This dyad belongs to the conflict Israel: Palestine
Summary of conflict Israel: Palestine
The Israel–Palestine conflict revolves around the issue of what state should exist in the territories that today are either in the state of Israel or occupied by the same. In this conflict over territory, the state of Israel is opposed by various Palestinian armed groups.
In January 2025, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire that included the release of Israeli hostages held in Gaza in exchange for the release of Palestinians detained by Israel. Fighting decreased substantially during the following weeks. However, the ceasefire collapsed in March 2025 and Israel resumed large-scale military operations in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, an Israeli blockade of Gaza restricted the entry of humanitarian aid, resulting in worsening humanitarian conditions. The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), established with Israeli and US support, began distributing aid through an alternative mechanism to existing UN-led operations. Several deadly incidents occurred at or near GHF distribution sites during the year, generating significant international concern.
In October 2025, Israel and Hamas reached a second major ceasefire agreement that substantially reduced the level of violence. The remaining living hostages held in Gaza were released, as well as almost 2000 Palestinian detainees. As fighting subsided, humanitarian access to Gaza improved although the situation remains fragile.
Historical background and the outbreak of the conflict (1880–1948)
The Israel–Palestine conflict concerns what state should exist on the lands that have historically been referred to as "Palestine." Since the establishment of the state of Israel on some of these lands in 1948, the two contenders have been the Jewish-dominated state of Israel (Eretz Yisrael) and a rivaling state for the Palestinian people (Filastin), currently mainly enshrined by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The perceived borders of these two rivaling entities encompass the same piece of land.
Before the end of World War I, the territories known as Palestine were part of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled from Istanbul. The Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the German-dominated Axis, an alliance that subsequently lost the war against the Allies. The Allies won the battle in the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire with the help of the so-called Arab Revolt (initiated in 1916), a movement that channeled Arab nationalism into a struggle for a united Arab republic free from the Ottoman Empire. When the Allies had won the war, the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire were divided between the United Kingdom and France, with the areas of Palestine being placed under a British mandate by the League of Nations. In 1917 the British government announced the Balfour Declaration, which, in short, stated that the Jewish people were to be given a homeland in Palestine, although not at the expense of other peoples dwelling in those areas. This declaration was to have significant consequences for the future of this disputed territory.
In terms of demography, Palestine at the time of the fall of the Ottoman Empire was dominated by Arab-speaking peoples (about 87% of the population were Muslim or Christian Arab) that commonly ascribed to a dual Palestinian-Arab identity. The notion of Arab nationalism had grown during the revolt against the Ottomans and continued to do so, as it was also linked to the concept of a special identity for Palestinians. At the end of the First World War, the term "Palestinian" was, in general, used as an identifier of people and the concept of "Palestine" became a central issue in Arab nationalist discourse.
In the 19th century, nationalism among Jews living both inside and outside present-day Israel and the Palestinian territories also grew, mainly through the writings of Theodor Herzl and his book "Der Judenstaat" (The Jewish State). In this work, Herzl stated that the problems faced by the Jews were not religious or economic but political and that the issue could only be solved by the founding of a Jewish state, a notion that carried tremendous appeal among those Jews that felt stateless and/or persecuted. Herzl’s writings initiated a Jewish nationalist movement called Zionism, which worked towards the goal of such a Jewish state.
After World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine was relatively small, numbering only about 94 000, or 13.5 percent of the total population. The vast bulk of these Jewish inhabitants were immigrants. Some Jewish immigration had begun as early as the late 19th century when many who were inspired by Zionism or fled persecution made the journey to the then-Ottoman territories. However, the majority of Jewish people still lived in Europe, where some were integrated into the liberal, and relatively secular states, while others were often persecuted for their religion and/or ethnicity. The latter was mostly the case in the states of Eastern Europe, in which more than half of Europe’s Jews resided, although anti-Semitism was also prevalent in Western Europe. After World War II and the Holocaust, the number of Jewish immigrants to Israel increased exponentially, and the Zionists began to press for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration.
The increase in Jewish immigration from 1880 and onwards soon sparked conflict between the indigenous Palestinian Arabs and the newcomers from Europe. Clashes between Jewish settlers and Palestinians are known to have occurred as far back as 1886. However, only after 1917 did the problems attain more significant proportions; as Jewish immigration increased, the Jewish settlements became more clearly Zionist, and when calls were made for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. At first, it was only a declaration of policy by the British Crown. Yet, the declaration won international legal power as it was written into the mandate for Palestine that the League of Nations bestowed on the UK. It is of importance, however, that the text did not mention "state" but rather only "national home," not "of Palestine" but "in Palestine." Thus, the British faced two conflicting challenges within the mandate; preparing the population for self-rule and establishing a national home for the Jews.
Despite the wishes of the Palestinian Arabs, the British did not manage to control Jewish immigration to the area, and as the persecution of Jews escalated in the 1930s and 1940s with the advent of fascism and Nazi Germany, immigration increased further. The Holocaust in Europe throughout World War II intensified immigration, both during and after the war. It is estimated that by 1947, Jews made up some 30–40% of the total population of the British mandate of Palestine, bringing the confrontation to a climax.
Among Jews, Zionism was the dominant ideology, which intermingled with other ideologies such as socialism to create various strands within the movement. The preeminent leader of the Zionist movement in Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s was David Ben-Gurion, who would later become Israel’s first president. He attempted to reach statehood for the Jewish people both through armed action against the British and negotiating with Palestinian and Arab prominent individuals. On the Palestinian side, opposition to the Zionist movement and the domination of Palestine by a European power was led by al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, a prominent religious official from Jerusalem. He vehemently opposed any compromise with the Zionist movement and led the Palestinian Arabs in the 1936–1939 revolt against the British. Thus, two opposing sides had appeared with the British and their mandate being found in the middle.
In 1939 the British released a policy paper, which clearly stated that they would create no Jewish state in Palestine. This all changed, however, with World War II and the Holocaust. Not only did most Jews then commit themselves to Zionism and the idea of a Jewish state as a refuge for all Jews, but the world’s stance on such a state changed. Faced with an issue they could not resolve, the British passed the decision on to the newly created United Nations (UN) in early 1947.
In late November 1947, the UN commission charged with exploring the issue of Palestine reached a final verdict, and a partition plan was adopted by the General Assembly, splitting the former mandate into one Jewish state of Israel and one Arab state of Palestine. 56% of the territory was given to the state of Israel. Palestinian Arab leaders opposed this plan, not only since it gave the majority of the land to Israel but also since they objected to partition as a principle. Fighting between Jews and Arabs in Palestine erupted soon after.
