This dyad belongs to the conflict Libya: Government

Summary of conflict Libya: Government

In 2011, Libya became engulfed in a conflict over governmental power following mass protests – which were part of the wider “Arab Spring” phenomenon - against its incumbent leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The protests in Libya quickly evolved to an armed uprising organized under the umbrella of the National Transitional Council (NTC), which operated from the eastern city Benghazi. After the much debated Resolution 1973 was passed by the United Nations Security Council, a no-fly zone was established over Libya on 17 March in order to protect Libya’s civilians from attacks by Gaddafi loyalists. Despite the bombing of Gaddafi’s forces – mainly by NATO aircraft – the NTC were initially unable to make any significant advances. However, NTC forces were eventually able to capture Tripoli in August, and this phase of the conflict was effectively put to an end after the killing of Gaddafi in October.

Following the election in June 2014, two governments claimed governmental power in Libya, one in the capital of Tripoli and one in the eastern town Tobruk; clashes between the government and its rivals in the Zintan Military Council and House of Representatives persisted in 2014 and 2015. After a year of inactivity in 2016, the conflict became active again in 2017. Mirroring the increasingly fragmented political situation in Libya, the Tripoli-based government led by Fayez al-Serraj fought several rival factions, including the House of Representatives, forces loyal to former Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghawil, and the clandestine - allegedly “pro-Gaddafi” - Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya (PFLL). In 2018, the conflict became inactive again due to low activity. The conflict came back with full force in 2019, which saw a sharp increase of battle-related deaths as the House of Representatives launched an operation to take control of the oil-rich southern Libya. After struggling to fend of the House of Representative’s assault, the Libyan government sent an official request for the Turkish intervention in December 2019. The trend continued throughout 2020 as Turkey and presence of Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries led the House of Representatives to look for international support. This support came from Russia in the form of sending Syrian mercenaries and having the Wagner group operate on the House of Representatives side. This internationalization led to a further increase in battle-related deaths. However, by the end of 2020, both battling parties managed to reach a secession of hostilities and broker a ceasefire agreement that resulted in the appointment of a new prime minister in early 2021.

The Libyan uprising and the formation of the National Transitional Council (NTC)

In early 2011, protests against the ruling regime in Tunisia quickly developed in to a series of mass protests across the Arab world; these events soon became known as the “Arab Spring”. The protests reached Libya - which had been ruled by the eccentric dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi since 1969 - in February. As in Egypt and Algeria, the protesters in Libya demanded better quality of life, more freedom, and a higher level of political participation. The protests gathered considerable media attention in the West, and speculations about the future were rife. Initially, many scholars pointed to the radically different set of preconditions in Libya as a factor that would prevent Libya from joining the Arab spring countries; these analyses were proven wrong when the Libyan population joined its neighbors in demonstrating against the regime. An important distinction to be made was that the demonstrations in Libya were not inspired by the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria, but rather caused by specific domestic politics and the Gaddafi regime’s way of repressing dissent, and demands for human rights and enhanced living conditions. What distinguished the case of Libya from its North African neighbors was the particularly brutal fashion in which Gaddafi responded to the popular uprisings. When a “day of revolt” was organized on 17 February, it became clear that Gaddafi would not tolerate any scenario that would diminish or infringe on his absolute power.

On the first day of the uprisings, Gaddafi released prisoners from jail and hired them as mercenaries to fight the protesters. Furthermore, he also employed a great number of predominantly western Africans as mercenaries to deal with the protesters. Just days after the instigation of the protests, Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam Muammar al Gaddafi appeared on state television warning that the situation might cause a civil war. He blamed the uprising on foreign interest, particularly Israel; he further accused Western media of providing a biased picture of the situation in Libya. The situation did not improve after al-Islam’s speech, and the attacks on civilian protesters continued and even intensified; a large migratory flow towards the borders began to materialize. The fact that Libya hosted a large population of migrant workers made the situation even more precarious. In just a matter of days, there were large refugee camps set up on the border to Egypt. Since Gaddafi had hired western Africans as mercenaries, the situation for migrant workers from that region was especially dangerous as the migrant workers trying to get to the borders were mistaken for mercenaries and consequently met with hostility or even violence by other Libyans. As the situation escalated, Gaddafi made an appearance in his bombed out home - a remnant from the 1986 bomb-campaign by the U.S – where he delivered an hour-long, seemingly incoherent televised in which he blamed various countries and organizations for the ongoing protests. For example, Gaddafi accused al-Qaeda of poisoning the drinking water, causing the youth to revolt, and he also blamed the United States along with a majority of the Western world for the situation. Gaddafi promised to die as a martyr and that he would rather fight to the last drop of blood than step down.

