This dyad belongs to the conflict Yemen (North Yemen): Government

Summary of conflict Yemen (North Yemen): Government

The conflict over government in Yemen has been continuously ongoing since 2008, when Ansarallah first stated an incompatibility. In 2009, AQAP (al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula) was formed. Violence increased amid massive protests during the Arab Spring in 2011-2012, during which the authoritarian president of Yemen of 33 years, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was forced to step down. Much of the country was divided between various armed groups as central authority crumbled, while the security forces divided in support and opposition of Saleh.

In 2015, the violence in Yemen escalated drastically. Ansarallah ousted the government led by President Hadi and took control over the capital in January. According to UCDP definitions, Ansarallah, as the actor which controlled the capital, was then seen as the Government of Yemen. After having managed to flee to Aden on 21 February, Hadi gather forces that supported him as the legitimate president of Yemen. In 2022, Hadi finally resigned, and was replaced by a supposedly transitional Presidential Leadership Council. The non-state group that had supported Hadi as president thus changed name from the Forces of Hadi to the Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council.

In 2025, the number of battle-related deaths the conflict over government in Yemen decreased for the fourth consecutive year, reaching the lowest levels since 2008, even as overall violence rose due to the interstate conflicts with United Kingdom, United States and Israel. A ceasefire signed in April 2022 largely continued being adhered to, even though it had formally expired in October 2022. The ceasefire came about through UN-led negotiations after the Ansarallah government’s offensive to seize Marib city, the Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council’s last major stronghold in northern Yemen, which had caused the massive spike in fatalities in 2021, ended inconclusively early 2022. Since the signing of the ceasefire, violence has been limited to occasional outbursts of localized clashes and continued high civilian fatalities from mines and unexploded ordinances.

Pre-1989: Conflicts during the Imamate, 1918-1970

In 1918, North Yemen (formally the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen) became independent under Imam Yahya Mahmud Hamidaddin al-Mutawwakil, the military and spiritual leader of the Zaydi highland tribes that had resisted Ottoman rule in North Yemen. Zaydism is a branch of Shiite Islam that diverged from the mainstream during the 8th century by designating Zayd ibn Ali the fifth Imam, rather than his older brother. North Yemen during the Imamate was a deeply isolationist theocratic absolute monarchy, ruled according to traditional Zaydi madhab legal principles and tribal customs. The governing elite were dominated by sāda (sing. Sayyid), descendants of the prophet Muhammad, a privileged class under the madhab system. South Yemen was under British rule until its independence in 1967, and would remain so until unification with North Yemen in 1990.

On 17 February 1948, the 80-year-old Imam Yahya was assassinated alongside three of his 16 sons and his chief adviser. Following the assassinations, Abdullah ibn-Ahmad al-Wazir, a former chief adviser to Yahya, seized power. He stated that a “constitutional government” had been formed under the Emir Seif al-Hak Ibrahim, one of the late Imams sons. However, shortly afterwards, an opposition coalition of mainly Zaydi tribesmen led by Imam Yahyas oldest son, Ahmad bin Yahya Hamidaddin, succeeded in overthrowing the new government after a short intrastate conflict and subsequently assumed power as the new Imam.

The Imamate was eventually overthrown on 26 September 1962, in a military coup by Nasserist officers, a week after Imam Ahmad's son, Muhammad al-Badr, inherited power. The coup, sometimes called the Republican Revolution, sparked an eight year-long conflict between the new Republican Government and Royalists, which supported the ousted Imam. The initially intense intrastate armed conflict lasted until 1970 and involved Egyptian troops fighting alongside the republican government. The conflict ended in a republican victory after Saudi Arabia ended its support for the Royalists, following a rapprochement between republican and monarchist Arab states after the Arab defeat in the Six Day War to Israel in 1967.

Pre-1989: First anti-Saleh coalition in North Yemen, 1979-1982

National Democratic Front (NDF) was formed by six leftist groups as an umbrella organization on 2 February 1976, though membership of the umbrella movement shifted over the years as a number of groups joined while others left NDF. In the beginning, the goal was to peacefully persuade the sitting President, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, to allow the left back into politics. Furthermore, the group also wanted North Yemen and South Yemen to unite into a single Yemen, a process decided upon by both countries in 1972, but which had seen little progress. Although al-Hamdi refrained from legalizing the group, he chose not to use military means to suppress it. In 1977, al-Hamdi was assassinated and less than a year later, in 1978, his successor, Ahmad al-Ghashmi, was also killed.

Ali Abdullah Saleh thereafter came to power, supported by a tribal coalition of Hashid and Bakil tribesmen, whom inhabited the highlands around Sanaa. Saleh, a Hashid tribesman, would maintain power in Yemen for over three decades, largely by playing various factions of against each other and by maintaining a patronage network throughout the tribes of the highlands. Key to his success in managing Yemen's complex tribal network was his close relationship with Abdullah ibn Hussein Al-Ahmar, the sheikh of the Hashid tribal confederation.

