This dyad belongs to the conflict Sudan: Government
Summary of conflict Sudan: Government
Sudan suffered from an all-out intrastate conflict for over 30 years, with devastating consequences for both the population and the environment. The incompatibility between the Sudanese government and various rebel groups has centered on the concentration of political and economic power in Khartoum and the marginalization of peripheral regions. Religious and cultural divisions, along with competition over natural resources, have further contributed. While violence began in the south, it spread to Darfur in 2003. In April 2023, a new phase of conflict erupted between the SAF and RSF.
In 2025, the conflict over government in Sudan intensified significantly, resulting in over 12 000 fatalities compared to over 4 500 fatalities in 2024. The escalation was driven by military escalation and major shifts among armed actors. While the Government of Sudan, represented by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), remained engaged in large-scale hostilities with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the formation of the Sudan Founding Alliance (SFA) in February, uniting RSF, SPLM/A-North, and allied factions, broadened the war both geographically and tactically. Fighting remained particularly intense across Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum, as the government forces pursued territorial recapture campaigns in central Sudan while SFA increasingly relied on drone strikes, artillery shelling, and siege tactics.
A major turning point occurred in late October when RSF, under the banner of SFA captured El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and the last major SAF stronghold in Darfur region, after a prolonged siege. Its fall largely consolidated RSF control over most of Darfur, strengthening its territorial dominance in western Sudan, despite continued resistance from SAF-aligned forces. The capture also enhanced RSF supply lines and operational coordination across Darfur and neighboring Kordofan. Expanded drone warfare further marked a significant tactical shift, with RSF and allied forces increasingly targeting military installations, urban centers, and strategic infrastructure beyond traditional frontlines. Territorial shifts throughout the year significantly increased civilian vulnerability and further entrenched Sudan’s fragmentation.
Brief overview
Prior to July 2011 when South Sudan gained independence, Sudan stretched from Egypt in the north to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya in the south, from Chad and the Central African Republic in the west to Ethiopia and Eritrea in the east.
This vast country was divided along various ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. Moreover, the very high degree of centralization, with most resources and power concentrated in the capital Khartoum, has left other areas of the country marginalized.
Since its 1956 independence from British rule, the country has suffered almost constant conflict with different rebel groups consistently fighting against the government. The conflict over governmental power followed after the outbreak of a territorial conflict concerning the southern part of Sudan, which took place between 1963 and 1972.
The conflict over government has been active according to UCDP criteria in 1971, 1976, and from 1983 until 2018. For many years, the majority of the fighting took place in the southern part of Sudan, but after 2003 the fighting has mostly been located in the Darfur region in the western part of the country.
One of the most substantial divides (although grossly simplifying the actual situation) in Sudan has been between the predominantly Arab/Muslim north and the primarily African/Christian south. Until 1946, these regions were administered separately; northern Sudan governed by Egypt, at the time a British protectorate, while the British themselves administered the southern part. There were large differences between the regions, geographically, culturally, as well as in economic development. The south was and continues to be, remote and underdeveloped in comparison with the north.
When the two regions came together to become one country, the colonial rulers handed over power to the Muslim elite in the north, and thus began the northern domination and subsequent tension between the two regions.
Outbreak of secessionist and governmental conflicts and the Addis Ababa agreement (1963-1972)
The period after Sudan’s independence from British colonial rule was characterized by conflicts over both territory and governmental power, which ended up becoming connected.
After independence, large demonstrations broke out and in the early 1960s, an armed rebellion commenced in the south, involving former southern officers who had mutinied and formed the Anya Nya movement. A full-fledged civil war between this secessionist group and the Sudanese government concerning the status of southern Sudan characterized the 1963-72 period.
In 1969 a group of young officers, led by Colonel Jafaar an Nimeiri, seized power in Sudan and proclaimed the establishment of a democratic republic. Nimeiri became president and banned all political parties, and nationalized the banks and industries.
In 1971, following the announcement of a planned formation of the SSU (Sudan Socialist Union), which would assume control of all political parties, the government arrested several leading communists. This consequently led to a coup on 19 July 1971, carried out by prominent communist leaders. Nimeiri was held captive in the presidential palace for 3 days before loyal army units rescued him and arrested the coup-makers. Clashes between the coup-makers and the loyalist army reached the level of an armed conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths in one year).
Following the coup attempt, the government carried out mass arrests and several executions of communists and dissident military officers. The SSU was created in January 1972, as the only legal party in Sudan. However, Nimeiri was pushed to seek peace with the southern rebels to stay in power. Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie took on a mediating role, and in February 1972, the Addis Ababa peace agreement was reached. The agreement between the Government of Sudan and Anya Nya, ended the territorial conflict. It granted the southern region a measure of self-rule, and Anya Nya’s leader, Josef Lagu, approved its terms, and both sides agreed to a ceasefire. The formerly ruling Islamic conservative parties were banned and their leaders went into exile.
The secular presidency of Nimeiri was characterized by a lack of political strategy, which was picked up by critics and commentators who frequently used the term “unpredictable” as a descriptor.
National Front and the abortive coup of 1976
During his rule, President Nimeiri was subject to several coup attempts, the most significant of which occurred in Khartoum, on 2 and 3 July 1976. This coup was organized by the National Front, formed in 1974 by the leaders Sadiq al-Mahdi, former Prime Minister, and Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, former Minister of Finance. It was a coalition of banned conservative parties, consisting of Sadiq al-Mahdis wing of the Umma, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Charter Front, and the Nationalist Union Party - all parties opposed to President Nimeiri. Since the parties were banned in Sudan, the National Front was organized by politicians in exile. The rebel fighters had received military training and weapons in Libya. They had then secretly crossed the border in small groups, awaiting orders for the attack in Khartoum.