On 24 February, a nascent rebel movement – formed as the anti-Gaddafi protesters began to organize themselves - announced that it had complete control of the eastern city Tobruk, located not far from the Egyptian border. After the rebel side had established control of Tobruk, Gaddafi’s forces escalated the violence against the opposition. A few days later, on 26 February, the rebels announced the formation of the National Transitional Council (NTC) - an umbrella organization intended to organize the armed resistance against Gaddafi – in the eastern town Benghazi. Benghazi had been one of the first towns to experience anti-Gaddafi protests, which meant that it came to be regarded as the “cradle of the revolution”, giving it a significant symbolic value to the anti-Gaddafi rebels. NTC was made up of a mixture of freedom fighters (commonly called “thuwwar”), politicians that had defected from the Libyan government, religious leaders, and elements of the Libyan diasporas. Mustafa Abdul Jalil led the NTC; Jalil defected from his position as Secretary of Justice in the Libyan government on 21 February because of the use of force against civilians. Following the formal formation of an armed opposition, Gaddafi’s forces escalated its repression to include indiscriminate shelling of entire towns believed to be house rebel forces and/or sympathizers commenced, causing great civilian suffering.

Escalation of hostilities and NATO intervention

While fighting spread to many parts of Libya during the spring of 2011, some towns emerged as key battlegrounds that would determine the outcome of the conflict. For example, key battles were fought in Zawiyah just west of the capital Tripoli, and in Benghazi, the cradle of the uprising. While Gaddafi forces were able to capture Zawiyah on 10 March, the failure to drive the NTC from Benghazi at the end of the same month signaled a turning point for Gaddafi’s forces. However, one of the most decisive events of the 2011 uprising was the siege of Misrata, a town located on the Mediterranean coast east of Tripoli. The fighting in Misrata was drawn out and characterized by the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons in civilian populated areas; it was suggested that Misrata may have in fact seen more fatalities than any other town during the entire 2011 uprising. It was not until 15 May that NTC forces were able to break the encirclement of Misrata. The NTC victory at Misrata subsequently allowed the rebel forces to roll back Gaddafi’s forces along the so-called “Misrata frontline”, capturing towns such as Khoms, Zliten, and Tawergha.

The international community did not stand idly by as Gaddafi was embarking on what was described as warfare against his own people. The issue was brought before the Security Council, which on 17 March voted in favor of imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, restricting Gaddafi from using his air force against the Libyan population. The passing of the no-fly zone was preceded by economic sanctions. These sanctions did however not affect the situation on the ground and the issue of intervening more forcefully to protect the civilian population of Libya was again put before the Security Council. The vote was not uncontroversial, and five countries chose to abstain; Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation. However, resolution 1973 passed and the responsibility of enforcing the no-fly zone was distributed among the member states of the UN with NATO as the commanding organization. The 19 participating states were Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States. The no-fly zone did indeed ease the suffering of the civilian population of Libya. The primary goal of the no-fly zone was to disable the Libyan air force, but the coalition airstrikes did in fact target a wide array of military installments, from tanks to military compounds, which crippled the forces of the Libyan government. However, Gaddafi continued to targets civilians and there were reports of cluster bombs being used in the shelling of villages and towns.

After five days, on 24 March, NATO officially took over the leadership of the enforcement of the no-fly zone. The NATO led forces carried out daily bombings of military installments. As the suffering of the Libyan civilian population increased, the mission to enforce the no-fly zone over Libyan air space was gradually broadened, not officially but the actions and missions undertaken by NATO forces alluded to a significantly wider area of operations. Intense bombings of central Tripoli sought to kill Gaddafi, and France admitted to air-lifting weapons and other supplies to the rebel forces of NTC. These actions were in no way sanctioned by Resolution 1973; they were however carried out within the realms of that mandate. The quick response to the Libyan crisis and the civilian suffering it caused was controversial and among its strongest critics were Russia and China. The fact that the mission soon seemed to focus on finding and eliminating Gaddafi was seen as a major breach of mandate by many actors. The international involvement was a boost for the rebels, as they were no longer exposed to attacks by the Libyan air force.

It should be noted that the NATO-led international intervention in Libya was not considered by the UCDP as secondary warring support to NTC. Resolution 1973 – which delineated the purpose of the intervention – did not explicitly state that the international forces should support the NTC in fighting Gaddafi’s forces, but rather ensure the protection of civilians and achieve a ceasefire at the earliest possible convenience. While the bombings in effect contributed to the battlefield success of the NTC, the formulation of Resolution 1973 made it impossible for the UCDP to consider them secondary warring support. Consequently, events including confirmed fatalities from international bombing were not included in the UCDP data.

