This dyad belongs to the conflict Mali: Government
Summary of conflict Mali: Government
In 2009, the process that had been initiated when Algerian Islamist group AQIM started moving south in the early 2000s led to the outbreak of a conflict over government power in Mali. Extending the scope of its aims to also include sharia law in Sahel states such as Mali, AQIM had settled in the northern part of the country in 2003 and in 2009 fighting flared. Two years later the conflict re-erupted in close relation to the conflict over territory the same year. 2012 saw the Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Dine fight for the imposition of sharia throughout Mali. After swift rebel advances, disgruntled soldiers staged a coup on 22 March and a little over a month later Red Berets, supporting the ousted president attempted a counter-coup, but failed. Having controlled the country's vast north during the latter half of 2012, Ansar Dine, together with fellow Islamist groups AQIM, MUJAO and Signed-in-Blood Battalion launched an offensive south in early 2013. This spawned external intervention from e.g. France and the Islamists were pushed back, albeit far from defeated. Since then, the armed conflict has continued in the northern part of the country, expanding southward in 2015, to also engulf the central parts of Mali. In March 2017, the Islamist groups came together under the al-Qaida-loyal alliance JNIM, and since then, violence has escalated even further. JNIM appears increasingly strong, and the group has stepped up its attacks on military targets.
In 2025, the conflict between the Malian state and JNIM escalated markedly, reaching a peak in the number of fatalities that almost matched the all-time high recorded in 2022. This was due to JNIM escalating its attacks, launching frequent, large-scale assaults on military bases and towns (e.g., Dioura, Boulikessi, Timbuktu), killing many soldiers and sometimes overrunning positions. From September onward, the group also stepped up its economic warfare; by imposing a major fuel blockade, destroying tankers and cutting supply routes it escalated its pressure on the military junta.
The conflict erupts: AQIM’s road to Mali
AQIM originated as GPSC (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) in the context of the Algerian intrastate conflict. Initially focused on fighting for the implementation of Sharia law in Algeria, the group’s aims expanded as it grew closer to al-Qaida. In 2003 it had declared its allegiance to al-Qaida, and in September 2006 the organisations second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahari confirmed that the two groups were officially affiliated. Subsequently, in early 2007 the group adopted its new name, which in itself indicated the expanded scope of its struggle. A little over a year later Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel) confirmed this in an interview with the New York Times, where he stated that the group’s struggle now concerned the entire Islamic Maghreb (which includes Mali) and that it aimed to “rescue our countries from the tentacles of these criminal regimes that betray their religion and their people”.
It was not only AQIM official discourse that changed and widened. At the same time as the group moved closer to al-Qaida parts of it physically started moving south. This was most probably due to a combination of military pressure in Algeria and AQIM's expanded ambitions. Furthermore, the Sahel region offered ample lucrative smuggling and other illicit trafficking opportunities for the AQIM katibas (roughly ‘brigades’) making the move south. Parts of the group first settled in northern Mali in 2003 and subsequent years saw a very ambiguous strategy towards the group by the Malian government. On the one hand, Mali was one of the Wests’ allies in the fight against terrorism, but on the other it seems clear that Bamako did not put much effort into pursuing the group. Some analysts even argue that the Malian government was colluding with AQIM, gaining large sums of money from the latter’s lucrative criminal businesses in the Sahel.
Nevertheless, in 2009 tensions between the army and AQIM came to a head and the months of June and July saw a number of military confrontations both around Timbuktu and near the border with Algeria. After this outburst of violence, the conflict de-escalated once more and very little further violence was recorded between the two parties until AQIM took part in the January 2013 Islamist offensive.
Background to the 2012 fighting
The 2012 violence was played out in two widely different contexts, both geographically and temporally. However, developments in the two were also interlinked, with the events in northern Mali at the start of the year playing an important part with regards to developments in Bamako in late April and early May.