The president returned to Khartoum from a trip in the early morning of 2 July. Upon his arrival, most of Sudan’s ministers were present at the airport to receive him. Both the ministers and the president escaped the coup, perhaps due to the weather circumstances which had made the president’s airplane arrive early. The attack, however, was well prepared, and due to the factor of surprise, the rebels managed to cause large damage and instability.
On the same day, serious clashes took place on the streets of Khartoum; however, the Sudanese army managed to force a withdrawal of the rebels, and order was restored in the capital. The direct result of the coup attempt was, except for the material damage in Khartoum and the death of numerous civilians, the death of approximately 700 rebels and 83 government soldiers, and the conflict is therefore coded as a minor armed conflict (between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a calendar year) in UCDP data.
Since the National Front had received arms and training in Libya, Sudanese relations to this country soured. Moreover, many rebel leaders had been traveling using Ethiopian passports, which resulted in a worsening of Sudanese-Ethiopian relations as well. However, President Nimeiri realized his need for allies and thus initiated a process to include the Islamic parties in his government. This meant that the violent events of 1976 led to a national reconciliation process. Nimeiri initiated talks with the leader of the National Front, Sadiq al-Mahdi, which subsequently led to his return to Sudan from exile in London. The Amnesty Act of 1977 was announced in August, and about 1000 political detainees were released and over 30 prominent, conservative Islamic leaders-in-exile were offered amnesty.
However, the issue of reconciliation was surrounded by uncertainties since Nimeiri’s greatest achievement was the secularization of politics. The increasingly religious orientation of the regime led to great concern amongst the non-Muslim population; especially the majority Christian southern Sudan followed the events in Khartoum with concern. The following years were to be characterized by the struggle between the core of the SSU (Sudan Socialist Union) and the returned Islamic opposition members who had been in exile.
SPLM/A and the outbreak of conflict (1983-1985)
The beginning of the 1980s was characterized by turbulence, financial recession, violent clashes between protesting students and the army, deterioration of the relations with Libya, and an ill-advised decision to send Sudanese troops to fight on the Iraqi side in the Iraqi-Iranian war. Moreover, due to years of ineffectiveness, incompetence, alleged corruption, and general abuse of power, both SSU (Sudan Socialist Union) and the president received decreasing support from the Sudanese population. A continued drift into political instability was pending.
Developments in southern Sudan were reaching boiling point at this time and the discontent against the government posed a serious threat to the peace that had lasted since the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972. At the beginning of 1982, small-scale guerrilla activities occurred with great resemblance to the Anya Nya movement during the previous territorial conflict (1963-1972).
In 1983, the government announced changes in national politics, including the dramatic measures of dividing southern Sudan and adopting Sharia legislation. Many viewed the partition as a way to weaken the South and to once again move all power to the central government in Khartoum. On 29 April 1983, Sharia law for all Sudanese regardless of religious affiliation was adopted. The judicial process became chaotic and unpredictable in the following months, leaving no one, guilty or innocent, safe from the law. Even devout Muslims concluded that the version of Sharia presented by president Nimeiri had little to do with Islam.
The same turbulent year a rebel group based in southern Sudan, the SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army), decided to take up arms against the Khartoum regime. Around the same time, the group Anya Nya II had emerged. It consisted of former Anya Nya (see article above “Outbreak of secessionist and governmental conflicts and the Addis Ababa agreement (1963-1972)”) veterans who were never satisfied with the Addis Ababa agreement and were now re-dedicated to the separatist rebellion (Anya Nya II has never been included in UCDP data, but the information is important to the present context.) However, Anya Nya II was not a unified military organization and SPLM/A regarded it as an undisciplined group of rebels with whom they did not want to mix. Rather, the SPLM/A rejected the secessionist demands of Anya Nya II, and instead viewed the struggle in national terms, including all Sudanese irrespective of religion or origin and were fighting for a unified, democratic, socialist Sudan with religious freedom.
The leader of the [SPLM/A(/#/actor/466), from its formation until his death in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005, was John Garang. He continuously stated that he did not just seek a change in the status of the south, but rather a change in the Government of Sudan in its entirety. However, SPLM/A has seen internal divisions about how much focus should be placed on seeking independence/autonomy for what was the southern parts of Sudan up until July 2011 (present-day sovereign Republic of South Sudan), versus the amount of fighting-effort that should be made to achieve a change encompassing the whole of Sudan.
In 1983-1984, SPLM/A clashed with the already demoralized government forces and could, despite its numerical weakness (SPLM/A had an estimated 3000 soldiers and the government forces had an estimated 53 000) easily seize strategic areas and cities. By 1984, Sudan was involved in a full-scale civil war and suffered from heavy economic problems; industry was suspended, factories unable to produce even half of their capacity, and the influx of an estimated one million refugees from Ethiopia contributed to the famine that threatened vast areas of southern and western Sudan. The situation was getting increasingly intractable.
On 6 April 1985, as he was away on a state visit to the U.S., the Sudanese Army removed President Nimeiri in his absence. Former Defence Minister Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dahab replaced him, Nimeiri took refuge in Egypt, and the Transitional Military Council was set up.
New President Dahab expressed his ambition to initiate a peace process with the southern rebels. However, he lacked the skills of unifying leadership that Sudan needed. John Garang of SPLM/A made it clear that fighting would continue, despite Nimeiri’s ouster. Garang saw little difference in the new government and vowed that the SPLM/A would continue its fight against both racism and bigotry.