After Saleh took power, NDF joined with supporters of the late al-Hamdi and declared their goal to oust the newly appointed President Saleh, who immediately after assuming power had stepped up the repressive measures against the opposition. In 1979, clashes between NDF and North Yemeni troops escalated drastically, at the same time as North Yemen and South Yemen engaged in a short border conflict. On 24 February 1979, North Yemen accused South Yemen of having launched an invasion into its territory. South Yemen, on the other hand claimed that it had successfully had repelled an attack by North Yemeni forces (see the interstate conflict between North Yemen and South Yemen).

Simultaneously, NDF launched attacks on North Yemen from positions inside South Yemen. NDF received considerable support from South Yemen and was based in Aden, the capital of South Yemen, for much of its existence. On 24 February, the same day as the first clashes between North and South Yemen took place, NDF claimed to have captured several North Yemeni border towns, including Qataba, Al Bayda and Harib. North Yemen rejected these claims and denied NDF’s existence, despite its advancement deep into North Yemen. The fighting between the government troops and NDF ended when a ceasefire agreement was reached between North Yemen and South Yemen on 16 March 1979. NDF was not part of these negotiations nor a signatory to the ceasefire agreement.

Following the ceasefire between the North Yemen and South Yemen, the latter began to decrease its support to NDF. More and more NDF troops were subsequently moved into North Yemen. At the same time, North Yemen and NDF entered into negotiations in order to find a political solution and cease hostilities. In February 1980, the leader of NDF, Sultan Ahmad Umar, announced that an agreement had been signed with the North Yemeni President Saleh on 31 January. The agreement was claimed to include provisions for NDF to participate in election. The government remained silent, however, and never officially recognized the existence of NDF, usually referring to them as “dissidents” or “subversives”.

In late April 1980, NDF started to accuse the government of violating the January agreement and later, in August, it claimed that the regime had terminated their dialogue. The verbal accusations were accompanied by the eruption of fighting in early May. A number of violent clashes between NDF and North Yemeni troops took place in May and in early June, reportedly in the border area south of Sanaa. Over 100 army troops were said to have been killed or wounded in the fighting.

In early 1981, after months of continuous fighting in 1980, NDF was claimed to have been defeated and forced to retreat to their bases in South Yemen. At the same time, there were reports claiming that the group was still active in the southern parts of North Yemen, near the border with South Yemen. The latter reports were correct and clashes took place throughout most of 1981, with particularly heavy clashes towards the end of the year. On 26 November, a ceasefire was agreed between the government and NDF. The meeting leading up to the ceasefire was held in Kuwait under the auspices of the Kuwaiti government and was also attended by the South Yemeni President Ali Nasir Mohammed. The agreement stipulated a demilitarized border region and the formation of a tripartite committee consisting of representatives from NDF, North Yemen and South Yemen.

Despite the ceasefire in late 1981, the fighting between the government troops and NDF continued in 1982. A new ceasefire was negotiated and entered into effect on 3 April 1982, after mediation efforts by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). This ceasefire was also short-lived, and it was broken off when NDF captured the town of Juban, located in what is now Lahij governorate. A counter-attack by the North Yemeni government troops followed and according to NDF, about 4000 political opponents were arrested by the government in Sanaa and Taiz. In connection to this offensive, the governments of North Yemen and South Yemen met on 5-7 May in order to avoid a renewed border conflict between the two countries. The risk of renewed fighting was high since North Yemeni troops were pushing the NDF rebels closer and closer to the South Yemeni border and there was a risk that the troops might cross the border in pursuit of the rebels. An agreement was reached between the two governments, stipulating that North Yemen would proclaim amnesty for NDF members and also incorporate them into the political system. In return, South Yemen pledged not to give any further support to the group. Following this agreement, a ceasefire was agreed upon with NDF. This time the ceasefire held and the promised amnesty was proclaimed. Many of the NDF leaders subsequently began to take part in the political dialogue in Sanaa.

In South Yemen, a short civil war in 1986 brought Ali Salem al-Beidh to power, who helped improve relations with the north. After the Soviet Union fell in 1989, and subsequently ended its economic support, South Yemen finances were badly hurt, paving the way for unification. In 1990, South Yemen merged with North Yemen, with North Yemeni President Saleh as President of both countries, and South Yemen President Ali Salem al-Beidh as his Vice-President (see South Yemen - North Yemen). South Yemeni separatist aspirations would soon flare up again, with war breaking out in 1994, and would remain a challenge for the unified Yemeni state ever since (see Yemen: South Yemen](/#/conflict/402)).

2004-2010: Emergence of Ansarallah

The main challenge to the government of unified Yemen came from the Zaydi Shiite tribes of Yemen’s northwestern highlands. The Zaydi tribes, in particular the old sāda (sing. Sayyid) elite, had been the dominant political force in North Yemen for most of its history, with the Zaydi Imams being the rulers of North Yemen from its independence in 1918 until the republican coup in 1962, and prior to this ruling parts of or all of Yemen in various capacities with few interruptions since the 9th century. A Zaydi revivalist movement called Ansarallah (Supporters of God, originally called the Believing Youth) was formed in 1992 by Hussein Badr al Din al Houthi, which aimed to end perceived the persecution of sāda and end the growing influence of Sunni Islam in the Zaydi heartland, with evangelizing groups such as the Salafist Dar al-Hadith having been sponsored by members of the Saleh regime, notably General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and Abdullah ibn Hussein Al-Ahmar. Due to the prominence of members of the Sayyidi al-Houthi family, Ansarallah were often referred to as Houthis by its opponents.

