Government of Colombia - FARC-EMC

Number of Deaths

Number of Deaths

05010015019891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420251989-2025
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Map data ©2026 Google, INEGI
Map data ©2026 Google, INEGI

This dyad belongs to the conflict Colombia: Government



Summary of conflict Colombia: Government

The armed conflict in Colombia between the Government of Colombia and left-wing guerrillas formed in the 1960s wishing to overthrow the government is the oldest of today's civil wars. One underlying reason for the conflict's longevity has been the income of the coca leaf. Some rebel groups found negotiated settlements and disarmed in the early 1990s. Since then, the main groups that remained active have been the FARC, the largest and most deadly group, and the ELN. In 2016, the FARC and the Government of Colombia signed a peace agreement, transforming the FARC into a political movement. Factions within the FARC who opposed the peace process, led by Iván Mordisco under the name FARC-EMC, continued the armed struggle against the state. On August 29, 2019, another faction known as the FARC Segunda Marquetalia, led by Luciano Marín alias "Iván Márquez", returned to arms, citing the "betrayal of the State" regarding peace agreements. In 2022, left-wing President Gustavo Petro launched the “Total Peace” policy, seeking negotiations with all armed groups. In 2023, this led to temporary ceasefires with the ELN and FARC-EMC, but violence persisted in key departments like Cauca, Norte de Santander, Nariño, and Chocó as armed groups continued to compete over territorial control and illicit economies.

2025

In 2025, the “Total Peace” policy faced serious challenges. Talks with the ELN, FARC-EMC, and FARC Segunda Marquetalia were disrupted by repeated ceasefire violations and limited progress, resulting in the suspension of negotiations and the non-renewal of bilateral ceasefires. The year started with a declared state of emergency in The Catatumbo area. These setbacks also exposed internal divisions within the groups, leading to fragmentation and the formation of new armed factions. As a result, violence persisted, with five active state-based dyads: Government of Colombia – ELN, Government of Colombia – FARC-EMC, Government of Colombia – FARC-Segunda Marquetalia, Government of Colombia – EGC and Government of Colombia – EMBF. The internal fragmentation of armed groups contributed to a more dispersed and complex conflict landscape. Emerging and existing factions competed violently over control of illicit economies, trafficking routes, and strategic territories. Overall number of active dyads increased, which made this the deadliest year in two decades. Active non-state dyads in 2025 included: EGC – ELN, EGC – Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada, Los Costeños – Los Pepes, EGC – ELN, FARC-EMC, EGC – La Terraza, ELN – EMBF, FARC-EMC– ELN and FARC-EMC– EMBF. The most affected areas of the country were Arauca, Catatumbo, Cauca and the Caribbean.

La Violencia and the start of left-wing guerrillas

Colombia has suffered from internal violence for a long time. Many parties to the conflict have been present over the years, with FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army) active to some degree since the 1960s. Other guerrilla organizations, such as M-19 (Movemiento 19 de Abril, 19th of April Movement) and EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación, Popular Liberation Army), chose the political path and disarmed when the option was given to them at the negotiation table in the early 1990s. These four groups should be considered the main rebel groups in the conflict’s history. However, it is not only the government’s forces that have been fighting against the rebels. Paramilitary organizations have also been active, with the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self-defence Forces of Colombia) in the 1990s to name one.

Starting with the decade-long period known as ‘La Violencia’ (‘the violence’, 1948–58), the country has suffered more than half a century of armed strife. ‘La Violencia’ was characterized by landowners organizing peasant clients to launch attacks and vendettas on neighboring villages. Though it is claimed that the period caused over 200 000 deaths there was no outspoken incompatibility with the government. The period saw an attempt by the conservative government to exclude liberals from state power; the army and police were used to repress any opposition, which was mostly unorganized. Spontaneous actions of sabotage taken by liberal guerrillas were responded to by indiscriminate action against liberals. By the early 1950s, some groups started to become more organized. In 1953 the Liberal guerrillas claimed that the goal of their revolutionary forces was in part to overthrow the government. However, An agreement was met with the government, and the group did not resort to violence but turned in their arms.

