mining interests in the region. The government was reinforced by European mercenaries and US-manned combat and transport aircraft.
During the second half of 1964, the government contained the rebellion and in January-June 1965, the rebels lost almost all territory they previously held. Meanwhile, the rebel leaders quarreled among themselves over power and strategies. The final offensive was launched on 29 September 1965, and their last stronghold, Fizi, fell on 10 October, when the remaining rebels fled into the bush without a fight.
In an effort to strengthen the government, President Kasavubu in July 1964 replaced Prime Minister Adoula with Moise Tshombe, who had been fighting the government for the Independence of the Katanga region. After elections in 1965 the friction between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe was heightened. Although a Tshombe-led coalition had won the majority votes in the election, Tshombe was dismissed in October 1965. The constitutional deadlock that followed paved the way for a new leadership. On 25 November 1965 Joseph-Désiré Mobutu declared a state of emergency and assumed power in a bloodless coup. Mobutu declared himself President for a five-year period. Mobutu stated that the military campaign against CNL would continue until it was crushed. The military continued to fight the rebels in remote areas. In May 1966 a military tribunal was held where a number of rebel officers were sentenced to death and President Mobutu declared that the rebellion had been quelled.
In 1967 a new rebellion appeared, this time aiming at the return of Tshombe to power. In July a group of Mercenaries and former Katangan gendarmes led by a Belgian Jean Schramme launched a mutiny and attacked an army camp in Stanleyville (Kisangani). After weeks of fighting, the mutineers withdrew to Bukavu where they established a “Government of Public Safety”. Fighting continued and on 29 October 1967 the Congolese army launched its final assault on Bukavu. Only seven days later the remaining opposition militia was forced to flee into Rwanda.
Shaba I and II (1977-1978)
At the first congress of the only legal party MPR (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution) in 1970, the sole contender Mobutu was re-elected president for a seven-year period. On 27 October 1971 the name of the country was changed from Congo to Zaire. In his “Historic Speech” in 1975 Mobutu presented several amendments in Zaire’s constitution; Christianity was replaced by Mobutism, the agricultural sector would undergo nationalisation and the army would become an institution of the MPR.
In March 1977, the FLNC (Front de libération nationale congolais, Congolese National Liberation Front) launched a military campaign from Angola with the objective of toppling the regime of President Mobutu. The FLNC was mainly made up of ex-Katangan gendarmes who after the Zaire: Katanga civil war had helped the Angolan government fight their rebel groups. The rebel group soon managed to take control over some territory in Shaba (Katanga) and met only a little resistance from the Zairian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Zaïroises, FAZ). Zaire was forced to ask for outside support, Morocco answered the call and in April Morocco sent a paratroops brigade to fight in the conflict. Zaire and Morocco recaptured lost territories and FLNC was pushed back into Angola in May.
The insurgency recurred in May 1978. This time FLNC targeted the mining sector, the first objective was Kolwezi with its copper mines. Mobutu again asked for outside support and this time there were widespread reports that the rebel group harassed and killed Europeans. At that point the USA airlifted French and Belgian forces into Zaire with the supposed mission to protect the white population. The French and Belgian paratroopers managed to drive FLNC out of Kolwezi, and the French continued to fight them within a 20-mile radius of the town. FLNC was once again forced out of the country and most of them fled to Zambia. In the aftermath a peace-keeping force - the African Security Force, led by Morocco was installed in Shaba. The peace-keeping force stayed for over a year and with the help of the African Security Force the government resumed its control along the Zambian and Angolan borders.
The war against Mobutu (1996-1997)
From the early 1960s until the mid-1990s, political life in Zaire was dominated by President Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled the country in a manner eerily reminiscing of the former Belgian colonial rulers. The regime tightly controlled all major economic and political resources and used them to rule through a system of patronage and fear. All through Mobutu's reign there were efforts to oust him from power. However, it was not until the mid-1990s that a large-scale rebellion was launched. To fully understand the background to the 1996 rebellion, events both internal and external to the country - and sometimes a combination of the two - need to be examined.
The Banyamulenge is an ethnic Tutsi group, originally from Rwanda, who have resided in the eastern part of DR Congo (Zaire) for over 200 years. Due to, among other things, their relative wealth, there is a long history of animosity between the Banyamulenge and other ethnic groups in the region, something that Mobutu encouraged as a part of his divide-and-rule strategy. In 1981, Mobutu fed into this resentment even further by revoking the Banyamulenge of their Zairian citizenship. Tension continued to grow and in the 1990s turned violent as both the Zairian army and the local population began attacking the ethnic Tutsis. In response, the Banyamulenge set up armed militias to defend themselves.
