This dyad belongs to the conflict Syria: Islamic State

Summary of conflict Syria: Islamic State

The conflict in Syria over the Islamic State emerged as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) re-branded itself and expanded into Syria from Iraq in April 2013. On 29 June 2014 ISIS proclaimed the caliphate at the same time they changed their name to the Islamic State. A bloody war has since developed with IS attacking both the government of Syria as well as many of the Syrian insurgent groups.

After dramatically capturing much of Syria in 2014, mainly from other non-state actors, an international coalition led by the United States began supporting the government of Iraq and PYD / SDF in defeating IS. IS has since been fighting a grueling retreating battle in Syria. During 2017, IS was pushed back into Syrian-Iraqi border areas in eastern Syria as they lost control over 90% of their previously held areas. In 2019, IS lost its last pockets of territorial control, and was declared defeated. Although IS has lost all territory it previously held in Syria, it continues to carry out attacks against both security forces and civilians. After a one-year lull, the conflict again reached the intensity of war in 2020, with more than 1000 battle-related deaths. In 2021 and 2022, the conflict continued to deescalate and the did not reach the threshold of war.

ISIS declares a caliphate in Syria

In April 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaida's Iraqi affiliate, unilaterally decided to merge with Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaida's Syrian affiliate, to form the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Jabhat al-Nusra and the al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri disputed the merger and Zawahiri dictated that ISIS should limit its operations to Iraq. But ISIS rejected the order and continued to operate in Syria fighting both the government and many Syrian insurgents. A large number of Jabhat al-Nusra conscripts switched over to ISIS, helping ISIS to establish itself as a leading group in Syria. The IS - Jabhat al-Nusra conflict led to ISIS formal expulsion from the broader al-Qaida-network in February 2014, which would lead to ISIS emerging as an alternative leader for the global jihadist movement.

ISIS fought together with the Syrian opposition in 2013; for example when taking control over the Minnigh air base in the Aleppo Province on 5 August 2013, during clashes in the Dayr az Zawr Province, the battle of Sadad in Homs Province and in clashes with PYD in Hasakah. The Government of Syria - IS conflict thus emerged in the context of an ongoing conflict over government. Despite the early cooperation between IS and other groups, conflicts within the opposition would soon emerge. As ISIS's power grew it became more assertive in the areas it was active, often trying to monopolize control over towns and resources, as well as enforcing its own strict brand of justice. It grew especially powerful in Hasakah and Deir ez Zor along the Iraqi border, as well as in Raqqah and northern Aleppo province.

This behavior put it at odds with many other rebel groups, several of which banded together to drive it out of Syria in January 2014. The main coalition, which tried to drive ISIS out of Aleppo and Idlib, consisted of several of the largest alliances in Syria, namely the Islamic Front, the Mujahideen Army and SRF (see IS - Islamic Front, Mujahideen Army, SRF). Other consequential coalitions formed to drive ISIS out of Raqqah (see IS - Islamic Front, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah, Liwa Thuwar ar-Raqqa and Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front, Islamic Front, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa Thuwar ar-Raqqa - IS) and Deir ez Zor (see Authenticity and Development Front, Islamic Front, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham - IS and IS - Mujahideen Shura Council). Despite heavy fighting, and initial setbacks for ISIS, it emerged in control of much of eastern and northern Syria. By March 2014, most of Raqqah governorate had fallen to ISIS, and in July so had Deir ez Zor governorate.

On 10 June 2014, ISIS gained global prominence by capturing Iraq's second largest city, Mosul (part of the Iraq: Government conflict). On 29 June 2014, ISIS proclaimed a global caliphate, with Raqqah city as its capital, and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph and Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), to whom it claimed all Muslims owed allegiance. To mark its now broader claims of authority it changed its name to the Islamic State (IS). Unlike al-Qaida, which envisaged the establishment of the caliphate but considered it a goal to be left to future generations, IS goal was to capture territory and establish a State, first in the Iraq and al-Sham region, which roughly corresponds with the Levant, or eastern Mediterranean, but later for the entire Muslim community throughout the whole world. The last caliphate, the Ottoman caliphate, was abolished by the Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk in 1924; an event that is referenced by Islamic scholars as a profound turning point in Islamic history. IS aim was to recreate the caliphate and to do so following the example of the four rightly guided caliphs (the Rashidun) who led Muslims from Muhammad’s death in the golden age from 632 until 661.

The capture of Mosul and other areas of Iraq had significant implications for the Syrian conflict, as it vastly increased IS's capacities, both in terms of its monetary income, and by capturing large stocks of advanced military equipment provided to the Iraqi army by the US, making IS the world's probably best equipped rebel group. By late-summer 2014, IS controlled broad swatches of territory in both Syria and Iraq, with a population of around five million, and was estimated to have around 25,000-30,000 fighters. At this time, it was estimated that IS had an income of $3 million per month, largely through natural resource extraction and taxation, making it the wealthiest rebel group in the world. During the coming months its income and territorial control would increase further, peaking in the first half of 2015, at which time it would control approximately 9 million people and have a degree of territorial control of almost 17% of the combined land mass of Iraq and Syria. In areas under their control they combine harsh punishments and strict adherence to their interpretation of Sharia with the provision of rudimentary services to the civilian population. Despite its harshness it was often seen as an improvement from earlier rebel governance, which in many cases was characterized mainly by its looting and corruption. The same could not be said of its treatment of minorities, or anyone attempting to resist, whom were often faced with brutal repression (see IS - Civilians).