The outbreak of the fighting in the north is, in turn, related to the conflict over territory fought intermittently in the 1990s and 2000s, where mainly Tuareg groups fought for an independent Azawad. The Tuaregs are a pastoral, nomadic people, scattered among a number of West- and North African states. In Mali, they comprise less than ten percent of the total population, but make up much of the population in the sparsely populated northern regions of the country, deep in the Sahara desert. This area is called Azawad by the Tuaregs, a term used in the names of all rebel groups in the armed conflict in the 1990s. Traditionally, the North in general, and the Tuaregs in particular, have been both economically and politically neglected. This neglect has been compounded by severe drought and a brutal, southern, military presence. Dissent has been expressed numerous times since independence, but until the 1990s, the government managed to repress it.
In the mid-1970s and onward, large numbers of young Tuaregs from both Mali and Niger emigrated to Libya and Algeria due to severe droughts. Many received military training, as Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi incorporated some into his regular military forces and others into a Libyan-sponsored ‘Islamic Legion’. The latter was dispatched to Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan, where numerous Tuaregs acquired considerable combat experience. In the late 1980s, economic conditions deteriorated, and only those Tuaregs who had obtained Libyan citizenship were able to stay. Those returning launched a separatist rebellion in Mali in 1990. With the signing of the 1992 peace accord, some hardline fighters, rejecting the agreement, returned to Libya and became senior officers in the Libyan army.
As the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 spawned a change in direction of the flow of fighters between the two countries, and well-armed and battle-hardened Tuaregs returned to Mali, they entered an already volatile situation. Northern Mali, on the eve of the 2012 rebellion, was characterized by a lack of economic development, limited presence of administrative structures and a general resentment with the central government; many of the same grievances that had bred earlier Tuareg uprisings. Furthermore, insecurity was rife, with the region serving as a haven for smugglers, traffickers and the transnational militant AQIM. The president at the time, Amadou Toumani Touré (commonly called ATT) ruled the north through a network of alliances with rival and opportunist elites.
The return of the Tuareg fighters and subsequent development set off a chain of events that bred both the re-eruption of the armed conflict for an independent Azawad, and – the focus here – the outbreak of a conflict over governmental power, first in the north and later in Bamako.
Fighting in the north, January – March 2012
Ansar Dine was formed by Iyad Ag Ghali in December 2011. Ag Ghali, a veteran from the Tuareg separatist rebellions of the 1990s, had initially attempted to gain a leading role in the MNLA (later CMA), when this group was formed in October 2011. However, he was rebuffed due to his links with AQIM, past conflicts with parts of the Tuareg community and diverging ideas of what the ultimate aim of the new group should be (for information on the territorial conflict between the government and MNLA, see the Mali: Azawad section in the encyclopedia). While the top brass of the MNLA aspired to create a separate Azswad state, Ag Ghali opposed this idea, instead arguing for the imposition of sharia throughout Mali. Having failed to gain a leading role in MNLA, Ag Ghali set about forming his own group. He recruited both from among Tuareg fighters that had returned from Libya and from an AQIM unit led by a relative, and when MNLA launched its armed struggle, the newly created Ansar Dine fell in behind it.
The relationship between Ansar Dine and MNLA shifted over time, with uneasy acceptance and cooperation characterizing the first months of the fighting. Subsequently, during the first months of 2012, Ansar Dine and MNLA fought the same enemy – albeit for different goals – and at times carried out joint attacks. With the Malian Army in a state of disarray, the rebels quickly made large territorial gains. Between January and mid-March they were able to capture nearly a third of the country’s territory. These developments bred widespread protests in the capital, Bamako, culminating in a coup on 22 March.
Coup and counter-coup attempt in Bamako
Following the swift rebel advance in the northern part of the country, disgruntled soldiers staged a coup on 22 March, ousting the long-time president Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT). During the fighting, ATT managed to flee his official residence and seek refuge with the “Red Berets” of the 33rd Paratroop Regiment, who doubled as the Presidential guard and remained loyal to the ousted president. They eventually managed to smuggle him out of the country, to Dakar. The coup leader, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, subsequently seized power and proclaimed the formation of a national committee for the rebuilding of democracy and the restoration of the state (CNRDRE).