Through the summer of 2011, fortunes on the battlefield varied and the rebels traded territory and towns with the regime in a see sawing fashion that produced considerable casualties. The rag tag army of NTC engaged the regime forces. Furthermore, the presence of land mines - some of them remnants from the Second World War - was a factor that slowed the rebel advances. There were reports of huge civilian suffering as towns were pounded by grenades and rockets, a tactic used by both parties to capture or recapture important locations. The pattern was often repeated as either rebel - or government troops - were desperately trying to capture important towns, predominantly along the Mediterranean coast. The battles – such as the aforementioned siege of Misrata - were often accompanied by bombardment by NATO forces, and the fighting created a mass exodus of Libyans trying to escape the fighting. The rebel side suffered infighting as the conflict lingered on. On July 28, the rebel general and former Interior minister in the Gaddafi government, Abd al-Fatah Yunnis was mysteriously killed. The murder made visible a possible rift in the rebel ranks. No motive was established, neither was anyone arrested for the act. However, rumors were rife; some sources mention that Yunnis had information that Algeria was supplying Gaddafi with weapons, other claim that the general was in fact a double agent sabotaging the rebel cause. Regardless of the motive the fact that there were internal problems within NTC fueled suspicion of a potential fifth column operating within the rebel ranks.

The fall of Tripoli and Gaddafi’s demise

With the support of NATO, the Libyan rebels eventually to gained the upper hand, during late August reaching the capital Tripoli. Again, it should be noted that the international bombings were not considered as secondary warring support to the NTC, and that no confirmed fatalities from the bombings were included in the UCDP data. The battle for Tripoli was characterized by fierce street battles, as the NTC slowly made their way into the capital. Particularly fierce fighting took place around Gaddafi’s headquarters in the Bab-al Aziyah district, and around the infamous Abu Salim prison. During the final stages of the battle, there were reports of gross human rights violations being perpetrated by both sides. For example, eye-witnesses quoted in NGO reports testify to shallow graves containing Gaddafi loyalists executed as NTC forces gained control of the areas. Witnesses also described entire hospital wards full of patients killed in their sick beds, supposedly by Gaddafi forces as they retreated. These horrific scenes were widely reported, and investigations were launched to deal with the potential war crimes that took place during the last week of August. On 26 August, the NTC proclaimed victory in Tripoli and announced that they would move their base from Benghazi to Tripoli; in doing so, the rebels became the de facto Government of Libya. The loss of Tripoli was a decisive blow to Gaddafi, who nevertheless remained defiant releasing audio recordings encouraging his supporters to keep fighting the rebel forces.

As Tripoli fell, rebel forces failed to apprehend Gaddafi, who managed to escape the capital. As such, the conflict continued, albeit under a new dynamic. In accordance with UCDP coding principles, the NTC came to function as the Government of Libya after 26 August, while the forces loyal to the Gaddafi regime were labeled as the Forces of Muammar Gaddafi. The fact that Gaddafi managed to escape led to further bloodshed, as the ousted dictator continued his violent rhetoric urging Libyans to stand up and fight the aggressors. Consequently, the fighting raged on, particularly in and around towns that were known as “Gaddafi strongholds”, such as Bani Walid and Sirte. As the former rebels, now in governmental power, purged Libya of pockets of resistance they gained control over a majority of the cities along the Mediterranean coast and the major desert cities. The most defiant town was however Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown and stronghold of his native Qadhadhfa tribe. Sirte had historically been privileged by Gaddafi, and did thus not hail the NTC as saviors. On 20 October, a decisive step towards victory over Gaddafi was taken as Sirte eventually fell to the NTC forces. Furthermore, Gaddafi himself – whose whereabouts following his escape from Tripoli had been heated topic of debate – was found hiding among his loyalists in the city. When Gaddafi and his entourage attempted to escape Sirte, he was captured and later shot. While video clips documenting the former dictators’ final moments soon surfaced, the exact circumstances of his death were unclear; the video evidence suggested that he may have been beaten or tortured before being shot. Gaddafi’s son Motassim – who had been travelling with the entourage - was also killed under unclear circumstances. Gaddafi’s eldest son and designated heir, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, was eventually captured on 19 November Following the death of Gaddafi, the NTC-led Government of Libya officially declared Libya liberated on 23 October.