Parallel to this internal process, developments in neighbouring Rwanda came to have a decisive impact on the future of Zaire. A civil war had been fought since 1990, between the Hutu government and the Tutsi FPR (Front patriotique rwandais, Rwandan Patriotic Front) guerrilla. In 1994 events came to a head and a genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus was carried out, only halted when FPR managed to seize power in Kigali. More than one million Hutus, among them the main perpetrators of the genocide, the Interahamwe militia, fled across the border into eastern Zaire, where they congregated in enormous refugee camps. Interahamwe and other armed elements subsequently used the camps to carry out raids into Rwanda, but also commenced attacking the Banyamulenge, thus merging the two crises.
These events eventually led to the emergence of a more organised struggle. In October 1996 the Banyamulenge had joined forces with a number of disparate anti-Mobutu groups and together they created the AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo, Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Rwanda and to some extent also Uganda played a vital role in setting up the alliance. At this time the Zairian armed forces (FAZ) was in bad shape. Their numbers had declined, as Mobutu failed to pay their salary, and morale was low.
As described above, events in Rwanda played an important part in the early stage of the conflict. During the first phase, Rwandan troops assisted AFDL, aiming to both root out the Hutu militia operating from Zairian territory and to topple Mobutu, who had supported the previous regime in Rwanda, and who accepted the presence of the armed Hutu groups on Zairian soil. Also, Uganda provided much needed military training and troops to AFDL, albeit never openly admitting to doing so. Most analysts conclude that Uganda's involvement was mainly based on security concerns, as anti-Museveni rebel groups ADF (Alliance of democratic Forces), WNBF (West Nile Bank Front) and LRA (Lords Resistance Army) operated out of Zairian territory. The only state openly admitting to sending troops in aid of AFDL was Angola, who had the same motivation as Rwanda and Uganda, allowing the rebels to launch attacks from Zairian territory.
In line with regional alliances, Mobutu cooperated militarily with a number of the rebel groups mentioned above, i.e. groups fighting neighbouring governments from bases on Zairian territory. Thus, Ugandan guerrilla group ADF, Rwandan dissident Hutu group ALiR (Liberation Army of Rwanda) later FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda), Angolan rebel group UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and Burundian rebels CNDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie, National Council for the Defence of Democracy) at times fought alongside FAZ.
Mobutu was also supported by the diverse Mayi Mayi militias, a set of groups consisting of marginalized youths from eastern DR Congo. Originally, these groups were set up to protect local villages, but as fighting proliferated, the groups allied themselves to the warring parties. Early on in the conflict, the most significant Mayi Mayi group sided with Mobutu, but after Kabila made an overture to the militias, most of the groups joined the conflict on AFDL's side.
The course of the conflict was rapid, with AFDL and its allies advancing swiftly on Kinshasa. Their prompt victory over Mobutu's forces is most often ascribed to the sizable assistance given by Uganda and Rwanda as well as to the discontent with the regime found among the population. Apart from this strictly military aspect of 1996 rebellion, it was also characterised by a huge humanitarian refugee crisis. Initially, most Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire were commonly given a choice to either return to Rwanda or to die. However, as fighting pushed the refugees further into Zaire and away from Rwanda, the latter option was no longer available, and refugees were killed in large numbers.
During the early phase of the conflict, Nelson Mandela mediated negotiations between Mobutu and Kabila on a number of occasions. However, Kabila had a clear upper hand on the battlefield, and was therefore not willing to compromise. Mobutu was finally toppled in May 1997. Laurent Kabila became the new President and he renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Africa’s first world war (1998-2006)
In August 1998 conflict restarted after only a short period of relative calm, this time becoming increasingly complex. After assuming power Laurent Kabila quickly managed to alienate many of his former allies, both previous AFDL members and external supporters. Playing on anti-Rwandan and anti-Banyamulenge sentiments in society at large, Kabila ended DR Congo's military cooperation agreement with Rwanda, which in turn made the Banyamulenge perceive their situation as increasingly precarious. In August 1998 RCD (The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, Congolese Rally for Democracy), launched a rebellion against Kabila's regime. RCD was a movement composed of various political elements opposing the government, including both former AFDL members, primarily Banyamulenge, and Mobutuists. The group, which stated that its goals were to end dictatorship, rebuild the country and promote peace in the region, proved to be endemically fractious.
Originally, one of the main causes behind the internal splits was divisions between the movements main backers, Uganda and Rwanda. Subsequently, in May 1999 RCD split into the two groups RCD-Goma, which UCDP sees as the continuation of RCD and RCD-ML, the former backed by Rwanda and the latter by Uganda. Since then even further splits have occurred, producing smaller factions like RCD-Original, RCD-National, RCD-Populaire and RCD-K-ML. The second rebel group to appear on the battle-field was the MLC (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, Movement for the Liberation of Congo), a movement that enjoyed strong popular support in its base area in the Equateur province. Created by Jean-Pierre Bemba in September 1998 with the aim to overthrow Kabila, MLC launched its rebellion in November the same year.