While causing some bloodshed (around five fatalities were reported), the March coup did not exceed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold, and is subsequently not recorded as an armed conflict in UCDP data. However, a little over a month later, on the night of 30 April – 1 May, Red Berets loyal to ATT and commanded by Colonel Abidine Guindo, mounted a counter-coup attempt, which caused intense fighting and at least 27 deaths. The fighting was concentrated to Bamako and its environs, with clashes reported at the airport, military barracks in the city, the national TV and radio stations and Sanogo’s headquarters at Kati military base, roughly 15 km outside the capital. Sanogo loyalist eventually managed to overrun the Red Beret base at Djicoroni and their leader went into hiding.
This was the only bout of fighting between these parties during the year. After the counter-coup attempt had been put down, the government attempted to dissolve the regiment; many Red Berets went missing after having been arrested by security forces whereas others were reassigned to other units. A majority refused to take up their new assignments, though, and remained holed up at their base through the rest of the year.
Developments in the north after the March coup
After the 22 March coup, the army dissolved from within and the main northern towns fell in succession to the rebels. On 6 April the separatist MNLA declared the formation of the independent state of Azawad, comprising the three northern regions Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.
By this time, the relationship between Ansar Dine and MNLA had started to deteriorate. Increasingly outspoken on their goals - the imposition of sharia throughout the entire country - the former grew in strength, often at the expense of the latter. As the rebels pressed south, they entered territory where the population was more favorable to the message of Ansar Dine than to MNLA's separatist agenda, which the former used to its advantage. Furthermore, the presence of two other Islamists groups in the area, AQIM and MUJAO, started to shift the balance of power in favor of Ansar Dine. Ag Ghaly had longstanding links to especially AQIM and they started to pay off, as the group received reinforcement both in terms of men and weapons. During April and May it became clear that the Islamists had created a joint alliance against MNLA and the latter was pushed out of all main towns. The major showdown took place in late June, when the separatists were forcibly evicted from Gao, where they had set up their provisional government. Prior to this, Ansar Dine and MNLA had made an attempt to patch up their differences though negotiations. A deal had even been reached in late May, whereby the two groups agreed to merge and create the independent Islamic state of Azawad. Ansar Dine had thus conceded their goal of transforming the system of government in the whole of Mali, while the MNLA had compromised on their outspoken secular stance. However, the agreement broke down almost immediately and Ansar Dine turned again to their Islamist allies. As MNLA withdrew into the desert after the late June fighting, the Islamists set about creating a de facto Islamic state where Sharia law was strictly enforced.
Throughout the rest of the year, Ansar Dine, together with AQIM and MUJAO, remained in control of the northern part of Mali: Ansar Dine controlled Kidal and the northeast, MUJAO Gao and the southeast, and AQIM Timbuktu and its environs. After the government troops were driven out of the north in late March, no attempt was made by the government to re-take the region. There were protracted negotiations on a possible military intervention by a primarily West African force, preferably under a UN mandate.
As for the relationship between the various armed groups in the north, Ansar Dine's alliance with the Islamists appeared to weaken during the fall, while new attempts were made at reaching common ground with MNLA. According to many analysts this was clearly linked to the plans of international military intervention gaining momentum (see below). When, in November, Ansar Dine announced its willingness to fight "extremists" and "terrorists" and to rid the country of foreign groups there were doubts as to its sincerity. These doubts were strengthened when the group was rumored to have sent military reinforcements to the Islamist MUJAO, when they clashed with the secular and separatist rebel group MNLA later in November. However, after taking part in joint negotiations with the government in Ouagadougou in early December, Ansar Dine and MNLA carried out negotiations among themselves, assisted by Algeria and Burkina Faso and were able to sign a seven-point partnership agreement, under which both parties rejected terrorism and opposed the use of military force in northern Mali.
