This dyad belongs to the conflict Afghanistan: Government
Summary of conflict Afghanistan: Government
Since the 1970s, Afghanistan has been characterized by severe civil war as Muslim groups have battled the regime and each other in their attempts to control the country. The strict Islamist rule imposed by the Taleban movement in 1996 came to an end when a US-led multinational force intervened in 2001. However, the extremists continued their struggle and heavy fighting between the internationally backed regime and the Taleban movement continued.
The intrastate armed conflict over the government between the government of Afghanistan and the Taleban was the bloodiest conflict in the world in 2018 and 2019, and the second bloodiest in 2020-2021 until Kabul fell to the Taleban in August 2021. Although anti-Taleban forces, such as National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), continued the fight, violence decreased significantly in 2022. For the first time since 2004, the conflict did not reach the intensity level of war. Fighting continued on a low level during 2025, mainly taking the form of ambushes and mines, as well as executions carried out by the Taleban government.
1970s: The onset of civil war in Afghanistan
The onset of the Afghan civil war can be traced back to the political turmoil of the 1970s, when two communist-backed coups, in 1973 and 1978, aroused an opposition of Islamic groups protesting against a secularist and centralist state authority. The Soviet Union had been a very important actor in Afghan politics since the 1950s. Situated between the Soviet Union and USA’s Asian allies, Afghanistan became a pawn in the power relations between the two superpowers. Initially Kabul tried not to become involved in the dynamics of the Cold War and thus followed the principle of non-alignment. However, as Pakistan’s relationship with the US grew closer, Afghanistan turned to Moscow for military aid.
As a reaction to a coup in 1973, Islamic student groups decided to turn to armed struggle and in 1975, an uprising was launched by the Islamist group Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan). The uprising failed as the population turned against the rebels and supported the army instead, forcing the Islamist fighters to take refuge at Peshawar in Pakistan where they received training and established bases. The most radical elements of Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, under the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, left the organization and established Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan).
In the 1978 coup, the communist party PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) ousted President Mohammed Daoud Khan, who himself had taken power in the coup of 1973. There have been allegations that the USSR supported the communist PDPA; however, it has never been proved that the Soviet Union had anything to do with the coup. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union immediately recognized the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and a Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship was signed, including an agreement on a collective security system.
As the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan increased, the Islamist struggle against the regime became increasingly violent. The PDPA government imposed several reforms aimed at strengthening Communist rule and weakening the Islamist opposition, most notably an agrarian reform and a literacy campaign. However, the reforms failed to build support for the regime in the traditional, tribal areas of Afghanistan and instead the Islamists gained strength. The state was also using extensive violence against the religious elite, and as a result, revolts started taking place across the country.
In the spring of 1979, a large public uprising took place in Herat in western Afghanistan. Demonstrations against the state started on 15 March and the government sent in an army division to break up the riot. However, the army division was not loyal to the government; thousands of soldiers, led by Ismael Khan, joined Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, which had participated in the riots. The rebels took control of the city for a couple of days, and many of the Soviet advisers positioned in Herat were killed. The military forces encircled the city and subjected it to numerous bomb attacks, eventually forcing the resistance to give up.
The growing unrest across Afghanistan caused the Soviet Union to step up its support for the Communist government and the number of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan increased substantially after the Herat uprising. A number of mutinies took place across the country and tens of thousands of troops deserted to the rebels.
At the same time as the Soviet troops were struggling against the Muslim resistance, the Soviet leadership was alarmed by developments within the Afghan government. A power struggle between Afghan President Nur Muhammad Taraki and Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin resulted in a shootout at the Presidential Palace. Shortly thereafter Taraki stepped down due to health issues. The Soviets, already worried about a collapse of the Marxist government in Kabul, was even more troubled by the fact that they couldn’t trust Amin. The new President’s loyalty to Moscow was considerably weaker than Taraki’s, and the Soviet leadership feared that their influence in Afghanistan was diminishing. During the fall of 1979, the planning of a military invasion of Afghanistan was initiated in Moscow and in December a large number of Soviet troops started arriving in Kabul. On 27 December, Soviet troops attacked the Presidential Palace, killed Amin and installed the more Soviet-friendly Babrak Karmal on the presidential post. (For more information see the interstate conflict Afghanistan–Russia (Soviet Union)).