As indicated earlier, the conflict grew increasingly complex during the second phase, as former allies turned on each other and new groups and supporters emerged. When the fighting began in August 1998, alliances had shifted and Kabila's former main backers Rwanda and Uganda now supported the rebels. Furthermore, UNITA in 1998 and 1999 cooperated militarily with the rebels. Simultaneously, the government received direct military assistance from a large number of parties, something that was crucial to Kabila's war efforts, given the bad state of his armed forces, Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC).
Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia sent troops under a SADC banner, all with their own vested interests in the conflict. Angola, like in the previous phase of the conflict, intervened to refuse UNITA a safe haven on Congolese territory, but analysts have also concluded that DR Congo's diamond sector was another strong incentive. Zimbabwe, for its part, had a less clear reason for sending troops to the conflict. While Mugabe claimed that the troops among other things were protecting central Zimbabwean interests in DR Congo, e.g. a vital electricity supply line, it is also obvious that the support given proved very beneficial economically for the country. Namibia's troop deployment was the smallest one and it only played a minor military role in the conflict. Its reason for entering the war is closely tied to that of Angola, as Namibia during the late 1990s became increasingly embroiled in its northern neighbours civil war.
Furthermore, and with no clear reason for doing so, Chad sent troops to fight alongside Kabila in mid-September 1998. Apart from these troops, sent by neighbouring governments, Kabila, like his predecessor Mobutu, cooperated militarily with a number of rebel groups, already fighting his opponents, e.g. the Ugandan ADF, the Burundian CNDD, Palipehutu-FNL and the Rwandan ALiR (and later FDLR). He also enlisted the help of some Mayi Mayi militias in eastern Congo, feeding into their antagonism against the Banyamulenge.
When the fighting restarted in eastern DR Congo in August 1998, the regime initially experienced a number of setbacks. As most of the relatively well-trained units of FAC defected and joined the rebels, the eastern Kivu province was lost to the RCD, who went on to march both northwards and southwards. Eventually it was only with the deployment of Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian troops in the country that the march on Kinshasa could be halted. Subsequently RCD focused on eastern Congo, where it had the upper hand in the fighting, making FAC increasingly dependent on its allied rebel groups, and the Mayi Mayi. The emergence of MLC in northern DR Congo further deteriorated the position of the government.
The rebel onslaught continued until mid-1999, when FAC managed to get the upper hand due to both the above-mentioned splits within RCD and successful aerial bombardment of rebel positions. The signing of a peace agreement, also in mid-1999, was not reflected on the ground, as clashes continued, albeit on a low level, only interrupted by periodic ceasefires. It is important to note that apart from the fighting between the government and the various rebel groups, there was also a large amount of fierce fighting between the rebel movements, competing with each other for the country's abundant resources. The violence between the government and the rebels had ceased by late 2001.
As compared to the previous conflict episode the pace of negotiations accelerated when the conflict restarted in 1998. Zambian President Chiluba mediated a series of talks, where the rebels were initially denied access. Also Libyan President Qadaffi made mediation efforts with some of the parties to the conflict. In 1999, a peace agreement was concluded. The Lusaka accords provided for the disarming of the militias, the deployment of a 5537-strong UN peacekeeping force, and an "inter-Congolese dialogue".
However, in the following 18 months little progress in implementing the peace agreement was made, despite continued talks. Even though all of the parties violated the agreement, the lack of progress can be mainly ascribed to President Laurent Kabila's resistance to the peace process. The stalemate was broken in January 2001, when the President was killed and his son Joseph Kabila took over. The foreign troops started to pull out, the parties agreed to withdraw 15 km behind the ceasefire lines and UN peacekeepers, MONUC, arrived.
After initial problems with starting up the Inter-Congolese dialogue, aiming to bring together the government, civil society groups, political opposition groups and rebel movements to work out a peace plan and discuss the future of DR Congo, real negotiations finally commenced in March 2002. After 50 days of talks an agreement was signed by the government, MLC and most of the opposition parties, under which rebel leader Jean Pierre Bemba was to become prime minister in a new transition government. Negotiations continued in late 2002, aiming to also include the various RCD groups in the accord and in December an all-inclusive agreement was reached. The "Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo" stipulated that elections at the end of a 24-month transition period, during which Joseph Kabila would remain president, joined by four new vice-presidents.
