This dyad belongs to the conflict India: Government
Summary of conflict India: Government
Since independence in 1947, India has seen several episodes of violent conflict waged by different communist groups. In 1948-1951, fighting between CPI (Communist Party of India) and government forces reached the intensity of war, and in 1969-1971 CPI-ML (Communist Party of India–Marxist-Leninist) launched an armed struggle. Since the 1990s, the active groups have been PWG (People’s War Group), and MCC (Maoist Communist Centre), merging in 2004 to form CPI–Maoist (Communist Party of India–Maoist). The rebels are often referred to as the Naxalite movement.
Violence in the conflict continued to escalate in 2025, a trend starting in 2025 with fatalities more than tripling compared to the previous year.The primary conflict parties were again the Government of India and CPI-Maoist. This surge reflected both an increase in the number of events and greater lethality, often tied to large-scale Government of India counterinsurgency operations. The escalation aligns with intensified efforts to combat CPI-Maoist activity across India, as part of a broader campaign to eliminate ‘Left-Wing Extremism’ by March 2026. Most of the violence continued to be concentrated in Chhattisgarh state.
Several episodes of communist guerrilla struggle
India became independent in 1947, and since then, it has seen several episodes of violent conflict waged by different communist groups. The conflict over government in India first became active in 1948-1951, when fighting between CPI (Communist Party of India) and government forces reached the intensity of war. However, the rebellion was crushed by the early 1950s, and the party abandoned armed struggle for conventional politics.
In the late 1960s, several elements of the Indian communist movement decided to revolt against the main party, accusing it of being counter-revolutionary. The so-called Naxalite movement, named after the place of the initial uprising in 1967, went from being a loose alliance to a revolutionary party with the establishment of CPI-ML (Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist) on 22 April 1969. From 1969 to 1971, an armed conflict took place between CPI-ML and the government of India. After a successful counterinsurgency campaign by the government, the movement was contained and was not active again after 1971.
Meanwhile, a third conflict episode began in the early 1990s. Already at its formation in 1969, it had become obvious that factions within CPI-ML held differing views on the best strategy for agrarian revolutionary struggle and party formation. As a result, one faction had split and established MCC (Maoist Communist Centre) on 20 October 1969. The MCC remained active despite political repression and imprisonment in the early 1970s and became one of the primary warring parties in the armed struggle against the Indian government in the 1990s. The other main rebel group challenging India's present political system through armed struggle was the PWG (Peoples War Group). It split from the CPI-ML on 22 April 1980, rejecting what it perceived to be the abandonment of the armed struggle by engaging in parliamentary elections, as the rest of the party desired. In 2004, the MCC and the PWG merged and formed CPI-Maoist (Communist Party of India–Maoist).
PWG and MCC: re-emergence of leftist guerrillas in the 1990s
The MCC (Maoist Communist Centre) and PWG (Peoples War Group) led the Maoist insurgency against the Indian state in the 1990s. The groups rejected India's system of parliamentary democracy and aspired to overthrow the government. Their stated goal was to establish a "People's Government" through a "People's War." The revolutionary aim included the abolishment of the feudal order in rural India, and the means for achieving this goal was protracted armed struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare.
The Naxalite outfits have primarily mobilized among the peasantry, finding support in pockets of the country inhabited by tribals and landless poor. Within popular opinion, the Naxalite movement has thus been seen to a large extent as voicing genuine grievances. The initial attitude of the Indian government, facing mounting public agitation in the early 1990s, was relatively soft, but as violence escalated, the authorities decided to enforce harder measures to combat the militants. By then, the PWG had already emerged as a somewhat organized force, establishing itself in the jungle districts of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa where it had set up parallel administrations. It also established "courts" for public trials of landowners, traders, and informers; forcibly redistributed land owned by the big farmers; and took measures to raise farm wages. This made the Naxalite movement immensely popular among the poor.
The warring strategy of the insurgents was at the outset directed at undermining government authority, rather than attacking military targets. They thus chose to specifically target the administrative structures of the state, such as government buildings, telephone exchanges, railway stations, and police posts. The Naxalites' boycott of state elections has been violently enforced through widespread pre-poll violence and intimidation of candidates. The Indian government has responded by deploying paramilitary troops with shoot-on-sight orders, to oversee elections.