With the liberals on the government’s side communists were starting to be targeted in the mid-1950s. The government launched a campaign of ‘pacification’, including media censorship and information monopoly but also violent attacks against communists. The communists were also using violent measures in the 1950s, mostly directed towards landowners but also with occasional clashes with government troops. Though violence reached over 25 battle-related deaths in some years in the late 1950s and in the early 1960s, the formation of the Southern Bloc Guerilla (Bloque Guillero Sur) in 1964 took the conflict to new levels. Compared to the previous self-defense character of the Southern Bloc in the 1950s they now had an outspoken agenda against the government and clashes with government forces are reported to have produced more than 200 casualties in 1964 and 1965. In 1966 the organization adopted a pro-Soviet ideology and was renamed FARC.

Another organization that has played a large role in the Colombian conflict was also formed in 1964. ELN was formed by a group of students who had returned from a visit to Cuba. The group adopted the strategies of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara but also had strong ties to Catholicism. ELN’s first military action was taken in 1966, causing more than 10 battle-related casualties. Though there were several years of conflict between the government and ELN, not least in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were also several years where the conflict was kept at low levels. One of the reasons for this low level of violence was that ELN had suffered severely from the conflict and was close to defeat during this time.

The 1970s and the coca financed guerrillas

By the 1960s two of the most notable left-wing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, FARC and ELN, were born. Guerrilla movements were not only a rural phenomenon, however. In 1972, a section that had been thrown out of FARC and the socialist wing of ANAPO (Alianza Nacional Popular, National Popular Alliance) came together and formed the urban-based M-19. The name came from the allegedly stolen presidential election on 19 April 1970, where an ANAPO candidate was defeated by the Frente Nacional candidate by a small margin. In comparison to its counterparts FARC and ELN, the M-19 was a nationalist movement rather than a communist one, with many members coming from the fairly moderate ANAPO. The first act of the group was stealing the sword of Simón Bolívar, a symbol of struggle for the nation.

The 1970s saw fairly low levels of progress regarding the guerrillas’ efforts to their revolutionary cause. In the rural areas, where peasants and guerrillas had strong links, the 1970s saw a new turn as a new crop became popular, the coca leaf. M-19, which during the 1970s started to refocus from an urban to a rural agenda, was the first group to adopt the possibilities that coca cultivation could mean for resistance. FARC soon followed in this process and agreements between drug traffickers and the guerrilla movements were formed. By the late 1970s coca cultivation was spreading in many of the colonization zones. The drug-based increase in income in the areas also meant that people in the urban areas saw an opportunity to make money quickly and violence followed in the anarchic attempts to get rich quickly. Drug barons and guerrillas shared a common enemy, the government of Colombia, which helped them to reach agreements on how to divide the profit and work in securing the cultivation and non-involvement of the government in the areas. However, the alliance between the drug mafia and guerrillas did not last and after the breakup, the mafia organized its military groups to fight the guerrillas.

By the turn of the decade, guerrilla forces had increased their effect on Colombia’s national politics. The violence had started to move into the urban areas with murders, kidnappings, and confrontations. Guerrilla forces had also started to confront the army directly. It has been estimated that guerrilla forces by that time consisted of between ten and fifteen thousand troops. Facing these armies of guerrillas and with the continued instability of the country political leaders started looking for political solutions for the conflict.