The group came into the spot-light in 2003, as members of the group shouted their anti-American and anti-Israel slogan in a mosque in the northern Saada town in the presence of the Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh. The slogan "Allah Akbar, Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, and Victory for Islam" was seen as a grave offense against the president, as it implicitly criticized Saleh’s relationship with the United States. An arrest warrant was issued in June the following year for the leader of the group, Hussein al-Houthi, causing widespread clashes to erupt. On 10 September 2004, Hussein al-Houthi was killed by security forces. The conflict did not end with the death of Hussein al-Houthi, instead the leadership of Ansarallah was taken over by his brother Abd-al-Malik al-Houthi and the clashes continued in northwestern Yemen.

This was the first of several rounds of conflicts known as the 'Saada Wars', fought between 2004 and 2010. Originally fought over issues not related to government or territory and therefore not included in UCDP data, with Ansarallah persistently claiming that the group did not want to overthrow the sitting government during its early years. In June 2008, during the fifth phase of the conflict, Ansarallah made apparent their intention to use violence to remove Saleh based on him being an agent of Israel and the United States. The fifth conflict ended only weeks later in a ceasefire agreement with the government, after a brutal conflict in which around 1,000 government soldiers are believed to have been killed earlier in the year.

A new round of fighting erupted in August 2009, killing at least some 1,300 people during the year, and not ending until the following year. Between November 2009 and February 2010, Ansarallah also clashed extensively with Saudi Arabia. Ansarallah crossed the border into Saudi Arabia in November, ostensibly in punishment over Saudi Arabia's support for the Yemeni government. Due to the lack of a valid incompatibility this violence is excluded.

2009-2010: Formation and early years of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

The first recorded al-Qaida attack in Yemen took place in Aden, in southern Yemen, in 1992. Two hotels were bombed in a failed attempt to hit US troops on their way to Somalia. Throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, al-Qaida performed attacks but on a low scale. In 2000, the US warship USS Cole was struck by two suicide bombers as it was refuelling in Aden port, killing 17 American soldiers. In May 2003, al-Qaida cells in Saudi Arabia carried out simultaneous suicide attacks on three Western housing compounds, leaving 29 people dead. A few more attacks were carried out, but the Saudi security forces eventually managed to gain the upper hand and large parts of the al-Qaida leadership in Saudi Arabia were killed. Meanwhile, al-Qaida in Yemen was considerably strengthened in February 2006, when 23 al-Qaida members escaped from Sanaa prison. Several of the escapees were later recaptured or killed, but the Yemeni security forces did not find Abu Basir Nasir al-Wahishi, who had previously worked as an assistant to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Following the prison breakout, the group recruited new members and set up new bases in Yemen. In September 2008, al-Qaida cells were linked to the attack on the US embassy in Sanaa, which killed ten Yemeni guards, four civilians as well as six of the assailants.

On 23 January 2009, a video was released announcing the merger of the local al-Qaida branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the formation of AQAP (al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula). The group claimed that they had come together in order to launch a holy war in the Arabian Peninsula and establish an Islamic State. In the first statement, the whole Arabian Peninsula was targeted, although with a special focus on Saudi Arabia. Yemen was described as the group’s new base and Muslims all over the world were encouraged to travel to Yemen and join AQAP. In a later statement, the group also called upon the tribal leaders in Yemen to fight against the Yemeni government and support the al-Qaida members living in their areas. 2009 was the first time al-Qaida cells in Yemen directed their threats and attacks against the Yemeni government. Previously, al-Qaida cells in Yemen have not fulfilled UCDP’s requirement of stated incompatibility and thus, 2009 was the first year al-Qaida cells operating in Yemen were included in the database.

AQAP's formation put the Yemeni government under increased pressure from its neighboring countries and USA to intensify its efforts to thwart the group and prevent it from gaining further ground in Yemen. Throughout 2009, there were numerous reports of arrests and clashes involving suspected al-Qaida members. It was, however, not possible to verify that it was AQAP members who were involved in the clashes, which is why the first use of armed violence in this dyad was set to 3 November 2009. This was the first time that AQAP claimed responsibility for an attack on the Yemeni security forces.

The international interest in Yemen increased significantly during 2010, AQAP threatened and conducted several attacks on foreign people and installments. In early January, the UK, US and French embassies in the capital of Sanaa closed following threats from the group. A few months later, on 26 April, the UK Ambassador to Yemen, Timothy Torlot, escaped an assassination attempt unharmed when his convoy was attacked by a suicide bomber in the capital. The attack was later claimed by AQAP. Following the failed bombing attempt of an airliner heading to Detroit, USA, on 25 December 2009, which was later claimed by AQAP, there had been growing concern that AQAP would continue to strengthen its positions and pose an increasing threat outside Yemen. In this light, a one-day summit on Yemen was held in London on 27 January. The conference was attended by the foreign minister of Yemen, foreign ministers from the G-8 countries and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) as well as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The conference resulted in a pledge to support the government of Yemen’s efforts to fight AQAP, as well as other forms of terrorism. A further conference was held in Saudi Arabia on 27-28 February.