1979–1989: Afghanistan under Soviet control
On 27 December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, killed President Hafizullah Amin and installed the more Soviet-friendly Babrak Karmal on the post (For more information see the interstate conflict Afghanistan–Russia (Soviet Union)). During the following ten years the Soviet Union would have substantial influence in Afghanistan. In January 1980, there were around 50 000 Soviet troops on Afghan territory, a number that rose to 85 000 in three months. The Soviet Union continued to increase its presence in Afghanistan and although it did not officially rule Afghanistan, no important decision, civil or military, could be made without Soviet approval. The number of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan was equivalent to or larger than the number of effective PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) members in the government apparatus. In the military forces, the number of Afghan soldiers varied between 30 000 and 50 000, while the number of Soviet troops in the country reached 115 000 in 1984.
In the years following the Soviet invasion, plenty of guerrilla groups sprang up. By the end of 1983, the number of guerrilla groups in Afghanistan was estimated at between 150 and 200. The groups, often small bands operating within a clearly defined territory, were generally affiliated with an exiled resistance organization based in Peshawar or Teheran, providing them with arms and other types of support. The resistance organizations in Pakistan received large amounts of military aid from several governments, including the United States and Saudi Arabia. (For more information see Secondary Support to the Mujahideen). During the time of Soviet control of Afghanistan, seven resistance movements based in Pakistan, and one movement based in Iran, took part in the conflict. The seven Pakistan-based movements, sometimes called the Peshawar Seven due to the location of their offices, consisted of three moderate parties; Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, and Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan, and four fundamentalist parties; Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Khalis faction, and Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan. Several Shiite parties were based in Iran, but only Harakat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan was active in the conflict during this period.
Despite their heavy military presence, Soviet troops found it hard to control the country outside of Kabul. During the spring of 1980, the Muslim guerrillas, commonly referred to as the Mujahideen or freedom fighters, took control over large parts of eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. They moved freely across the border, established camps on Pakistani territory, and smuggled weapons into Afghanistan. The Shiite rebels from Hazara Jat in central Afghanistan established control over large parts of the provinces of Bamiyan, Ghowr and Uruzgan, and set up their own government in the area. Powerful guerrilla commanders also established their own civil administrations in Wardak province and in the Panjsher Valley in Kapisa province. Soviet troops, together with the decimated Afghan military forces, were able to control Kabul, sections of the larger cities, and parts of the larger roads, but the Mujahideen together controlled around 85 percent of the countryside.
The Soviet troops were ill-prepared for counterinsurgency operations in a mountainous country like Afghanistan. Their reliance on heavy weapons did not suit the terrain and their immensely long convoys of slowly moving vehicles were an easy target for Mujahideen ambushes. Due to their military power, the Soviets could penetrate any Mujahideen-held area, but as soon as the troops left, the resistance forces resumed control. Over the years, the Soviets began to put more emphasis on the use of lighter infantry. However, at the same time as the Soviets improved their tactics, so did the Mujahideen. The most characteristic tactic employed by the Soviet troops was the heavy use of aerial warfare, and the MI-24 Hind helicopter soon became a symbol of the war in Afghanistan. Many cities and villages became targets in the bombing campaigns, and the civilian losses were immense. The Soviets also used aerial-dropped butterfly mines, which maimed more often than killed. The Mujahideen mostly employed the tactic of small-scale hit-and-run attacks, but some of the more prominent commanders, like Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Pansjher Valley, also performed larger, coordinated offensives.
In Kabul, the communist party PDPA had its own problems. In 1980, the economy was in disarray and the government apparatus was not functioning. The new President Karmal belonged to the Parchami section of PDPA. His cabinet was a coalition of both Khalq and Parcham, although in contrast to previous President Amin’s cabinet, Parcham had the majority. Khalqis, mainly Pashtu-speaking, and Parcham, mainly Dari-speaking, had for a long time had difficulties ruling together, and the new Parchami majority in the cabinet augmented their problems. During the period of Khalqi rule, thousands of government officials belonging to the Parchami section had been imprisoned or executed. Khalqi officials, who occupied all important government posts, feared violent retaliation under Parchami rule, and consequently few officials dared make any decisions. In the army, almost 40 percent of the enlisted men had deserted since the PDPA coup in 1978. In 1980, Khalq outnumbered Parcham by a factor of three to one in the military forces, and when the new Parchami government tried to expel Khalqi commanders, the soldiers often revolted. Thousands of troops deserted and by the end of 1980, army divisions from the Khalq faction were actually fighting alongside the Mujahideen.