Agreements, demobilization but continued conflict (1982–1992)

In the 1982 elections Belisario Betancur, a conservative, was elected President of Colombia. Betancur initiated a process to achieve peace. In 1982, an unconditional amnesty was declared and by mid-1984 a ceasefire agreement was reached between the government and FARC. This was followed two months later by ceasefire agreements between the government and M-19, which was the first group to accept the offer to search for a political solution, and EPL respectively. ELN, on the other hand, refused to negotiate. As part of the agreement, the guerrillas were allowed to form political movements and compete in the 1985 elections. FARC was the only group to accept this option, however, as M-19 and EPL denounced the ceasefire and resumed, and even escalated, violence before the elections.

While negotiations to achieve a ceasefire agreement were ongoing the conflict rose to new levels. During the process of 1983–4, M-19 escalated its levels of violence in several parts of Colombia. FARC was able to spread its area of influence, expanding from thirteen fronts in 1982 to twenty-seven in the following months. By 1983, in some regions, the conflict was multifaceted, involving the armed forces, FARC and assassins clashing. The result, apart from high levels of violence, was an influx of peasants to the cities, fleeing the instability.

During the ceasefire M-19 used its time to increase their support in the shantytowns of Cali and Bogotá. M-19 and FARC were targeted by paramilitary groups in the post-ceasefire agreement period, and several leaders from both groups were assassinated. While FARC continued its stride to enter the political arena, M-19 responded violently, clashing with the army in a three-week battle in January 1985. The army was also involved by supporting the paramilitaries’ actions against FARC and M-19. The high pressure on the guerrilla groups also led to internal struggles where internal assassinations and high levels of suspicion within the ranks grew.

In 1985 several guerrilla movements attempted to coordinate their efforts, forming the CNG (Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera, National Guerrilla Coordination). As in previous attempts of this kind, there was only limited coordination achieved between the groups in CNG. While there were military benefits of the cooperation, with an estimated total force as high as 15,000 men, there was very little progress on common political ground. M-19 was returning to the use of violence, ELN standing outside the peace negotiations, and FARC somewhat clinging on to the failing peace initiative from Betancur. Together with the long ongoing tension between FARC and ELN and each group's strong need to remain an independent organization, it may not be surprising that the coalition failed. In the elections in 1986, the conservative president Betancur was replaced with Virgilio Barco who continued the search for a negotiated solution to the conflict.

Though there had been incidents with FARC leading to casualties in 1986 it was close to one-tenth of the 1985 level of battle-related deaths. By 1987 the level of violence relating to FARC almost doubled and in 1989 the guerrilla ended its cooperation with the political party, the UP (Unión Patriótica, Patriotic Union). The UP had been targeted by paramilitary forces killing hundreds of members and two presidential candidates. In the late 1980s, a new attempt for coordination between guerrillas was made. The CGSB (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar, Simón Bolívar Coordinating Board) was a coalition between FARC, ELN, EPL, M-19 and some smaller guerrilla movements. The group was disbanded in the early 1990s.

Meanwhile, FARC’s definite move back to guerrilla operations coincided with a peaceful breakthrough, a deal between the government and M-19 where the latter agreed to disarm. In exchange for disarmament M-19 received preferential access to the political system. The EPL followed M-19’s example and signed a similar agreement with the government. By the early 1990s 791 members of M-19, 2149 members of EPL, and a few hundred members from smaller guerrilla groups agreed to demobilize. Former M-19 guerrillas turned to politics and united with the political party MDCU (Movimiento Democrático Colombia Unida, United Democratic Colombia). Together with members of other demobilized guerrillas, they formed the AD M-19 (Alianza Democrática M-19, Democratic Alliance M-19).

Failed peace talks, paramilitaries, and continued conflict (1990–2002)

By the early 1990s, several guerrilla groups had left their violent path to enter into politics. Following peace agreements with the government, groups like M-19, EPL, and some smaller guerrillas were now participating in the political process and striving to gain electoral support. However, FARC and ELN as well as a dissident group of EPL were still pursuing military ways of achieving their goals. FARC and the EPL dissidents were not content with the EPL's decision to abandon the armed struggle and in the early years following the agreements former EPL guerrillas were targeted by assassins. Within two years of demobilizing close to 200 former guerrillas had been killed.