In December 2009, USA launched two missile strikes against AQAP strongholds in Yemen, the first verified involvement of the USA as a secondary warring party against AQAP. The first attack was launched on 17 December. The missile, loaded with cluster bombs, hit an alleged training camp for AQAP in Abyan province. However, the attack also killed a large number of civilians. A week later, on 24 December, a second attack was launched, this time with no reports of civilian casualties. The Yemeni government claimed the attacks and USA has never officially confirmed any US attacks in Yemen. However, Amnesty International has reported that USA is the only country that has that type of missiles that were used in the first attack (citing photographs of damaged missiles parts as evidence). Furthermore, on 20 September, 2010, Yemen’s foreign minister acknowledged that USA was behind the December strikes. A few days after the failed 25 December 2009 attack on the US transatlantic flight, AQAP claimed responsibility, stating that it was a response to the attacks earlier the same month, for which it blamed USA. At the same time, the Yemeni government stated that it would continue its military campaign against AQAP and vowed not to let Yemen become a refuge for terrorists.

US involvement in Yemen was deeply unpopular among large segments of Yemen's population, and US authorisation for CIA to capture or kill the AQAP-linked Anwar al-Awlaki (who has been linked to the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and the failed airliner bombing in late 2009) sparked Yemeni protest against US intervention in Yemen. The Yemeni government rejected any US involvement in this matter, stating that the Yemeni constitution prohibits any extradition of Yemeni citizens to other countries. On 24 May 2010, the deputy governor of Ma’rib province, Jaber Ali al-Shabwani, was accidentally killed in an US drone airstrike during a mediation session with AQAP members. The governor’s tribe responded by attacking a number of installations and oil pipes. Several people were killed in the subsequent clashes. The government of Yemen eventually engaged in tribal mediation and paid reportedly 4.5 million dollars in “blood money”.

2011: Government challenged on several fronts

From January 2011, protests against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s 33 year-long authoritarian rule erupted in the context of the Arab Spring. Thousands of protesters held largely peaceful demonstrations in Sanaa, Aden and Taiz, but were met with lethal violence from government forces and regime supporters. The violent response by the government triggered mass defections among the regime's supports in the military and among the tribes, and also caused parts of the opposition to take up arms (for more information about the protests in Yemen in 2011, see Government of Yemen - Civilians). Sadiq al-Ahmar, son of Saleh’s former right-hand man Abdullah ibn Hussein Al-Ahmar and the leader of the Hashid tribal confederation, defected after the ‘Friday of Dignity’ massacre of protesters in Sanaa. This was a particularly harsh blow to the regime, as it was largely upheld by its ties to the Hashid tribes to which most senior figures belonged, including the prominent General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, who would go on to form the Free Yemeni Army from dissident military units, as well as Saleh himself. Sadiq al-Ahmar would go on to form the Alliance of Yemeni Tribes, while some of his brothers was involved in pushing the largest opposition party, Islah, to support what was rapidly evolving an armed revolt rather than a peaceful protest movement.

Government forces fought dissident military units in the Free Yemeni Army, and armed opposition members of Islah and the Alliance of Yemeni Tribes during the year, in addition to the already ongoing conflicts with Ansarallah and AQAP. During this period of instability, as security forces turned on each other and loyalist forces concentrated on the capital to protect the regime, the governments effective control of the country diminished as the various armed groups, most notably Ansarallah and AQAP, greatly expanded their territorial control. Several of these groups also fought each other, as they competed over territorial control in the power-vacuum caused by the collapse in government authority.

The armed conflict between the government of Yemen and AQAP escalated drastically in 2011, as AQAP rapidly gained ground. The estimated number of battle-related deaths in 2011 rose to 1200, compared to 200 in 2010. Furthermore, given the relatively few detailed reports about civilian fatalities in connection to the battles of the urban areas, which displaced tens of thousands of people, it is possible that the number of battle-related deaths in 2011 was even higher.

Throughout the year, the southern governorate of Abyan was the area most hit by fighting between government troops, eventually joined by local tribes, and AQAP. On 26 March, AQAP militants seized the town of Jaar in the southwestern parts of Abyan governorate and immediately began to impose a strict sharia rule. The proclamation of an “Islamic Emirate of Abyan” soon began to appear on jihadist web forums. AQAP continued to gain ground and in late May the capital of the Abyan governorate, Zinjibar, was captured by militants. Residents of Zinjibar claimed that the group met little resistance from the army, and large parts of the military did indeed leave when the city came under attack. However, when capturing Zinjibar, AQAP militants failed to take control of the army base just outside the city, which housed the only military brigade that remained in the area when Zinjibar was attacked. The fighting over Zinjibar and other towns that had been seized by AQAP raged throughout the summer. In September, the army stated that it had managed to push the militants back and that Zinjibar would soon be cleared of the few remaining militants. However, fighting in and around the city continued for the remaining part of 2011.