The aftermath of the killing of Gaddafi was complex; the UN demanded an independent investigation since there was evidence suggesting he was shot in captivity. The killing of Gaddafi who had ruled Libya for the past 42 years brought to an end an era of despotic and at times erratic leadership. Gaddafi who had made a name for himself as an unpredictable statesman had made several enemies throughout his years as Libya’s leader. Apart from almost comical episodes from the Gaddafi era, the decree that each Libyan had to own a hen, or the attempt at creating a new calendar, he did also alienate Libya from the rest of the world through state-sponsored terrorism and a blatant disrespect for human rights. His antics might have been a factor that did speed up the international involvement in Libya, the killing of him was, regardless of his past record of crimes, condemned by the international community. The general sentiment was that Gaddafi should have been put before a judiciary process.

As this phase of the conflict in Libya came to an end the conduct of the rebel forces also came into focus, as there had been rumors of potential war crimes being perpetrated by both sides as the battle for Tripoli raged; similarly, evidence suggesting mass executions of Gaddafi loyalists during the final battle for Sirte emerged. These allegations were troubling for those international actors that had unconditionally supported the anti-Gaddafi forces. Furthermore, forces that had fought for the NTC also engaged in revenge attacks against civilian communities accused of collaborating with Gaddafi. The most prominent example was the forced displacement of the entire civilian population of Tawargha, a town situated about 40 kilometers from Misrata. The population of Tawargha was accused by the anti-Gaddafi fighters of having supported the Gaddafi troops’ siege of Misrata during the spring, and thus of actively contributing to the suffering of the town’s population. In a similar move, NTC-affiliated militias from the town Zintan displaced the entire populations – most members of the Mashashia tribe, which had sided with Gaddafi – of the villages ‘Awnya, Zawiyat al-Bagul, and Omer in June and July.

Post-conflict Libya: Failed transition and factionalism

In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, the new NTC-led Government of Libya failed to restore order in Libya because of the almost complete collapse of the country’s national security forces. Another pressing issue facing the government was the large number of revolutionary fighters (commonly referred to as “thuwwar”) that had fought for the NTC during the uprising, but now refused to disarm. In a bid to stabilize the fragile security situation and appease the often heavily armed thuwwars and militias, the Libyan government put many of these groups on an official government payroll as part of either the “Libya Shield Force” (LSF), or the “Supreme Security Committees” (SSC). The LSF, formally subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, was created to curb the proliferation of independent tribal and local armed groups. The LSF was comprised of 12 divisions (or “Shields”, such as the Central Shield and Libya Shield One) each responsible for a defined geographic region; the separate Shields were organized from existing revolutionary (anti-Gaddafi) brigades created during the 2011 uprising. A significant proportion of the LSF forces was drawn from the town Misrata, which had taken a prominent role during the fighting against Gaddafi. The SSC, formally subordinated to the Ministry of Interior, served as a makeshift gendarmerie force tasked with providing security at the local level; it was comprised of 60 000 to 100 000 former rebel fighters. Together, the LSF and SSC were intended to serve as de facto armed forces and paramilitary security forces. Nevertheless, the thuwwar militias – even the ones that had joined LSF – remained largely outside of government control. In many parts of the country, the thuwwar militias instead established themselves as autonomous local or regional powerbrokers. The lack of socioeconomic and political progress in the aftermath of the uprising also contributed to a growing dissatisfaction, both among the general population, and among the thuwwar militias. The move not to disarm the revolutionary militias would also contribute to a militarization of Libyan politics, as support from armed militias became a pivotal foundation for political influence.

On 8 August 2012, the NTC transitional government formally ceded power to the new “General National Congress” (GNC) legislative assembly, which had been formed following parliamentary elections on 7 July. Following the 2012 elections, it became increasingly evident that Libya was ideologically divided, with the main fault line – in simplified terms - being drawn between two camps: an emergent Islamist and “pro-revolutionary” movement (which was supported by a majority of the thuwwar), and the “anti-Islamists”, which included secular liberals, nationalists, local militias, and some defectors from the Gaddafi regime. Within the GNC itself, the Islamist bloc included factions such as the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and the al-Wafa bloc, while largest “anti-Islamist” factions was Mahmud Jibril’s National Forces Alliance (NFA). Outside the GNC, the ideological divide was extended into a wider context where the divide was between the pro-revolutionary and Islamist thuwwars – who wanted a complete removal of all remnants of the Gaddafi era – and those factions that had previously been favored by or supported Gaddafi, and thus aligned itself with the anti-Islamist bloc. While the two camps were far from coherent movements, they still provided a salient political division of Libya that actively exacerbated existing tribal and factional tensions. For example, many thuwwar groups from towns, regions, and tribes disfavored by Gaddafi sided with the Islamist factions, as the latter sought to completely reform Libya’s old discriminatory political system. One particularly important thuwwar stronghold was Misrata, which fielded some of the largest and most well armed militias at the time.