The British left the mandate on 15 May 1948, up until which fighting between Jews and Palestinians had raged with the result of the Jews having been able to hang on to most of the territory given to them by the partition plan. Israel declared independence on 14 May, to which the neighboring Arab states of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon – which all opposed the partition of the territory – replied with an invasion intended to crush the fledgling state.
This war ended with armistice agreements with Israel’s Arab neighbors in 1949, drawing up ceasefire boundaries that left Israel in control of more territory than was proposed by the partition plan (approximately 78% as opposed to the earlier 56%). The 1948 war set the tone and context for the Israeli-Arab conflict, which has since run parallel to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, intertwining interstate and intrastate conflicts. It also contributed to two of the thorniest issues in present-day deliberations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides: the Palestinian refugee problem and the delimitation of borders. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled from the area of conflict, and after the war in 1967, they were joined by even larger refugee populations. At the same time, new boundaries of control entered the context as the original partition plan was de facto altered by Israel’s military victories in 1948. Also, the West Bank fell under Jordanian control, while Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip.
Guerrillas from the West Bank and Gaza (1948–1966)
The military victory of the state of Israel over the more populous Arab states and the Palestinians might appear to be counterintuitive, but can be explained by the fact that the Arab states did not commit very many troops, that the Israelis were highly organized while the Arab states were in disunity, that the Palestinians had been devastated by their 1936–1939 conflict with the British, and that the Arab states lacked the necessary training and equipment to confront Israel.
Despite the enormous setback of losing territory to Israel, known among the Palestinians as al-Nakba (the Catastrophe), Palestinian organizations soon began to challenge the Israeli state violently, both from within Israel, where some 150 000 Palestinians still resided, and from those areas of Palestine that Israel did not occupy but which were then under Egyptian and Jordanian control.
Palestinian movements and organizations had taken a severe beating during the 1947–1948 war, and in general, the political structures that existed before the war were destroyed. Several different Palestinian organizations took to the battlefield to fight Israel, such as the Arab Salvation Army (dissolved in 1949), the armed forces of the All Palestine Government (APG), the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), and the Fidaiyyun group (mainly controlled by Egypt). In UCDP data, these groups are found under the heading "Palestinian insurgents" since it is extremely difficult to ascertain conflict activity and other aspects at a more disaggregated level.
In 1965 the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) initiated its armed struggle alongside the umbrella movement of the Arab Nationalists’ Movement (ANM). These movements carried out infiltration operations from neighboring countries and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into Israel as their primary strategy, albeit at a relatively low level of intensity.
However, the strategies pursued by these movements were to be drastically altered after the war of 1967.
The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (1967–1974)
In 1967 Israel fought Syria and Egypt in what came to be called the Six-Day War. The outcome of this interstate armed conflict was a clear-cut victory for Israel, which came to occupy the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula (previously controlled by Egypt), the West Bank (previously controlled by Jordan), and the Golan Heights (previously controlled by Syria).
The 1967 war between Israel, Syria, and Egypt altered or enhanced many of the core aspects of the Israel–Palestine conflict.
First of all, Israel suddenly controlled all the lands of former Palestine, and, secondly, a new wave of refugees streamed across the borders to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Thirdly, the focus of Palestinian resistance shifted from the control of the Arab countries to the Palestinian movements themselves, and fourthly, yet another new set of borders became the de facto partition of the former British mandate of Palestine.
The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip also kick-started the issue of settlements, with Israeli Jews moving into occupied lands to build settlements on Palestinian land. More or less throughout the entire history of the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the governments of Israel have supported such moves by settler communities, albeit with differing levels of ambition.
The military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was soon denounced by the international community and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242, which demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied lands.
In 1968 the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) came under the direct control of Fatah, a liberation group headed by Yassir Arafat. Fatah itself was founded in 1958 and was at the time of its founding opposed to the PLO, which was a creation of the Arab League (an organization for cooperation between Arab states). The movement, however, joined the PLO already in 1967. Fatah is of a secular nationalist orientation, with leftist leanings, and was at its founding highly influenced by the anti-colonialist writings of Franz Fanon and the Algerian struggle for independence from France. The PLO itself had become active as a warring party already in 1965.
The loss of footholds in Palestine by Jordan and Egypt in 1967 opened up the playing field for Palestinian actors once more, and the PLO under Arafat moved in to fill this vacuum and become the dominant player on the Palestinian side. The PLO and Fatah sought, at a minimum, the return to the borders of 1949. At the outset, their claim to Palestine was, however, total, thus including also the lands that are now the state of Israel. Taking control of the PLO, Fatah and other fighting groups rewrote the charter and consciously shifted the organization’s focus from the pan-Arab agenda to a more solidly Palestinian one. This was perhaps a logical outcome, seeing that the Arab states had been defeated by Israel in open combat and seemed more concerned with recovering lost lands than with the fate of Palestine. At a later stage of the conflict, the PLO became bestowed by the international community with great legitimacy and came to be viewed as the embodiment of the Palestinian "state without a country."
However, the PLO’s policy shift in late 1973 and early 1974 towards claiming that Palestinian self-rule could be installed in the West Bank and Gaza before the liberation of all Palestinian lands caused a split within the movement between the more moderate Fatah-led factions and the more radical groups that saw such moves as opening the door to a partition of Palestinian lands.
A loose alliance of Palestinian groups known as the Rejectionist Front (or, Front of Forces Rejecting Capitulationist Solutions; Jabhat al-Qiwa al-Rafida li al-Hulul al-Istislamiyya) thus appeared, comprised at its outset of the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command), the ALF (Arab Liberation Front) and the PPSF (Palestinian Popular Struggle Front) with the goal to subvert any such moves by the PLO. This alliance first became active as a warring party in 1974. Membership in the Rejectionist Front and the PLO has since fluctuated as different Palestinian groups have shifted their allegiance between these two umbrella movements.
Guerrilla action launched from Gaza and the West Bank during the 1967–1974 period was not particularly successful, perhaps mostly because the geography of these areas was not sympathetic to guerrilla tactics. With guerrilla tactics failing several Palestinian groups, especially those of the Rejectionist Front, turned to attacking Israeli civilian targets and also engaging in violent activities such as the hijacking of planes and attacks on Israeli targets in foreign countries. Notable violent operations were, for instance, the killing of 11 Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 (perpetrated by the Black September group), and the Ma’alot Massacre (perpetrated by the PFLP) in Israel in 1974.