As AQAP militants gained ground in the Abyan governorate during the spring and summer months, many of the local tribes joined the army in fighting the militants. The decision of the tribes to support the army was decisive in eventually pushing back large parts of the militants, not the least given the general state of the Yemeni army. In response to the growing number of people killed in the demonstrations against Saleh in the light of the Arab Spring, high-ranking soldiers had withdrawn their support for Saleh. This led to a deeply dived army; some fought against AQAP, some joined the protesters, others remained loyal to the government and participated in the violent crackdown on the protesters. In the battle for Zinjibar, for instance, the army was divided between loyalists, units claiming neutrality, and Free Yemeni Army units.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Yemen in early January 2011 to further strengthen the cooperation between the two countries against AQAP. This was the first visit to Yemen by a US Secretary of State in more two decades. It should however be noted that even though USA eventually urged Saleh to resign, the two governments continued to cooperate in the fight against AQAP. Throughout the year, USA conducted a number of drone attacks on Yemeni soil against AQAP-members, the most well-reported being the attack that killed the US-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki on 30 September. The Yemeni government had denied any direct US involvement in the fight against AQAP. However, on 14 June, Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA, stated that USA in fact were carrying out operations in Yemen. In response to the growing number of people killed in the Arab Spring demonstrations, USA eventually urged Saleh to accept a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) brokered deal outlining his resignation.

After several broken promises by Saleh, he finally signed such a GCC brokered agreement on 23 November. By this act, Saleh promised, in return for an amnesty, to relinquish all presidential powers to his Vice-President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi, who would be elected interim President for a two-year period, after which free elections were supposed to be held. Elections were held in February 2012, with Hadi as the only candidate running, and Hadi was inaugurated as interim-president soon thereafter.

2012-2014: The Yemeni government regains control of AQAP’s main strongholds in the south

Hadi’s new government was largely dominated by the former opposition, in particular Islah, which in turn was closely allied with the Free Yemeni Army (which was being reintegrated into the army) and the Alliance of Yemeni Tribes. It had a tense and partially adversarial relationship with Ansarallah, which however still participated in some government functions, including the drafting of a new constitution through the National Dialogue Conference, which would run from 2013 until January 2014. This helped pause the conflict with Ansarallah in the north, and allowed the government to focus its limited resources on dealing with AQAP, which had taken over large swathes of Yemen’s southeast.

The conflict between the Government of Yemen and AQAP escalated drastically in 2012. In May, AQAP carried out a suicide bombing against the rehearsal of a military parade in Sanaa, killing around 100 people. The attack was reportedly a response to the new governments increased effort to oust AQAP from their strongholds in southern Yemen. The same month, the Yemeni military launched a large-scale offensive in order to regain control of the areas captured by AQAP in 2011. The government troops, backed by local tribes, managed to regain control of the important port city of Zinjibar in June and subsequently also the neighbouring towns of Shaqra and Jaar, following intensive fighting that also displaced tens of thousands of people. Later in the summer, AQAP was ousted from several other towns in southern Yemen.

After having lost much of the territory captured in 2011, AQAP made a strategic shift during the second half of 2012 and focused more on high-profile assassinations, suicide bombings and hit-and-run attacks, rather than establishing territorial control. A large number of high-ranking security officers were killed in these attacks, including the military commander of the Southern Region of Yemen. The group continued with these tactics in 2013 and 2014, but despite a number of deadly attacks claiming large number of lives, the violence did not reach the same intensity as in 2012. However, the violence escalated again in 2014 and passed the UCDP threshold of war (at least 1000 battle-related deaths in one year), as the group stepped up activity to take advantage of the government being distracted by the renewed conflict with Ansarallah.

2014: Ansarallah takes control of most of the capital Sanaa

Between 2013 and late January 2014, the National Dialogue Conference (in which Ansarallah and all major political factions, except for AQAP, participated in) worked on a negotiated solution to Yemen's political crisis. In late January 2014, the conference presented plans to divide the country into six federal states and to extend Hadi’s term as president for another year without elections. Hadi had previously been planned to serve as the interim president during for two years from his election in February 2012, after which free elections were supposed to be held. Soon before the conference concluded this, Ansarallah withdrew from the conference in protest. Ansarallah immediately criticized the plan arguing that it would create rich and poor regions and leave the Houthi-dominated Sadah region without direct access to the sea and natural resources. They also called the extensions of Hadi’s term illegitimate.

On 9 March 2014, immediately after Hadi’s term in office had originally been set to expire, the leader of Ansarallah, Abd-al-Malik al-Houthi, called on the government to step down. The leader cited what the group perceived as the government’s failure to improve living standards in the country as well as corruption as reasons for its call for resignation. A few days after the leader’s remarks in March, thousands of the group’s supporters protested in Amran town, located between Sadah governorate and the capital, demanding the resignation of the government.

During the early spring of 2014, Ansarallah advanced south from the Sadah governorate to Amran governorate and also towards the capital Sanaa. The group seized control of Amran town and the governorate with the same name in July. Resistance from government and tribal forces was subdued, which is often credited to Ansarallah’s alliance with the former president Saleh and his network, centered on the General People's Congress (GPC) party, which continued to have considerable influence in many tribes and over parts of the army. Saleh allied with his former enemies in Ansarallah against his own former vice-president and successor to the presidency, Hadi, in an apparent bid to re-secure his influence in Yemen. The alliance largely targeted Islah and General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, which had been the real power in Yemen’s capital after Saleh’s resignation.

