This dyad belongs to the conflict Mali: Azawad
Summary of conflict Mali: Azawad
The territorial conflict, fought between a number of Touareg and Arab rebel groups and the Malian government, concerns the status of the Azawad region in northern Mali. With some seeking independence and others fighting for autonomy, the rebels have pursued their armed struggle intermittently in the 1990s and 2000s. By 2012, MNLA (subsequently CMA) emerged as the largest mainly-Touareg group and a new phase of the conflict commenced. After initially succeeding in pushing government troops from northern Mali and declaring the independent state of Azawad in April 2012, an alliance of Islamist groups evicted MNLA from the main cities of the region. A conflict over government subsequently ensued, pitting the Islamists against the Bamako regime.
In 2013, France intervened on the side of the Malian government, and managed to push the Islamists from all towns in the north. With the weakening of the Islamists, MNLA re-appeared, seizing control of Kidal, a regional capital in the north. This caused friction with the government, which aimed to re-establish control over the north. After a new bout of fighting in 2013, a ceasefire was reached and a negotiation process initiated. The fact that the northern population is split on the question of independence complicated both the situation on the ground and the negotiations. Eventually two groupings emerged and were formalized: CMA (including MNLA), demanding independence or autonomy, and Platform, representing those opposed to this idea. A peace agreement was signed in mid-2015, but implementation was slow. In 2023, CMA joined CSP-PSD, a broad umbrella bringing together groups that had previously been divided between the CMA and Platform camps. When the new umbrella became embroiled in fighting against the regime, it did so with a broader set of goals, encompassing both the Azawad territory and ousting the military junta. Thus, this is recorded as a new conflict in UCDP data.
Background to the conflict
The Tuaregs are a pastoral, nomadic people, scattered among a number of West- and North African states. In Mali, they comprise less than ten percent of the total population, but make up much of the population in the sparsely populated northern regions of the country, deep in the Sahara desert. This area is called Azawad by the Touaregs, a term used in the names of all rebel groups in the armed conflict in the 1990s. Traditionally, the North in general, and the Tuaregs in particular, have been both economically and politically neglected. This neglect has been compounded by severe drought and a brutal, southern, military presence. Dissent has been expressed numerous times since independence, but until the 1990s, the government managed to repress it.
In the mid-1970s and onward, large numbers of young Tuaregs from both Mali and Niger emigrated to Libya and Algeria due to severe droughts. The ones who ended up in Libya received military training, as General Muammar Gadaffi incorporated some into his regular military forces and inducted others into a Libyan-sponsored "Islamic Legion". The latter was subsequently dispatched to Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan, where numerous Tuaregs acquired considerable combat training. Along with the military training received, the emigrants in Libya were politically active and soon the so-called Tanekra (uprising) emerged, a nationalist movement that began preparing for an eventual rebellion. The group also took a more formal name: the Mouvement Touareg de Libération de l'Adrar et de l'Azawad, and declared its dedication to the liberation of the northern areas of Mali and Niger. In 1988, encouraged by Libya, the Malian section of the movement split from the Nigerien one, and formed MPLA (Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azaouad: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) under the leadership of Iyad ag Ghali. In the late 1980's, most Malian Tuaregs were expelled from Algeria and Libya, due to deteriorating economic conditions in the host countries. Newly received military capabilities combined with protracted historic grievances and a lack of alternatives, subsequently led the Tuaregs in MPLA to initiate an armed struggle against the Malian government in June 1990.
The early 1990's: Fighting and Factionalization of the Rebels
Initially MPLA was the only Tuareg organisation fighting the government. However, already during the latter part of 1990, as negotiations were initiated, the Arab component of the movement broke away and created FIAA (Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azaouad: Arab Islamic Front of Azawad). The group was the first to take an explicitly ethnic and religious title and it had a more militant Islamic orientation. One of the main reasons for its creation in 1990 was the concern of the Arabs that they would receive too small a share of the benefits from government negotiations.
Apart from MPLA and FIAA, two further groups emerged in the region in 1991: FPLA and ARLA (Armée Révolutionnaire pour la Libération de l'Azaouad: Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad). While fighting between the government and ARLA never caused 25 battle-related deaths during a year, which means that the group was never recorded as active in UCDP data, it needs to be mentioned and acknowledged in order to understand the dynamic within the rebel camp during these years.
