This dyad belongs to the conflict Mali: Islamic State
Summary of conflict Mali: Islamic State
After Islamic State's (IS) then-leader al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a caliphate in 2014, and announced the group’s intentions to expand its territory across the globe, numerous already existing organizations pledged allegiance to the core IS leadership and new IS groups sprung up word-wide. This spawned a range of new conflicts, one of which was the one between the so-called Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Malian state. The Greater Sahara section of IS was created already in 2015, but not accepted into IS until late 2016. Based in the “tri-state border area” (Mali, Burkina, Niger) known as Liptako-Gourma, the group was initially relatively small, but built up its strength over the following years. In March 2022, the Greater Sahara section of ISWAP was declared its own province, thus becoming IS – Sahel province (ISSP).
In 2025, the conflict between the Malian government and the ISSP intensified yet again, mainly due to the heavy death toll from one large-scale attack. In June, the group carried out a coordinated assaults on the military camp in Tessit, in Gao region’s Ansongo cercle. The group used vehicle-borne explosives (VBIEDs) to breach the camp’s defenses and then launched a ground assault from multiple directions, overrunning the base and killing more than 40 soldiers. This exposed persistent weaknesses in Mali’s control over the tri-border region and further shone a light on the difficulties associated with containing an armed group of a transnational character, such as IS.
Background to the conflict
Mali is a country hit hard by armed conflict. An uprising among parts of the Tuareg population in northern Mali was launched in 1990 and continued intermittently through the 1990s, tapering off in the 2000s. With the fall of Gadaffi in Libya, a new phased of the conflict erupted as many militarily trained Tuaregs returned to Mali and created MNLA. As the group launched its lightning offensive in 2012, they were joined by Ansar Dine, another group based among the Tuareg population, but which had a different agenda; instead of striving for the creation of a separate state, the group was Islamist and aimed to apply sharia law in Mali as a whole. With that, the group joined AQIM in a conflict over government power. The Islamist groups fighting the government in this conflict proliferated, as both MUJAO and Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Signed-in-Blood Battalion left AQIM, but continued to fight the Malian state. In August 2013, MUJAO and Signed-in-Blood Battalion merged to create al-Murabitun. It was here that one leg of the process towards the conflict between the Malian government and Greater Sahara section of the Islamic State commenced.
In Iraq, a little less than a year later, the Islamic State (IS) – a Salafi jihadist militant group – announced that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, it demanded the allegiance of all devout Muslims worldwide, and declared that it would continue to seize land to expand its territory across the globe. When the caliphate was proclaimed, IS stated: "The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.”
This declaration set off several chains of events world-wide, with already established groups pledging allegiance to IS-leader al-Baghdadi, and new IS organizations springing up around the globe. In the Sahel, in June 2015, al-Murabitun fell apart when its senior spokesman and self-proclaimed emir Adnan Abu Waleed al-Sarhawi pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. While stating that the pledge was on behalf of al-Murabitun in its entirety, Belmokhtar quickly announced that he and Signed-in-Blood Battalion remained a staunch ally of al-Qaida.
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara becomes part of Islamic State proper
While al-Sarhawi began calling his group the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) soon after the pledge, the core IS leadership failed to acknowledge it for more than a year. It was not until 30 October 2016, when ISGS had conducted a series of cross-border attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger, and IS core was under pressure in Syria and Iraq, that the group officially recognized the pledge via its Amaq news agency, hailing the integration of al-Sahrawi’s faction of al-Murabitun into the “Islamic Caliphate.” With that, what had previously been ISGS became integrated into IS.
Two and a half years later, in March 2019, an organizational restructuring incorporated ISGS into IS West Africa Province (ISWAP), with the former serving as the latter’s Greater Sahara faction. This modification probably indicated an increase in communication between what was previously two distinct groupings within the IS umbrella, and analysts have argued that what was earlier ISGS has received increasing technical support from ISWAP. However, there were few signs of close cooperation between the two, and their areas of operation remained far apart, with ISWAP proper focusing its actions on north-eastern Nigeria, south-eastern Niger, northern Cameroon and The Lake Chad area of Chad. The Greater Sahara section of ISWAP, in turn, was based in the “tri-state border area” (Mali, Burkina, Niger) known as Liptako-Gourma, and as such had a presence in all these countries.
In March 2022, the Greater Sahara section of ISWAP was declared its own province, thus becoming IS – Sahel province.
The conflict erupts
When ISGS was integrated into IS proper in 2016, the group’s fighters began focusing on Mali and the conflict between the Malian government and IS commenced, with the latter focusing on integrating Mali into its Islamic State. Based in the “tri-state border area”, the group’s main geographical focus in was the Menaka and Gao regions. During 2017, fighting escalated and the conflict was registered as active for the first time in UCDP data, as it resulted in more than 25 battle-related deaths. In parallel to operations in Mali, the group from the outset also launched attacks in Niger and the following year also in Burkina Faso, with both countries becoming embroiled in their own conflicts against the organization.
Escalating levels of violence
While starting out as a relatively insignificant group militarily, the Greater Saharan faction of IS built up its strength over the following years, eventually turning into a substantial threat. In 2019, it began to carry out a number of large-scale operations against the Malian army, the most devastating one being the attack on the military post in Indelimane in November, killing some 49 soldiers. Much of the fighting in the conflict was carried out by the French Barkhane force – allied to the Malian government – at times in conjunction with pro-government militia groups GATIA and MSA. The islamists and the two latter organizations also fought each other in escalating non-state conflicts, closely tied to, and feeding into ethnic tensions between Daoussak Tuaregs and Fulanis in Mali’s Menaka region, but also across the border in Niger.