NIF and NDA (1985-1996)
The ruling Transitional Military Council almost immediately handed over power to a civilian government through general elections in April 1986. The elections were incomplete, and a coalition government was appointed including the conservative Islamic Umma Party, Democratic Unionist Party, and NIF (the National Islamic Front), which had succeeded the Islamic Charter Front as the main political instrument for the radical Muslim Brotherhood. The leader of the Umma Party, the former leader of the National Front, Sadiq al-Mahdi, was appointed Prime Minister.
Southern presence in the Assembly was, due to irregularities in the election, much smaller than it should have been. National politics became characterized by disagreements over Sharia law, the civil war with the SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army), and the country’s severe financial situation.
On June 30, 1989, yet another military coup took place in Sudan, and President Ahmed Ali al-Mirghani (in power since the 1986 elections) and Prime Minister Al-Mahdi were overthrown. From 1989 onwards, a military junta, headed by President Omar al-Bashir, represented the government side in the conflict. The coup was masterminded by Islamic extremists in the NIF and its leader Hassan Turabi. Political parties were banned, and strict Islamic legal codes were enforced.
The coup led to the formation of an umbrella opposition group called NDA (National Democratic Alliance), composed of different groups opposing the new military regime. In 1990, the SPLM/A joined the NDA, which at the time was a non-militant opposition group. The NDA had the ambition to remove the regime and set up a democratic system in Sudan, and as part of this new democratic system, the people in the south would have the right to a referendum on self-determination. The NDA was fairly loosely organized, composed of a variety of different entities, including both civil society organizations and rebel groups. Groups taking part in the alliance have on several occasions acted on their own, both when it comes to negotiations with and fighting against the government.
Until 1996, the NDA was a solely political platform, but in September 1996, it decided to set up a joint military force. After this point, the NDA was both an umbrella organization and an organization with forces and commanders fighting under its banner.
Also in 1996, another rebel group took up arms against the government. This rebel group was called SAF (Sudan Alliance Forces) and was composed of northern military officers who, under the leadership of Aziz Khalid, broke away from the government. During the years when SAF, NDA and SPLM/A were all fighting the government, the vast majority of the clashes took place between the SPLM/A and the government (SAF has never been included in UCDP data).
SPLM/A negotiations and continued fighting (1994-2003)
Since 1989, numerous attempts have been made to mediate an end to the conflict. During the early 1990s, none of these yielded any progress. In 1994, the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) peace committee, consisting of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, was launched, seeking to mediate between the Sudanese government and SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army). The IGAD-process continued over the following years and in 2001 these negotiations lead to a ceasefire agreement. However, fighting continued on a large scale between 2001 and 2003, and it should be noted that this process only included SPLM/A, and not the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) which was active in fighting between 1996 and 2001. Thus, in 1999 Libya and Egypt attempted to launch a parallel process between the NDA and the government. A five-point peace plan was presented the same year, but no negotiations were held. Due to Egypt's strong resistance to self-determination for the south, this initiative ran into great obstacles, and the SPLM/A rejected the whole process.
In 2002, a breakthrough in the IGAD-process was made as John Garang of the SPLM/A and President Omar al-Bashir met for the first time and, after negotiations, signed the Machakos Protocol. This was a framework accord and included general procedures for a transitional process and an agreement that further negotiations would take place to specify the terms of the protocol.
In 2003, the IGAD process continued, with the government and SPLM/A conducting talks in Kenya throughout the year. The negotiations mainly centered on the distribution of power and wealth, and in February the same year, the parties agreed on a framework concerning a Government of National Unity where the SPLM/A was to be the major partner. Furthermore, in September 2003, a security agreement was signed, and in December the parties agreed in principle on a 50-50 sharing of oil wealth in the south during an interim period. Aside from the negotiations, the ceasefire agreement was extended several times, and in contrast to previous years, the ceasefire held with only one exception in 2003. This meant that the fighting between the SPLM/A and the government was still ongoing, albeit on a significantly lower level of intensity than in previous years.
Overview of support, regional dynamics, and international response in the southern arena
Sudan is situated in a region characterized by poverty and armed conflicts and the Sudanese civil war has both influenced and been influenced by conflicts in neighboring countries. During these wars, there have been several shifts in international constellations.
Before the fall of Nimeiri's regime in 1985, SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army) received substantial support from Libya. The support began to decline in the mid-1980s, and as a consequence of the removal of Nimeiri in 1985, Libyan support was suspended immediately. During the 1980s, SPLM/A received crucial aid from the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, which provided both rear bases and arms. The fall of this regime in 1991 was a near-fatal blow to the movement. However, during the 1990s, SPLM/A managed to enlist the support of the new regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as of the Government of Uganda, as the Sudanese government was accused of aiding rebels in all of these states. However, a new setback for the Sudanese rebels came in the late 1990s, when outside support nearly dried up as a consequence of Ethiopia and Eritrea going to war against each other, and Uganda being drawn into the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Sudanese government on its part received aid from several different states. During the 1980s, it was given support and aid from the U.S., which saw Sudan as an important base between the anti-western regimes in Libya and Ethiopia. Moreover, several American companies (principally Chevron) had invested financially in Sudan and had a presence in the country which might have contributed to the amount of support given to the Government. Nimeiri often spoke in terms of the Cold War and the struggle against communism that Sudan fought. In 1985, well aware of the risk of Nimeiri’s fall by withdrawing its support, the U.S. suspended some of its aid as the Sudanese government failed to carry out the conditions of the aid program. However, US military aid continued.
Egypt has been another important ally of the Sudanese government and in 1976 the two states entered into a military defense pact. After the removal of the pro-western Nimeiri, Libya supported the government.