Major events of fighting during this period included the so-called Battle of Karameh, which took place in the Jordanian town of the same name in 1968. The town had become the headquarters of Arafat’s Fatah faction, and when Israeli intelligence claimed that the town would be used as a launching pad for attacks into Israel, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) launched an attack across the Jordanian border. In the battles that followed, hundreds of combatants (mainly Palestinian and Jordanian) were killed as the IDF fought against the combined forces of Fatah and the Jordanian army. Palestinian groups also played a small role in the 1973 conflict between Israel, Egypt, and Syria.
Up until 1971, the PLO made use of Jordan as a sanctuary, maintaining large bases and training camps in the kingdom. The PLO, however, soon outstayed its welcome in Jordan as it extended its power base throughout the country with the help of the kingdom’s large Palestinian population and sympathies within the Jordanian army. Some Palestinian groups even attempted to assassinate the king. King Husayn, feeling threatened by the loss of control over his kingdom, moved in 1970 to restore his influence, sending the Jordanian army to attack the PLO and other Palestinian groups entrenched throughout the land. The first attacks were launched in September 1970; events referred to by the Palestinians as "Black September." Hostilities continued throughout 1970 and into June of 1971 when the Jordanian army had reassumed full control of the country and expelled the PLO’s presence there.
PLO operations and headquarters instead moved to Lebanon since Egypt and Syria would not allow the group to set up camps on their territory. However, the Lebanese government and army were much too weak to resist these moves. This shift to the Lebanese theatre would have drastic consequences both for Lebanon and the PLO.
War in Lebanon (1975–1978)
The 1967 war between Israel, Syria and Egypt effectively moved the strongholds of Palestinian resistance from Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip to Israel’s neighbors; first to Jordan and then after 1971 to Lebanon. By this time, the leadership of the Palestinian movement had become firmly entrenched within the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), dominated mainly by the Fatah movement of Yassir Arafat. By 1975 the PLO had also reached great international recognition, with Arafat addressing the UN in 1975, having been bestowed in 1974 by the Arab League with the right to represent all Palestinians, and having diplomatic relations with more countries than recognized Israel.
Having been forcibly removed from Jordan following the violence there between the Palestinian guerrillas and forces of the Jordanian monarchy, the PLO moved its main theatre of operations into Lebanon. Lebanon had already absorbed hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees following the 1948–1949 and 1967 wars. The country also came to accommodate the bulk of the PLO’s fighting forces, approximately 10 000 – 15 000 men under arms, as well as other Palestinian militant groups. The bulk of Palestinian forces were stationed in southern Lebanon, where they could conduct raids into Israel, while the PLO’s headquarters was located in Beirut. The Lebanese government was much too weak to resist this newcomer’s ambitions, even if it had wished to do so.
The arrival of the PLO in Lebanon drastically altered many factors within that country and was a contributing factor in triggering the civil war that lasted in Lebanon from approximately 1975 to 1990 and in which the PLO partook (for information on the Lebanese civil war, consult the Lebanon conflict page). Israel also became involved in this civil war with the stated goal of crushing the PLO, although the wish to install a pro-Israeli government in Beirut also played a part. In short, in Lebanon, the PLO allied itself with the leftist, mainly Muslim, Lebanese National Movement (LNM) to face off with the rightist Maronite-dominated Lebanese Front (LF). Israel supported the LF in this struggle since the Maronites were fighting the PLO and were more amenable towards Israel in general. Although this conflict, which also involved the active participation of Syria (on shifting sides throughout the long civil war), swallowed much of the PLO’s fighting capacity, guerrilla groups from the movement continued to raid Israel across its northern border.
Southern Lebanon was the last frontier from which the PLO could cross the border into Israel, and the presence of PLO bases there both held threats and opportunities for Israel. The presence in such close proximity to Israel of more than ten thousand Palestinian commandos armed with tanks and artillery was, of course, a relatively severe threat, but if Israel could remove this challenge, all borders into Israel would be effectively sealed to Palestinian infiltrators.
In early 1975, as the PLO’s presence in Lebanon rose to the forefront of the polarizing issues in Lebanese politics, Israel continued to launch air raids on Palestinian refugee camps and bases in southern Lebanon, as well as conducting limited ground incursions across the northern border. Israel conducted such raids in Lebanon partly to ensure that the costs of allowing the PLO to stay on Lebanese soil were continuously on the Lebanese agenda. PLO and other guerrillas retaliated in kind, launching raids across the border between February and June of the same year. The guerrilla activity also increased in the West Bank throughout early 1975.
Between 1976 and 1977, the conflict between Palestinian groups and the Government of Israel continued to be locked in a retaliatory cycle such as the one described above. The PLO and the Rejectionist Front continued to partake in the Lebanese civil war, which drained its resource considerably as they faced encirclement in their camps, constant clashes with Maronite forces and finally a Syrian intervention. It was not until 1978 that the conflict increased in intensity and scope, as Israel became more heavily embroiled in the Lebanese quagmire.
Invasions of Lebanon and the expulsion of PLO (1978–1982)
Already in 1977 Israel had escalated its operations in southern Lebanon as a reply to an increase in PLO forces in these areas. The PLO and the Rejectionist Front had dispatched a significant number of troops to the south to battle offensives carried out by the pro-Israeli Maronite militia called the South Lebanon Army (SLA, and also called the Free Lebanon Army), which threatened to close off the entire border area with Israel through its battlefield successes.
Tensions continued to increase towards the end of the year, as the PLO shelled northern Israel and Israel, together with its client militia, shelled PLO bases and Lebanese villages. More than a hundred people were killed in shelling and air raids by Israel towards the last months of the year, prompting calls from within Lebanon for the PLO to withdraw from the border.
On 11 March 1978, Fatah rebels landed, by boat, south of Haifa in Israel, hijacked a bus with Israeli civilians, and drove it towards Tel Aviv. Israeli forces intercepted the bus, and in the ensuing battle 9 rebels, 34 civilians, and 2 Israeli soldiers were killed. Using this attack as a pretext, the Israeli government found the cause enough to invade southern Lebanon to remove the Palestinian threat from the border. An invasion force of approximately 25 000 – 30 000 troops and 300 tanks attacked across the Lebanese border and soon took control of all Lebanese lands between the Litani River and the Israeli border, scattering PLO and Rejectionist Front forces before them. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) lost 21 men, killed about 65 rebels and at least 176 civilians.
The offensive ended with a UN ceasefire agreement on 20 March, which was accepted by Israel and which mandated the placement in southern Lebanon of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL’s task was to ensure the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called for a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. The IDF withdrew from this territory over the following months but handed over control of large parts of southern Lebanon to the pro-Israeli SLA. In one respect, the Israeli invasion was successful since Fatah activity moved from the border area to the security zone, accompanied by Israeli retaliation. The Israeli government also kept up the pressure on the Palestinian groups in the years that followed, carrying out ground incursions as well as bombing raids, at times forcing tens of thousands of civilians to flee southern Lebanon.