One of the most contentious political issues during this period was the process that led to the implementation of the so-called “Political Isolation Law” (PIL). This law banned anyone who had been affiliated with the Gaddafi regime from holding public office. The GNC implemented PIL under pressure from Islamist factions, hardline Misratans, and several other thuwwar groups. This effectively excluded several prominent political officials, of which many were associated with non-Islamist factions. The implementation of this law also demonstrated the political leverage held by the thuwwar militias, as hundreds of Islamist and pro-revolutionary armed fighters “besieged” central Tripoli for weeks in order to force the GNC to adopt the PIL. The new law significantly limited the influence of several important political and military figures associated with non-Islamist political factions, including NFA leader Mahmud Jibril, ex-NTC interim Prime Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil, GNC president Mohammed Magariaf, and Khalifa Haftar, a former high-ranking Gaddafi-era military commander turned militia leader.

A prominent example of a rivalry – which would later have a profound effect on the development of the conflict over government in Libya – outside the GNC itself that developed during this period was between militias from the towns Misrata and Zintan. While both towns had supported the NTC during the uprising, its militias soon became rivals as they competed for influence in Tripoli. The rivalry also gained a national political dimension, as the Misratans supported the Islamist/pro-revolutionary bloc, while the Zintanis supported Jibril’s NFA. While the rivalry was initially mostly that of a “turf war”, it soon gained a political and ideological dimension, since the Zintanis viewed the PIL’s implementation process in 2013 as a direct attempt by Misrata to expand its influence in Tripoli. A more detailed description of the Misrata-Zintan dynamic can be found here.

It should be noted that while the government conflict in Libya was inactive 2012, the political instability and the almost complete security vacuum it caused directly contributed to the eruption of communal violence in various parts of the country, including Sebha, Kufrah, and the Nafusa mountains. Furthermore, forces loyal to the Government of Libya clashed with local armed groups in several towns during this time period. However, the poor quality of the reporting of these events combined with a lack of fulfillment of UCDP’s criteria for organized violence meant that many of these events were not included in the UCDP data. This included fighting and attacks against government-affiliated forces in Bani Walid, Tripoli, and Sebha.

The Emergence of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL)

Amid the political turmoil and increasing factionalism that characterized post-2011 Libya, there was also a proliferation of overtly hardline Islamist and jihadist groups, particularly in the eastern parts of the country, including Benghazi and Derna. By far the most well-known group to emerge was Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), which had evolved from various thuwwar groups formed during the 2011 uprising. ASL’s overarching goal was to establish an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law in Libya, and it had pronounced militant and jihadist tendencies; the group maintained a particularly strong presence in Benghazi. However, ASL initially attempted to bolster its popular support by providing various charity (dawa) services. ASL became internationally known after it was implicated in the 11-12 September 2012 attack against the United States’ consulate in Benghazi, in which unidentified militants killed several Americans, including ambassador Christopher Stevens. While ASL formally denied any involvement, American authorities branded the group as one of the primary instigators behind the attack. Also against ASL’s denial, the Americans and others accused the group of colluding with prominent jihadist organizations like al-Qaida and AQIM. The attack against the consulate nevertheless led to a disastrous loss of public support for ASL, which was forced to evacuate Benghazi and Derna following popular protests against it and other militias in late 2012.

In 2013, ASL reestablished itself in both Benghazi and Derna; it also expanded to Sirte, by absorbing into its ranks Katibat al-Farouq – a Sirte-based militant Islamist group originally from Misrata – in June that year. The group also established itself in Ajdabiya, a town located southwest of Benghazi. By mid-2013, the group had also undergone an ideological radicalization, and shifted its focus towards more overtly militant activities. ASL increasingly paraded its armed vehicles through the streets of the towns where it was present, displaying its flag and symbols overtly. During the summer of 2013, ASL began to clash with the Zawiyah Martys Brigade – a militia affiliated with the Libyan government – in Sirte. The hostilities in Sirte escalated following the killing of a prominent ASL commander by government-affiliated fighters in August. In a parallel development, there was a rapid deterioration of the security situation in Benghazi and Derna, which saw a wave of targeted killings of government officials and members of the security forces by unknown militants. While ASL was among the groups implicated in the killings, the lack of information made it impossible to attribute these attacks to a specific actor.