By 1985, the Afghan army had regained some of its strength and the Soviet forces had adopted new strategies to defeat the resistance. In order to stand up against the Soviet/Afghan forces, the Mujahideen tried to coordinate their efforts. Several alliances had been announced during the war, but in 1985 a resistance alliance finally lasted. The Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen included the seven main groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan and this time they managed to coordinate their struggle and cooperate in battles. Moreover, in the mid-1980s, foreign aid to the Mujahideen increased significantly when the US decided to step up its military support to the resistance groups. From 1985, the Mujahideen received anti-aircraft missiles, and in 1986 the US supplied advanced Stinger missiles. The heavy fighting resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, and in 1987 it was estimated that five million Afghans had fled the fighting to neighboring Pakistan and Iran.
The Soviet/Afghan forces’ inability to control Afghanistan and the increasing diplomatic efforts made by the UN finally resulted in a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, agreed upon in 1988. (For more information, see Negotiations and Third Party involvement.) The last Soviet troops left Afghanistan in February 1989, after nine years of military presence. They left a country ravaged by war; with a leadership that most people believed would fall as soon as the Soviet troops were gone.
Secondary support to the Mujahideen
The resistance groups in Afghanistan, commonly referred to as the Mujahideen or freedom fighters, were supported by many governments and private donors, although many of them did not openly admit to it. The rebel groups themselves also denied that they were receiving training and weapons from foreign sources. Instead, they claimed that their weapons were captured from the Afghan army and that former Afghan soldiers, who had now joined the resistance, were providing them with training.
The two largest donors were the United States and Saudi Arabia, but Pakistan handled all the aid given to the Mujahideen and several other countries also provided weapons, training and logistics. Although the United States had started to support the Mujahideen on a small scale as early as in 1979, it was not until after the Soviet invasion in December of that year that the rebels could count on extensive American aid. While the US continued to officially deny its involvement in Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter, on 9 January 1980, authorized a program of covert military assistance to the Muslim insurgents. In a joint action with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and to some extent China, the US started transferring large quantities of arms to the resistance groups in Afghanistan. Until 1985 only communist-block weapons were bought, in an attempt to hide the fact that the US was giving the Mujahideen material support. Weapons from China and Egypt were shipped to Karachi or, on some occasions, flown to Islamabad in American, Saudi, Chinese or Pakistani planes. When in Pakistan, all military aid was handled by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI, which transported the arms to the Afghan resistance groups’ headquarters in Quetta and Peshawar and distributed them among the seven Sunni resistance parties. The parties then brought the arms to border dumps for the commanders in Afghanistan to come and pick them up.
In Pakistan, the question of aid to the Afghan rebels was politically sensitive, as they worried about Soviet retaliation if it was revealed that the Pakistani government supported the Mujahideen. There is no evidence that Pakistan provided weapons for the rebels, but they handled almost all the aid, military and financial, that was given to the Mujahideen by others. Pakistan only recognized seven resistance groups; Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan, Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Khalis faction. All the support for the Mujahideen that was distributed by Pakistan was divided among those seven on a percentage basis. Pakistan also administered training for the Afghan resistance and from 1981, there were Pakistani soldiers situated in Afghanistan as military advisers to the commanders.
The bulk of the weapons that the US and Saudi Arabia provided for the Mujahideen was purchased in Egypt and China, but both Egypt and China also sporadically provided weapons as aid. Egypt openly stated that they supported the Afghan resistance. Defense Minister Kamal Hassan announced in early 1980 that Egypt would provide training to the Afghan fighters, and that the combatants would return to Afghanistan with Egyptian weapons. In December 1980, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat said in a TV-interview that Egypt would send more arms, as well as medicine and food, to the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan. How many guerrillas that received training in Egypt, and how many arms that were given to the Afghan resistance by Egypt remains unknown. China, on the other hand, never admitted that they supported the Mujahideen.
One of the largest donors was Saudi Arabia which contributed roughly the same amount of money as the US. In 1980, Saudi Arabia granted 24 million dollars to the Mujahideen while the US provided between 20 and 30 million dollars. The aid increased from year to year and in 1987, USA and Saudi Arabia provided $630 million each. When military aid officially ceased in 1992, the US had given $2–3 billion to the Mujahideen, to which a comparable sum from Saudi Arabia can be added. Although most of the weapons bought by the US and Saudi Arabia for the Afghan resistance were shipped to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia occasionally flew in arms deliveries to airports in Rawalpindi and Islamabad.
Iran made several statements supporting the Afghan resistance, but supplied little, if any, material aid to the rebel groups.