However, the Palestinian rebels were not defeated and, over the coming years, with the assistance of large amounts of Arab funds, conducted large-scale military build-ups towards becoming a regular army. Training in the Soviet Union and Arab countries, the PLO especially acquired tanks and rocket launchers, air force capabilities, and other military skills. The PLO also consolidated its control over the territory it held in Lebanon and even begun to train other rebels from Asia to the Americas.
Tensions in 1981 between the expanding Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon and Israel grew, with both sides shelling the other across the border with fierce intensity. Israel was nervous about the possible transformation of the PLO from guerilla units into a regular army, and the PLO’s shelling of Israel’s northern settlements were met with harsh retaliation. Amongst other notable attacks, an airstrike against the Palestinian headquarters in Beirut killed up to 150 civilians and 30 PLO officials in July 1981.
Despite inflicting a steady flow of casualties on the PLO and Lebanese society, it had become clear to the Government of Israel that the PLO could not be defeated without a major ground incursion that could also remove the threat of intense PLO artillery fire.
Such an incursion materialized in early June of 1982, planned by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, with more than 75 000 troops and more than 2 500 armored vehicles streaming across the border to face approximately 15 000 PLO troops in what was called "Operation Peace of the Galilee." As Palestinian forces – supported by Syria and Lebanese leftist militias – were scattered by the onslaught and made their retreat, it also became evident that the PLO had severely underestimated the reach of Israel’s plans. Most of the PLO had thought that the attack would be big but not extend to Beirut, as it did. However, Israel’s government, especially Ariel Sharon, was set on taking Beirut and destroying the PLO’s entire presence in Lebanon in doing so. In mid-June, Beirut was surrounded by IDF forces.
Several ceasefires were negotiated throughout July until the PLO and Israel, through the indirect mediation of the US, agreed to a final ceasefire and an evacuation plan for the PLO from Beirut. The Palestinian forces in Beirut admitted defeat and agreed to be evacuated from Beirut to those Arab countries that would accept them, such as Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Tunisia. The agreement also brought in a peacekeeping contingent, the Multinational Force, composed primarily of soldiers from the US, France, and Italy. By 14 September, the peacekeeping forces had evacuated the PLO and left Lebanon. The evacuation did, however, not mean the end of the Israeli presence in Beirut and the possibility of assisting in the installation of a pro-Israeli President in Lebanon (Bashir Gemayel of the Phalange party, who was assassinated before taking office) enticed Israel to continue to occupy parts of Beirut.
The occupation of Beirut came to an end after the events of 17–18 September 1982, when Israeli troops allowed and supported the Lebanese Forces (the main Maronite militia in Lebanon) in their entrance into the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Over 48 hours, and with Israeli knowledge, the Maronite militia slaughtered somewhere between 700 – 2750 civilian Palestinian refugees in the camps.
When the news of these events reached Israel, massive demonstrations against the government broke out in Tel Aviv, in the end, forcing the withdrawal from Beirut of the IDF. For about a year, Israeli troops remained on the outskirts of the city. The massacre also heralded the return of the Multinational Forces to Beirut.
The casualties caused by "Operation Peace of the Galilee" are still in dispute, but Lebanese police statistics claimed a total of 17 825 dead, with some 75% of all deaths being civilians. While Israel admitted losing some 420, and the PLO stated that they had lost 560 and approximately the same number of people died on the side of other Palestinian and Lebanese militias. Some 1 200 Syrian troops are also thought to have been killed. The Israeli operation marked the end of the major presence in Lebanon of Palestinian rebels and was a severe blow to the PLO, which lost its territorial base as well as most of its military infrastructure.
The PLO in exile (1983–1986)
The loss of its territorial holdings in Lebanon was a massive setback for the PLO and the Rejectionist Front. The PLO’s presence in Lebanon was, however, not ended completely, as PLO and other Palestinian forces remained in cities and refugee camps in the north of Beirut. From these positions, the Palestinian groups continued to attack Israel and Israeli forces in Lebanon, although more sporadically than in the previous period. Subsequently, Israeli reprisal raids by land and air also continued.
Israeli forces occupied parts of Lebanon as far north as the outskirts of Beirut for years following the 1982 hostilities and only withdrew southwards in 1983 before establishing the so-called 'security zone' in southern Lebanon in 1985. The security zone, a buffer against both Palestinian and Lebanese resistance fighters, was controlled by the Israeli-backed SLA, supported by a contingent of IDF soldiers.
One important consequence of the IDF’s military victory over the Palestinian groups in Lebanon was the PLO’s shift from its more militarist stance to one of diplomacy. The period between 1983 and 1990 thus saw an intense flurry of diplomatic steps from the PLO’s side.
Throughout this period, Palestinian groups kept up attacks on Israeli forces and interests, both in southern Lebanon (into which PLO and other Palestinian guerrillas again infiltrated) and in the occupied territories, while Israel retaliated. Large-scale hostilities of note were the Israeli bombing raid on PLO headquarters outside Tunis (Tunisia) in October 1985 in which approximately 45–70 people were killed, the sinking of a ship of Fatah rebels off the coast of Israel in April 1985, and a number of clashes with Palestinian and Lebanese guerrillas in the so-called ‘security zone’ in 1983–1985.
PLO Chairman Arafat’s stance on initiating negotiations over the issue of a Palestinian state caused violent splits within the Palestinian national movement, mainly caused by the rebellious groups that made up the Rejectionist Front and other pro-Syrian organizations. The 1983–1990 period was beset by clashes between these two formations of the Palestinian resistance, which killed hundreds of rebels and civilians, and which also forced the evacuation from the Lebanese city of Tripoli of even more of the PLO’s forces. In Lebanon, the PLO also faced opposition from the Shiite Muslim Amal movement, which violently opposed the PLO’s reestablishment in the refugee camps in what came to be known as the "War of the Camps." Over a thousand fighters and civilians were killed in the fighting around and the sieges of Palestinian refugee camps in this "War of the Camps."
Although intense diplomatic maneuvering took place, the PLO and the Government of Israel never met face to face during this period but instead met with several third parties that attempted to negotiate a platform for direct talks. The most important of these third parties were the US and Jordan.