Having escalated for two consecutive years, activity in the conflict decreased in 2020. Early in the year, France identified ISGS as the key target in the intensified counter-insurgency operations that they launched. As the group was unable to withstand this type of military force, it opted to keep a lower profile in areas where these operations took place, not carrying out as many attacks. Furthermore, it began to move into territory previously mainly associated with the al-Qaida-loyal alliance JNIM. A scuffling for control began and evolved into intermittent heavy fighting during the rest of the year. The conflict between ISGS and JNIM meant that the former’s attention was divided and also thus served to decrease activity in the group’s conflict with the state.
This relative lull was broken in 2021, as the group stepped up attacks once again. Escalating markedly in terms of battle-related deaths, the conflict in 2021 was marked by a mix of large-scale IS attacks and government successes. IS launched its most fatal attack in March, when some hundred fighters aboard pick-ups and motorcycles struck Malian troops between Tassit and Lellehoye, in the eastern Gao region, killing 33 soldiers. As for the opposing side, its main success during the year was arguably France’ killing of Abu Walid Al-Saharaoui, the head of the ISGS, in August.
The escalation continued in 2022, when the number of fatalities increased even more steeply; at 300, the number of battle-related deaths was the highest since the conflict started. A major reason behind the escalation was a surge in IS activity, first in Menaka region and then also in Gao’s Ansongo cercel. This surge was the direct result of the withdrawal of the French Barkhane force from Mali. Following the deterioration of relations between Mali and France after the 2021 coups, president Macron had announced that the French military presence would be phased out. The French withdrawal started in February 2022 and was finalized by mid-August. As the Malian army has a very limited presence in Menaka region, the French withdrawal meant that a window of opportunity opened up for IS and the month of March saw the resurgence of IS activities in the eastern-most part of Menaka region. What began as one-sided attacks on Daoussak Tuareg villages in the area, soon also spawned fighting with the GATIA and MSA militias, who continued to function as proxy forces for the government. As the year progressed, fighting between the army and IS also escalated, and a string of bloody battles were fought. One particularly devastating attack was carried out by IS on the Malian army in the town of Tessit in early August; the complex and coordinated assault involved the use of drones and explosives, car bombs and artillery, and caused 42 fatalities among the armed forces. IS’ area of operation continued to expand as the year drew to a close, and it’s threat was so great that GATIA and MSA even opted to work together with JNIM at times to withstand its operations. It is noteworthy that these three non-state groups, and not the Malian army and its Russian Wagner partner, remained the main players in opposing the threat of IS Sahel Province throughout the year.
Regional initiative and a de-escalation of the conflict
While fighting de-escalated in 2023 compared to the year prior, at over 180 battle-related deaths, the level of violence nevertheless remained on a high level compared to other years in the period. IS continued to enhance its presence in particularly the Menaka region during the first months of the year, and by May the group controlled the entire area, apart from Menaka town, which came under siege. As in previous years, the Malian armed forces and their Wagner allies had a limited presence in the areas affected by IS, but in September, the junta created a defense alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger – the “Alliance of Sahel States” – and the rest of the year saw persistent joint air and land operations between the Malian Armed Forces and the Niger Armed Forces, targeting IS. Even though these seemed to put some pressure on the jihadists, IS was able to carry out coordinated attacks on two military posts in the northeast of the country as the year drew to a close. On 3 December, the group launched attacks on Labbezanga and Menaka, with the latter attack seemingly constituting a diversion for the latter. The fighting in Menaka only continued for an hour before IS was pushed back; in Labbezanga the jihadists were able to temporarily seize control of the base, partially burning it and killing up to 30 soldiers.
Amid a continued decline in the level of violence, the year 2024 saw an increased focus on regional cooperation. In July, the AES defense pact was turned into a confederation, a main object of which was to increase coordination in the fight against both IS and JNIM. A joint military force was also announced, but its deployment in the field was unclear in 2024. Some sources announced that it was already in existence, but in early 2025, Niger’s defense chief stated that the 5000 strong force would “soon” deploy. Nevertheless, regardless of under which flag, the year saw joint operations against IS take place with both Burkina Faso and Niger. A majority of these were airstrikes, which clearly exerted some pressure on the group. However, the junta’s attention was by and large focused elsewhere, on the more immediate threat JNIM, which inched closer and closer to Bamako, and on taking back and retaining control of the Kidal region, from the Tuareg rebel group FLA. In the shadow of this, IS continued to be able to roam relatively freely in Menaka region, where it imposed its law on the population, demanding the payment of zakat.
While the following year saw an intensification of the conflict, it remained relatively small-scale, and the escalation in terms of fatalities was mainly due to one big attack, with a high death toll. In June, ISSP carried out a large-scale, coordinated assaults on the military camp in Tessit, in Gao region’s Ansongo cercle. The group used vehicle-borne explosives (VBIEDs) to breach the camp’s defenses and then launched a ground assault from multiple directions, overrunning the base and killing more than 40 soldiers. Aside from being one of the deadliest attacks on the Malian army in 2025, it also underscored the necessity of regional coordination, since the attackers likely operated across borders. The response to the transnational character of ISSP was a continued deepening of the AES as a military alliance. After leaving ECOWAS in January 2025, marking a major geopolitical shift in West Africa, the bloc formally consolidated. During the year, the AES countries prioritized joint security cooperation and at the December summit, a joint battalion for counter-terrorism operations across borders was announced.