However, it is worth noting that since 1992, when aid from Libya dried up, other states in the region have not given any help to Khartoum. The government has instead relied on support mainly from Iran, which has provided arms and military training. During the latter half of the 1990s, outside support to the government decreased substantially, something that was a great problem until the late 1990s when oil revenues started to increase.
Militarily, the fighting between the SPLM/A and the government has been characterized by large offensives and battles over strategically important locations. Initially, SPLM/A was stronger because of demoralization plaguing the government's army. However, in the early 1990s, the government forces gained the upper hand, as SPLM/A became severely weakened by the loss of Ethiopian support and was wrecked by internal fighting. The internal struggle was the result of differing views within the SPLM/A on the movement's political aspirations, struggles over power within the movement, and ethnic divisions. However, by the mid-1990s, the rebel group managed to recover most of these losses, and the government was under enormous pressure. Initially, the fighting had been concentrated in the southern parts of the country, but with the advent of the military campaign by NDA (National Democratic Alliance) in 1996, a second front was opened in the east, something that further weakened the state army. However, the situation changed yet again in the late 1990s, when SPLM/A lost most of its external support, whereas the government managed to mend fences with many of its neighbors and start collecting oil revenues.
The conflict has also struck the civilian population hard as both sides in the conflict have committed gross human rights violations. Since the end of the 1990s, when foreign companies began exploiting Sudan’s rich oil reserves in the south, the government has cleansed large areas in the south, killing people and burning villages, near the oil reserves.
Apart from the suffering of the population around the oil reserves, the initiation of oil export also led to an escalation of the conflict, as the rebels saw the oil pipelines as legitimate military targets and launched several attacks against them. Furthermore, the oil generated a welcome income for the government, which has been able to increase its military budget. It is estimated that two million people died as a result of violence, famine, and disease during the first 20 years of the war. During the same period, approximately four million people were displaced within Sudan and another 420 000 became refugees outside of the country.
SLM/A, JEM and the outbreak of conflict in Darfur (2003)
In early 2003, while the government and the SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army) were negotiating a settlement to the conflict mainly taking place in southern Sudan, conflict broke out in another area: the marginalized region of Darfur in the west. This new battlefront differed from the southern one such that a religious dimension could be seen in the latter since most people in the south are Christian. This factor was lacking in the new arena since the inhabitants of Darfur are Muslim. However, an ethnic dimension can be seen such that a lot of violence has pitted people of African origin against people with Arab roots. This division, while important, is however a gross simplification of a vastly more complex actual situation on the ground. While rebels predominantly hail from African groups whereas the regime’s recruits have been mainly Arab, violence pitting people from the same communities against one another has also been seen in the region (indeed, Arab-Arab violence has been the most lethal during recent years).
In Darfur, the Government of Sudan faced challenges from two separate rebel groups: First, SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army), previously known as the Darfur Liberation Front, issued a Political Declaration on 14 March 2003, stating that it had taken up arms against the Khartoum government to change the political system in Sudan. It demanded a united democratic Sudan based on equality, the separation of religion and state, complete restructuring and devolution of power, even-handed development, and cultural and political pluralism. A few months later, a second opposition group, JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), also launched an armed struggle against the government, seeking a federal system with autonomy for all states, a rotating presidency, and equal distribution of natural resources.
These two Darfurian rebel groups have cooperated both militarily and politically, and also discussed the possibility of uniting their two forces. However, this led to internal disagreement, and on some occasions fighting, between the two groups.
Just as was the case in the south, the fighting between rebels and the government in Darfur has been disastrous for the civilian population. Aside from the fighting between the rebel groups and the army, a government-aligned Arab militia known as Janjaweed has had a devastating effect on Darfur.
The Janjaweed, made up of some 20 000 militias, has been burning villages, looting, and killing people in the areas inhabited by ethnic groups of African origin, mostly Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. These acts of violence have created massive refugee flows inside Darfur and across the Chadian border. The relationship between the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed is heavily discussed. The government has repeatedly denied its responsibility for the Janjaweed. However, joint attacks by the government and the Janjaweed, former government officials stationed within the group, the limited effort to try to stop the attacks, as well as arming and payments to the Janjaweed, leave little doubt that the relationship was close.
The violence carried out by the Janjaweed, alone or together with government forces, was brutal, including acts such as rape, looting, and burning villages, aside from killing large numbers of people. The attacks were targeted, and together with statements showing that the purpose of this violence was to "change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes", amounted to ethnic cleansing. (The violence targeting civilians is coded as One-sided violence, (in instances where Janjaweed attacked together with government forces, the attacks were attributed to the government side, thus for more descriptive information see Government of Sudan – Civilians and Janjaweed – Civilians.)
The humanitarian situation in Darfur became dire, however, in 2005 it improved and the mortality rates decreased. Reasons for this were an overall reduction in the intensity of the clashes and an increased humanitarian response from the international community in assisting the civilian population with food and other types of humanitarian assistance.
SLM/A and JEM in negotiations with the government (2003-2004)
In 2003, negotiations between the SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) and the Sudanese government, mediated by the Chadian government, were held in Abeche, Chad. The parties signed a ceasefire agreement on 3 September 2003, but only a few days later the SLM/A accused the government of breaking the ceasefire, which it denied. They met again twice during the year, without any tangible results. The Chadian government had proposed a draft for a peace agreement, but the SLM/A demanded a presence of international monitors in Darfur, something the government rejected. JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) did not take part in any of the peace talks. In 2004, there were several rounds of peace talks between the government and both the SLM/A and JEM. Chad mediated a ceasefire agreement signed on 8 April, which, however, was violated by all parties throughout the year.