The question of a potential military intervention in northern Mali was hotly debated from April 2012 and through the rest of the year. As the Islamists, including Ansar Dine, gained increasing strength, marginalising the secular, separatist MNLA (see the section on the Mali: Azawad conflict), applying sharia law and burning the tomb of a Sufi saint, a UNESCO World Heritage site, the calls for military action became increasingly loud. Furthermore, many western countries were worried that northern Mali would be used as a safe haven for jihadist groups. However, progress was slow and not until on 20 December was UN Security Council Resolution 2085 passed, allowing for the deployment of AFISMA (the Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali), which was to be operational by the fall of 2013 and intended to help the Malian army to reconquer the north. However, it was clearly stated that all diplomatic avenues needed to have been exhausted before the force could be used.
2013: External intervention and retreat of Islamist groups
The situation changed quickly on 9 January when Ansar Dine did an about-face. Instead of continuing with the initiated partnership agreement with MNLA (see above), whereby they would sever all links with the other Islamist groups in the county, the group launched a southern offensive, initially targeting the town of Konna. While the government was able to withstand the initial attack, they were forced to withdraw when Ansar Dine received support from allied Islamist groups AQIM and MUJAO. The Islamists also moved to within 20km of Mopti, a strategically important town on the frontier between rebel-held and government-held territories. In the face of this imminent threat, the Malian government appealed to France for help in stopping the rebels’ advance. The French President Francois Hollande agreed to Bamako’s request and on 11 January French troops launched Operation Serval, deploying helicopters and fighter jets, as well as ground troops right away. They were subsequently able to stop a column moving towards Mopti and by the night of 11 January the Malian army backed by French troops reported that they had succeeded in re-taking Konna.
After averting a counter-attack at Diabaly near the border with Mauritania, the French forces started pushing the Islamist groups northwards. In late January they had reached the big towns in the north: Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, with the latter at that time under MNLA control (for more on MNLA developments, see the Mali: Azawad section). With French airstrikes preceding the ground troops’ advance, the Islamists for the most part withdrew without a fight, although there were some skirmishes.
Following France’s military intervention, it was stated that the deployment of AFISMA – authorized in December 2012, but not planned until September 2013 – would commence as soon as possible in order to support Mali in recovering the areas in the north under the control of “terrorist, extremist and armed groups”. Subsequently, from 17 January and onward troops from some nine ECOWAS states as well as from Chad began sending troops.
Having pushed Ansar Dine, AQIM, Signed-in-Blood Battalion (an AQIM splinter group that had not participated in the southward offensive) and MUJAO from the main centers of the north, a new phase of the conflict was initiated. For one, MUJAO – it became clear – while having withdrawn from Gao, remained in the vicinity. The group soon began planting land mines and carrying out suicide attacks targeting mainly military checkpoints. They also infiltrated the town and there were fierce street battles.
Ansar Dine, AQIM, and Signed-in-Blood Battalion for their part withdrew to the Adrar des Ifoghas massif, where they firmly entrenched themselves in caves and tunnels. On 19 February France, aided by Chadian troops, launched Operation Panther intended to clean up the remote mountain area. The operation continued until 25 March and saw severe fighting resulting in high fatalities, especially on the side of the Islamists. Significantly, one of AQIM's top commanders in the Sahel region, Abou Zeid, was killed during the operation.
Operation Panther was deemed a success and it was clear that a severe blow had been dealt to the Islamists holed up in the Ifoghas Mountains. Furthermore, as spring turned into summer activities by MUJAO also receded.
On 1 July MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) took over from AFISMA. MINUSMA had been established by Security Council resolution 2100 on April 25, 2013 and under the terms of this resolution the mission would perform a range of activities, such as to support the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks, protect civilians, assist in preparations of free, inclusive and peaceful elections and help extend state authority.
During the fall – as the security situation began to deteriorate once again – it became clear that the winter and spring offensives had displaced rather than destroyed the Islamist groups. In October al-Murabitun, a new jihadist group created by the merger of MUJAO and Signed-in-Blood Battalion launched a new attack on Gao – the first one since late March – and during the same month there were reports that AQIM fighters were gathering in the Timbuktu region.