In 2006, the historical elections, provided for in the peace agreement, were held in DR Congo. These elections brought Joseph Kabila to power as the country's first democratically elected president in 40 years. Despite some election-related violence between Kabila followers and supporters of Jean-Pierre Bemba, the election went relatively smooth.
CNDP and conflict in North Kivu (2006-2009)
Hopes nurtured by the elections in 2006 were soon scattered, when violence recurred in the Kivu regions. DR Congo had failed to disarm the Rwandan Hutu refugees now organised as FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda); and they had continued to attack the civilian population. Former rebel combatants from both the main rebel factions and smaller Mayi Mayi militias were integrated into the new national army FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) as part of the comprehensive peace agreement. This led to tensions – sometimes clashes within the army. The new integrated military, FARDC, was also poorly trained and was often accused of gross human-rights abuses.
One Congolese Tutsi and former RCD commander Laurent Nkunda felt betrayed with the outcome of the conflict. Nkunda considered himself protector of the Congolese with Rwandan descent known as Banyarwanda, and he thought that the political influence of the group was diminishing. He also believed the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge population was threatened by both the army and FDLR. In September 2003, General Laurent Nkunda refused to integrate into FARDC stressing his fear of being arrested. In 2004 the tension in the region led to the first major crisis when forces led by Nkunda attacked the South Kivu city of Bukavu, claiming he was trying to stop an on-going genocide of the Banyamulenge people. In August 2005, Nkunda launched CMDP( (Military Counsel for the Peoples Defense) an armed group with the goal of establishing an "inclusive and conflict-free government, capable of restoring peace and security for all in our republic". CMDP was later renamed CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, National Congress for the Defence of the People). In late 2005 the newly formed group attacked an integrated brigade of FARDC in Rutshuru and managed to drive them out.
From 2006 CNDP gained control of several villages in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu. The group set up a state apparatus with their own taxation system, administrators, police and intelligence services. Low level fighting was on-going between the government and CNDP but in November the violence escalated as Nkunda seized Sake, a town situated near Goma despite MONUC presence in the town. CNDP then advanced on Goma leading to a massive attack from MONUC peacekeepers. At the same time, fighting broke out in Lushebere northwest of Goma. The violence led to substantial losses on both sides and forced the parties to negotiations.
In January 2007 CNDP met with the Government of DR Congo in Rwanda for talks. An agreement was reached in which the government promised Nkunda even more troops under his control if he integrated into FARDC. Despite the agreement fighting resumed in August and after overlooking an October deadline for the start of DDR the government launched a heavy offensive to defeat CNDP militarily. At the end of 2007 heavy fighting were reported involving CNDP, the government, FDLR and a Hutu-Mayi Mayi coalition called PARECO (Patriotes Resistants Congolais, Congolese Patriotic Resistance). The effort to defeat CNDP failed and in December the parties again turned to the negotiation table. On 23 January 2008, a peace-process agreement was signed providing for a ceasefire, including provisions for the resettlement of Banyamulenge refugees and establishing a commission to provide a forum for negotiations of CNDP's political demands. After only a month CNDP withdrew from the agreement and demanded new direct talks with the government. The government was only willing talk with the CNDP as part of the MONUC launched Amani Programme which included all the armed groups in the region and which CNDP considered to be something separate from the commission provided for under the peace agreement.
In August 2008 the government launched a new military offensive against CNDP. However the group again managed to gain the upper hand and they managed to overrun a number of army positions. CNDP again approached Goma leading to a diplomatic crisis. Rwanda intervened and asked Nkunda to halt the advancement. On 29 October, the rebels declared a unilateral ceasefire demanding direct talks with the government. The ceasefire held until 4 November, when CNDP was attacked by PARECO and Mayi-Mayi at Kiwanja. Following intense fighting CNDP captured Kiwanja where the group massacred at least 150 people. Additional clashes between the army and CNDP were reported in Nyanzale, Rwindi and Kibati until the fighting stopped on 18 November. In November talks were held between the parties through the Nigerian negotiator Olusegun Obasanjo, and on 9 December direct talks began at the United Nations headquarters in Kenya between the CNDP and the Kinshasa government. The talks moved forward although neither Nkunda nor Kabila were present.
On 6 January 2009, Bosco Ntaganda dismissed Nkunda as leader of the CNDP, he offered the government new negotiations and on 16 January the Ntaganda-led faction of CNDP declared a ceasefire, after the group had been promised to integrate in FARDC and join Rwanda and DR Congo in their upcoming military operations to disarm FDLR. On 22 January, Rwanda.
On 23 March 2009, CNDP concluded a peace agreement with the government. Under the agreement CNDP was promised political participation in the government if they transformed into a political party, the agreement also stipulated an amnesty and the release of political prisoners as well as provided for the return of Banyamulenge refugees. At first the agreement seemed to hold as CNDP became part of the army and also part of the ruling coalition in the 2011 elections. However in a new phase of violence the history repeated itself, this time the rebels accused the government of not abiding to the 23 March 2009 peace agreement.