In early 1991 FIAA and MPLA signed the Tamanrasset accord with the government, and the latter changed its name to MPA (Mouvement Populaire de lAzaouad: Popular Movement of Azawad), dropping the contentious "Liberation" and limiting its aim to autonomy. In a reaction to this, the more heard-line FPLA was formed when a group broke away from MPA. In November the same year, MPA split yet again, as ARLA was created. Both groups returned to the ideology of independence and rejected the Tamanrasset agreement. However, despite their differences, these four organisations in late 1991 came together and formed an umbrella organisation, MFUA (Mouvement et Fronts Unifiés de l'Azaouad: Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad), in order to be able to present a unified front in negotiations with the government (see below).
During the first phase of the conflict the government accused a number of neighboring states of aiding the rebels. However, none of these allegations have ever been confirmed and most observers hold that they stemmed from the government troops inability to respond effectively to the guerrillas type of warfare. Even though the rebels never outnumbered the government troops, the latter were not trained to fight a guerrilla war, with the rebels launching mainly nocturnal attacks in - to them - familiar territory. Fear and frustration led the army to respond by unleashing a campaign of violence, which primarily targeted the civilian Tuareg population. This, in turn, initially created hundreds of new rebels, as young Tuaregs fled into the hills to escape massacre.
The level of violence fluctuated during the conflict. In 1990, the conflict quickly escalated and throughout the year, the government suffered a series of humiliating defeats. Following the Tamanrasset agreement, there was a decline in organized violence. However, as both FPLA and ARLA rejected the 1990 agreement violence continued, albeit on a lower scale. FIAA, a signatory of the accord, soon rejected it and resumed its armed struggle. In 1994, when the other organisations to a large extent had given up the armed element of their struggle against the government, FIAA escalated its operations. Complicating the situation even further was the fighting between the Tuareg groups, which escalated during 1994.
Negotiations in the first half of the 1990's
Negotiations were initiated soon after the armed conflict had started. This was due largely to a combination of the facts that the rebels had scored major victories early on, and that the dying Malian regime of Moussa Traoré badly needed the troops deployed in the north back in the capital to restore its authority. Thus, in January 1991, the government, MPA and FIAA met for the first time in Tamanrasset, Algeria, with Algeria participating as mediator. In the resulting Tamanrasset Peace Accords a ceasefire was stipulated, as was the release of Tuareg prisoners and the revoking of the state of emergency. Most importantly, though, the accord provided for a high degree of autonomy for the North. Only two months later Traoré's regime fell. Even though the new leadership confirmed its support for the agreement, both the armed forces and the greater public were dissatisfied with it, feeling that the territorial integrity of Mali had been compromised. In addition, FIAA soon declared that they no longer supported the accord. All this, together with a lack of funding, led to a failure to implement the agreement.
Following a series of preparatory meetings, four rounds of negotiations were held in Algiers from late December 1991 to March 1992. Again, the Algerian government played a key role as mediators, this time joined by Edgar Pisani for France and Ahmed Baba Miské of Mauritania. The rebels now negotiated together in the newly established umbrella organisation MFUA . On 11 April the National Pact was signed. This agreement accepted special administrative structures for the country's three northern regions, provided for the incorporation of Tuareg rebels into the armed forces as well as for the integration of Tuaregs into national politics and the national economy and called for the demilitarization of the North. During 1993-94, amidst continued violence, primarily carried out by FIAA, there was a string of negotiations and agreements concerning the interpretation and implementation of the National Pact, between the Malian government and MFUA. On 7 January 1995 FIAA, the only group still officially fighting, declared a total ceasefire, via the Algerian mediators. The same month the group announced its willingness to cooperate in the restoration of peace and thus accepted to reintegrate itself into the peace process. This phase of the conflict was officially terminated when the FIAA announced an end to its armed struggle in June 1995.
On 27 March 1996, the so-called Flame of Peace ceremony was held in Timbuktu. Conducted to mark a final conclusion to the conflict, the ceremony saw some 3 000 decommissioned weapons be destroyed symbolically in a giant fire. Furthermore, FPLA leader Zeidane ag Sidalamine, representing all four rebel groups, as well as the Songhai MPGK militia, announced their formal dissolution.
