This dyad belongs to the conflict Egypt: Government
Summary of conflict Egypt: Government
Between 1993 and 1998, the Government of Egypt fought an intrastate conflict with the al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), which challenged the government for power over the country. Counter-insurgency operations and heavy-handed tactics against the supporters of the Islamic Group led to its defeat in 1998. After that, Egypt enjoyed a relatively calm period, though it had kept experiencing attacks against civilians by other Islamist outfits in the country. Security forces and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis clashed throughout 2014. In November 2014, the group pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) and became part of it; for more information, see Government of Egypt - IS.
The conflict over government power with Harakit Sawa’id Misr has remained active until 2019. Most of the conflict events took place in the Cairo governorate. Harakit Sawa’id Misr (or Hasm), was allegedly affiliated to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and focused on attacking targets connected to the Egyptian Interior Ministry and police. Since 2019, no fatalities were recorded.
Egypt and political Islam
The state of Egypt became a republic in 1956, under the reign of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose Free Officers’ Movement overthrew the Egyptian monarchy that had ruled the country since the independence from the British.
Nasser, who became an idol in the Arab world for his efforts to promote Pan-Arabism, was a secular and socialist modernizer who sought to introduce these ideologies in Egypt. Identity in Egypt was to be built on Arabism, nationalism, and anti-imperialism.
This regime, in which the Presidency was taken over by Anwar Sadat in 1970 and then by Hosni Mubarak in 1981, repressed political dissent in all its forms, be it secular or religious.
A competing mode of governance and identity in Egypt was promoted throughout the 20th century by various Islamic groups, the most famous of which was the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in the 1920s, believed that secularisation and modernization were not the way for Islamic countries to recreate the glory of the ancient Muslim civilizations. The Muslim Brotherhood instead claimed that the path to glory lay in an Islamic society, where all aspects of life stemmed from the writings in the Quran. The Muslim Brotherhood expanded greatly throughout the mid-20th century, and the movement spawned several sibling organizations throughout the Muslim world.
Radical Islam in Egypt was further spurred in the 1960s, through the defeat of Egypt in the Six-Day War with Israel as well as by the writings of Sayid Qutb, who espoused a more militant view of Islamist politics than did the mainly pacifist Muslim Brotherhood.
What was to come in the 1970s was the beginning of the clash between the secular trend of the Government of Egypt and the militant Islamists that were on the rise.
The al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya insurgency
Around 1974 an Islamic student association by the name of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group, commonly abbreviated IG) was taking shape. A factor that contributed to the formation of Islamic organizations, in general, was President Anwar Sadat's release of imprisoned leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose dissent had been met with force. Also, Sadat actually supported the Islamic groups at times, since he needed a counterweight to the Nasserist left and the Marxists who dominated the student movements and made up the bulk of the secular dissent that was also present in Egypt.
The formation of - and the recruitment to - al-Gamaa was further enhanced by the negative sentiments held by many after Egypt’s defeat in the October War of 1973, by Sadat's trip to Jerusalem to make peace with Israel, the government's support of the Shah of Iran, and Sadat's turn against the Islamist trends at the end of the 1970s.
Al-Gama’a was the part of the Islamic movement that, unlike the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood, followed the militant and anti-government teachings of Sayid Qutb, and later Omar Abd al-Rahman (known to have been involved in the World Trade Center bombing in 1993). Al-Gama’a worked closely with other jihadist groups, and it was not until 1984 that the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group and al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya finally went their separate ways. The teachings of Qutb read that Islam should be the sole source of authority, law, and governance, and the states should be ruled based on the teachings of the Quran. Qutb also taught that the use of force against governments that were not Islamic was acceptable according to the Quran and that the teachings that jihad (holy war) should only be pursued for defensive purposes was a misconception.
Although there had been violence between Islamic militants and Christians, and between demonstrators and police during the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the1980s, it was not until the Islamic Jihad group assassinated President Sadat on 6 October 1981 that the resolve of the militants became obvious. The unrest that followed the attack led to the first violence between al-Gamaa and government forces, and to a serious crackdown on militants. An outright rebellion did, however, not begin.
Many Islamist activists instead became involved in jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and did not return to Egypt until the beginning of the 1990s. With this influx of battle-hardened fighters, the situation in Egypt radically changed.
The rebellion by the al-Gama’a was initiated in 1992 through a small number of attacks in the Assiut province (southern Egypt) and Cairo. The first active year of the conflict was 1993, with the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths being crossed as early as in March when several militants and police were killed in clashes in Cairo.