M23 and the new North Kivu rebellion (2012-2013)
All peace agreements concluded in the DR Congo conflicts have failed to solve the underlying issues that led to recurrent conflict in the Kivu Provinces. These provinces have been characterized by strong in-group, out-group identities, which resulted in local territorial and political disputes between different groups. Years of joint operations between FARDC, MONUSCO and Rwanda against the Rwandan Hutu militia FDLR had weakened the group but did not produce an outright victory. Their presence contributed to the militarization of the Congolese society due to continuing local and regional fears. In 2011 and early 2012, these local and regional security concerns intersected with national and individual grievances, exacerbated by accusations of flawed elections and President Kabila’s hint at executing the ICC warrant on Bosco Ntaganda. Bosco Ntaganda had been in the top leadership of the CNDP rebel group but after the 23 March 2009 peace agreement, he was integrated into FARDC and led operations in North Kivu against FDLR for the Congolese army.
In early 2012 FARDC was plagued by a wave of defections. Defections began in January, then to a group called CONSUP. CONSUP planned a mutiny in Bukavu which was aimed to start an uprising against President Kabila following the Presidential elections. However, the government dissolved the group before it could launch its campaign. At the same time, other defecting officers formed new armed groups, including the UPCP (Union of Congolese Patriots for Peace), led by former PARECO commanders Kakule Sikuli Lafontaine and Albert Kahasha. In late March Bosco Ntaganda, who would also appear as a prominent person in the M23 leadership, defected along with hundreds of Tutsi soldiers. According to a memo, the defection was prompted by mistreatment, underpayment, poor rations, and lack of promotion opportunities in the army.
On 4 May 2012, the main leader of M23 Colonel Sultani Makenga defected and went to Rwanda. Two days later M23 was officially formed. They released a statement that their goal was to revive the stalled 23 March 2009 agreement. In July M23 formed a political wing and broadened its goals stating: "We are upset by the Congolese governments fraudulent election and failure to improve the living conditions of the Congolese people; we want to chase the government in Kinshasa from power. We are calling for a revolution." Again a group had been formed, aiming to topple the Congolese regime, again with the support of Rwanda and Uganda. During this period, M23 reached out to other armed actors, including UPCP, to broaden its Congolese base and form tactical alliances.
During the early period, M23 had seized control of large parts of the Rutshuru territory in the North Kivu province, an area bordering [Uganda[(/#/country/500) and Rwanda. In November 2012, the conflict escalated further as fighting came closer to the Provincial Capital Goma. On 18 November, the Government was forced to leave Goma and over the coming two days M23 took full control of the town. Through the fighting M23 called for negotiations with the Government but Kabila refused. On 1 December 2012, the deadlock was broken when M23 agreed to leave Goma to instigate negotiations. The first round of talks was held in Kampala Uganda between 9 and 21 December. On 16 January 2013 the parties signed a framework agreement setting the agenda for the future Kampala talks.
In February M23 split in a faction led by General Sultani Makenga and one led by ex-political leader Jean-Marie Runiga leading to a temporary disruption of the Kampala talks. In the same month an agreement was concluded at the regional level between the Governments of DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda stipulating non-interference in each country. This agreement led to the decision of the UN to send an UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), with a mandate to more offensively fight armed groups in the eastern part of DR Congo.
In May 2013, heavy fighting again broke out between the Government of DR Congo and M23, with frequent shelling and clashes. M23, weakened by the split, struggled against the government forces, but with the intervention of the UN Force Intervention Brigade, the government began to perform better. M23 was gradually pushed toward the Ugandan and Rwandan border areas.
On 5 November 2013, M23 capitulated, and its leader announced the end of the rebellion in accordance with the Kampala talks' recommendations. A governmental delegation and a rebel delegation were supposed to sign a political agreement on 11 November to put an end to the conflict, but after the military victory, Kinshasa refused, instead calling it a "declaration." This addressed issues regarding combatants’ quartering, disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and amnesty. Kinshasa rejected a general amnesty, though combatants not guilty of war crimes could re-join the FARDC or police. On 12 December, the Kampala dialogue ended with separate declarations by the Government and M23 signing separate declarations to reflect the agreement reached during the talks. These declarations became known as the Nairobi declarations of 2013 confirmed that M23 renounced the armed struggle and DR Congo undertook to grant amnesty to rebels not guilty of war crimes. M23 disappeared from the conflict scene until a reappearance in the 2020s.