There are also reports that the Gulf States were providing the Muslim guerrillas with financial aid. However, large parts of the funds seem to have been donated by individuals and it is unclear if the governments of these states were involved in supporting the Afghan resistance.
1989–1994: The Mujahideen groups seize power in Afghanistan
In 1989, when the Soviet Union pulled out its forces from Afghanistan after nine years of presence, many analysts believed that President Mohammed Najibullah’s regime would fall within months. As the Soviet troops withdrew, together with government forces that realized they could not stand up against the Mujahideen, there were few reports of fighting between the retreating forces and the resistance groups. Instead, the Mujahideen occupied the positions the Soviets left behind. However, as government troops left remote outposts, their defense became more concentrated and consequently stronger in other places. The Mujahideen surprisingly lost the battle for the key city of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan in the spring of 1989, due to the redeployment of government forces. Soon, the situation became just as deadlocked as it had been before the Soviet troops left Afghanistan. In contrast to what most people expected, Najibullah remained in control of the government in Kabul, and the Mujahideen were unable to defeat him with armed force. When the resistance groups’ common enemy, the Soviet Union, had left the country, the unity within the Mujahideen started to fall apart. Although a transitional government was set up in Pakistan by the rebels with representatives from the major resistance parties, they increasingly started fighting each other over local control.
Najibullah was also attacked by units within his own ruling party, PDPA (Hizb-i Demokrati-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan). Rivalries between the two factions within PDPA, Khalq and Parcham, went back to the late 1960s and had previously resulted in fierce fighting and executions. (For more information see 1979–1989: Afghanistan under Soviet control). In March 1990, the Khalqi Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanay, with support from the opposition group Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, attempted a coup against President Najibullah, from the Parcham faction. After Tanay had been defeated, an anti-Khalqi purge was initiated by Najibullah.
In order to control areas outside Kabul and to reduce the dependence on Khalqi units within the army, Najibullah employed militias to fight the Mujahideen. An Uzbek militia under the leadership of Abdul Rashid Dostum, was the largest and most efficient one, comprising over 40 000 men based in the Jowzjan province in northern Afghanistan. However, Dostum developed close ties to the resistance group Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and in 1992, he turned against Najibullah, allied with Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and captured large parts of northern Afghanistan. With the rebels closing in on Kabul, Najibullah agreed to step down in mid-April. On 28 April, power was officially transferred to an interim council set up by the seven main Pakistan-based guerrillas, in line with the Peshawar accords signed by the groups four days earlier. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, leader of Jabha-yi Nijat-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, was installed as the President of Afghanistan for two months, after which Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of Jam’iyyat-i Islami took over. When Dostum was appointed General of the Armed Forces, relations between the Mujahideen parties worsened as Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan demanded Dostum and his new organization Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, to withdraw from Kabul. Dostum’s refusal gave Hekmatyar an excuse to launch an offensive against Kabul and the civil war continued with the coalition government led by Rabbani on one side, and the opposing Mujahideen groups, most prominently Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, on the other.
Following negotiations between Rabbani and Hekmatyar in the spring of 1993, Hekmatyar was sworn in as Prime Minister of Afghanistan on 17 June. Yet he continued to oppose the Rabbani regime and did not participate in meetings. The same year, Dostum sided with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and started fighting his previous allies in the government. By 1994, Afghanistan was in a state of collapse. The Mujahideen leaders were switching sides, fighting together one day and against each other the next. It was against this background that the Taleban movement emerged, and eventually seized power in 1996 (For more information see 1994–2001: The Taleban period).
1994–2001: The Taleban period
In 1994, when two years of fighting between the different Mujahideen groups had ravaged the country, a new, even more radical organization of fighters was formed in Afghanistan. For years, rival warlords had controlled the southern city of Kandahar and their battles and continuous harassment of the civilian population resulted in frustration among the former resistance fighters. In a meeting in Kandahar, called by Mullah Mohammed Omar Akhund (often called simply Mullah Omar), the Taleban movement was formed. The organization, mostly made up of Islamic students (taleb, Taleban in plural, is the word for an Islamic student), declared that their aims were to restore peace, disarm the population and enforce Sharia law. In October 1994, the Taleban captured the town Spinboldak in Kandahar province from Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and in November Kandahar city fell to the Taleban. In 1994, the Taleban was still concerned with security on the roads and in the cities, and was not interested in ruling the country. When they took control over Kandahar, they fought against Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and not against government forces; hence the Taleban was not active in the state-based conflict in 1994.