In 1983, in order to circumvent US and Israeli attempts to exclude the PLO from any formal negotiations (the US and Israel being more interested in negotiating only with Jordan over the Palestine issue), the PLO attempted to formally align itself with Jordan to create a Palestinian-Jordanian axis of negotiations. This negotiation strategy was further cemented in 1985, when Jordan and the PLO formed an official joint diplomatic strategy to introduce the PLO into the Israeli-US equation for a settlement. During this attempt at creating a negotiating stance with Jordan, the PLO informally accepted the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions that accepted a partition into two states, one Palestinian and one Israeli. The Amman Accord, as it was called, was drafted on 11 February 1985 and called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for a comprehensive peace, the option of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, and the aforementioned joint negotiation team. Groups aligned with the Rejectionist Front vehemently opposed this accord. The PLO, under international and Jordanian fire for a series of violent acts by Palestinian guerrillas, attempted during 1986 to further cement this relationship with Jordan, holding talks in January 1986. Jordan also met with Israeli PM Peres in London in mid-February to attempt to move things forward.
The PLO’s unwillingness to officially accept UNSCR 242, however, led to the collapse of the joint negotiating initiative in 1986, when Jordan pulled out of its commitment and severed the PLO’s ties to the nascent peace process. When Jordan in July 1988 also relinquished its claim to the West Bank, the joint negotiating track was definitely buried. By late 1986 the PLO had thus lost both its strong foothold in Lebanon, as well as its most promising inlet into possible peace negotiations. At the same time, hostilities between the parties to the Lebanese conflict escalated, drawing the PLO into costly battles in Lebanon.
The First Intifada and the first steps towards negotiations (1987–1990)
The PLO’s beleaguered position was strengthened in late 1987 by the outbreak of the so-called First Intifada (intifada meaning "to shake off"). The spark that set off the Intifada is commonly said to have been the 8 December 1987, deaths of four Palestinian agricultural workers in Gaza when they were hit by an Israeli vehicle. Their deaths, believed by Palestinians to have been intentional, set off angry protests and attacks on Israeli military outposts throughout the occupied territories, protests that did not abate during the weeks that followed and would continue for several years.
The driving force behind the Intifada was the accumulation of grievances towards Israeli policies in the occupied territories. The industrial and agricultural output from these areas had dropped sharply since the 1967 occupation, and it was estimated that by 1985 a total of 250 000 Palestinians had been detained and/or interrogated by Israeli security forces, deepening resentment towards the policies of the occupation administration. The First Intifada was a mixture of both violent and nonviolent protests, with attacks on Israeli forces and civilians, as well as stone-throwing by youths, being intermingled with strikes, sit-ins, and peaceful demonstrations. It was, in essence, a mass movement of the grassroots, only in part controlled by the Palestinian factions that waged war on Israel. The institutionalization of the Intifada came later, as the various Palestinian factions began to harness the revolt in mid-1988.
Although surprised by the uprising, the Israeli response came relatively quickly, with the number of troops deployed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip being doubled and tripled, respectively. Several collective punishments were enacted, and thousands of activists and guerrillas were imprisoned over the years of the Intifada.
The Intifada was a new chapter in Palestinian strategy against Israel and heralded the arrival on the scene of conflict of the more religiously inclined Palestinian rebel organizations. Foremost among those that appeared during the Intifada were Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyyah: Islamic Resistance Movement) and PIJ (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin: Palestinian Islamic Jihad). To the PLO’s detriment and displeasure, these Islamic movements – and others with them – played a prominent part in the initial phases of the Intifada, made possible through their increase in numbers in the occupied territories in the wake of Israel’s severe measures against other, secular, Palestinian groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These Islamic groups did, however, not become active as warring parties until the early 1990s.
On the negotiation front, Arafat had for the first time accepted UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 242 and 338 in an interview in late 1987, and reiterated this in his New Year’s address on 31 December 1987, opening up for negotiations on terms that were relatively agreeable to Israel. This opening soon had an effect, as US Secretary of State Shultz began to conduct shuttle missions to the region in February 1988. The US was at this time, however, not willing to accept the PLO as an equal negotiating partner.
Later that year, the new stance on the UNSCRs that concerned Palestine was also adopted as a political program by the PLO, cementing the stance on a two-state solution and condemning terrorism in all its forms. In December 1988, the PLO modified its statements even further, finally meeting the demands of the US, making US Secretary of State Shultz accept the opening of an official dialogue between the PLO and the US. Initially, this diplomatic offensive by the PLO stalled, with talks in December with the US not going well. Further talks followed in March 1989, in which the US wanted only to discuss the issue of ending terrorism and also yet again proposed that the Palestinians should be represented by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Additional meetings during the year between the US and the PLO did little to assuage the PLO’s temper, as the group would only accept that representatives of the organization itself would partake in any peace talks.
In May 1989, Israel launched its drive towards peace talks, proposing a formula composed of two main phases; the first containing the holding of Palestinian elections to choose Palestinian representatives, and a second phase of engaging these representatives in talks on self-determination. This formula excluded the PLO and was thus not accepted by that group.
It is important to note that although the negotiations undertaken to resolve the conflict were held under the banner of the PLO, this organization was, in essence, entirely dominated by Arafat’s Fatah movement and had so been since approximately 1983. Note that from 1989 and onwards, the constituent groups of the PLO and the Rejectionist Front are analyzed in their separate capacities, with Fatah being the primary bearer of the PLO flag. This shift in the level of analysis is done since more detailed information on the doings and dealings of the different Palestinian groups becomes available from 1988 and onwards.
The year 1990 continued to be beset by haggling over the exact formula for talks, with the PLO arguing for a delegation of its own, Israel wanting elections in the occupied territories to find Palestinian representatives, and the US (through James Baker) promoting a 5-point plan which included a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The PLO’s objections slowly diminished, however, opening up for the October 1991 peace conference in Madrid.
Madrid, the Oslo Process and the start of the Second Intifada (1991–2001)
Israeli and Palestinian delegations first met for direct negotiations during the talks between Israeli, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian-Jordanian delegations at the Madrid peace conference in October and November 1991. The conference itself had been called to order by the USA.
PLO representatives were not part of the official Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, a prerequisite set by Israel for its participation. But the Palestinian representatives at the talks from the outset made it clear that they received their mandate and directives directly from the PLO. The objective of the conference in Madrid was not only to secure an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal but also to make peace between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The conference's opening was held in Madrid, while several more sessions were held in Washington in late 1991 and early 1992. The conference and the talks that followed initially bore little fruit.