The SLM/A and JEM were dissatisfied with Chad as a mediator, since they considered Chad biased in favor of the government. Chad on its part did deploy troops in Darfur which fought together with the Sudanese government against the SLM/A in 2003.
In May 2004 the African Union (AU) initiated a peace process. Four rounds of talks were held during the rest of the year, resulting in the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission with 130 observers and some 300 military troops to protect them. A few agreements on the humanitarian situation were also signed. However, both the agreements and the ceasefire were heavily violated during 2004.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement with SPLM/A (2005)
In 2004 the peace process continued between the SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army) and the Government of Sudan with the parties making progress. In January an agreement on wealth sharing was signed, and on 26 May, three other protocols were signed: one on power-sharing and two concerning the three border regions (Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile states). After that, only technical issues remained to be resolved.
After having signed a Memorandum of Understanding in November, thereby committing to the peace process, the SPLM/A and the government signed a permanent ceasefire on 31 December. They signed the final agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), on 9 January 2005, putting an end to 22 years of conflict in southern Sudan. The peace agreement envisioned the slogan of legendary SPLM/A leader John Garang: "a New Sudan - One country, two systems". The agreement stipulated that Garang be made First Vice-President of Sudan, that Islamic Sharia law, imposed in 1983, would be lifted in the mostly non-Muslim south, which would also have a separate army. The north would keep the Sharia legislation and use an Islamic banking system.
The CPA further stipulated that a referendum would be held concerning the future of the southern parts of Sudan. The referendum should be held in 2011, six years after the signing of the agreement, and one of the options should be independence. Should the turnout favor independence, the territory of southern Sudan would become sovereign six months later.
The CPA has kept the peace between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A, and no more fighting at the level of an armed conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths in one year) has taken place.
Death of John Garang (2005)
On 30 July 2005, SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) leader John Garang died in a helicopter accident, just three weeks after he became Sudan's Vice-President as per the peace agreement signed in January. His death led to riots between southerners and northerners in Khartoum and the southern towns Juba and Malakal, resulting in the deaths of 130 people over three days. Supporters of Garang argued that the helicopter incident was not an accident and accused the government of being behind the attack. However, the leadership of the SPLM/A said that it was an accident and never accused the government of being responsible for Garang's death.
John Garang was succeeded by Salva Kiir (former army chief of SPLM/A) both as the new head of the SPLM/A and as First Vice-President of Sudan.
Further negotiations and fighting in Darfur (2005)
With the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in place between the SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army) and the government, international efforts to solve the ongoing fighting in Darfur continued. AU-sponsored negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the main Darfurian rebel groups, SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) and JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), continued throughout 2005 with several rounds of negotiations held in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. In July the parties signed a Declaration of Principles, including calls for refugees to be brought home and for new security arrangements, as well as more long-term principles such as respect for different ethnic and religious groups and equitable distribution of national wealth. While political leaders expressed hope that the agreement would lead to peace in the region, rebel commanders in the field painted a grim picture of the reality on the ground.
Further negotiations were held during the year but rebel divisions and violence on the ground plagued the talks. At the end of November, the 7th round of talks began, again in the Nigerian capital Abuja and brokered by the AU. No results were reached as the talks concluded during 2005. Thus far, negotiations had stalled on power-sharing and security arrangements, with the rebels demanding the redrawing of Darfur's borders and a Vice-Presidency for Darfur in the new government.
Armed conflict continued in Darfur during 2005, albeit at a significantly lower level than in late 2003 and 2004. A peacekeeping force, AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan), which had been present in the country since 2004, had a substantial numerical increase in 2005; from about 1000 peacekeepers to almost 7000. Moreover, there was a consolidation of areas controlled by the warring parties. However, the civilian situation was dire with a large part of the civilian population having either fled to neighboring countries or ended up in refugee camps as Internally Displaced Persons.
Overview of support, international response, and the humanitarian disaster in the Darfur arena
As the conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, this introduced new actors. Eritrea has aided the SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) and JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), by providing financial, political and material support, including arms, ammunition, military training, and equipment. The rebels have also received support from Chad and Libya. However, it has not been determined whether material support for the rebels in Darfur emanating from Chad and Libya was official government policy or rather the independent actions of government officials.
At the beginning of the conflict, Chadian President Idriss Déby supported the government side, but in 2004 he switched sides. Déby is Zaghawa, as are many of the rebels in Darfur, and consequently, many of his supporters could not accept aiding a government killing Zaghawa. They, therefore, forced him to stop supporting the Sudanese government, shifting support to the rebel side instead.
From a humanitarian perspective, the situation in Darfur has been viewed as one of the worst catastrophes in the world with hundreds of thousands of people estimated killed by violence, starvation, and disease since the eruption of conflict in the area, and millions of civilians have been left homeless. Discussions regarding whether or not the violence in Darfur would be considered genocide was taking place. In the end, it was decided not to use this terminology, thus there was no legal obligation to intervene.
A UN arms embargo was put in place on 30 July 2004, which, while not able to prevent the inflow of small arms into Darfur from neighboring states, may have impacted the deployment of heavy weapons that are easy to observe.
In 2005, the international humanitarian response to the Darfur crisis increased, and the civilian population was better assisted with for instance food. This, coupled with less fierce clashes, led to some improvements in the humanitarian situation. However, when violence increased again the following year, the security situation forced many NGOs and aid workers to leave the area. The result was that the number of people not reached by humanitarian assistance rose again.