There is also an important non-state dimension to the conflict. Private armies, promoted by and owing allegiance to particular castes, have become pitched against each other in fierce inter-communal battles. Naxalite insurgents have engaged in this "caste rivalry" against armies based within the landowner community. Internecine clashes have furthermore taken place between different factions within the Naxalite movement that have attempted to expand their own power base. In many instances, violence has been directed not at government targets, but civilians. The low-intensity conflict between the Indian government and the rebels is thus only one dimension of the deteriorating security situation in the Naxalite strongholds of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh during the 1990s.
Attempts to reach a political solution
Both the rebel groups and the government have taken initiatives to find a political solution to the conflict, most of which proved fruitless. The government has insisted on unconditional talks, while the PWG (People's War Group) wanted promises for a halt in military raids, the conducting of public inquiries, and the recognition as a political party. Negotiations thus remained stalemated until a civil rights group called "Concerned Citizens" engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the parties. After several months of preparatory moves, negotiations took place in June 2002. This was the first time during the insurgency that the PWG publicly held talks with government representatives.
PWG withdrew before the second round of talks and called off the ceasefire. It accused the government of not maintaining its part of the truce as the army had resorted to killing PWG cadres. Initiatives to resume the talks did not succeed. In mid-2003, the government again offered one-to-one talks with the PWG, but there was no response. The Naxalites have presented four demands, possibly to be seen as preconditions for talks: 1) they should be given opportunities to work in the plains; 2) the release of tribals arrested in fake cases; 3) judicial inquires into cases of police excesses; and 4) the withdrawal of police forces from Naxal areas.
During 2004 the PWG and MCC (Maoist Communist Centre) were extending and consolidating their influence in their communist strongholds - the states of Jharkhand, Bihar and Andrah Pradesh respectively - while also further strengthening their cross-border links with Nepalese Maoist cadres. Poverty and weak governing institutions in the affected areas produced power vacuums that were filled by Maoist parallel administrations, which have engaged in tax collection, education practice, and settling land disputes.
Neither in 2004 was there any concerted effort among the insurgency affected states to address the issue of violence and suspend hostilities. However, the newly elected state government in Andrah Pradesh declared a unilateral ceasefire with the PWG on 16 June 2004. Peace talks were initiated on 15 October but ended without any substantial progress as the PWG presented demands that the state government could not accommodate. The rebels demanded a written truce, the release of prisoners, and redistribution of land to the poor. In December 2004, the parties agreed to a further extension of the ceasefire, so the year ended on a positive note.
Formation of CPI–Maoist and continued conflict
On 14 October 2004, in the run-up to negotiations between PWG (People's War Group) and the Andhra Pradesh state government, the MCC (Maoist Communist Centre) announced its merger with the PWG. The merger had been under discussion since 2002 but had until now been obstructed by ideological differences between the parties. The new group was announced as CPI-Maoist (Communist Party of India–Maoist) and would be headed by the PWG Central Committee General Secretary.
Negotiations between CPI-Maoist and the Andhra Pradesh state government, which had begun in late 2004, broke down in mid-January 2005 after the rebels accused authorities of not addressing its demands for a written truce, the release of prisoners and redistribution of land. CPI-Maoist appeared to retain its strong cross-border ties with other Communist rebel groups (especially CPN–M in Nepal) and also continued to consolidate its hold on large rural areas in several Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, etc.). Its growing strength caused increasing concern not only in the affected parts of the country but also at the center. The conflict remained active throughout the year.
The conflict continued to grow and intensify in 2006-2010, as the insurgency proceeded to affect around half of 28 states in India. In particular, the formation of a state-sponsored militia, the Salwa Judum, in the state of Chattisgarh was the catalyst for a sharp increase in violence. Compounding the security problem is the fact that each state is responsible for its own security, meaning that there is no comprehensive, coordinated approach by the various state governments to the Maoist conflict. The result has been an increase in violence and insecurity throughout the eastern states of India. The central government continues to treat the conflict purely as a security issue. It asserts that it will not negotiate with the CPI–Maoist until it agrees to lay down its arms.
The armed conflict between the government of India and CPI-Maoist has been active since 2005. Though it has not reached the level of war, the conflict intensity often fluctuates. A recent peak in intensity was recorded in 2018, followed by several years of declining fatalities. In 2024, this trend was decisively reversed, with fatality levels surpassing those of 2018. While violence was reported across nearly all Red Corridor states, the escalation was most pronounced in Chhattisgarh state.