The early 1990s saw an increase in the violence between government troops and guerrilla movements, which had been relatively low in the late 1980s. By the mid-1990s the situation was beginning to resemble the situation before 1982 with direct confrontations between guerrillas and government troops. President Ernesto Samper, who had been elected stating a wish to have dialogue with the guerrillas, made little progress in moving the conflict toward a negotiated settlement. The numerical strength and armed activity of the guerrillas grew steadily in the 1990s. In response to this increase the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, United Self-defense Forces of Colombia) was formed in 1997 as an umbrella organization for several local paramilitary groups active throughout Colombia. The AUC considered itself an illegal army, neither paramilitary nor pro-government, defending the system and the state with weapons taken from state authorities. They have referred to themselves as a special pro-state group. The AUC has been considered the biggest human rights violator in Colombia, being responsible for the killing of many civilians whom they have accused of collaborating with leftist guerrillas.

In 1998 the conflict intensified and in 2001 it reached the intensity level of war. The two remaining rebel groups ELN and FARC were not willing to hold negotiations unless the government first recognized the existence of the internal armed conflict in the country, something the President denied, instead referring to the government fighting terrorist groups. In 1998 Pastrana, a conservative, became the president of Colombia and soon after taking office negotiations started with the guerrillas. Both FARC and ELN were involved in peace talks during the Pastrana administration’s time in office and a few peace process agreements were signed.

In negotiations with FARC two agreements were signed, stipulating agendas for further talks to secure negotiations, in Los Pozos. Los Pozos was located in a demilitarized enclave, similar in size to Switzerland, which had been created to hold the talks. The FARC hijacking of a commercial plane with a senator aboard resulted in Pastrana breaking off the talks and giving FARC 48 hours to leave the demilitarized zone. Around this time, talks were held with ELN, resulting in two agreements: "the Palace of Viana Pre-Agreement in Madrid" in 1998 and "the Accord for Colombia between the Colombian Government and ELN" in 2001. Neither of these agreements resulted in a permanent resolution of the conflict between ELN and the government, however, as peace talks stalled in 2002. Peace talks with both groups were hosted and facilitated by several different countries with Cuba, Spain, France, Norway, and Switzerland assuming special interest in the talks.

Intensified conflict in the early 2000s and continued fighting (2002–2012)

In 2002, Álvaro Uribe, a hardliner president, came into power. Following the failed peace processes between the government and FARC and ELN, respectively, it took more than two years until negotiations restarted. Uribe’s first two years in power saw intense fighting until both FARC and the government expressed willingness to restart negotiations in 2005. In 2004 the government had intensified the military offensive against the guerrillas through Plan Patriota (the Patriot Plan). When government troops carried out "Patriot-Plan-activities" in the FARC heartland of Caquetá, Putumayo, and Guaviare provinces in southern Colombia, FARC responded with counter-attacks in neighboring provinces, to take some pressure off their heartland. In early 2005, FARC announced it was moving into a new phase Plan Resistencia (Resistance Plan). One explanation for the increase in attacks could be that FARC wanted to defend its countryside influence for the legislative and presidential elections in 2006. Yet another explanation could be that FARC sought to undermine the public perception that the security situation had substantially improved. During the period of reduced activity in 2003 many people thought that FARC’s tactic was to lull people into a false security and that they would step up their attacks.