In 1995, the Taleban continued to fight the Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and by February, they controlled eight provinces in the southeast, after having forced Hizb-i Islami out of their last strongholds. In mid-February, they had reached Kabul and for the first time they demanded that the government step down. Copies of directives issued by the Taleban started to appear banning shaving of beards, gambling and kite-flying. In early March their first attack on government forces was carried out and it was followed by heavy fighting throughout the rest of the year. Much of the fighting occurred in the Kabul area with the Taleban firing rockets at the capital and the government answering with bombardments against Taleban strongholds. By September, the Taleban had also defeated government forces in western Afghanistan and established control in areas that were not dominated by Pashtuns, the ethnic group that the Taleban represented.
With the Taleban controlling larger and larger parts of the country, President Burhanuddin Rabbani turned to the other warlords opposing him in an attempt to broaden his base of support. In February 1996, all opposition groups except for the Taleban agreed to negotiate peace with Rabbani’s regime and in May the government signed a peace agreement with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, offering Hekmatyar the post as Prime Minister of Afghanistan. Rabbani also tried to gain international support and to receive increased military aid by visiting several of the neighboring countries. Russia, Tajikistan, Iran and India increased their support to the Rabbani government, while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia stepped up their arms supplies to the Taleban. Strengthened by this increased support, the Taleban launched an offensive against the eastern city of Jalalabad in August 1996. In mid-September, Jalalabad fell and the following days the Taleban captured the eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar. Surprised by the strength of the attacks, the government forces withdrew to Kabul. On 26 September, Taleban forces entered the capital after having attacked it on three fronts. They tortured and killed the former President Mohammed Najibullah and his brother, and subsequently hanged their bodies from a traffic post just outside the Presidential Palace.
The Taleban proclaimed the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the enforcement of Sharia law. They imposed a strict Islamic code: women were banned from working, were not allowed to receive formal education after the age of eight and were ordered to wear head-to-toe veils; television, music, alcohol and games such as football and kite-flying were all banned; and public stoning and amputations were enforced as forms of punishment. International recognition of the new regime was universally withheld, with the exception of Pakistan. The ousted Rabbani government actually remained the de jure government of Afghanistan, recognized by the UN, until it formally retired in December 2001.
After the Taleban had captured Kabul in September 1996, the forces of Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud (of Rabbani’s Jamiyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan) retreated to its stronghold in the Panjsher Valley north of Kabul. The Taleban pushed up along the Salang highway until they were hindered at the Salang tunnel by the forces of another warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum (belonging to Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami). Neither the Taleban nor Massoud could count on Dostum’s support, as it was unclear whose side he would take. He had switched sides numerous times during the years and negotiated with both the Taleban and Massoud. On 10 October, Dostum met with ousted President Rabbani, Massoud, and Karim Khalili, the leader of Hizb-i Wahdat. The meeting resulted in the announcement of an anti-Taleban alliance, which came to be known as UIFSA (United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan). The alliance was also commonly referred to as the Northern Alliance.
Dostum’s stronghold Mazar-i-Sharif was the scene of some fierce fighting in 1997 when the Taleban tried to capture the city. In May, Dostum’s second-in-command, Malik Pahlawan, turned against him and UIFSA and joined the Taleban in their attacks against northern Afghanistan. One by one, the northern provinces fell to the Taleban, and when Dostum fled to Uzbekistan, Mazar-i-Sharif was in Taleban hands. However, after just a few days, Malik once again turned against his allies and attacked the Taleban in the city of Mazar. Untrained in street fighting, and not familiar with the surroundings, the Taleban were an easy target for the UIFSA forces. Spurred on by the victory in Mazar, UIFSA forces recaptured several provinces lost to the Taleban and inflicted severe Taleban losses. In an attempt to strengthen their organization, UIFSA set up a parallel government in Mazar-i-Sharif under the leadership of ousted President Rabbani. The parallel government administered a mini-state covering five provinces in the north, while the Taleban effectively controlled the rest, about 90 percent, of Afghan territory.
In spite of the united efforts by the anti-Taleban forces, the Taleban gained ground. When Mazar-i-Sharif was captured in 1998, the UIFSA’s capital was moved to Taloqan in Takhar province. However, the Taleban captured that city as well in the fall of 2000. By 2001, UIFSA had been pushed back to the northeastern corner of Afghanistan, controlling less than five percent of the country. A Taleban victory seemed imminent.