Ibrahim Bahanga, ATNMC and the 2007-09 rebellion
After 12 years of relative calm, the conflict erupted again in 2007, this time involving a new rebel group: ADC - IB (Alliance démocratique du 23 Mai pour le changement - Ibrahim Bahanga: Democratic Alliance for Change of 23 May - Ibrahim Bahanga faction). The Ibrahim Bahanga faction had broken away from the original ADC group, which had briefly fought the government in 2006, albeit not to such a degree that the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was crossed. Many of the fighters in both ADC and the Bahanga faction had been active in the rebel groups of the 1990's and the demands were the same. The rebels had been integrated into the Malian armed forces following the National Pact signed in 1992 but felt discriminated against because of the slowness of their promotions and the mediocrity of their attributed tasks. When ADC signed a peace agreement with the government in July 2006, a faction of the movement under Ibrahim Bahanga rejected the accord and in May 2007 they launched their struggle.
The group continued its struggle in 2008, changing its name to ATNMC (Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement: North Mali Alliance for Change). A ceasefire was agreed in April and succeeded in producing a lull in rebel attacks for almost a month. However, in May fighting erupted again. An Algeria-led negotiation bid was launched in July and resulted in a ceasefire. Ag Bahanga appears to have been skeptical to the Algerian process, though, and in October he moved to Libya with his family. In December he surfaced in Mali again when ATNMC attacked a desert garrison post. This resulted in one of the bloodiest battles since Ag Bahangas faction launched its armed struggle in 2007.
Following the December 2008 fighting, the army launched an offensive in January 2009 and managed to capture and destroy Boureissa, the main rebel base, located in Tinsalak near Mali's border with Niger. After further defeats Ag Bahanga left the country and hundreds of ATNMC fighters joined the ongoing peace process between the government and ADC. However, the situation in northern Mali remained tense due to the presence of the Algerian rebel group AQIM in the region. Ag Bahanga subsequently spent the rest of 2009 and most of 2010 in Libya and Algeria. While reports at the time indicated that he was increasingly isolated, reports in 2012 suggest that he was in fact actively involved in the preparations for the re-launching of the conflict in January 2012 (for more information on this, see The Emergence of MNLA, below). During these preparations, he died in unclear circumstances in August 2011.
The Emergence of MNLA and the 2012 conflict
In 2011, regional developments related to the Arab Spring, together with the tense situation in northern Mali together spawned the outbreak of a new episode of the conflict over Azawad. To understand how regional developments could influence developments in Mali one needs to return to the long-standing relationship between the Tuareg and Libyan President Muammar Gadaffi described in ‘Background to the conflict’. As previously described, in the late 1980's, most Malian Tuaregs were expelled from Libya, due to deteriorating economic conditions. Only those Tuareg who had obtained Libyan citizenship were able to stay and many of those returning launched the 1990 separatist rebellion (see above). With the signing of the 1992 peace accord, some hardliners, rejecting the agreement, returned to Libya and became senior officers in the Libyan army. In 2011 the fall of Gaddafi spawned a change in direction of the flow of fighters between the two countries, and well-armed and battle-hardened Tuareg returned to Mali.
The returning fighters entered an already volatile situation. Northern Mali, on the eve of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, was characterized by a lack of economic development, limited presence of administrative structures and a general resentment with the central government; many of the same grievances that had bred earlier Tuareg uprisings. Furthermore, insecurity was rife, with the region serving as a haven for smugglers, traffickers and the transnational militant AQIM. The president at the time, Amadou Toumani Touré (commonly called ATT) ruled the north through a network of alliances with rival and opportunist elites. In this context, many of the returning fighters chose not to disarm, but withdrew to the hills of Tin-Assalak, north of Kidal in Northern Mali. In October 2011 they, together with remnants from the ATNMC and a Tuareg political organization called MNA, (Mouvement national de l’Azawad: National Movement of Azawad) formed MNLA (Mouvement national de libération de lAzawad: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad).
The new group, under leaders such as Bilal Ag Acherif, a cousin of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga (Secretary General) and Mohammed Ag Najem, a former professional officer in the Libyan army (Head of Military Operations), immediately made it clear that their objective was to free ‘the people of Azawad from the illegal occupation of their territory by Mali, which has been the cause of decades of insecurity in the region. Furthermore, in an interview with the media official for the new movement, he stated that the rebels were preparing to declare a state in northern Mali and to launch military operations against the Malian military if they were not granted self-rule. He went on to give the Malian Government until 5 November before starting to implement their threats on the ground.
Also formed in late 2011 was another Tuareg rebel group, Ansar Dine. Its leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, a veteran from the rebellions of the 1990's, had initially attempted to gain a leading role in MNLA, but was rebuffed due to his links with AQIM, past conflicts with parts of the Touareg community and diverging ideas of what the ultimate aim of the new group should be. Favoring the implementation of sharia in the whole country to the creation of an independent Azawad, Ag Ghali subsequently went on to form Ansar Dine, which became an increasingly important player during 2012, fighting against the Malian regime in a conflict over government.