Continued insecurity
After the events of 2013, insecurity remained rife in northern Mali. France continued to conduct operations against the different Islamist group, sometimes in cooperation with MINUSMA, sometimes together with the Malian army, but most often on their own. Despite the successes reported in these operations, the Islamists have been able to continue to carry out frequent attacks throughout the north. Aside from attacks on army bases, the groups have increasingly come to target the MINUSMA forces. There have been rocket attacks on UN bases, suicide attacks and shootings, as well as frequent casualties from land mines. This resulted in MINUSMA being the bloodiest UN mission worldwide. Two of the deadliest attacks on MINUSMA troops to date were carried out in 2016. In February, seven Guinean peacekeepers were killed when Ansar Dine hit a MINUSMA base in Kidal with mortars, gunfire and a truck bomb. Three months later, in May 2016, the same group claimed responsibility for an IED and an ensuing ambush near Aguelhok, where six Chadian peacekeepers were killed.
The islamsist groups also came to increasingly target western interests, thereby reaching the international headlines. In August 2015, Islamist stormed Hotel Byblos in Sévaré, a hotel popular among westerners in the city. Three months later armed med launched an attack on the luxurious hotel Radisson Blu in Bamako. A siege ensued, and when it ended more than 20 people had died. These attacks on soft target are, however, not recorded in the state-based category of organized violence, but as one-sided violence. Attacks on western targets continued in 2016 and 2017. In March 2016, for example, AQIM attacked a hotel in Bamako, hosting the headquarters of a European Union military training operation. Furthermore, in June 2017, islamists stormed Kangaba, a tourist resort on the edge of Bamako, popular with foreigners, briefly seizing hostages and killing two people.
The strength of Ansar Dine seemed to grow during 2016, as a rebel group based in central Mali – FLM – pledged allegiance to the former in May. The connection between the two groups had been difficult to determine prior to the pledge, with some analysts describing FLM as the southern part of Ansar Dine already from its formation in early 2015. This could not be substantiated until the pledge was made, and up until then, UCDP recorded FLM as a separate group, fighting the government over a different incompatibility: reviving the 19th century Fulani-led Macina Empire, a theocratic caliphate that existed in present-day Mali. With the pledge of allegiance, Ansar Dine’s reach southwards increased substantially.
AQIM also grew in strength and influence, and this was manifested by the group carrying out a the most deadly attack ever on Malian soil in early 2017. On 18 January, a car laden with explosives forced its way into an army camp in Gao. At the base, some 600 soldiers at that time took part in a training session and the car exploded just next to them. There is some uncertainty as to the actual death toll, but at the very least 55 people lost their lives, with some sources setting the figure at 62. The Malian government declared three days of national mourning, with the president stating "We will fight you. We will defeat you. You will not have the last word" in a televised address.
JNIM is created and fighting escalates
On 2 March 2017, the creation of a new al-Qaida affiliated alliance was announced. Jaamat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, or JNIM, is made up of Ansar Dine, AQIM’s Sahara branch and FLM, and is led by Ansar Dine -leader Iyad Ag Ghali. With the launching of the new group, the number of attacks soared, and the death toll increased substantially from 2016 to 2017. JNIM also expanded the scope of its operations during the year, launching attacks also across the border in Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso, for its part, became increasingly embroiled in the conflict, both due to it being the target of JNIM attacks, and because a Burkinabe islamist group called Ansaroul Islam had bases on Malian soil. Thus, Mali and Burkina Faso, together with French Barkhane forces, carried out a number of joint attacks during the year, targeting JNIM and Ansaroul Islam bases in Foulséré forest in late April, and Serma forest in late May, both located in Douentza cercle, near the Mali – Burkina border.
Over the following years, the conflict continued to escalate, as JNIM stepped up attacks. Aside from the frequent targeting of both the Malian army and MINUSMA through land mines, the group also carried out numerous small-scale attacks on military bases and police posts. Furthermore, from 2019 on, the group managed to carry out a number of more substantial attacks on the Malian military, inflicting heavy losses. Despite initial setbacks in 2019-20 in an ongoing intra-jihadi conflict with the IS’ Greater Sahara section, the al-Qaida loyalists managed to re-group and remained a threat to the Malian state. This was evident as the group stepped up attacks in 2021, carrying out a number of increasingly complex ambushes, combining mines with heavy weapons.