On 19 June 1992, Israeli negotiators met with their Palestinian counterparts to discuss the possibility of having less official talks between Israel and the Fatah/PLO. Terje Larsen of Norway mediated these pre-negotiations (preparations for actual negotiations) that continued until 20 January 1993 when the first substantive Oslo talks were held between Israeli and PLO teams. The negotiations resulted in The Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement), signed on 13 September 1993. The agreement declared, amongst other things, the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority and a preparatory transfer of power and responsibilities from Israel to authorized Palestinians, and that a final settlement was to be reached within five years. It was also stipulated that further negotiations were to be conducted in three stages.
The first result of the continued negotiations was the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, a withdrawal that was completed in May 1994. The second outcome was the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, also referred to as Oslo B, signed in September 1995. Oslo B established a certain amount of self-determination in part of the occupied territories, over which the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was to hold sway as the first embodiment of Palestinian statehood. In reality, the PNA became a prolonged arm of the Fatah movement, as Yassir Arafat became president of the PNA in the 1996 elections with his Fatah movement also capturing the vast majority of the PNA’s legislative seats.
The last stage of the peace process was the so-called final status negotiations, which were to settle issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the return of refugees, the evacuation of Israeli settlements, and ultimate Palestinian statehood. Several peace agreements were signed between 1997 and 1999 that catered only to some minor issues (such as continued Israeli withdrawals) and not the core of the problem. All in all, these negotiations and the ones mentioned above are commonly referred to as the ‘Oslo Peace Process.’
The initiation of the Oslo Peace Process led to a marked decline in conflict activity in the occupied territories, with the Fatah movement ending large-scale attacks on Israeli forces and civilians. This dyad was thus inactive from 1993 until the year 2000, when the final status negotiations failed. The armed conflict itself, however, continued, as Hamas and the PIJ – groups that denounced the peace talks as being a defeat – did not cease their armed actions against Israel. The establishment of the PNA in 1995, however, brought the conflict to a rare standstill; no conflict activity was recorded between 1997 and 1999.
During the First Intifada, the geographic focus of fighting shifted away from the battlefields of Lebanon to the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Some clashes and Israeli raids continued to occur in southern Lebanon, but the geographic shift signaled a clear return of violence to the West Bank and Gaza theatre.
In 1996 the PNA became active as a warring party. In September of that year, the so-called Tunnel Riots broke out after the Israeli government opened an archaeological site in the Old City of Jerusalem for tourism. Since the tunnel was close to the holy Muslim Al-Aqsa Mosque, and since the excavations delved through the Temple Mount, scores of Palestinians demonstrated, backed by Palestinian armed groups. The PNA’s police and IDF soldiers ended up engaging in clashes during these riots, with more than 25 people being killed.
The great hopes that were pinned to the final status negotiations were never fulfilled. Initially, the final status negotiations were delayed due to several disagreements between Fatah/PLO and the Government of Israel. The first serious attempt was not made until the first half of 2000, as then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak attempted to leap over the remaining interim issues and go directly for a final status agreement. After the negotiations had stalled, primarily on the refugee and Jerusalem issues, the negotiation climate deteriorated sharply.
The talks were to reach their high point in July at Camp David in the US. However, the PLO/Fatah and the Israeli government failed to reach a deal on a final status agreement at these talks. Soon after, the Second Intifada (also referred to as the Al-Aqsa Intifada) broke out in September 2000.
The violence began after the Israeli opposition politician Ariel Sharon (the architect of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon) visited the Temple Mount, a move seen by many Palestinians as a blatant provocation due to his hard-line stance on negotiations and the peace process. While some view the outbreak of violence as being yet another outpouring of grievances by the Palestinian grassroots (since, for example, the military occupation continued to control 60% of the West Bank), others claim that the violence was premeditated and launched mainly by Fatah to punish Israel for the failure of the negotiations and was thus used to force concessions from the Government of Israel.
The last push for a final status agreement was made in January 2001, when the two parties met in the Egyptian resort of Taba. Although the parties appear to have narrowed the gap significantly at these talks, no agreement was signed, and the Second Intifada rolled on.
The Second Intifada (2001–2005)
In comparison to the First Intifada, the second one was a much more militarized affair. While both Intifadas contained a myriad of nonviolent initiatives, the Second Intifada was characterized by a significantly higher level of violence. The number of suicide bombings peaked (mainly perpetrated by Hamas, the AMB and the PIJ), attacks by militant groups on Israeli soldiers and settlers increased, and Israeli retaliation became much tougher than had it been between 1987 and 1993. The most active groups of the Second Intifada were Fatah, Hamas, PIJ, and the Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AMB).
Hostilities came to a head in April 2002, with the initiation of "Operation Defensive Shield." Following a number of high-profile suicide bombings in Israel in the early months of 2002, the Israeli government decided to deal a blow against the Palestinian groups and their urban strongholds. Incursions were launched into most Palestinian cities, with Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Jenin being exposed to the worst violence. In Ramallah, the IDF besieged the headquarters of Arafat (the Mukataa), in Bethlehem the Siege of the Church of Nativity was played out, and in Jenin a full-scale attack was launched, especially targeting the refugee camp. Several hundred people, mainly Palestinians, were killed during these operations.
In addition to lowering expectations of the possibilities of reaching a peace deal, the Second Intifada also had the effect of delegitimizing Arafat as a leader in the eyes of the Government of Israel. The Israeli government was convinced that Arafat controlled – or at the least refused to try to control – the violence of the Second Intifada and thus once again begun to claim that there was no viable Palestinian partner for peace.
Nevertheless, new peace initiatives were made in 2003, attempting to resolve the issue of violence at least and, at a later stage, revive the stalled final status negotiations. In February 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon held his first direct talks with Palestinians in nearly a year, meeting senior Palestinian officials to discuss ways to reach a ceasefire and resume the talks.
These initial contacts in 2003 were followed by negotiations between Prime Minister Sharon and Mahmud Abbas (who would replace Arafat as PLO Chairman after Arafat’s death in November 2004) on 29 May, intended to prepare the ground for a three-way summit with US President Bush in Jordan on 4 June. The meeting took place as planned, and some progress was made. On 27 June, Israel and the PNA reached an agreement in US-mediated talks over the issue of Israeli troop withdrawal from Gaza and Bethlehem and an end to Israeli attacks on Palestinian militants in return for the PNA’s promise to enforce the end of violence by Palestinian groups. At the same time, "The Quartet" – composed of the UN, the US, the EU and Russia – presented a "Road Map" for peace, which spelled out three reciprocal steps the Israelis and Palestinians should take to end the violence and initiate new peace talks. The Road Map was, for some time, the agreement of choice for both parties, but it was never fully implemented.