A marked change in Benghazi’s conflict dynamics occurred in late November 2013, as a patrol from the Libyan Army’s Saiqa (“Thunderbolt”) Special Forces Brigade was attacked by ASL fighters not far from the latter’s headquarters in the town. The attack triggered intense firefights between government forces and ASL that quickly spread to other parts of Benghazi, leading to nine deaths. In the following days, both parties sent reinforcements to Benghazi, leading to new deadly clashes and targeted assassinations of security personnel. As in 2012, the fighting triggered popular protests demanding the departure of all militias – including ASL - from Benghazi; on at least one occasion, unknown assailants attacked the protesters, but without causing any fatalities. Over a period of approximately two weeks, ASL clashes repeatedly with security forces in several of Benghazi’s neighborhoods. While ASL did not pose a direct threat against the Libyan government’s hold on power in Tripoli, its activities contributed to a marked deterioration of the security situation in eastern Libya. As security forces were unable to contain ASL, the group established de facto control over parts of Benghazi. By the spring of 2014, ASL had also established itself as the dominant group in Sirte by driving out militias affiliated with the government. As such, the group laid bare the inability of the Libyan security forces to maintain order even in major towns like Benghazi and Sirte, which further undermined the Libyan government’s already tenuous position.

It should be noted that the UCDP most likely underestimated the number of fatalities in the clashes between Libyan security forces and ASL, particularly in Benghazi. The clandestine nature of ASL’s activities – combined with its unwillingness to publicly claim attacks – meant that it was impossible to confirm the group’s involvement in a majority of the lethal events in Benghazi in 2013. The presence of several other militant groups further complicated the assessment of the violence in Benghazi and Derna.

The second phase of the conflict: Competing governments and political fragmentation

While the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi was commonly known as the “First Libyan Civil War”, the events that began to unfold in late 2013 and early 2014 would later become publicly known as the “Second Libyan Civil War”. The political situation in Libya deteriorated further in late 2013 and early 2014, as the Islamist-dominated GNC voted to extend its own term limit without holding parliamentary elections. As a result, Khalifa Haftar – the former Gaddafi-era general who had participated in the 2011 uprising – began agitating against Libya’s Islamists in February 2014, and even demanded the resignation of the government and dissolution of the GNC. On 17 May, Haftar’s LNA militia launched an attack (dubbed Operation Karama/Dignity) against various Islamist groups in the town Benghazi. Inspired by Haftar’s anti-Islamist campaign, militias affiliated with the Zintan Military Council – the al-Qa’qa and Sawa’iq brigades – stormed the Libyan parliament building in Tripoli on 18 May and demanded the dissolution of the GNC. After this, the GNC-led Government of Libya agreed to revoke the extension of its term limit, and to convey parliamentary elections on 25 June. The elections – which replaced the GNC with a new “House of Representatives” – had a very low voter turnout, and resulted in the Islamist parties losing most of their seats in the legislative assembly to various non-Islamist factions, particularly the secular-leaning and nationalist ones. Libya’s Islamist parties – such as JCP and the al-Wafa bloc – actively attempted to discredit the elections; the JCP in particular was motivated by a desire to avoid a reversal of the PIL by the new parliament. There was also a concern within the Islamist bloc that the thuwwar militas would be left without state funding, and that they would be forced to demobilize. This also meant a relative loss of power for the Misratans, who were aligned with the Islamists. As a result, tensions between the Zintanis and Misratans in Tripoli increased further.

In July 2014, tensions in Tripoli exploded into open armed conflict between rival militias from Zintan and the Libya Dawn coalition, a pro-Islamist group dominated by Misratan fighters. It should be noted that while this was classified by the UCDP as a non-state conflict – none of the actors was at the time affiliated with the Libyan government – it still served as a direct precursor to the state-based violence that erupted later in the summer. Because of these clashes, the newly elected House of Representatives was unable to convene and appoint a new government; most of its deputies were also forced to evacuate Tripoli, and relocate to the eastern Libyan town Tobruk. Because of the violence during the summer, UN staff withdrew from the country. The US embassy, as well as several other embassies, closed and the staff evacuated in July. By 23 August, the Zintani forces had been forced to leave its positions in Tripoli, and the victorious Libya Dawn then facilitated the return of the defunct GNC to government power on 24 August. Islamists elements from this “New GNC” proceeded to create a “National salvation Government” (NSG); Libya Dawn was transformed into a de facto armed force of the new, NSG-led Government of Libya. It should also be noted that the fighting in Tripoli was linked to Khalifa Haftar’s ongoing offensive in Benghazi. Haftar’s LNA militia and the Zintani forces fighting in western Libya were allies fighting towards the same goal: dislodging Libya’s Islamist factions from power. Consequently, both Haftar and the Zintanis claimed to support the House of Representatives; however, the exiled legislative assembly did not at the time endorse any armed factions, and stressed the need for a peaceful, political solution to the conflicts that were erupting across Libya.

