This dyad belongs to the conflict Chad: Islamic State
Summary of conflict Chad: Islamic State
The territorial conflict between the Chadian government and the Islamic State (IS), which commenced in March 2015, is tightly connected to the conflicts in neighboring Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger. Prior to March, conflicts were fought in the two former, with Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) seeking to install Islamic rule. In March 2015, this group pledged allegiance to IS - a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – and with that, what had previously been Boko Haram was integrated into IS, and renamed Wilayat West Africa. The group subsequently switched its goal to the more far-reaching one stated by IS: the creation of a global Islamic State. In 2014, IS had declared that it considered the legality of those states to which its troops had arrived to be null, wherefore IS quickly found itself in conflict with several states in the region, one of them being Chad. The conflict between IS (and more precisely its West African wing) and the Chadian government subsequently focused on IS’ aim of integrating Chad into its Islamic State.
Conflict between the Chadian government and the IS continued in the Lake Chad region of Chad in 2021, although the intensity of violence decreased compared to the previous years. Throughout the year, IS claimed attacks on security forces of Chad, but the majority of these attacks were not verified by the Chadian government or independent sources. The deadliest fighting between the two sides occurred in April which led to the killing of 40 IS fighters and 12 Chadian forces in a military outpost in Litri village.
Background to the conflict
The territorial conflict between the Chadian government and the Islamic State (IS) – and more specifically the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (Wilayat West Africa) – is closely tied to the previous conflicts involving Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram), against the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments.
The conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamist group Boko Haram erupted in northern Nigeria in 2009, and became increasingly bloody as the years passed. In early 2015, the group also challenged the Cameroonian government resulting in a conflict over government power breaking out. However, both these conflicts ceased in March 2015, when the group pledged allegiance to IS - a Salafi jihadist militant group with its origins in Iraq – and a few days later the latter accepted the pledge. With that, what had previously been Boko Haram was integrated into IS, and renamed Wilayat West Africa. The group subsequently switched its goal to the more wide-reaching one stated by IS: the creation of a global Islamic State. Thus, while the actual fighters on the ground remain the same, they have announced a new name for themselves and are now fighting for a different goal.
While the conflict between the Chadian government and IS began in 2015, N’djamena had been involved against IS’ predecessor Boko Haram for many years, assisting first the Nigerian-and then also the Cameroonian government with troops as a secondary warring party. The reason for the changed role of Chad – going from being a secondary warring party to a primary party in its own conflict against the group – can be found in a 2014 IS declaration, where it stated that it considered the legality of those states to which its troops had arrived to be null. This meant that the group found itself in conflict with the Chadian government as soon as Boko Haram evolved into IS, seeing as its fighters had been on the ground in the country since the Boko Haram-period. The group had operated in Chad since at least 2009, when many of its members fled Nigeria after the military assault that left its founder Muhammad Yusuf dead. The relative ease with which they appear to have been able to establish themselves not only in Chad, but also Niger and Cameroon can be explained by the strong linkages that exist between the four countries in the Lake Chad region, with languages, ethnicities, cultures and patronage networks spanning the porous borders. The group had also used Chad as a pool of recruitment, and there are reliable reports of Chadians in the ranks of both Boko Haram and its successor, IS.
Aside from having a territorial incompatibility with the Chadian government, which Boko Haram had not had, also the behavior of IS against N’djamena was different than its predecessor. While Boko Haram had carried out a few one-sided attacks on islands in Lake Chad, they refrained from attacking soldiers and state institutions on Chadian soil. Some sources even allege that there was a secret ceasefire between Chad and Boko Haram, and that the former assisted the latter with weapons and cash. This cannot be substantiated, however. The Chadian regime’s attitude towards Boko Haram had begun to change even prior to its transformation into IS. When the group increased its attacks in Cameroon, it threatened to disrupt Chad’s logistical route to the Cameroonian port of Doula. This was one of the main reasons behind N’djamena’s decision to send troops to Cameroon, and later launch a large-scale offensive in neighboring areas of northern Nigeria. Thus, the transformation of Boko Haram into IS, and the accompanying territorial incompatibility, coincided with a shift in the relationship between N’djamena and IS. With the Chadian offensive in Cameroon and Nigeria, IS responded by widening its focus in Chad, also commencing to launch attacks on military targets.
Islamic State's West Africa Province (Wilayat West Africa) attacks Chad
2015 saw scattered fighting on remote islands in Lake Chad, pitting IS against the Chadian military. However, the deadliest attacks and fighting took place in N’djamena in June. On 15 June, two Chadian IS militants launched simultaneous attacks on a police headquarters and a police training school in the Chadian capital, killing almost 30 people. The attacks spawned a flurry of activity, with the regime vowing that “spilling the blood of Chadians will not go unpunished”, and subsequently retaliating by bombing IS positions in northern Nigeria (although this was denied by Nigeria). Furthermore, foreigners were rounded up, mass arrests made and burqa and niqab banned. Two weeks after the suicide attacks, on 29 June, eleven more people – five police officers, five IS fighters and one police informant – were killed when Chadian police launched a raid against IS in a district of the capital.
After a decrease in the number of attacks in 2016, with the conflict falling below the level for inclusion, the year 2017 saw two noteworthy incidents that caused the conflict to cross the 25 battle-related deaths threshold yet again. In May, IS launched an attack on an army post in Kaiga in, spawning heavy clashes; and in July, there were intense fighting on islands in Lake Chad, resulting in heavy looses on both sides. Conflict activity continued to increase in 2018-19, as a number of large-scale attacks were launched on - and most often - repelled by Chadian troops on the shores of Lake Chad. One of the army's main set-backs during 2019 was an IS ambush in June, at a location called Tchoukoutalia, during which it lost 11 men.