Coups and new levels of violence
Popular protests against the regime erupted in mid-2020, partly linked to the deteriorating security situation. As they gained in strength, the demonstrators began calling for the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and on 18 August, the military seized power in a coup. Only nine months later, on 24 May 2021, a new coup took place, ousting the civilian transitional government that had briefly ruled the country. Subsequently, Colonel Assimi Goïta took over as interim president of the country.
The democratic backsliding that these coups constituted caused rifts with many of Mali’s international partners. Notably, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the French Barkhane force would be phased out. The French withdrawal started in February 2022 and was finalized by mid-August. One contributing factor to the breakdown in Mali-French relations was the former’s increasingly close ties to Russia in general and the Wagner group in particular. Wagner troops had started to arrive in Mali in late 2021, and from early 2022, they began launching joint offensives with the Malian armed forces. In June 2023, in yet another step away from its western allies, the junta called on the UN peacekeeping force MINUSMA to leave its territory “without delay”, stating that the force had become part of the problem. Subsequently, from July, MINUSMA began to gradually withdraw, and by 31 December 2023 the mission was officially concluded.
In parallel to Mali’s realignment with Russia, the conflict between the junta and JNIM continued to escalate. When Wagner troops were first deployed in the field in early 2022, they joined the army in targeting the Katiba Macina part of JNIM in central Mali. The JNIM sub-group initially responded by retreating to safe havens in Burkina Faso and Mauritania. However, in early March of that year, it countered with a large-scale attack on an army barracks in Mondoro, killing at least 27 troops and after that, conflict activity remained at a high level. Thus, the year saw the conflict escalate to levels not seen before, going from a little over 600 fatalities in 2021, to more than 1100 and thus being registered as a war in UCDP data for the first time. The escalation was not only confined to the number of fatalities, but also to the geographical area affected; JNIM widened its area of operations both west-and southward, creeping ever closer to Bamako, and carrying out attacks near the capital a number of times. As the number of attacks surged, the group made use of multiple types of military tactics ranging from assassinations to large-scale complex attacks, and also including use of IEDs and ambushes.
While the following year saw a slight de-escalation in terms of fatalities, with numbers decreasing to just over 900, the geographical spread of the conflict continued. As MINUSMA began leaving its bases in northern Mali, JNIM exploited the void left, its attacks picking up pace. Furthermore, it notably initiated a blockade of Timbuktu in August, accompanied by intermittent shelling. Roads became too dangerous to travel, and the Niger River – already a crucial transport route – for a time appeared a safer option. However, on 7 September JNIM carried out its most deadly attack in 2023, when it shelled a transit boat plying a route between town along the river, carrying between 500 and 1000 passengers. As the ferry left Timbuktu it breached the blockade and was thus very much a potential target, wherefore the boat was manned by soldiers. When JNIM launched the first rocket, the soldiers attempted to fire back, but to no avail. Two more rockets hit the boat, and large numbers of people were killed; initial reports set the death toll to 64, but later, members of the junta’s equivalent to a national assembly raised the number to 111, and, eventually survivor accounts emerged, revising the figure further to between 120 and 154.
Furthermore, the year saw a number of complex attacks on army detachments across the country. In late November, the group’s Timbuktu Wilayat sent a suicide bomber in a booby-rapped vehicle, followed by dozens of fighters accompanied by shelling, when it targeted the army detachment in Niafunké. Some 50 soldiers were killed, and JNIM temporarily occupied the military base. Only some weeks later, in mid-December, the group’s Macina katiba stormed Farabougou, a rural commune in south-central Segou region, which had been besieged by the group for two years. They seized and the destroyed the camp, killing between 42 and 60 soldiers, as well as five civilians.