After a temporary lull in the fighting in and around Tripoli, clashes between government forces – comprised of Libya Dawn fighters – attacked tribal fighters allied to the Zintan Military Council in the Wershafana area on 7 September (see Government of Libya – Zintan Military Council). The government forces moved quickly through Wershafana, using heavy weapons to drive back the Zintan-allied fighters from the Wershafana tribe. The clashes in and around Tripoli soon resulted in enough fatalities for the Libyan government conflict became active again. By late September, the Government of Libya had reestablished control over most of Wershafana, and the fighting instead spread to the Nafusa mountains south and southwest of Tripoli. Most of the fighting was concentrated around the town Gharyān, as the Zintan Military Council forces alongside their allied tribal militias battled government forces for access to strategically important roads. In early October, government-affiliated Libya Dawn forces launched a large offensive against the strategically important town Kiklah. Despite receiving considerable reinforcements, the government forces were unable to break the defenses around Kiklah; the Zintani forces had occupied high ground in the town, and was able to stop the Dawn forces with the help of heavy artillery attacks.

A pivotal crossroads in the Libyan government conflict came on 15 October, when the ousted House of Representatives endorsed Haftar’s LNA militia and its Zintani allies. From this date, the LNA and the Zintanis thus became the de facto armed forces of the House of Representatives, which almost immediately became involved in fighting the government forces. This proved decisive for the battle of Kiklah, as Haftar now directed warplanes based in eastern Libya to attack government-affiliated militias in and around the town. By late November, Kiklah was completely in the hands of forces loyal to the House of Representatives. Parallel to this, House of Representatives-loyal militias advanced in areas close to the Libya-Tunisia border. In late 2014 and early 2015, fighting shifted towards the Gulf of Sirte coast as government forces launched an unsuccessful operation to capture the important oil infrastructure, such as the complexes around Sidra and Ras Lanuf. At the time, the “Petroleum Facilities Guard” (PFG), a pro-House of Representatives militia led by local warlord Ibrahim Jadhran, controlled many oil installations. The fighting also affected Libya’s civilian population and UNHCR estimated that around 400 000 people were internally displaced by the fighting and other violence in various areas of the country. During the latter half of 2015, the fighting between the Government of Libya and the House of Representatives decreased considerably. The decreasing violence could in part be explained by the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Libya, as both the Libyan government and House of Representatives had to divert its military resources to fight this new threat (for more info on this, see Libya: Islamic State and Forces of the House of Representatives – IS).

On 17 December 2015, the NSG-led Government of Libya and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco. The LPA contained a series of power-sharing arrangements, which included that the GNS should be disbanded and replaced with a new executive body, the “Presidency Council”, and a “Government of National Accord” (GNA). The House of Representatives would also be recognized as Libya’s legitimate legislative assembly, provided that it ratified the GNA. Despite resistance from hardline factions within both the government and the House of Representatives, the agreement was ratified and the new GNA created. The LPA was signed following considerable international pressure, as particularly Western countries were deeply invested in reconciling Tripoli and Tobruk, so that more effort could be directed towards curbing the growth of IS in Libya. The relatively weak support for the LPA within the signatories themselves was displayed when the House of Representatives failed to ratify the list of ministers for the GNA suggested by the Presidency Council, as many of its members were opposed to the LPA. The House of Representatives instead opted to maintain its own rival government, and was thus never integrated into the Government of Libya. Given their investment in producing the agreement, the Western countries and the UN chose to recognize the new Presidency Council and the GNA as the legitimate Government of Libya.

The new GNA, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj (who also served as the chair of the Presidency Council), officially assumed office in December 2015. However, the GNA did not arrive in Tripoli until 30 March 2016. NSG Prime Minister al-Ghawil, who did not support the LPA as it would effectively force him from power, initially contested the legitimacy of the GNA. Nevertheless, al-Ghawil stepped down on 5 April 2016 and recognized the authority of the Presidency Council. While the LPA failed to fulfil the criteria of a formal peace agreement, it was nevertheless followed by a marked decrease of violence in Libya’s conflict over government, which was not active in 2016. The lack of activity in this conflict could however be explained by the fact that its primary parties were engaged in other conflicts. For example, the Government of Libya was continuously engaged in fierce fighting against IS, while the House of Representatives fought both IS and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. Much like the preceding governments, the GNA was unable to assert much real influence outside Tripoli and its immediate environs; various non-state actors controlled most of both eastern and southern Libya.