The declaration of the caliphate and broader IS - al-Qaeda dispute would have significant consequences for Syria's Islamist movements. It not only outed Jabhat al-Nusra as al-Qaida's local affiliate, but also forced it to reconsider its strategy. Previously Jabhat al-Nusra had fought as an integral part of the anti-Assad forces, often engaging in shared control of captured town. However, with a rival Jihadist movement declaring Islamic governance over large part of the country, Jabhat al-Nusra was forced to prove its Jihadist credentials by doing the same. In response to the declaration of a caliphate by IS-leader al-Baghdadi, Jabhat al-Nusra declared its own Islamic Emirate, centered on its holdings in Idlib. The decision would cause further raptures in ranks of Syrian insurgents, and cause several non-state conflicts involving Jabhat al-Nusra, as it focused on establishing its exclusive territorial control at the expense of other insurgents (see Jabhat Fateh al-Sham - SRF).

Intervention of the United States of America and the halting of IS's conquest

In July 2014, IS for the first time seriously turned their guns on the regime, capturing the remaining regime pockets in Raqqah. Division 17 army base fell in late July, followed by Brigade 93 and Tabqa Airport in August. Following the fall of Raqqah, IS pressed on into eastern Hama and Aleppo, threatening government supply lines. In Homs governorate, IS killed hundreds of pro-government militiamen and soldiers when capturing Shair gas field in July 2014, though a government counter-offensive recaptured large parts of the field only days later. The fighting around Shair was the deadliest between IS and the government to date, and several new rounds of heavy fighting would continue in the area until late-April 2017, with the gas field changing hands several times. Attempts to capture the city of Deir ez Zor and its airport from pro-government forces from September 2014 failed. Despite repeated attempts by IS to capture the city, government forces retained this isolated toehold in the region until the siege was broken in November 2017.

Whilst IS did engage the Syrian government repeatedly in 2014, it was mainly focused on fighting other non-state groups to increase its territorial control and weakening potential rivals. As part of this campaign against other insurgent groups, it launched a large-scale offensive on the Kurdish PYD-controlled enclave of Kobane/Ayn al-Arab in northern Aleppo in September 2014. Despite early success in capturing the countryside of Kobane town, the PYD and several allied FSA groups, operating jointly as the Euphrates Volcano operations room, held out in the town until an international coalition, led by the United States, intervened to support PYD/Euphrates Volcano with airstrikes and equipment on 27 September 2014. The siege of Kobane would last for several months, with extremely high death tolls for IS (see Euphrates Volcano - IS). IS was forced to retreat from the town in late January 2015, a symbolic defeat after having expended massive resources to capture the town, which blunted some of the momentum and its image of invincibility which it had carefully fostered. The Siege of Kobane was the starting point of an international campaign to degrade IS in Syria, which had already begun in Iraq. Local non-state actors, primarily PYD/Euphrates Volcano and later SDF, provided ground troops, while the international coalition provided secondary warring support consisting mainly of airstrikes.

2015-2017: A slow retreat

In March 2015, IS begun a two pronged attack against the regime in Hama and Homs governates, as it pushed further westward into the interior of Syria. One prong targeted Sheikh Hilal, located near the Hamah-Ithriya road, in an attempt to cut the Syrian governments supply lines between Aleppo in the north and the central Syrian town of Hama. The other prong targeted the Syrian desert in Homs, mainly around the towns of Sukhna and Palmyra/Tadmur. In May 2015, IS managed to capture first Sukhna, followed a week later by Tadmur, a town known for its many ancient monuments and the largest city in the Syrian desert. Both towns are strategically located on the Damascus - Deir ez Zor road, and therefore constituted a significant victory for IS. IS thereby opened up a route to threaten the Syrian capital and the city of Homs, while cutting of the regime's supply lines to Deir Ez Zor, thus tightening the ongoing siege. IS did attempt to push westwards from Tadmur, capturing Qaryatayn town on 5 August 2015. The town would thereafter be its base during hard fought battles to control the villages of Mahin and Hawarin, where IS's seemingly inevitable push westward was stopped. Some IS raids would, however, managed to hit the for the regime vital M5 road, which connected Damascus to Homs and the rest of northern Syria. Qaryatayn was recaptured by government forces in April 2016, soon after Tadmur town itself had been recaptured by government forces in March. However, in December 2016, IS launched a new successful offensive on Tadmur, though this time IS only held the town for a short while before having to withdraw from the town on 2 March 2017.