2001-2009 : The US-led intervention and Taleban resurgence
In 2001, the Taleban controlled over 95 percent of Afghanistan, and UIFSA (United Islamic Front for Salvation of Afghanistan), only controlling a small territory in northern Afghanistan, was almost defeated. However, the balance of forces changed drastically with the entrance of the US-led multinational coalition into the conflict. USA's attitude to the Afghan civil war had been somewhat ambiguous, but its approach to the conflict and the Taleban regime was drastically changed on 11 September, when New York and Washington became targets for terrorist-actions blamed on the Afghanistan-based Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida organization. Following the refusal of the Taleban regime to surrender Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida associates, the multinational coalition began aerial bombardment of Taleban and al-Qaida positions on 7 October 2001. UIFSA, backed by US and UK military force, made rapid military advances. It took control over Kabul on 12 November, and on 7 December the last Taleban stronghold of Kandahar fell to the anti-Taleban alliance.
As the balance of power shifted from the Taleban to UIFSA, UN efforts to create a stable transitional government in the country intensified. The Bonn accords were signed by the major anti-Taleban factions on 5 December 2001, leading to the establishment of a 29-member interim government headed by Hamid Karzai. In a formal ceremony in Kabul on 23 December, Burhanuddin Rabbani handed over power to Karzai's administration. The authority of the interim government was strengthened by a UK-led UN peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, equipped with the strongest possible mandate under the UN Charter.
By 2002, many of the leaders of UIFSA had gained positions in the Afghan Transitional Administration. The Multinational Coalition continued to hunt remnant al-Qaida elements throughout the year, but although there were sporadic attacks by Taleban remains against US forces, they did not appear to be organized or constitute a new conflict. By early 2003, the Taleban forces had, however, managed to regroup and reorganize. In late February, statements coming from the Taleban expressed not only their desire to perform jihad (holy war) against the Coalition forces, but also against the Afghan government, asserting that Mullah Omar was the real leader of Afghanistan and that Karzai's government did not enjoy the support of the people. The Taleban quickly confirmed the force behind this statement with an increased number of attacks on Afghan security forces. With only an approximate 6000 troops, the Afghan government was not able to provide effective security outside the Kabul area and was therefore reliant upon Coalition forces to fight the Taleban, particularly in the troubled southeastern parts of the country.
The security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated in 2004, and in 2005, the conflict reached the level of war for the first time since 2001, as more than 1000 battle-related deaths were recorded. Elections to parliament and the local provincial council were held on 18 September 2005, but the election turnout was surprisingly low. Observers cited fear of intimidation, public disappointment with the pace of the democratic process, and troublesome links from election candidates to former warlords and drug traders as possible explanations.
The Afghan insurgency gained further strength in 2006; fierce clashes in the south-eastern provinces and a rash of suicide bombings in the urban centers claimed more than 3000 battle-related deaths. Part of the general upsurge in violence followed from the Afghan army and the Coalition troops expanding their presence into new areas. Observers also agreed that the Taleban, boosted by money from the booming opium trade and by cross border infiltrators from Pakistan, had been able to regroup with unexpected strength. The Taleban dramatically increased their use of suicide bombings, in attacks on ‘soft targets’ such as civilians and government officials and on the more poorly equipped and trained Afghan soldiers. During 2006, the authority over the 30 000 international military troops were transferred from the US led Coalition to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As ISAF took over the control in the volatile southern provinces and eastern borderlands, they found themselves involved in heavy fighting with the insurgents.
In 2007, International troop presence reached approximately 45 000 with 32 000 of these being ISAF troops and the rest being stationed under a US-led Coalition. In 2008 this number was up to 95 000 of which 84 000 belonged to ISAF. ISAF fought the Taleban in the southern provinces (mainly Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul), while the US and its allies battled both Taleban and al Qaeda militants in the east. However, in 2009 violence spread to previously almost untouched areas in the northern parts of Afghanistan.
2010-2019 : Escalation of violence
In 2010, the conflict in Afghanistan increased in intensity as an additional 30 000 international troops were sent to the country, and the Taleban stepped up its attacks and use of road-side bombs. The total number of ISAF trops in the country reached 130 000 during 2010.
The following years, Afghan security forces suffered an increasing number of fatalities as they took on the full responsibility for security in Afghanistan. In 2014, violence in Afghanistan reached the highest levels since the American-led invasion in 2001. By the end of the year, the ISAF mission ended with foreign soldiers leaving Afghanistan. In October an agreement was signed with the US and NATO to launch the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support in 2015.