On 17 January 2012, MNLA launched its armed struggle and with the Malian Army in a state of disarray, the rebels quickly made large territorial gains. Between January and mid-March the group, backed by an increasingly strong Ansar Dine, was able to capture nearly a third of the country’s territory. These developments bred widespread protests in the capital, Bamako, culminating in a coup on 22 March, with a group of junior officers under Amadou Sanogo ousting ATT. The army subsequently dissolved from within and the main northern towns fell in succession to the rebels in late March. On 6 April MNLA declared the formation of the independent state of Azawad, comprising the three northern regions Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. With that, the military phase of the conflict was terminated for 2012 and Moussa Ag Assarid, a Paris-based spokesman for the group announced that the group was ceasing military operations because it had reached its goal.
However, at this point the luck started to change for MNLA. Its relationship with Ansar Dine had started to deteriorate as the former became increasingly outspoken on their goals and grew in strength, often at the expense of the separatist MNLA. As the rebels pressed south, they entered territory where the population was more favorable to the message of Ansar Dine than to MNLA's separatist agenda, which the former used to its advantage. Furthermore, the presence of two other Islamists groups in the area, AQIM and MUJAO, started to shift the balance of power in favor of Ansar Dine. Ag Ghaly had longstanding links to especially AQIM and they started to pay off, as the group received reinforcement both in terms of men and weapons. During April and May it became clear that the Islamists had created a joint alliance against MNLA and the latter was pushed out of all main towns. The major showdown took place in late June, when the separatists were forcibly evicted from Gao, where they had set up their provisional government. Prior to this, MNLA and Ansar Dine had made an attempt to patch up their differences though negotiations. A deal had even been reached in late May, whereby the two groups agreed to merge and create the independent Islamic state of Azawad. MNLA had thus compromised on their outspoken secular stance, while Ansar Dine had conceded their goal of transforming the system of government in the whole of Mali. However, the agreement broke down almost immediately and Ansar Dine turned again to their Islamist allies. As MNLA withdrew into the desert after the late June fighting, the Islamists set about creating a de facto Islamic state where Sharia law was strictly enforced.
Throughout the rest of the year, Ansar Dine, together with AQIM and MUJAO, remained in control of the northern part of Mali, while MNLA attempted to re-group in the countryside. After the government troops were driven out of the north in late March, no attempt was made by the government to re-take the region. There were protracted negotiations on a possible military intervention by a primarily West African force, preferably under a UN mandate, but by the end of the year no conclusive decisions had been made as to how and when this should be launched.
Diplomatic wrangling
In 2013 the other conflict active in Mali – that over governmental power – escalated markedly as the Islamist groups pushed south, spawning intervention from first France and soon thereafter an ECOWAS-organised force under the name AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali). The conflict over the status of the Azawad region failed to re-ignite, however. As the Islamist groups were forced to retreat to the Adrar des Ifofghas Massaif, leaving all urban centers of northern Mali, MNLA quickly seized the opportunity to re-take control of Kidal town, one of its previous bastions. This was tolerated by the intervening forces that were the first to reach the north, France and Chad and the latter states came to cooperate with MNLA on security-related issues. Bamako was not impressed, however, and the first half of the year saw diplomatic wrangling, with the government seeking to gain access to the Kidal region and the rebels refusing, stating that they would not concede control without substantial negotiations taking place. Another hotly debated issue was the question of whether it would be possible to hold nation-wide elections in the summer.
After ten days of reportedly tense negotiations, a ceasefire agreement was signed on 18 June. The accord allowed for Malian army troops to enter Kidal to be able to secure the July ballot and stipulated that an "inclusive dialogue" between the new Malian administration and the rebels be initiated 60 days after the new cabinet had been formed. Furthermore, it provided for MNLA fighters to be assembled at agreed sites under UN supervision but not disarmed until a long-term peace accord had been achieved.
On 28 July the presidential vote subsequently went ahead. Voter turnout was however low in the Kidal area, estimated by the election commission at 12 percent in the district. After a second round run-off held on 11 August, former Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was declared winner and new president of Mali. His election was cautiously welcomed by the Tuareg rebels, with Sidi Mohammed Ag Sarid, homeland security spokesman for MNLA saying that “he may be the man for the job, given his past. … He has never been responsible for acts that have harmed Azawad."