Violent aftermath in the Kivus
The new agreements still failed to solve the underlying conflict issues in the country. Over the years many small militias have appeared, taken sides, disappeared and reappeared under new names. Many of these militias only have local goals and never appear as conflict belligerents in the main conflict over who should govern DR Congo. Other militias have gone public, demanding the regime to step down, all of these groups are considered part of this conflict.
After the Government of DR Congo supported by the MONUSCO intervention brigade defeated M23 in November 2013 they started to fight other small groups in the Kivu regions. In February 2014, FARDC launched an operation targeting APCLS, an ethnic Hunde Mayi Mayi militia active in the Masisi territory of North Kivu province. This militia had been a government ally during its conflict against M23 but had remained outside of the peace process. On 17 March FARDC took control over the town Lukweti, which had been controlled and used by APCLS as headquarters for six years. Clashes continued throughout the spring and forced the group to disperse further. In December 2014, the leader of APCLS, General Janvier Karairi, was interviewed telling the journalist that he was waiting for instructions from God who had commanded him to liberate the Congolese people. In March 2015, it was reported that APCLS managed to retake Lukweti town although they were dislodged the day after. In September fighting were again reported this time around Kashebere. Almost one year later in August 2016, APCLS together with some Hutu Nyatura groups signed a commitment for peace in Muhanga under the mediation of two elected representatives of Masisi, the militias agreed to work for the peace and development of the Bashali Mokoto chiefdom. In particular to put an end to the hostilities, kidnappings of humanitarian workers and to allow the free movement of people and their property in the region. The following year APCLS formed a coalition with some Nyatura groups that had formed the CMC alliance and this coalition continued to clash with the Government of DR Congo around Kitshanga. APCLS became increasingly involved in different non-state conflicts pitting the group against NDC-R, a group that received support from the Government of DR Congo. In early July 2020, NDC-R splintered leading to a new dynamic in the areas of earlier NDC-R control. The splinter faction of Bwira NDC-R-GBS surrendered to and semi-integrated into FARDC and this government-led coalition fought both APCLS, CMC and smaller organisations in Masisi and western Rutshuru territories.
After a jailbreak from Kangabyi central prison in the town of Beni in June 2017, the former inmates introduced themselves as MNR](/#/actor/6740). The group attacked Kabasha on the Beni - Butembo road and stated that their "sole aim is to perpetuate Joseph Kabila’s regime". After the June clashes the group disappeared from the scene. Another larger coalition in the same area, the UPLC, became active in UCDPs data in 2018. The group was created in 2016, came together "to fight the man who wants to stay in power forever". 2018 was an election year in DR Congo (Zaire). The result of the presidential, legislative and provincial elections of 30 December 2018 was disputed but ended with the inauguration of Félix Tshisekedi as President on 24 January 2019. As a consequence a number of militias in DR Congo chose to surrender. A part of UPLC did so in July 2019 but most returned to the bush in early October the same year.
Another alliance, the CNPSC was targeted in clashes in the South Kivu province. The alliance was formed in July 2017 when PARC-FAAL allied themselves with a number of smaller Mayi Mayi militias. The largest group within CNPSC was also known as Mayi Mayi Yakutumba after its military leader, “Major-General” William Amuri Yakutumba. In 2010 Mayi Mayi Yakutumba had formalized its political side of the organisation after building stronger ties with Burundian rebel groups that had settled in the area. Mayi Mayi Yakutumba had been refusing to disarm after every peace process in the region and in the early years the government mainly clashed with the group in efforts to attempt disarmament. But after forming CNPSC in July 2017, the group became a stronger force in the region and managed to control territory. CNPSC was pushed back by an army-offensive in 2018 but remained active. However the armed conflict between the government and CNPSC became more and more entangled with non-state conflicts in the region as well as the Burundi: Government conflict. The government increasingly clashed with other members of the alliance in an effort to quell ethnic violence. Broad but weak coalitions between armed groups, including FARDC and Imbonerakure a militia controlled by the ruling party in Burundi, were forged and influenced the violence on the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu.