Following the willingness to restart negotiations, the parties failed to agree on the terms of the talks in 2005, however, so new attempts were made in 2006. In the talks FARC proposed exchanging 500 jailed rebels for 62 of the hundreds of hostages it held. These included former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, three US nationals, and dozens of Colombian soldiers, police, and politicians. In October all attempts to negotiate a humanitarian accord ended abruptly when President Uribe accused the FARC of being behind a car bomb attack, injuring 23 people, on a military facility in Bogotá. The president claimed that FARC used the blast as an excuse to "slam the door" on peace talks and ordered the armed forces to target the FARC leadership. FARC denied the accusations, claiming that the US government was behind the attack, and instead accused Uribe of using the attack as an excuse to end negotiations. In 2007 new attempts were made to negotiate a humanitarian accord. FARC demanded the demilitarization of the municipalities of Pradera and Florida in the province of Valle del Cauca as a condition for talks, something which President Uribe did not agree to, arguing that it would threaten the "democratic security". Peace talks between FARC and the government were launched in Oslo, Norway in 2012 and the first phase of the talks took place in Havana, Cuba in November. The talks had an agenda going beyond putting down weapons such as more extensive socioeconomic reforms dealing with the land issue and also putting a limit to the duration of the peace talks to one year. The FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire as a gesture of goodwill at the beginning of the talks in Havana. The government declared it would not consider a ceasefire until a final agreement was reached.

The conflict intensity decreased after the years of war 2004–2005. President Uribe was re-elected in May 2006, which was made possible through an amendment in the constitution in 2005 allowing the sitting president to be re-elected. Uribes “democratic security” policy and firm hand seemed to be what the Colombian population, tired of the protracted war, wanted. Both in 2007 and 2008, marches were organized nationwide, including up to a million people, protesting against kidnappings and demanding the liberation of hostages.

Since 2002 the third party involvement has consisted of Cuba hosting talks with ELN. International facilitators in these talks came from Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In 2007 and 2008 Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez was involved in mediation attempts with both FARC and ELN. Chavez tried to release FARC held hostages including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. His attempts to mediate were abruptly ended by President Uribe in 2007 when Chavez disobeyed the conditions of his involvement by speaking directly to Colombia's top army chief. Chavez pointed out the need for the Colombian government to recognize FARC and ELN as legitimate insurgent groups, rather than terrorists, as a first step towards possible peace talks. On 2 July 2008, the Colombian army rescued Ingrid Betancourt.

In the following years FARC lost some of its top commanders. In 2008 Manuel Marulanda, one of the organization's founders, died and Raul Reyes was shot by the Colombian army on Ecuadorian territory, causing tensions with the neighboring country. In 2010 the FARC commander Mono Jojo was killed in an army airstrike and in 2011 the FARC leader Alfonzo Cano was killed by the Colombian army in an attack on a FARC camp. At the beginning of 2011, Cano announced that FARC would step up activities. The new leader Timochenko announced, shortly after Cano's death, that the FARC would continue their ideological struggle. In 2012 the conflict intensity remained unchanged. Military airstrikes on rebel camps continued and President Juan Manuel Santos, elected in 2010, declared that the government wouldn’t consider a ceasefire until an agreement was reached.

Negotiations and peace agreement with the FARC (2012-2016)

President Juan Manuel Santos had signaled his ambition to find a negotiated end to the conflict and address its root causes. In 2012 the FARC released members of the security forces that had been held prisoners for over a decade. In August 2012 the General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace was signed in Havana, Cuba, between the Government of Colombia and the FARC. The agreement was a road map for the initiation of a formal peace process and established a thematic agenda. Peace talks formally opened in Oslo, Norway. When peace talks started on Cuba a month later, FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire as a goodwill gesture. In 2013 the parties agreed on the two first points on the six-point agenda: land reform and political participation. At the same time, fighting continued in both the Government of Colombia – FARC and the Government of Colombia – ELN dyad. During the Christmas Holiday the FARC announced a unilateral ceasefire and called on the Government of Colombia to accept a bilateral ceasefire to speed up the negotiation process. The government withheld its stand that a ceasefire wouldn’t be considered until definite agreements had been reached. Moreover, the final agreement had to be approved by the Colombian people through a constitutional referendum.