In mid-August, Ansarallah intensified its calls for the government to step down and arranged sit-ins and later on also demonstrations in the capital. The demand was coupled with calls for reinstating the fuel subsidies which had been decreased and subsequently resulted in a 90 percent price increase. Despite the government’s attempts to negotiate with the group as well as agreeing to its main demands, Ansarallah stayed in the capital. The peaceful protests transformed into armed clashes on 18 September. A few days later, on 21 September, Ansarallah took control of most of the capital. As the group advanced, many units of the security forces and governmental agencies capitulated, including the Interior Ministry which ordered its personnel to cooperate with Ansarallah.

The resistance to the Ansarallah advance into the capital was spearheaded by government forces loyal to General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the commander of the Free Yemeni Army prior to their reintegration into the army after the fall of Saleh, who was a close ally of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan)-aligned Islah party which dominated the current government. Tribal militias loyal to Islah supported Ali Muhsin’s forces. These forces reportedly acted on their own accord, rather than on the president’s order, resulting in a relatively limited defense of the capital.

The takeover of most of the capital resulted in a peace agreement, known as the “Peace and National Partnership Agreement”. The agreement was facilitated by the UN envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, and stipulated that President Hadi should dissolve the government, subsequently pushing the Islah party out of power. Many leaders in Islah, as well as Ali Muhsin, fled the capital. The deal also meant that Ansarallah, together with the so called “Southern Movement” (a loosely organized separatist group in the south) got broad powers in the new government that was appointed. Furthermore, the agreement included a ceasefire, removal of the protest camps in the capital and its surroundings, and a lowering of fuel prices.

The new government was formed in November with compromise candidate Khalid Bahah as prime minister. Despite the fulfillment of Ansarallah’s demands, the group kept its troops in the capital and exerted heavy influence on government policies, practically holding the government hostage. The group unilaterally appointed regional governors and halted the appointment of a new army chief of staff. After the September agreement, Ansarallah was able to greatly expanded its own territorial control, with the government to paralyzed to counter it. [Heavy fighting with AQAP]/#/nonstate/5545) erupted in October as Ansarallah entered Bayda governorate. By late November fighting died down with Ansarallah in control of most of the governorate.

2015-2016: Rival governments in Sanaa and Aden

In January 2015, a political crisis erupted as Ansarallah attacked the office of the prime minister in protest of a new draft constitution, which would have federalized Yemen on terms that the group opposed. The next day, on 20 January, the presidential palace was stormed. Hadi was put under house arrest and resigned on 22 January. The peace agreement from September 2014 thereby collapsed as Ansarallah ousted the government and took control of the capital. According to UCDP definitions, Ansarallah was then seen as the Government of Yemen. Ansarallah established a revolutionary council and a parliamentary body with the task of electing a presidential council. These actions were heavily criticized by Yemen’s political parties, the UN Security Council and many countries closed down their embassies. Anti-Ansarallah demonstrations were held in Sanaa and in some of the central governorates.

Following Ansarallah’s capture of Sanaa, security forces in Aden governorate declared that it would no longer take orders from the capital. Hadi managed to escape to Aden in February. On 21 February, he stated that all measures taken by Ansarallah (Government of Yemen) were “null and illegitimate”. Hadi retracted his resignation and resumed the position as president. While his government was the internationally recognized one, due to above stated definitions, Forces of Hadi (later renamed Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council) was seen as a non-state actor. The Ansarallah government reacted quickly to the threat posed by the revolt by Hadi, marching south towards the interim capital of the Forces of Hadi, Aden, to quash the uprising before it gained momentum.

As the Ansarallah government forces started advancing on Aden a Saudi-led coalition on 26 March began launching airstrikes against the Government of Yemen (Ansarallah). The coalition originally consisted of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, but most participating countries have since gradually withdrawn from Yemen. Eritrea, whilst not a formal member of the coalition, sent soldiers embedded under the UAE contingent. The stated goal was to reinstate Hadi’s government. The coalition later also sent in ground troops in Yemen. The Saudi-led airstrikes strained the relations with Iran, which supported the Government of Yemen. The tensions escalated in May 2015 when Iranian ships made several attempts to break a naval blockade of Yemen and deliver what was claimed to be humanitarian supplies.

Clashes and airstrikes took place at numerous places in Yemen, including in around the major cities of Sanaa, Aden and Taiz, as well as along the Yemeni-Saudi border. The Ansarallah government forces were forced to retreat from Aden under heavy pressure from coalition airstrikes in late July, after four months of heavy fighting in the interim capital. The defeat in Aden hindered the collapse of the Forces of Hadi and prolonged the conflict. The Forces of Hadi thereafter consolidated its forces and expanded its coalition with financial aid from its Gulf allies. By December, Forces of Hadi had reached as far as Sanaa governorate, by entering Nihm district from the direction of Marib and al-Jawf. Despite some early success, battlelines soon entered a stalemate. Fighting would continue in the area for the next four years, until the Ansarallah government recaptured the areas in its push towards Marib in 2020.