During September-November 2015, Aleppo saw heavy fighting between IS and the government, which now was supported by heavy Russian bombing. The government launched a successful 3-month offensive in eastern Aleppo which lifted the three year long siege of Kuweires airbase. IS counter-attacked in late October by capturing portions of the Khanasir-Ithriya road, thus cutting off the Aleppo from the rest of the government's territory. After two weeks of heavy fighting the supply route was reopened, and the government's offensive could continue, finally lifting the Siege on Kuweires on 10 November 2015. IS renewed its attempt to cut of the government's supplies to Aleppo in early 2016, during a renewed offensive targeting the Khanasir-Ithriya road. The offensive succeeded in cutting of the road and capturing Khanasir town, though a government counter-offensive soon brought the areas back under its control. This was followed by a government offensive in June 2016 attempting to capture IS's capital Raqqah. The offensive came within 7 km of Tabqa town before being repelled out of Raqqah governorate.

Other significant developments were IS's expanded presence in the suburbs of Damascus city, when it in April 2015 expanded from the Hajar al-Aswad suburb into Yarmouk refugee camp, located inside the city itself. Fierce fighting with a coalition of non-state groups which previously held the camp ended with IS holding control of most of it, thus having established a foothold in the Syrian capital. IS would retain a presence in the southern suburbs, often clashing with government forces and other rebels, until it was expelled by the regime in May 2018. Also in April 2015, IS started launching raids into Suwayda governorate, causing further insecurity in southern Syria and forcing its local Druze inhabitants to mobilize in their own pro-regime self-protection units. IS also at times fought the regime in Hasakah, in the Qalamoun mountains, in Latakia and in Daraa. IS also often conducted suicide bombings in urban areas, usually either targeting regime positions or minority communities. The government of Syria, and its Russian backers, bombed IS held towns and cities throughout Syria, causing large civilian death tolls.

By 2016, it was clear that IS was on the retreat. It was continuously losing territory in northern Syria to the US-backed SDF (a broad coalition of groups dominated by PYD). In March and April, the government recaptured large parts of Homs governorate. In August 2016, Turkey along with its non-state allies, the Hawar Kilis Operations Room, launched operation Euphrates Shield, which targeted both IS and SDF in northern Aleppo, carving out a Turkish sphere of influence along its border (see Hawar Kilis Operations Room - IS). By the end of the year, US-backed forces were initiating offensives on IS's two main cities, Mosul in Iraq and its capital Raqqah in Syria, both of which subsequently fell in 2017. According to a NATO report IS lost approximately 20% of its territory in Syria during 2016. During 2017, IS was pushed back into Syrian-Iraqi border areas in eastern Syria as they lost control of over 90% of their previously held areas. At the end of 2017, IS only held small pockets of territory along the Euphrates close to the Iraqi border, the southern suburbs of Damascus, the Yarmouk basin area in southwestern Daraa, and retained a presence in a few portions of the Syrian desert. The Syrian government gained control of most IS held territories to the west of Euphrates river, whereas SDF took control of areas to the east of the river.

Beyond a territorial caliphate

In 2018, most of IS's remaining pockets of territorial control fell. Its Damascus holding were lost in May, after its remaining fighters agreed to be allowed to withdraw into the Syrian desert. The government soon faced heavy criticism over the withdrawal agreement, as many of these fighters participated in the 25 July 2018 As Suwayda attacks, during which at least 258 civilians and government soldiers and militiamen died. The government responded to the attacks with an offensive from August until mid-November on IS's remaining holdouts in the desert of Suwayda and southern Rif Dimashq, concentrated to the Tulul as Safa volcanic plateau, eliminating IS's last holdouts in the region. Yarmouk pocket in Daraa was captured by the government on 31 July. The last territorial holding of IS in Syria, Baghuz in Deir Ez Zor, fell to SDF on 23 March 2019.

IS has since carried out repeated assassinations and minor skirmishes, both with the government and SDF, whilst these actors have been hunting remaining IS cells in their territory. There has been considerable worry that IS might see an resurgence, especially during the Turkish October 2019 offensive against SDF in Syria (see SNA - SDF). Thus far, however, IS has been unable to hold onto any territory in Syria since losing its last outpost, though the group remains a potent threat in many countries through its many affiliates around the world.

Russia and Iran

Russia intervened in the Syrian conflicts on 30 September 2015 after an official request from the Assad government. On the first day of their bombing campaign they targeted IS in Raqqa governorate (they also targeted Syrian Insurgents, see the Syria: government conflict).

To Iran, Syria was a crucial ally, important for its strategic interests. The two countries had a long history of supporting each other. Iran had been able to use Syrian territory to transfer resources to proxy groups in the region, and Syria had received Iranian support for its chemical weapons program. In terms of deterring an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear program or on its proxies, Syria had been an important asset to Teheran. The Government of Iran thus had strong incentives to seek to keep Assad in office.

From the outset, Teheran supported several pro-regime militia groups involved in the violence, some of these groups were transformed into the National Defence Forces (NDF, part of the Government of Syria) in 2013 with the help and training from Iran. Further, the Lebanese group Hezbollah and various Shi’ite groupings hailing from Iraq as well as from within Syria, also partaking in the violence on the government’s side, were considered Iranian proxy-forces. Iran also supported the government with advisers and funding. In October 2015 Iran sent in ground troops to boost Assad's army who launched major ground offensives backed by Russian air strikes.