Unimpressed with the Palestinian implementation of Road Map steps and the PNA’s inability (or unwillingness) to end violence, the Israeli government proceeded in 2004 with the construction of a "security fence" (by Palestinians called a "separation wall") between Israeli settlements and other parts of the West Bank and made preparations for the withdrawal of forces from parts of the occupied territories. On the Palestinian side, the efforts of the new PNA President and Fatah leader Mahmud Abbas to establish control over all militant factions seemed at first to be successful. The AMB officially became a part of Fatah in December 2004, and plans were announced to integrate the different militant wings into the security forces of the Palestinian authority. This control was, however, drastically lost in late 2005.
Sharon and Abbas met again on 8 February 2005 and officially agreed to a ceasefire and various steps to transfer security responsibilities in Gaza and the West Bank to the Palestinian National Authority. Abbas then negotiated with other armed factions, succeeding in getting thirteen different Palestinian organizations committed to a ceasefire in the March 2005 Cairo Declaration. The ceasefire was initially scheduled to last until the end of the year but was extended as elections to the Palestinian National Authority were scheduled in January 2006.
Israeli unilateralism, which became more prominent with the building of the "security fence," also had other effects, such as the unilateral Israeli pullout from the Gaza Strip during June–September 2005. This, coupled with the official ceasefire, led to a decrease in conflict activity in 2005 compared to the previous three years. In general, the ceasefire agreed to in March 2005 was adhered to by most Palestinian factions and is usually viewed as being the endpoint of the Second Intifada. It was, however, violated on several occasions by both sides, leading to short periods of intense retaliatory attacks. The security situation within the territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority deteriorated throughout 2005, and the end of 2006 as violent criminality became increasingly common as the PNA, which had been shattered by Israeli attacks, could not control the activities of militant factions and armed gangs.
The Hamas takeover of Gaza and beyond (2006–)
Hamas won the 2006 election in the PNA, leading to fighting between Hamas and Fatah. The fighting resulted in Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, while Fatah was left in control of the West Bank, effectively splitting the Palestinian territories into two entities. The Fatah dominated government in the West Bank received international endorsement, while the Hamas government was further isolated by the international community. Egypt and Israel closed their borders to the Gaza Strip in response to Hamas taking control, instituting a blockade of the area, which has caused significant economic hardship.
Negotiations in Annapolis between the Fatah dominated PNA and Israel led to a joint statement in support of a two-state solution at the end of 2007. Further negotiations failed to reach an agreement on core issues, though the conflict has not resumed between the parties. The conflict between Israel and Fatah has been inactive since 2008, with the result that most of the violence on the West Bank involves individuals without formal affiliation to armed groups.
Since Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip, most violence between organized actors has occurred there, primarily involving Hamas and PIJ. Both Hamas and PIJ were active during 2008 and 2009. During the first half of 2008, Hamas and PIJ fired rockets into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip, to which Israel responded with cross-border raids and airstrikes. A six-month ceasefire was agreed upon in June between Israel and Hamas, according to which Israel would ease the blockade of Gaza and end its airstrikes and incursions into Gaza, in exchange for an end of Hamas’ rocket attacks into Israel. The ceasefire significantly decreased the level of violence, though ceasefire violations occurred repeatedly. Tensions escalated during November and December, along with increasing shelling across the border. This led to a major escalation from December 2008 until January 2009, when Israel launched "Operation Cast Lead." The offensive resulted in the death of nearly a thousand people in airstrikes and during a major land incursion into the Gaza Strip. The operation ended with both Israel and Hamas declaring unilateral ceasefires in mid-January, with the consequence that the remaining months of 2009 were relatively calm.
The conflict over Palestine continued to be active in 2010 but at a significantly lower level of activity than in 2008 and 2009. The PIJ versus Government of Israel dyad was the only one that crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold, registering 27 such fatalities. These figures should be viewed as reflecting both Israel's and Hamas' restraint, as well as Hamas' policing of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. Most of those killed were PIJ militants killed during rocket fire operations.
Attempts at reaching an Israeli-Palestinian settlement were initiated again in 2010 under the leadership of US President Barack Obama. These negotiations took place between Fatah/PNA and the Government of Israel. Since Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, the Palestinians had been reluctant to return to direct negotiations as the Annapolis initiative had been buried after the Gaza war, and a right-wing government had come to power in Israel. The Palestinians were also firm that no direct negotiations could begin before Israel stopped building settlements in the West Bank.
On 8 March 2010, both the Fatah/PNA and the Government of Israel gave the green light to initiate "indirect talks" with the US as a mediator. These efforts to restart talks between Israel and the Palestinians (Fatah and the PNA in essence) culminated in the 2 September 2010 initiation of direct talks at the Washington Summit. These were to be the first face-to-face talks between these two parties since December 2008.
The direct talks did not go on for long as an Israeli ban on building settlements in the West Bank was not renewed after 26 September 2010, the ban's expiration date. Talks were subsequently suspended as the PNA demanded a continued freeze to continue negotiations. The suspension of the direct talks led to weeks of intense US diplomatic action, aimed at getting Israel to extend the ban or the PNA to continue talks despite this sticking point.
On 7 December 2010, the US announced the failure of this initiative. The US would instead hold bilateral talks with the parties with the intent to keep the process alive. By the end of 2010, these bilateral talks had little to show for themselves.
The conflict over Palestine continued to be active in 2011 and 2012, with both Hamas and PIJ fighting the Israeli government. Missile fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel increased in 2011, as well as the Israeli retaliation attacks, but the conflict did not escalate to the levels before 2010. Almost all of the battle-related deaths in the conflict were related to Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, in response to rocket attacks into Israel by Palestinian militants. One of the major events in terms of fighting was an eight-day period of Israeli bombings and airstrikes against Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip in mid-November 2012. This round of fighting ended with an Israeli–Hamas ceasefire on 21 November 2012.
In early January 2012, Palestinian and Israeli representatives held the first talks in more than a year in Amman, Jordan. The talks mainly focused on borders and security. After the fifth round of talks on January 25, Mahmoud Abbas announced that there would be "an evaluation phase." No further negotiations were held during the rest of 2012.
The ceasefire mentioned above paved the way for a relatively calm 2013 when the conflict again became inactive. Explanations for the calm can be found in the reinitiation of Israel–Fatah/PNA talks, and the fact that both Israel and Hamas respected the ceasefire (although violations took place), with Hamas also controlling the levels of violence perpetrated by the PIJ.
During 2013 new face-to-face talks were held between the government of Israel and Fatah/PNA. These talks were initiated under heavy pressure from the US (represented mainly by John Kerry) and came on the heels of both parties carrying out activities that appeared to intensify the deadlock. On its part, Israel continued to approve the construction of more settlements in the West Bank, while Fatah/PNA threatened to press its attempt to become a full member of the UN (which could potentially have legal consequences that were detrimental to Israel’s position). While the application for full UN membership was rejected, several UN sub-organizations admitted Palestine as a full member state.