A number of UN-led negotiations were held in 2015, but with limited success. Several ceasefire agreements was negotiated but they all broke down within days.

On 2 April 2015, a week after the start of the Saudi-led intervention, AQAP captured Mukalla, a major port city in the southeast of Yemen. Since the Ansarallah seizure of power in Sanaa, fighting involving AQAP shifted to the non-state category of violence, as the coalition of forces supporting Hadi continued to also be the force mainly combating AQAP (for more information on this dyad, see AQAP - Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council) (previously Forces of Hadi). AQAP’s involvement in the conflict over government against the new government of Yemen has been very limited, especially as its capabilities has gradually diminished over the years after it lost control of Mukalla in 2016, and the statebased dyad was last active in 2018.

In 2016, the conflict over government between the Government of Yemen and Forces of Hadi declined somewhat in intensity, though fighting continued unabated. The main focus of the fighting was in the northwest, close to the Saudi border, in Hajjah, in the eastern outscirts of Sanaa governorate in Nihm, and around the southern city of Taiz. The Saudi-led coalition continued to carry out airstrikes against the Government of Yemen, in support of Forces of Hadi. During this period the humanitarian situation in Yemen began to rapidly deteriorate, as rampant inflation and disruptions to the economy and government services undermined the well-being of the Yemeni people. The Forces of Hadi fought AQAP and IS in extensive battles in Aden

2017-2019: Saleh’s last gamble and the Stockholm Agreement

Fighting between Ansarallah and Forces of Hadi in 2017 shifted strongly towards the west coast, with the December 2016 launch of an offensive by the forces of Hadi into Hudaydah governorate. The Forces of Hadi would continue to advance northward along the coast, until they reached the city of Hudaydah.

In November 2017, the conflict dynamics saw significant changes, as former president Saleh and his General People's Congress (GPC) party staged a revolt against Ansarallah’s rule in Sanaa. The former president had been a close ally and member of the Ansarallah government’s security forces since 2014. On 2 December, after a few days of fighting in the capital, Saleh declared that his party was fighting and “armed revolution” against Ansarallah rule in Yemen. The revolt was short-lived, however, as Saleh was killed in the fighting in the capital two days later, and most of his loyalist forces thereafter either fled or surrendered. The instance still was important for the continuation of the conflict between the Ansarallah government and the Forces of Hadi, as former Saleh loyalists, including Saleh’s nephew, Tareq Saleh, joined the Forces of Hadi. Following the death of his uncle, Tareq Saleh created the Yemeni National Resistance (YNR), consisting largely of former members of the elite Yemeni Republican Guard, with the help of UAE patronage, and joined the Forces of Hadi in their offensive along the west coast into Hudaydah governorate.

The offensive in Hudaydah began in December 2017, and ended after UN brokered peace negotiations in Sweden on 6-13 December 2018, which ended in the signing of the Stockholm Agreement. During this time the Forces of Hadi captured almost half of Hudaydah governorate and reached the outskirts of its namesake capital city. The Stockholm Agreement was signed amid strong international pressure, as the international community feared that fighting for the large city of Hudaydah would further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The agreement included a local ceasefire around Hudaydah city, which came into effect on 18 December. Despite the ceasefire, minor clashes have continuously occurred around the city and the conflict elsewhere in the country has continued.

The number of recorded battle-related deaths in the conflict over government in Yemen decreased markedly in 2019 compared to 2018. This was in part due to the Stockholm Agreement. While some steps to implement the agreement was taken, such as exchange of prisoners, other parts of the agreement stalled. The SAU-led coalition conducted fewer airstrikes in 2019 compared to 2018 and the number of fatalities due to fighting in and around the coastal city of Hodeida decreased. Whilst fighting continued unabated elsewhere, the ceasefire and redeployment of troops away from Hudaydah significantly decreased the violence in one of the hardest hit areas in Yemen.

Whilst the conflict over government calmed in 2019, the divisions within the Forces of Hadi flared up. The UAE-backed southern separatist movement STC broke out of the pro-Hadi forces and seized the interim capital Aden in August as the intended capital for a reborn South Yemen state (see Forces of Hadi – STC). Despite a relatively fast reconciliation, resulting in STC forces yet again joining the Forces of Hadi through a power-sharing agreement in October, the separatist forces retained de facto control of the capital and relations remained tense with renewed bouts of fighting in 2020.

2020-2021: Fighting escalates in the east

The conflict saw an increase in the recorded battle-related deaths again in 2020, as fighting moved eastwards from Hudaydah towards the last major northern areas controlled by the Forces of Hadi in al-Jawf and Marib governorates. The Ansarallah government made some territorial gains in these areas, capturing Hazm town in March and most of the rest of al-Jawf by late April. In November 2020, the strategically important Mas Camp in Marib’s Madghil district was seized, which opened up the northwestern approach towards Marib town. In most other areas the frontlines remained relatively stable.