Increased Volatility and Resumption of Hostilities

In 2017, the political situation in Libya grew increasingly volatile as several groups violently contested the Government of National Accord’s (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj, hold on power. Following a year of inactivity in 2016, the House of Representatives again clashed with government forces. One of the most serious incidents was the attack on Brak El-Shati airbase in central Libya, when a combined force of Misratan militias loyal to the Libyan government and forces from SDB attacked the LNA, the largest militia loyal to the House of Representatives. More than 100 LNA fighters and civilians were killed, many under execution-like circumstances. While the Government of Libya denied ordering the attack, it had direct control over the Misratan “Third Force” unit that took part in the attack; SDB was an independent actor – vehemently opposed to House of Representatives’ top military commander Khalifa Haftar – temporarily allied to the Government of Libya at the time of the attack.

In general, the relationship between the Government of Libya and the rival, Tobruk-based, House of Representatives deteriorated during the year. While representatives from both sides met to discuss the possibility of new negotiations, no significant advances were made. The leader of the powerful LNA militia, “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar, also made moves to increase his military influence in western Libya. While the House of Representatives did not launch any large-scale attacks against government positions, rumors circulated that Haftar was taking advantage of local militia conflicts – such as in Sabratha - in order to expand his influence in areas perceived to be under government control. In a related development, Haftar in December 2017 officially rejected the Libyan Political Agreement signed in December 2015, and which had led to the establishment of the ruling Government of National Accord (GNA). However, it remained uncertain what effect Haftar’s move would have on the possibility of a definitive negotiated settlement of the conflict; Haftar was the military commander of the LNA, and it was uncertain whether he could exert total political control over the House of Representatives itself as well.

Aside from renewed fighting against the House of Representatives, the Government of Libya also clashes with two new groups claiming government power in 2017. Already in late 2016, forces loyal to a former Prime Minister of Libya, Khalifa al-Ghawil, attempted to seize power in Tripoli; al-Ghawil had denounced the GNA, and declared a new government after seizing several key buildings in the capital. However, despite several attempts, the forces of al-Ghawil were not able to take full control over Tripoli; the most intense fighting took place in late May. Al-Ghawil’s challenge against the Government of Libya highlighted the fluid loyalties of the militias supporting the various political factions vying for power in Libya. Throughout 2017, several powerful militias changed their allegiances between the government and al-Ghawil; one prominent example was the “Kaniyat” brigade, which abandoned al-Ghawil in October to fight for the government. The fighting between the government and al-Ghawil’s forces also displayed the vital role played by semi-independent militias in Libya’s power politics. In many ways, the ability to successfully compete for government power was linked to whatever support could be extracted from these militias. In the aftermath of the clashes against al-Ghawil’s forces, Prime Minister Serraj’s government grew increasingly dependent on a coalition of armed militias to maintain order in Tripoli. One of government’s most important de facto armed forces was Abdel-Raouf Kara’s Special Deterrence Force (SDF, also known by its Arabic acronym RADA) militia, which was used to fill many different security and fighting functions in and around the capital. Aside from SDF, powerful groups like the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB), the Ghaniwa Brigade, and the Nawasi Brigade – all of them nominally aligned with the GNA – took almost complete control over Tripoli from May 2017.

Starting in 2017, the Government of Libya was also challenged by a clandestine group calling itself the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya (PFLL). While little definitive facts were known about PFLL, it was largely described as “Gaddafi-loyalist”. PFLL was believed to have some links to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, who had been released from prison in June 2017; it was unclear whether the group was just loyal to, or led by al-Islam himself. Pro-government forces, supported by Zintan militias, clashed with the PFLL in the Wershafana area southwest of Tripoli in late 2017, and the PFLL appeared to have been at least temporarily routed. According to sources within the government-affiliated Zintan Military Council – which had abandoned its alliance with Haftar and largely reconciled with the Libyan government earlier in 2017 - many of the PFLL fighters were mercenaries recruited from Sudanese armed groups, such as JEM. Again, the emergence of PFLL underscored the increasingly fragmented politico-military situation in Libya, influenced by fluid militia alliances. Furthermore, the presence of Sudanese mercenaries highlighted the role of regional dynamics and porous borders in shaping the conflict in Libya.