Throughout the conflict Iran, Sudan, and Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda group are known to have been secondary supporting parties to al-Gamaa, providing safe havens, training, and weapons. On the side of the government, the US government has provided support to Egyptian forces through training in joint military exercises.
The distribution of power between the parties varied with the intensity of the government's persecution and imprisonment of members of the organization. In the conflict’s early phases, the distribution of power was closer to parity since the group enjoyed great popular support in some areas and since the government chose to fight the militants only with interior forces such as the police. In 1994 the al-Gama’a killed more police officers than the police killed militants, but by 1995 the tables had turned: many militants were killed, and thousands of extremists and sympathizers were arrested. In terms of geography, the bulk of the fighting stood in the Upper Egypt (southern Egypt) provinces of Minya, Assiut, and Sohag, but clashes were also located to militant hotspots in Cairo.
The al-Gama’a movement did not only attack government forces but also made use of one-sided violence during the conflict. Targeting especially suspected informers and Coptic Christians, several hundred civilians were murdered by the group.
The group’s path to becoming infamous was, however, sealed in 1997 when members of the group committed what came to be known as the Luxor Massacre. On 17 November, six al-Gama’a militants attacked tourists visiting the Hatsheput temple, killing 63 of them during a 45-minute killing spree. In addition to dealing with a terrible blow to Egypt’s tourism industry, the attack drew widespread resentment from the international community. Many al-Gama’a leaders denounced the attack, and recruitment soon became more difficult.
No overt negotiations were held or agreements signed between al-Gamaa and the Government of Egypt. But the eventual weakening of al-Gamaa resulted in a unilateral truce being called by imprisoned leaders during the spring of 1996 and the summer of 1997. This peace initiative was rejected by the government, which did not want to engage in talks with militants. The call for a truce was also rejected by some elements within the group, which ultimately led to a split into two major factions: a more peaceful faction headed by Mustafa Hamza, and a more violent faction run by Rifai Ahmad Taha.
The split within the group, the imprisonment of many of its top leadership, and the harsh countermeasures taken by the Egyptian government throughout 1997 and 1998 soon led to al-Gama’a’s demise as a movement. Many thousands of supporters and activists were imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities, and several hundred militants had also been killed in the fighting since 1993.
By the end of 1998, most al-Gamaa activists had ceased violent activities within Egypt.
In the years that followed the demise of the al-Gama’a movement, other Islamist groups have been present in Egypt, but have mostly carried out bombing attacks. One such group was Tawhid wal Jihad (Unity and Holy War), which carried out suicide bombings in the Sinai Peninsula in 2004 and 2005.
Escalation of violence in the Sinai Peninsula
The conflict over government in Egypt was restarted in 2014, after having been inactive since the 1990s. Since the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt, which started in 2011, the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula has deteriorated significantly. A number of different jihadist groups have taken advantage of the weakened security structure in the area and strengthened their positions. The security situation in the peninsula deteriorated further in 2013, following the military’s ouster of President Mohammed Morsi. The use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as targeted assassinations was frequently reported. In most cases, the incidents of violence were reported to have been carried out by unknown militants/terrorists/gunmen. The government troops also carried out a number of larger crackdowns in the Sinai Peninsula, resulting in high death tolls.
Some of the attacks in the Sinai Peninsula in 2013 were, however, assigned to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, but the violence was not included in UCDP data for 2013 due to lack of a stated goal of incompatibility.
In an article from 1 February 2014, it was noted that the group considers the police and army “apostates” and that they, therefore, consider it their religious duty to wage war against the security forces. According to the group, the police and army are “empowering a secular government that does not rule according to God’s laws” and are “protecting a constitution that permits what God has forbidden and forbids what God has permitted”. The precise date of these statements is not clear; therefore, 1 February 2014 was set at the date of first stated goal of incompatibility.
Clashes between security forces and members of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis took place throughout 2014. The clear majority of events took place in the Sinai Peninsula. In late October, the group carried out a large-scale attack on soldiers in the northern Sinai town of Sheikh Zuweid. Following the attack, President al-Sisi announced a three-month state of emergency and curfew in the area. The president also instructed the security forces to intensify the counter-insurgency operation.
In November 2014, the group pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) and became part of it. Since Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis became part of IS, the conflict over government was not seen as active in 2015. For more information, see Government of Egypt - IS.