Escalation, rebel factionalization in Darfur, and attack on Khartoum (2006-2009)
Even though the overall situation improved throughout 2005 with less armed conflict and certain improvements within the humanitarian sector, several worrying factors existed. One prominent example was the increased tendency towards "warlordism", as Darfur slid into a state of lawlessness. This was illustrated for instance by the increased banditry in the region, including attacks against aid-workers and AU peacekeepers. Another complicating factor (especially as far as negotiations were concerned) was the factionalization among the rebels, with internal fighting within the SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) where two rival groupings vied for power, fighting between JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) and the SLM/A, and splinter groups emerging from JEM.
In 2006 these worrying tendencies accelerated, and the year was characterized by a heightened level of violence, a deteriorating humanitarian situation, further fragmentation among the rebels, and a peace agreement that instead of resolving the conflict lead to a worsening of the situation on the ground.
Clashes between the government and the rebels increased in intensity during 2006 and their intensity again reached the threshold of war (over 1000 battle-related deaths in a year). Most of the fighting was between the government and an alliance formed at the beginning of July, named the NRF (National Redemption Front). However, fighting with other rebel groups also occurred several times throughout the year.
The fragmentation among the rebels which started at the end of 2005, escalated throughout 2006, and continued during the first half of 2007. At times "dozens" of rebel groups were reported to be in Darfur. Different breakaway-factions from the SLM/A caused most of the fragmentation, but there were also reports of splits within JEM.
The most important factor in creating the fragmentation on the rebel side was the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) that was signed by the Government of Sudan and the SLM/A - MM (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minawi faction), named after its leader, on 5 May 2006. Under the terms of this agreement, Minawi was appointed Presidential Advisor. Many commanders from Minawi’s group did not approve of him signing the DPA, and consequently left and created new factions or joined other rebel groups. In addition to this, other commanders left the leader of SLM/A, Abdul Wahid, because he signed the DPA.
Despite the numerous splits, the main incompatibility with the government remained the same, and the different groups also often cooperated militarily against government troops. However, in addition to clashes with the government, several clashes between different rebel factions also took place. The most severe of these involved the SLM/A - MM against other factions that had not signed the DPA. The amount of violence did not decrease at all after the signing of the DPA, and instead, the second half of the year was much more violent than the first five months.
During 2007 several rebel unification processes were launched. These did not lead to any substantial decrease in the number of groups until an SPLM/A-facilitated process in Juba (Southern Sudan) had some success. This process resulted in an umbrella movement called URF (United Resistance Front) and the unification of some SLM/A commanders under the leadership of Ahmed Abdelshaafie, a former adviser to Abdul Wahid. At the end of 2007, there were, arguably, five different rebel factions: the SLM/A led by Abdul Wahid, URF, SLM/A led by Abdelshaafie, JEM and SLM/A-Unity. Of these SLM/A led by Wahid, JEM and SLM/A-Unity have been included in UCDP data over the course of the conflict.
In May 2008 the conflict came to affect the capital city in a way it had not done before, as JEM attacked Omdurman, the twin city to Khartoum, in May. This event should be understood in relation to the ongoing proxy-warfare between Sudan and neighboring Chad, which involved each regime supporting rebels fighting the other government. In February 2008 Chadian capital N’Djamena was attacked by the rebel AN (Alliance National or National Alliance) which enjoyed significant Sudanese support. (For more information see Chad: Government). JEM, which already enjoyed Chadian support, received even more after the February attack which was crucial for the Omdurman attack; indeed the Omdurman attack was seen as revenge for N’Djamena. However, the Omdurman attack was an exception in terms of location, and the rest of the fighting during 2008 and 2009 took place in Darfur.
Deteriorating Government of Sudan – SPLM/A relations (2007-2008)
The relationship between SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) and the regime in Khartoum deteriorated during 2007. During the fall, SPLM/A left the Government of National Unity, one result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2005. This move was a response to the slow implementation of the agreement. However, the group retracted its withdrawal at the end of the year. Tensions remained high in 2008 and serious incidents took place between the parties in 2008, especially in the tinderbox area of Abyei, on the border between northern and southern Sudan. However, both parties remained committed to the peace agreement.
Deployment of UNAMID (2007-2008)
Since Sudan and Chad each supported rebels fighting against the government of the other country, the situation in Darfur also heavily influenced Chad which borders the troubled area. Moreover, attacks against civilians by the infamous Janjaweed militia had taken place in Chad as well as in Sudan.
In 2007, the international community ran two parallel processes to try to solve the conflict. One was a joint UN/AU meditation attempt that had little success during the year, and the other was deploying a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping force in Darfur. The regime accepted, on paper, a hybrid force for Darfur named UNAMID (United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur).
UNAMID’s mandate started 1 January 2008 and stipulated that the mission was to have 26 000 men deployed at the end of 2007. However, the Sudanese government sought to hinder the deployment of troops, and consequently, one year after this deadline, at the end of 2008, only around 12 000 were deployed. Moreover, given the reluctance of outside countries to provide technical equipment, such as helicopters, UNAMID’s ability to carry out its mandate properly, was reduced.
Elections and the Government of South Sudan challenged (2010)
In April 2010, elections were held. They were won by the sitting government and President Omar al-Bashir but all international observers stated that they were neither free nor fair.
The elections carried implications for the north-south dimension of the conflict. In the southern state Jonglei, George Athor ran for Governor but was unsuccessful in this endeavor. He then accused the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) of fraud and demanded its dissolution. Fighting broke out at the end of April and continued in May. The coming months were calmer but in December fighting took place once more.
The clashes between the Forces of George Athor and the GoSS were located in the border area between Jonglei and Upper Nile. Despite negotiations and the Government of South Sudan pardoning George Athor and his men, no solution to the conflict was seen in 2010. The fighting killed between 90 and 299 people.