The raise and fall of Kamuina Nsapu
In 2016 the Kamunia Nsapu militia spread in the Kasaï regions of DR Congo. Kasaï, which split in the 60s into Kasaï Orientale and Kasaï Occidental, and then again in 2015, into Kasai-Central, Kasai, Kasai-Oriental, Lomami and Sankuru provinces was one of the poorest areas in DR Congo and known for supporting Tshisekedi and his Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) the main opposition party. Kamuina Nsapu is the hereditary title for the chief in the Bajila Kasanga (Bashila) groupement. The chief over this groupement had traditionally had influence over many other neighboring areas bordering Angola. In 2011 the chief over Bajila Kasanga died and Jean-Pierre Mpandi was to inherit the position. When the Government of DR Congo refused to recognize the traditional appointment of Jean-Pierre Mpandi as Kamuina Nsapu, a conflict arose over the local leadership in the area. In a 2013 paper Jean-Pierre Mpandi had described the Kabila government as “an Occupation Government” and therefore the country had to be liberated by an operation known as “kabukulu”. He called the people to defend the Congolese soil against the presence of foreign mercenaries and their occupying government. In April 2016, when Jean-Pierre Mpandi returned from South Africa, where he had been working as a doctor, the Government of DR Congo decided to replace him with a brother to Mpandi who was a local member of Kabila’s ruling PPRD party. On his return the first reports appeared of a group called Kamunia Nsapu armed with weapons. Other traditional rulers joined the uprising and were asked to revolt against all symbols of the State, send young people to be initiated and trained to form a militia that would take actions aimed at destabilizing the government. When Mpandi was killed more people joined the Kamuina Nsapu militia protesting against the force used by the government in trying to crush it. The Kamuina Nsapu phenomenon spread to all five provinces of Greater Kasai. The conflict with Kamuina Nsapu in the Kasaï provinces de-escalated in 2018 and a large part of the group surrendered to the government.
Regime change but continued conflict
After elections in 2018, Joseph Kabila finally stepped down in January 2019, with Tshisekedi being inaugurated as the 5th President of the DR Congo (Zaire). The election results were widely questioned but it was still the first democratic transition of power in the country since it gained independence in 1960. In the early days of Tshisekedi's rule, he managed to take some positive steps towards peace through granting amnesties for political prisoners and allowing exiled critics to return. He also made an offer of an amnesty, money and the chance of a new life in the military if the fighters renounced violence. Some militias responded to the call, but most of them returned to the bush after the government failed to turn their promise into action. Tshisekedi also reached out to neigbouring countries to improve the relations in the region.
On 30 April 2021, Tshisekedi announced a state of siege in Ituri and North Kivu, two of the provinces that had continued to show high levels of violence. The aim was to combat armed groups and protect civilians. FARDC targeted armed groups in these two provinces and the conflicts with CMC and APCLS, sometimes in coalition escalated further. At the end of November 2021, the Ugandan army entered the DR Congo to participate in the DR Congo: Islamic State conflict against IS (former ADF), provoking Rwanda, who was suspicious of the improved relationship between DR Congo and Uganda. The following month Burundi was allowed to enter Congolese territory to fight RED-Tabara further straining the relationship with Rwanda. An Uganda and DR Congo road project further alienated Rwanda who has previously been benefited from trade routes through eastern DR Congo. Congolese imports and exports often passed through Rwanda’s borders. This partly revived M23 an old Rwandan ally.
The return of M23 and a resurgence of the regional conflict
M23, an armed group that had remained dormant since their defeat in 2013, began to reemerge in DR Congo from 2017. After leaving the Bihanga camp in Uganda, where they had been based since their defeat, they settled on Mount Sabinyo in Virunga National Park, near the borders of DR Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. While initially avoiding large-scale confrontations, M23 launched attacks in November 2021 to seize weapons and ammunition, following the breakdown of secret negotiations concerning the implementation of Nairobi Declarations of 2013. Disagreements over integration into FARDC, refugee return, and political representation stalled the talks.
The renewed activity occurred in the context of shifting regional dynamics, including increased cooperation between DR Congo and Uganda on security and road rehabilitation, and deteriorating relations between DR Congo and Rwanda. By 2022, M23 had gained territory in North Kivu, capturing villages in Rutshuru and advancing towards Goma, establishing local administrative structures. A unilateral ceasefire in April coincided with the Nairobi Process, an EAC-led peace initiative, but hostilities resumed in May with the seizure of a FARDC camp near Goma. In response to M23's advance, the Government of DR Congosought support from former adversaries. Armed groups, including APCLS, CMC and NDC-R negotiated a ceasefire and formed ARP (later renamed VDP), an alliance with the sole aim of fighting M23 and Rwanda. The new alliance also cooperated with FDLR-FOCA increasing tensions with Rwanda.