The Emergence of Harakit Sawa’id Misr and Jama’at Ansar al-Islam
After Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged allegiance to IS, the conflict over government in Egypt was inactive in 2015 and 2016. The conflict was then reactivated in 2017 as two new armed groups emerged to challenge the Egyptian government: Harakit Sawa’id Misr and Jama’at Ansar al-Islam. The former, Harakit Sawa’id Misr (sometimes “Hasm” or “Hasam”), had initiated its armed struggle already in 2016, but the conflict failed to reach the 25 battle-related deaths threshold that year. The conflict remained active in 2018, as Egyptian security forces repeatedly targeted cells of Harakit Sawa’id Misr during the year. Harakit Sawa’id Misr claimed, despite promoting only a moderately religious agenda, to wage a “jihad” against the Egyptian government. The group focused mainly on nationalist appeals, and perceived the Government of Egypt as oppressive, given the declared state of emergency in effect at the time, and the wave of “unlawful” detentions made by the regime. As a result, Harakit Sawa’id Misr was particularly opposed to the Egyptian Interior Ministry and the police. Because of this, the group was through 2017 hesitant of targeting the Egyptian Army and civilian targets. While it also claimed to wage jihad, Jama’at Ansar al-Islam had a far more hardline Islamist orientation than Harakit Sawa’id Misr; there was no information regarding any cooperation between the two groups. Believed to be an al-Qaida affiliate, Jama’at Ansar al-Islam pursued the ousting of the Government of Egypt to establish an Islamic Caliphate ruled by Sharia law.
Amid the escalating territorial IS insurgency in the Sinai, as well as increasingly intense government crackdowns against suspected militants and suspected members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood organization, Harakit Sawa’id Misr launched its insurgency against the Government of Egypt. The exact affiliation, if any existed at all, of Harakit Sawa’id Misr was not known, but Egyptian authorities consistently labeled it as an “offshoot” or “armed wing” of the Muslim Brotherhood. The insurgency waged by Harakit Sawa’id Misr was to a large extent well-coordinated and included targeted assassinations, ambushes, and targeted car bombs. In one of its more high-profile attacks, the group managed to assassinate Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Hussein of the Egyptian police force. Unlike the insurgency waged Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (and subsequently IS), Harakit Saw’id Misr did not utilize the inaccessible Sinai Peninsula to stage its attacks, but concentrated most of its activities to the Greater Cairo area and other densely populated parts of the Nile Valley; it is, however, worth noting that also IS was known to carry out attacks outside of Sinai.
Previously unknown, Jama’at Ansar al-Islam made its first overt appearance in Egypt’s Western Desert province in October 2017. In what appeared to be a highly coordinated attack, militants from Jama’at Ansar al-Islam ambushed an Egyptian police convoy not far from the remote Bahariya Oasis on 20 October. On the road linking Bahariya to the Nile Valley, heavily armed militants managed to cut off the police convoy, killing an unknown number of police officers and recruits. The official death toll, which was much lower than other (unconfirmed) reports, was around 30, including both militants and security personnel. Initially, no militant group claimed responsibility for the attack, and Egyptian security sources placed the blame on Harakit Sawa’id Misr. The Egyptian armed forces also carried out several raids against the remnants of the militants responsible for the ambush, killing many, including what at the time was believed to have been a prominent commander.
In early November, the “Guardians of Sharia,” otherwise most known for distributing statements from an al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, forwarded a statement from Jama’at Ansar al-Islam, in which the group claimed full responsibility for the ambush. In the statement, Jama’at Ansar al-Islam declared that the “Battle of the Lion’s Den” (the ambush at Bahariya) was the first step in the group’s jihad against the Government of Egypt. The group also confirmed that one of its top leaders, Abu Hatem Emad al-Din Abd al-Hamid, had indeed been killed by Egyptian forces soon after the 20 October attack. Little definitive facts were known about Jama’at Ansar al-Islam, but Egyptian intelligence services suspected that the group was closely linked to, or perhaps even led by, a notorious Egyptian Islamist militant called Hesham al-Ashmawy, a former Egyptian special operations soldier. Al-Ashmawy had previously been affiliated to Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, but left the group after it pledged allegiance to IS, allegedly because of some sort of disagreement. His whereabouts after leaving IS were not entirely clear, but he has been suggested as the leader of an al-Qaida-linked group called “Al-Murabitun” (not to be confused with the Malian group al-Murabitun). Other sources state that Al-Ashmawy traveled to Derna in Libya in 2014, where he took charge of a local an al-Qaida cell; it remains unclear if this was “Al-Murabitun” or some other group. In October 2018, al-Ashmawy was arrested in Libya and in May 2019, he was handed over to the Egyptian authorities. The spokesperson of the Egyptian armed forces stated that he was executed by March 2020.
The conflict with Harakit Sawa’id Misr has remained active for four consecutive years until 2019.