An explanatory note on this particular dyad is warranted in light of the UCDP definition of an incompatibility over government such that the stated goal should either be a removal of the government or else a substantial change to it. In 2010, South Sudan was part of the [Republic of Sudan]/#/country/625). George Athor’s stated goal included dissolving the present GoSS and forming a new one including independents and all southern political parties. However, to do so would entail a substantial change of the government of the entire Republic of Sudan. Thus, the incompatibility stated is included in UCDP data. (For more information, see Government of Sudan – SSDM/A.)
Attempts to stamp out the Darfurian rebels (2010)
As per the provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the people of southern Sudan were scheduled to hold a referendum concerning the future of the region, specifically whether the south would remain within Sudan or become an independent country. This meant a risk of war between the north and the south, and given the situation in Darfur, Khartoum wanted to avoid a challenging two-front war. Thus, the government initiated several offensives in Darfur during 2010, seeking to crush as much of the Darfurian rebel resistance as possible. This resulted in the highest levels of violence since 2006.
Most of the fighting took place between JEM and the government, but fighting between the government and SLM/A also caused many battle-related deaths.
Independence of South Sudan
2011 was a historic year in Sudan. On 9 January an overwhelming majority (99%) of the population of southern Sudan voted for independence in the referendum stipulated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. Consequently, Sudan split into two countries on 9 July, thereby forming the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, also as stipulated by the CPA.
Fighting, however, continued, and in Darfur, JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) and SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) continued their struggle against the government although at a lower level of intensity compared to previous years. Still, no durable solution for the continuing crisis in Darfur was within sight.
In addition to the Darfurian scene, fighting erupted between the government and a new rebel group called SPLM/A-North (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North) in the contested states South Kordofan and Blue Nile, close to the border to South Sudan. Although located in Sudan, large elements within these states feel more aligned with South Sudan and many people from these states fought on the side of South Sudan during the long war between SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. In the CPA which ended this fighting, the two states were given a special status. This meant that a popular consultation about security arrangements should be held before the end of the CPA period on 9 July, but no such consultations were held. Instead, an election over governorship was held in South Kordofan in May 2011. The election was won by the NCP (National Congress Party, the party of President Omar al-Bashir) candidate. The main opposition party SPLM/A-North (and most independent analysts) judge the election as neither free nor fair.
In early June the Sudanese army tried to disarm elements of the SPLM/A who had been able to keep their weapons in accordance with the CPA. SPLM/A-North refused to hand over the weapons and fighting erupted in South Kordofan on 5 June. A few days later, on 9 June 2011, the SPLM/A-North stated that it should work for removing the government. In September the fighting spread to the neighboring Blue Nile state.
The fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, continued throughout 2011, despite efforts by the AU and Ethiopia to find a negotiated solution.
A third scene experiencing violence was Abyei, located on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. This was however not a conflict over governmental power, but one with a territorial incompatibility. More information on this separate conflict can be found under Sudan: Abyei.
Lastly, there was also fighting taking place in the area that became South Sudan in July 2011. Two rebel groups, SSDM/A (South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army) and SSLM/A (South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) battled the Government of South Sudan (GoSS).
Before the independence of South Sudan came into effect, this fighting was part of the conflict in Sudan. The UCDP definition of an incompatibility over government states that the rebel groups should either want to remove the government or substantially change it. Up until 9 July 2011, present-day South Sudan was part of Sudan and not an independent country. The groups’ stated incompatibilities were just directed against the Government of South Sudan but removing it would be a substantial change to the government of the entire Sudan. Especially since SPLM/A (the dominant party in GoSS) was also part of a Government of National Unity until independence. However, after independence, the fighting is considered part of the intrastate conflict in South Sudan.
The fighting between the Government of South Sudan and SSLM/A and SSDM/A was intense during the months preceding the independence of South Sudan. (For information on the intrastate conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the SSLM/A and SSDM/A in the Republic of South Sudan, see South Sudan: government.)
Intense rebellion by the SRF (2011-2016)
In late 2011, the SRF was formed as an alliance between 4 groups: JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, led by Abdul Wahid), SPLM/A-North (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North), and SLM/A - MM (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minawi faction). It should be noted that Minni Minawi of the last group mentioned above had at this time left his post as Presidential Advisor to which he was appointed following the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006. The new group started to fight the government in 2011 in Darfur in the west, as well as in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states by the border to South Sudan.
The fighting between the SRF and the Government of Sudan originated from grievances within the affected regions. These have had different dimensions such as the political and economic marginalization of these areas in comparison with the Khartoum area. Besides, the tumultuous secession of South Sudan created hostile relations between Juba and Khartoum, hence the fighting could also be considered to have been part of a proxy war between the neighboring countries.
Rebel factionalization and SRF negotiations (2016-2018)
The rebellion continued into 2016, despite internal disputes resulting in the Darfur-based SRF members separating from the Blue Nile and South Kordofan-based SPLM/A-North alliance member. The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) established a roadmap agreement for negotiations, which was eventually signed by the government, SPLM/A-North and all the SRF alliance members except for the SLM/A in August 2016. Although negotiations soon stalled and the roadmap was not implemented, the signatories did implement unilateral ceasefires, and talks between the armed groups and the government continued. During the two following years, unilateral ceasefires and talks between the government and SRF alliance members occurred concurrently, which resulted in that the violence in the governmental conflict dropped substantially, to a historically low level of violence in 2017 and 2018, only similar to the levels experienced after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The government even embarked upon a national disarmament campaign, however, this triggered brief clashes with SARC in 2017.