Direct negotiations began on 29 July 2013, under the auspices of the US. These talks aimed to, within nine months, reach a final status agreement via negotiations in Washington, Jerusalem, and Hebron. The main pre-talk concessions meant that the PNA would give up its push for international recognition and UN membership, while Israel promised to release a number of Palestinian prisoners. Both parties’ leaders and delegations met with the US representatives many times over the months that followed. Reports regarding the talks signaled that several final status issues were discussed in these meetings. Little headway appears to have been made, and the talks subsequently collapsed in early 2014 as Israel refused to release the last batch of 26 Palestinian prisoners, and the PNA signed 15 international conventions in the continued push towards recognized statehood.
Israel blamed Hamas for the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers outside of Hebron in June 2014, which Hamas denied. This came in conjuncture with an increased rate of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. As a response, Israel launched a renewed offensive on the Gaza Strip, dubbed "Operation Protective Edge" from 7 July until 26 August 2014. It was the largest military operation to date against Hamas and resulted in the most deaths in a calendar year recorded by the UCDP for the Israel-Palestine conflict. After several failed ceasefire attempts, an Egypt-brokered ceasefire was implemented on 26 August. Hamas remained in control of the Gaza Strip, though Israel claimed to have dismantled much of Hamas’ military capacity, especially its rockets.
A further reason behind the escalation was the changing security situation for Hamas due to the overthrow of the relatively friendly Egyptian government of Mohamed Morsi, who was exchanged with the hostile government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The new Egyptian government cracked down hard on smuggling tunnels into Egypt. The closure of the tunnels was a hard blow to the finances of Hamas, contributing to its inability to pay the salaries of its employees in Gaza.
After 2014, the situation calmed down in the Gaza Strip, with both Hamas and Israel mostly upholding the ceasefire. The West Bank and Jerusalem saw a wave of hundreds of attacks in 2015 and 2016, most commonly knifings, by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israeli settlers and security personnel, but limited violence by any armed groups. This type of individualized violence continued during 2017, though to a lesser extent than during 2015 and 2016. No organized armed groups were active during 2015–2017.
In 2018, three years after having become inactive, the conflict over Palestine became active again. Protests in Gaza against Israel and the United State's decision to relocate the embassy to Jerusalem ignited a complex dynamic of nonviolent protests, Hamas organized protests turned violent, and air & ground operations by Israel targeting Hamas in Gaza.
In 2019, the conflict kept being active as the PIJ being the primary actor against the Government of Israel. Concentrating around the Gaza Strip, clashes emerged in the first week of May, after two Israeli soldiers were injured by a sniper. The IDF claimed that the sniper was linked to the PIJ and deadly clashes continued until May 6, when an Egypt-mediated ceasefire was reached. In November 2019, the conflict between the Israeli government and PIJ reemerged, during which Israel targetted some senior members of the group. After several days of heavy fighting, similar to what happened in May, an Egypt-mediated ceasefire was assured on November 14. Meanwhile, the intensity of the Hamas-involved clashes was lower when compared to the previous year.
In 2020, the conflict was once again inactive. The violence continued in an unorganized manner, with several lone-wolf attacks targeting Israeli checkpoints and military personnel, leading to the death of Palestinians who were not affiliated with any of the non-state groups challenging the Government of Israel. In January, US President Donald Trump announced his administration's proposal to end the Israel - Palestine conflict. However, the proposal was not welcomed by the majority of Palestinian actors. It was widely argued that the plan favored the state of Israel, and it was a smokescreen for annexations.
The conflict was active in 2021 with two organized actors, namely Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, challenging the Government of Israel. Following the Israeli Supreme Court's decision to evict six Palestinian families living in East Jerusalem on May 6, tensions between Israel and Palestinian armed groups had gradually increased. Four days later, deadly confrontations began as Hamas and the PIJ launched rockets from Gaza while Israel conducted airstrikes in the Palestinian territories. More than 250 people were killed in just 12 days until the Egypt-mediated ceasefire was reached on May 21.
The conflict became active in 2022 with two organized actors, namely Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, challenging the Government of Israel. The conflict has been most active in the West Bank near cities such as Hebron, Nablus, and Jenin. During the year, the Government of Israel conducted several raids against various Palestinian armed groups with the deadliest ones taking place between August and October. Between 5 and 7 August, Government of Israel also carried out airstrikes against Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, resulting in 15 dead Palestinian combatants and 1 dead civilian.
October 7, 2023: The catalyst for escalation
On October 7, 2023, the conflict between Israel and Hamas entered an unprecedented new phase. In a highly coordinated surprise assault, Hamas breached the border between Gaza and southern Israel, launching a barrage of rockets while armed groups simultaneously infiltrated Israeli territory. The attack resulted in many deaths, and hundreds of people were taken hostage and transported to the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s response was swift and overwhelming. The government declared a state of war and launched the most destructive bombing campaign the region had ever witnessed, targeting Hamas strongholds, infrastructure, and densely populated urban areas in Gaza. Civilian casualties in Gaza rapidly increased, with widespread destruction of homes, schools, and hospitals.
Throughout 2024, the war in Gaza escalated into a devastating conflict, resulting in unprecedented levels of destruction and civilian suffering. Israeli ground operations focused on dismantling Hamas’ military infrastructure, including its tunnel networks and command centers, while urban combat led to widespread devastation in cities such as Gaza City, Khan Younis, and Rafah. The humanitarian situation in Gaza deteriorated rapidly and access to basic necessities such as food, clean water, and medical care severely limited by the ongoing blockade and repeated military strikes. International aid agencies warned of a famine and the collapse of healthcare services as the conflict continued.
In January 2025, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire that included the release of Israeli hostages held in Gaza in exchange for the release of Palestinians detained by Israel. Fighting decreased substantially during the following weeks. However, the ceasefire collapsed in March 2025 and Israel resumed large-scale military operations in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, an Israeli blockade of Gaza restricted the entry of humanitarian aid, resulting in worsening humanitarian conditions. The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), established with Israeli and US support, began distributing aid through an alternative mechanism to existing UN-led operations. Several deadly incidents occurred at or near GHF distribution sites during the year, generating significant international concern.
In October 2025, Israel and Hamas reached a second major ceasefire agreement that substantially reduced the level of violence. The remaining living hostages held in Gaza were released, as well as almost 2000 Palestinian detainees. As fighting subsided, humanitarian access to Gaza improved although the situation remains fragile.