In mid-2022, M23 seized Bunagana on the DR Congo-Uganda border and advanced on Rutshuru town. Diplomatic efforts, including agreements mediated by Angola and the deployment of the East African Community (EAC) force, failed to produce a sustained reduction in hostilities. A ceasefire declared in the spring 2023 partially held, although clashes between M23 and VDP persisted in several areas. As part of the ceasefire arrangements, EAC troops were deployed to take control of contested areas from M23. However, in practice, the EAC force both assumed control in some locations and coexisted alongside M23 positions in others. In October, the Government ordered the EAC force to leave the country by 8 December. Subsequently, M23, supported by Rwanda, launched a renewed offensive, targeting areas near Goma. DR Congo sought support from SADC as the EAC had failed to contain M23. South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi who were also part of the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade sent troops
December 2023 was marked by several parallel developments. The Government declared a ceasefire in preparations for the national elections. During his campaign for a second term, President Tshisekedi issued threats against Rwanda stating that he would seek parliamentary authorization to declare war if re-elected. On 15 December M23 and nine other armed groups formed a new political-military alliance in Nairobi, Kenya. The alliance, led by Corneille Nangaa, was named AFC (Congo River Alliance, Alliance Fleuve Congo) and aimed to overthrow the Congolese government, citing failures in governance and security. Five days later, general elections were held in DR Congo, resulting in the re-election of Félix Tshisekedi with 73% of the vote.
Hostilities between AFC and government forces continued across North Kivu. The year saw repeated clashes near Goma, Rutshuru, and Sake. Despite multiple ceasefire declarations brokered by the East African Community (EAC) and SADC mediation, violations were frequent. Sporadic attacks targeted both military and civilian areas, and AFC retained the initiative in key border zones. In the second half of 2024, DR Congo engaged SADC forces, including South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian troops, to reinforce government positions after EAC troops withdrew.
AFC and the control over the east
In January 2025, AFC launched a major offensive against Goma between 23 and 30 January. FARDC, MONUSCO, and SADC forces resisted, but Goma fell to AFC, with heavy casualties among peacekeepers and SADC troops, particularly around Goma and Sake. During a press conference after the fall of Goma in January 2025, Corneille Nangaa stated that federalism would allow for more decentralized and inclusive governance, fostering better representation of the country's diverse regions and ethnic groups, and helping to reduce persistent tensions in the country.
Following the fall of Goma, AFC expanded southwards into South Kivu, seizing Bukavu and briefly occupying Uvira before withdrawing tactically. The offensive involved widespread shelling and aerial bombardment. AFC continued the state building project of M23 in the new areas it captured, appointing local governors, Joseph Bahati Musanga in Nord Kivu and Emmanuel Birato in Sud Kivu, to replace the official state structures.
Meanwhile, conflict dynamics in Ituri evolved with the emergence of CRP as an active actor. Government forces engaged CRP along the shores of Lake Albert, creating an additional front. These developments further expanded the geographic scope of violence and shaped new alliances in the northeast.
A ceasefire monitoring agreement was signed on 14 October 2025 establishing mechanisms to observe and report violations. However, the agreement had limited impact on the ground, as hostilities continued. Negotiations in Doha, Qatar, led to the Framework Agreement for comprehensive peace in eastern DRC on 15 November 2025. Signed by the Government of DR Congo and AFC under Qatari mediation, the framework reaffirmed the country's sovereignty, constitutional order, territorial integrity, and respect for international humanitarian law. While not legally binding, it committed both sides to dialogue, cessation of hostilities, and the restoration of state authority in areas under AFC control, with further discussions to define timelines, mechanisms, and coordination with local authorities.
Other diplomatic initiatives included the U.S.-brokered agreement between DR Congo and the secondary warring party in the conflict Rwanda, led by former President Trump, which sought to reduce cross-border support for armed groups. Despite these processes, hostilities continued, with clashes and aerial bombardments throughout North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri.
Final words on the conflict over Government in DR Congo (Zaire)
Beyond battlefield developments, the conflict over government in DR Congo (Zaire) has been shaped by persistent challenges related to state authority, and the fragmentation of armed actors. The DR Congo: Government conflict has been intertwined with other types of UCDP organized violence. Both state and non-state actors have been implicated in killings of civilians, forced displacement, and other abuses. Armed groups have frequently targeted civilians perceived as supporting rival factions, while also relying on coercive practices to sustain recruitment and territorial control. The armed groups fighting the government have frequently been involved in non-state conflicts often with groups supporting the Government. Despite repeated military operations and peace agreements, the Government of DR Congo has struggled to establish and maintain effective control over large parts of the eastern provinces. In several areas, parallel systems of governance have been established by non-state armed groups, including taxation, policing, and judicial practices.
The conflict landscape has also been characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and shifting alliances. Armed groups have repeatedly splintered, merged, and reconfigured into new coalitions, complicating both military responses and peace processes. Alliances between government forces and non-state actors have been fluid, often driven by short-term strategic considerations rather than long-term political alignment.
At the regional level, external involvement has remained a key driver of conflict dynamics. Neighboring states have provided varying forms of military, logistical, and political support to different parties, contributing to the persistence and escalation of violence. Regional rivalries have intersected with domestic conflict dynamics, reinforcing cycles of confrontation despite ongoing diplomatic initiatives.