Nevertheless, the violence in Afghanistan continued to escalate. Indirect and informal talks between the conflict parties during the first half of the 2015 resulted in the first direct peace talks in early July that year. However, following the announcement of Taleban leader Mullah Omar’s death in late July, the negotiations stalled and a leadership dispute broke out within the Taleban movement. Under their new leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the Taleban managed to take control of Kunduz city in late September 2015, their biggest achievement since their forces were pushed out of Kabul in 2001.
In May 2016, the Taleban named a new leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, following the death of previous leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Pakistan. Despite efforts to revive peace talks with the Taleban in early 2016, no indirect or direct talks were reported. Peace negotiations did, however, take place with Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and in September 2016, the group signed a peace agreement with the government. The deal, which granted Hekmatyar amnesty, was the first peace agreement to be concluded between the warring parties in Afghanistan since 1996.
Violence continued to escalate, and by 2019, the Taleban controlled more territory than during any other year since the US-led invasion in 2001. In 2018, the Taleban also launched offensives against previously calm districts in Ghazni province, primarily inhabited by Hazaras. Several peace conferences have been held, aiming to find a political settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Negotiations between the US and the TTaleban have also taken place on several occasions, preparing for a withdrawal of foreign forces and a process towards more inclusive peace talks. In June 2018, both the government and the Taleban announced historic ceasefires, and during three days violence dropped and Taleban were seen celebrating together with Afghan soldiers. Fighting resumed, however, and intensified ahead of the parliamentary elections on 20 October that year.
2020- : International withdrawal and the second Taleban regime
In February 2020, after eighteen months of negotiations, the Taleban signed an agreement with USA. The ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’ provided for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the start of intra-Afghan talks, and that the Taleban should prevent armed groups from using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against USA and its allies. During the first half of 2020, battle-related deaths dwindled and the Taleban refrained from announcing their annual spring offensive, which they have done every year since at least 2008. When intra-Afghan talks finally started in September 2020, violence had begun to increase again, however, and in October, large-scale offensives took place in the southern provinces of Hilmand and Kandahar.
In May 2021, the Taleban intensified its struggle to capture the province capitals, and following heavy escalation of fighting more territory fell to the Taleban. On 15 August, the Taleban finally took Kabul and the ousted president Ashraf Ghani fled the country.
Following the Taleban takeover, Panjshir valley north of Kabul was the last pocket of resistance against the Taleban regime. Former vice president Amrullah Saleh, together with Ahmad Massoud (son of the legendary Mujahideen Ahmad Shah Massoud) formed the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) to fight the Taleban regime. On 6 September 2021, the Taleban declared victory in Panjshir, but NRF claimed to continue the armed opposition from the mountains.
Although anti-Taleban forces, such as NRF, continued the fight, violence decreased significantly in 2022. For the first time since 2004, the conflict over government did not reach the intensity level of war. A new group became active in the conflict, Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), which first emerged in March 2022. Fighting continued on a low level during 2023-2025, mainly taking the form of ambushes and mines, as well as executions carried out by the Taleban government.
Negotiations and Third Party involvement in the conflict
The UN has been an important actor in the conflict in Afghanistan, serving as a third party for large parts of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. During the period of Soviet control of Afghanistan, UN passed several resolutions trying to convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from the country. In 1980, one resolution legally binding the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan, secured a majority vote in the Security Council. Not surprisingly, the resolution was vetoed by the USSR and the issue was shifted to the UN General Assembly, which passed a number of resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are not legally binding on member states, but they still serve as important statements and can affect world opinion.
Not being able to force the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan through a legally binding resolution, the UN instead tried to find a negotiated settlement of the issue. In 1981, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed Javier Perez de Cuellar (who later became UN Secretary General himself) as his personal representative to try to agree on a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Several rounds of talks were held in the 1980s until the Geneva accords finally were signed on 14 April 1988. The accords, bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the US and the Soviet Union as guarantors, included a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
Trying to deal with the chaotic situation following the Soviet withdrawal, the UN Secretary General announced a five point peace plan for Afghanistan in 1991. Strengthened by the fact that the US and the Soviet Union in September 1991 had agreed to suspend military aid to the warring parties, the UN decided to press ahead with the peace plan, even though three Mujahideen groups refused to participate. The Mujahideen groups had declared soon after the Soviet invasion that they were determined never to negotiate with the Karmal government. The only negotiations between the communist government and the Mujahideen took place in Geneva in November 1990 when President Najibullah met with guerrilla leaders and representatives of the former king. The negotiations focused on setting up a transitional government in Kabul. No agreement came out of the talks and the Mujahideen did not meet the government in negotiations again during Najibullah’s reign.