On the ground the ceasefire was fragile, however and there was fighting in Kidal in both late 2013 and in May 2014, ahead of a planned visit by Prime Minister Moussa Mara. By 21 May, the Malian army had been driven out by Kidal and it subsequently withdrew towards the Niger River region and to barracks in the north.
The emergence of CMA and Platform
Between February and June 2014, consultations were held in Algeria, intended to bring together the many disparate groupings of the north under one unified front. Divisions were too deep, however – both between Tuareg groups and other ethnic groups, and within the Tuareg community – and the attempt failed. There is a fear among the other ethnic groups of the north, that an independent Azawad state would mean marginalization under the more numerous Tuareg, wherefore they tend to favor a unified Mali. Furthermore, Tuareg society has traditionally been hierarchical, with nobility and vassals. There is a history of tension and competition between the different sub-clans and this has come to the forefront in the context of the armed conflict. MNLA is mainly made up the Ifogha sub-group, which is the Tuareg nobles who have ruled over other Malian Tuareg since the colonial era. Thus, many of the sub-groups view the independence-project with skepticism. Especially the Imghad sub-group, traditionally a vassal group, are opposed to the idea of an independent north, instead seeking autonomy within Mali and strong development aid from the central government.
In June the various northern groups eventually grouped themselves into two main camps: CMA (Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad: Coordination of Azawad Movements) and Platform. The former included MNLA, MAA-Ould Sidatti, HCUA, CM-FPR II (joined in August) and CPA (joined in September), all of which are pro-independence, whereas the latter was made up of MAA and CM-FPR, seeking national unity. In August, GATIA was founded; a self-defense militia mainly drawn from the Imghad community. The group quickly allied with the Platform side.
Peace agreement amidst continued fighting
In September 2014, negotiations were initiated under the auspices of Algeria, but soon ran into trouble. A number of further rounds ensued, but little progress was made. The process was further complicated by the fact that fighting between supporters of CMA and the Platform broke out intermittently. The non-state fighting revolved around the competition for control over territory and apart from creating problems for the peace process, it also caused renewed violence between the government and CMA. The level of inter-connectedness between the non-state and the state-based conflicts could be seen clearly in late April 2015. On 27 April, GATIA and allied groups from Platform attacked Menaka, an important town held by CMA, managing to oust the latter. Two days later, citing their right to exercise legitimate self-defense in the light of the Menaka attack, CMA forces attacked government troops in Goundam and Lere. The fighting was intense and caused over 20 fatalities.
Despite the continued violence, a peace agreement was signed in May. However, while signatories included the government and Platform, only a small portion of CMA agreed to it, prompting continued negotiations. The remainder of CMA demanded that Platform withdraw from Menaka for it to consider signing the accord. After efforts by the mediators, the Platform groups withdrew from Menaka on 18 June. The following day the government lifted arrest warrants against 15 leaders of CMA. This served to assuage the concerns that the latter had to travel to Bamako for the signing of the accord.
Subsequently, on 20 June 2015, the remaining parts of CMA signed the accord, which grants the northern region some autonomy, but makes clear that the territorial unity of the country will persist. Furthermore, the agreement provides for the integration of the rebels into the security forces in the north and for improved representation of the region in state institutions.
Implementation of the accord proceeded slowly and with difficulty. While the conflict was not recorded as active after 2015, intermittent fighting did continue between CMA and GATIA. In a sense, this was a continuation of the state-based conflict, but in a different form, since GATIA was more or less pro-government. However, the non-state conflict between CMA and GATIA should not be reduced to this, since it also had its own local internal dynamics.
In 2021, CSP-PSD was launched, a broad umbrella bringing together groups that had previously been divided between the CMA and Platform camps. Initially, the new alliance was merely intended to strengthen the northern groups' bargaining position in the largely failing peace process. However, as the process reached a deadlock in late 2022, the groups within CSP grew increasingly close. The main chasm between CMA on the one hand, and the largest among the Platform groups, GATIA and MSA on the other, appeared to be on the verge of being bridged, mainly due to the latter's loss of faith in the country's new junta. In January and February 2023, the alliances' military Chiefs of Staff subsequently made moves to establish a joint command structure and shared headquarters, as well as permanent military bases, and with that CSP became an actor in UCDP data. whereas CMA ceased to be one. When CSP and the Malian state found themselves embroiled in fighting, the conflict issue was broader, with the new group striving for both Azawad-specific goals, and the ousting of the regime. Thus, this is recorded as a new conflict in UCDP data.