The Malian government, for its part, continued its heavy-handed offensives, together with the Wagner Group (which was re-branded as Africa Corps in 2024), and from 2022 onward, a string of operations saw the civilian population bearing the brunt of the violence. An early example of this was the attack on the village of Moura in late March 2022, where hundreds of civilians lost their lives. The attack took place on a market day, and the village – situated in an area that had been under JNIM control for years – was full of both local villagers and other market-goers, as well as Islamists. When the armed forces launched the attack in tandem with their Wagner counterparts, there was some initial fighting, but the operation subsequently turned into a three-day long massacre, the worst single atrocity reported in the conflict. The army claimed to have targeted a meeting between different Islamist battalions, but eyewitness accounts confirm that a majority of those killed were civilians. They were most likely targeted either because of their ethnicity (with the Fulani ethnic group seen as linked to the jihadists) or their mere appearance (as the village had been under JNIM control, the inhabitants had been forced to abide by their rules, cutting off their pants and growing their beards).
Similar operations continued over the following years, albeit none quite as bloody, as the government, accompanied by Wagner/Africa Corps, responded to the smattering of attacks by carrying out increasingly brutal counter-insurgency operations around the country. One example is the operation carried out in Gatié Loum village in Mopti region’s Youwarou cercle in mid-December 2023. As in Moura, JNIM fighters were known to frequent the village’s market, purchasing and selling supplies, and according the army, the operation was a success, as it was able to neutralize a large number of islamists. However, other reports talk of indiscriminate killings, claiming that almost 30 civilians died.
In 2023 and 2024, the conflict de-escalated. However, this was not as much a reflection of JNIM losing its momentum or being weakened, as it was of the army simply – at least temporarily - ceding some areas to the islamists and thus not carrying out as many operations in some parts of the country. In other areas, ground operations decreased, but airstrikes continued. As with the counter-insurgency operations, the civilian population came to suffer significantly from these strikes, with the most well-known example being the March drone strike on Amasrakad village in Gao region. While the army claimed to have successfully neutralized terrorists, a range of human rights organizations including Amnesty International reported that the attack killed some 14 civilians.
An area that saw in upsurge in fighting in 2024 was Mali’s northern Kidal region. More or less under the control of the Tuareg rebel group CMA (later FLA) for a decade, with JNIM retaining a strong presence, but keeping a low profile, most main population centers of the region, including Kidal town had been re-claimed by the Malian army the year prior. The increased army presence contributed to an upsurge in the number of fatalities, many of which stemmed from airstrikes, but some also caused by mines. However, the by far largest armed encounter was a JNIM ambush near the northern town Ti-n-zaouatene in late July. The army and its Russian allies had been in a three-day battle against the FLA, when they were forced to retreat. During their withdrawal, JNIM took the opportunity to ambush them from a high place, with FLA moving in from behind. The result was devastating for the allied force, which lost between 60 and 90 soldiers.
Another noteworthy development in 2024 was an attack on Bamako for the first time in nearly a decade. On 17 September, JNIM was able to carry out nearly simultaneous attacks on a gendarmerie school and the main Malian air base, killing at least 77 soldiers and gendarmes. The attack was highly symbolic, in showing that the group remained a credible threat to the junta and that Bamako was within its reach. This operation may have been just a prelude of what was to come; in November, a spokesman for the Katiba Macina part of JNIM announced a new phase of the conflict, targeting capitals and major cities.
In 2025, the conflict intensified sharply, marked by a series of major, high-casualty attacks and a clear transformation in both the scale and strategy of violence. Beginning in May, JNIM launched coordinated assaults on key military bases such as Dioura (at least 40 soldiers killed), Boulikessi (between 75 and 120 soldiers killed and the base overrun), and Timbuktu, where simultaneous attacks using car bombs and armed infiltration targeted the airport and multiple checkpoints. At the same time, the geographic reach of violence expanded beyond central and northern strongholds into western and southern Mali, including strategic economic corridors near Senegal and Mauritania, with attacks spanning hundreds of kilometers. From September onward, JNIM increasingly shifted toward sustained economic warfare, systematically targeting and disrupting national supply lines: the group established checkpoints, ambushed commercial convoys, mined key roads and intermittently blockaded major transportation corridors linking Bamako to regional hubs, leading to fuel shortages and delays in essential goods that persisted for weeks at a time.