In 2014 the conflict was active only in the Government of Colombia – FARC dyad. The peace negotiations on Cuba between the Government of Colombia and FARC continued throughout the year. The parties agreed on most parts of the third point dealing with a solution to the problem of illicit drugs and started negotiations on the victims’ rights. Throughout the peace talks, fighting continued except for during the national elections in 2014 when both FARC and ELN announced a unilateral ceasefire. At the end of the year FARC declared a unilateral open-ended ceasefire that would only end if they found out that guerilla structures had been targeted by an army attack. The government’s stand on a bilateral ceasefire remained unchanged. In 2015 the negotiations started well until 11 soldiers were killed in a FARC ambush in Cauca in April. The incident turned public opinion against the peace process and boosted the popularity of the negotiations’ main opponent, former President Àlvaro Úribe. The Government of Colombia responded with a retaliation attack killing 26 FARC guerillas in Cauca. Amid the ongoing conflict, negotiations continued, and during the year a historic agreement on the victim’s rights on transitional justice was reached.

In 2016 the Government of Colombia and the FARC signed the agreement to end the conflict, cease hostilities, and surrender weapons, and in August the Government of Colombia and the FARC signed the final peace accord in Cartagena, Colombia. The congress called for a referendum on the agreement, which was held on October 2. A small majority of the Colombian people voted against the agreement. Six weeks after the referendum negotiations to revise the peace accord were held with the no side, led by former president Alvaro Ùribe. The Final Peace Agreement was taken by Congress and signed on 24 November. During that time President Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievements in the peace process with the FARC.

Aftermath of the peace agreement and the reconfiguration of conflict in Colombia

Following the signing of the peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, the intensity of the state-based conflict in Colombia decreased, with the ELN becoming the only group continuing armed struggle against the Government of Colombia. In 2017, FARC handed over its weapons and transitioned into a political party, with a UN mission established to verify implementation of the agreement. However, dissident FARC factions that rejected the peace process began regrouping and seizing former guerrilla strongholds; these groups later consolidated into FARC-EMC, which became the main dissident faction continuing armed struggle against the state. In 2019, a second dissident faction, FARC Segunda Marquetalia, emerged under Iván Márquez, citing state noncompliance with the accords.

The peace accord aimed to reintegrate ex-combatants and reestablish state control in conflict zones, but its implementation fell short, leaving power vacuums that armed actors, including ELN, FARC dissidents, and criminal groups, moved to fill. When Gustavo Petro became president in 2022, he introduced the "Total Peace" policy to engage all armed groups in parallel negotiations, distinguishing between those of political aim, with the rebel groups, and those of legal approach, with organized crime groups. In 2023, this approach yielded partial results, including bilateral ceasefires with the ELN and FARC-EMC. While these agreements temporarily reduced confrontations with state forces, violence persisted in contested regions, driven by unresolved rivalries, territorial disputes, and criminal economies.

In 2024, the “Total Peace” process unraveled amid escalating tensions and fractured negotiations. The ceasefire with FARC-EMC collapsed in March following an attack in Cauca that killed an Indigenous leader, prompting the government to suspend the agreement in three departments and denounce the group as a criminal enterprise. This triggered a split: EMBF, a new faction, broke away and opted to remain at the negotiating table, while FARC-EMC resumed armed actions to reassert territorial control. At the same time, talks with the ELN and FARC-Segunda Marquetalia stalled due to repeated ceasefire violations and lack of concrete progress. By the end of 2024, EMBF continued dialogue with the government, while FARC-EMC reasserted control over contested areas. The departments most affected included Cauca, Atlántico, Antioquia, and Bolívar. The conflict landscape became increasingly fragmented as armed factions competed over illicit economies and strategic corridors. Tensions in the border with Venezuela became a pivotal issue in the posterior crisis in The Catatumbo area, which led to the internal displacement of 64.783 people and the confinement of other 16.615. This being one of the biggest humanitarian crises the country had endured in three decades.

No recorded fatalities for this entity.
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