A rift within SRF became visible when SLM/A did not sign the roadmap agreement in August 2016. The leader of the group, Abdul Wahid, refused to take part in any negotiations with the Sudanese government before the disarmament of pro-Government militias in Darfur, and the security of the population in the area was restored. By this time SLM/A stopped taking part in SRF's coordination meetings, and was the only group from the alliance that continued to fight the government in the following years, mainly in the Jebel Marra area of Darfur, consequently splintering from the alliance. Further factionalization within the rebel groups took place in 2017, as the SPLM/A-North split into two factions after a leadership struggle between Abdelaziz al-Hilu and Malik Agar. al-Hilu managed to retain the majority of the forces of SPLM/A-North and the leadership of the group, those loyal to Malik Agar formed the SPLM/A-North - MA faction.
In response to the lower levels of violence in Sudan, the UNAMID peacekeeping mission continued to scale down its operations during 2018, a process that had started a few years earlier.
2019 - a year of transitions
Drastic changes took place in Sudan in 2019. The widespread protests against President al-Bashir that had started in December 2018, continued and gained momentum in 2019. al-Bashir was ousted on 11 April 2019 and was replaced by a Transitional Military Council, nevertheless, the protests continued against the military rule of the country. Protests were sometimes brutally put down by security forces, and clashes between the protesters and the security forces took place occasionally. The Transitional Military Council was dissolved in August 2019, and the civilian-led Sovereignty Council, with Abdalla Hamdok as Prime Minister, took over the transitional government.
The halting peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SRF, gained new momentum after these political changes. The parties, including SPLM/A-North, no longer part of the rebel alliance, met for peace talks on several occasions during the fall of 2019 in Juba in neighboring South Sudan. Several peace agreements, including political roadmaps and cessation of hostilities agreements, were signed.
From Power Struggle to War: The SAF-RSF conflict
Sudan plunged into a bloody armed conflict once again on 15 April 2023, repeating its history of violent power struggles. On one side stands Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the de facto ruler of Sudan since the 2021 coup. On the other side is Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, who was formerly al-Burhan’s deputy and is considered one of the most powerful men in Sudan. Hemedti leads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an organization notorious for committing atrocities against civilians.
The relationship between al-Burhan and Hemedti dates back to the early 2000s, when both played key roles in the civil war in Darfur. Al-Burhan operated within the formal military hierarchy of the SAF, while Hemedti rose to prominence as a senior commander of the Janjaweed—a collective name used for various Arab militia groups in Darfur. The Janjaweed were mobilized by then-president Omar al-Bashir to suppress rebellion in the region. In 2013, elements of the Janjaweed were reorganized into the RSF, which was formally recognized by the state. Hemedti assumed leadership of the new force, which quickly gained autonomy, military capacity, and financial power—particularly through control of gold mining operations.
In December 2018, widespread protests erupted against President Omar al-Bashir’s three-decade-long regime, culminating in his ouster by the military in April 2019. A Transitional Military Council (TMC), led by al-Burhan with Hemedti as his deputy, assumed power. Civilian protests continued, prompting negotiations—under pressure from the African Union and other international actors—which resulted in a power-sharing agreement in August 2019. A Sovereign Council was formed to lead the country to democratic elections by 2022, composed of both military and civilian representatives.
However, in October 2021, al-Burhan and Hemedti jointly staged a coup, dissolving the civilian-led government and the Sovereign Council and declaring a state of emergency. Al-Burhan became Sudan’s de facto head of state, with Hemedti as his deputy. The coup was met with mass demonstrations, particularly in Khartoum, which were violently suppressed by both the SAF and RSF.
In the aftermath, divisions between the two leaders deepened. Al-Burhan increasingly aligned himself with elements of the former al-Bashir regime, while Hemedti sought to position himself as a reformist, cultivating ties with some civilian leaders. Amid growing instability, international mediators brokered a new transitional framework agreement in late 2022. A central and contentious provision of the deal was the integration of the RSF into the SAF.
Disputes over the timeline and structure of this integration became the flashpoint. Al-Burhan insisted on a two-year timeline under SAF command, while Hemedti demanded a ten-year period, likely to preserve the RSF’s autonomy and his own influence. As negotiations stalled, both sides began mobilizing forces in key locations, especially in and around Khartoum.
The immediate trigger for the outbreak of hostilities came on 13 April 2023, when RSF forces mobilized near Merowe, a strategically important town in Northern State that hosts a military airbase. Al-Burhan denounced the RSF’s movements as unauthorized and issued an ultimatum demanding their withdrawal. Despite international efforts to de-escalate, full-scale fighting broke out on 15 April in Khartoum. On 17 April, al-Burhan officially dissolved the RSF and declared it a rebel group.
In the initial weeks of the war, violence was concentrated in densely populated urban areas, particularly those with significant military infrastructure, including headquarters and bases held by both sides. The conflict rapidly escalated, plunging Sudan into a nationwide civil war with severe humanitarian consequences.
The intensity of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) slightly decreased in 2024 compared to the previous year, with over 4500 fatalities. While heavy fighting continued in Khartoum, a major shift occurred with the RSF’s rapid expansion into Gezira state, following its capture of the regional capital, Wad Madani, in December 2023. This marked one of the RSF’s most significant gains, effectively extending its control eastward. The takeover accompanied by reports of targeted executions, as RSF forces sought to eliminate perceived SAF sympathizers.
In North Darfur, El Fasher emerged as a critical battleground. El Fasher held strategic importance both as a military stronghold and a humanitarian hub sheltering hundreds of thousands displaced civilians. In May 2024, the RSF launched a large-scale offensive to seize the city, triggering intense clashes. The SAF relied heavily on airstrikes to defend its positions, while RSF forces carried out ground assaults and imposed siege tactics, cutting off key access routes.