When Najibullah was ousted and the Mujahideen took power in April 1992, heavy fighting erupted between the new government, controlled by Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, and another Mujahideen group, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan. Both UN and Pakistan played important roles as facilitators, and in Pakistan’s case, as host in the efforts to agree on a power-sharing arrangement between the rival rebel groups within the Mujahideen. In late April 1992, six of the seven Pakistan-based resistance groups agreed on an interim government and a ceasefire in the negotiations in Peshawar, Pakistan. Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan did not take part in the negotiations and rejected the accord. After several rounds of talks and ceasefires, Jam’iyyat and several of the other Mujahideen groups, including Hizb-i Islami, met in Islamabad, Pakistan in early March 1993. The Islamabad accord was signed on 7 March and appointed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb-i Islami, Prime Minister. Another peace agreement was signed in the Afghan city of Jalalabad in May, further regulating the power-sharing in Kabul. Despite two peace agreements and several ceasefires, fighting continued between the government under Jam’iyyat control and the opposition, led by Hizb-i Islami.
During 1994 and 1995, the UN arranged several meetings with the warring parties, but failed to bring an end to the fierce fighting in Afghanistan. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) arranged peace talks in Teheran, Iran in 1995, but the talks did not result in any agreement.
In 1995, the Taleban movement forced Hizb-i Islami out of several of its previous strongholds, and as the Taleban closed in on Kabul in the spring of 1996, Hizb-i Islami finally sided with the government. In line with the Mahipur agreement, signed on 24 May, Hekmatyar was sworn in as Prime Minister on 26 June. When the Taleban movement captured Kabul in late September 1996, the situation on the ground changed drastically and the two main warring parties became the Taleban, as the new government side, and UIFSA (United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), a coalition of Mujahideen groups opposing the Taleban regime. Both Pakistan and the UN brokered peace talks between the parties during the fall of 1996, but no progress was reported from the efforts.
Until the Taleban government was overthrown in the fall of 2001, following the intervention of a US-led multinational coalition force, numerous attempts at peace talks were conducted with UN, Pakistani and US support. Between 1999 and 2001 the UN also imposed sanctions on the Taleban regime. When UIFSA, backed by US and UK military force, took control of Kabul, massive diplomatic efforts were initiated by the UN in order to create a stable government for Afghanistan. During UN-sponsored talks in Bonn, Germany on 5 December 2001, the major anti-Taleban factions and the former king Zahir Shan agreed to create an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai that would lead the country for six months, until a broad-based administration could take over and lead the country through the first phase of post-war reconstruction. The authority of the interim government was strengthened by a UK-led UN peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), equipped with the strongest possible mandate under the UN charter.
President Karzai has on several occasions invited the Taleban leaders for talks. The offers have been rejected by the Taleban, demanding that all foreign troops leave Afghanistan before negotiations can commence. There have been numerous allegations of talks and meetings taking place between the parties, but they have been usually been denied by the Taleban. Indirect and informal talks between the conflict parties during the first half of 2015 resulted in the first direct peace talks in early July that year. However, following the announcement of Taleban leader Mullah Omar’s death in late July, the negotiations stalled and a leadership dispute broke out within the Taleban movement.The other group active in the conflict, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, negotiated with the Afghan government during 2010. However, no agreement was reached and violence continued.
The peacekeeping force, ISAF, was under UN command until August 2003, when it came under NATO leadership. The primary role of ISAF was to assist the government of Afghanistan in maintaining security. In 2006, ISAF took over control of the international military operation in Afghanistan from the US forces. After the transfer of command in July 2006, ISAF is not recorded as a third party to the conflict. The countries contributing to ISAF are instead considered secondary warring parties to the conflict.
By the end of the 2014, the ISAF mission ended with foreign soldiers leaving Afghanistan. In October that year, an agreement was signed with the US and NATO to launch the non-combat mission Operation Resolute Support in 2015. Around 12 000 troops remained in the country as part of this mission, but given their new mandate the contributing countries were not considered secondary warring parties to the conflict. However, the bilateral agreement between the US and Afghanistan provided for the US to be considered secondary warring party to the Afghan government. In February 2020 the Taleban signed an agreement with USA, providing for a complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The last US troops left Afghanistan in 2021, as the Taleban took control of the capital, Kabul.