Following this success, the Ansarallah government launched a massive offensive towards Marib town in February 2021, resulting in some of the heaviest fighting of the conflict. At first, the Ansarallah Government of Yemen made only incremental progress, whilst suffering massive casualties, to a large extent due to Saudi airstrikes. The momentum shifted decisively in the favour of Ansarallah during the summer and fall of 2021. In September, all of Al Bayda governorate fell to Ansarallah. Already in 2020, they had made gains in the al-Qayfa area in Bayda governorate, where they inflicted significant defeats upon the IS and AQAP forces residing there. Using Al Bayda as a launching pad, Ansarallah captured five districts in the governorates of Marib and Shabwa between September and October, thereby cutting off the southern supply route to Marib town for the Forces of Hadi and nearly encircling the town in the process. The gains came at a heavy cost, with Ansarallah admitting to have lost almost 15,000 fatalities just between June and November in Marib and its surroundings.

Despite speculation that Marib soon would fall, the offensive stalled for the rest of the year, and was even partially reversed as a Forces of Hadi counter-offensive through Shabwah and into southern Marib started in late December. The counter-offensive was conducted mainly by the Giants Brigade, which until recently had been deployed along the relatively calm ceasefire lines in Hudaydah governorate. On 9 November, the UAE-backed National Resistance Forces (NRF), a loose coalition consisting of the Guardians of the Republic, the Tihama Resistance and the Giants Brigade, which has been fighting as part of the Forces of Hadi since 2018, suddenly began withdrawing from much of southern Hudaydah governorate. They abandoned the districts of al Hawak, al Durayhimi, al Tuhayta and Beit al Faqih in Hudaydah governorate to the Ansarallah government, thus shaking up the military situation along the west coast. This resulted in some of the most intensive clashes in Hudaydah governorate since the signing of the Stockholm Agreement, though violence no longer threatened the major urban center of the city of Hudaydah. The withdrawal was part of a redeployment from the static Hudaydah frontlines to initiate a counter-offensive through Shabwah and into southern Marib starting in late December. These forces were some of the best-equipped and trained forces in the coalition supporting Hadi, having been trained and equipped by the UAE. They had, however, seen relatively little use since the Stockholm Agreement in 2018, as they remained guarding a relatively calm ceasefire line as fighting moved elsewhere.

2022-2025: Hadi resigns and a country-wide ceasefire is signed

On 7 April 2022, the internationally recognized President of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, resigned and was replaced by an eight-man Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), consisting of the major warlords in the anti-Ansarallah camp. The coalition that had supported Hadi as president was thus renamed the Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council. The PLC was chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, and its members represented the major military factions fighting the Ansarallah Government of Yemen. It comprised several members from Islah, as well as the leader of both the Guardians of the Republic and NRF, Tariq Saleh and the leader of Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarus al-Zoubaidi. The leader of the Giants Brigade, Abdulrahman Abu Zara'a Al Muharrami, was also a member, and has since he merged his group with STC in May 2023 been one of three STC members on the council.

The move to appoint the PLC was meant to better the coalitions bargaining position during the “transitional phase” between entry of the ceasefire on 2 April and the supposed election of a new president after the signing of a peace treaty. Whilst the UN-sponsored talks held with the Ansarallah government resulted in the ceasefire being prolonged several times, and the easing of restrictions for the movement of goods and people in Yemen, they reportedly remained limited to managing the conflict, rather than resolving it. The ceasefire expired on 2 October 2022, amidst disagreement over the responsibility for the payment of public officials’ salaries in areas controlled by Ansarallah. Violence did not immediately escalate, as renewed talks were soon initiated between the Ansarallah government and Saudi Arabia, the main external backer of the PLC. Throughout the ceasefire, violence between the parties remained at relatively low levels, with around three-quarters of the fatalities reported in fighting between Ansarallah government and the Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council in 2022 occurring prior to the signing of the truce on 2 April.

The talks between the Ansarallah government and Saudi Arabia continued throughout 2023, with the result that an informal ceasefire was maintained along the frontlines throughout the year. With neither side willing to escalate tensions to the point that it threatened the talks with Saudi Arabia, even amidst significant worry in the PLC camp that these talks do not necessarily represent their interests, violence was limited to the occasional outbursts of localized clashes and continued high civilian fatalities from mines and unexploded ordinances. Ansarallah appears to have hoped to convince Saudi Arabia to withdraw from Yemen, leaving them to deal with the PLC from a position of strength. Saudi Arabia on the other hand appeared to be seeking an exit from what has become a costly Yemeni quagmire that both secures its southern border and allows it to maintain some degree of influence over Yemeni affairs. Saudi Arabia has expressed particular concern over the increasingly close ties between Ansarallah and Iran, which has deepened considerably during the war.

The talks stopped in 2024, as Ansarallah’s attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea, ostensibly in solidarity with Hamas in the Israel: Palestine conflict, sparked open conflict with the United Kingdom and United States. Despite the end to the talks, violence continued at relatively low levels, though there was a slight uptick in clashes towards the end of 2024, as both parties appeared to be making preparations for the potential resumption of fighting. Many of the key factions of the PLC, in particular the NRF and the large Hashid and Bakil tribal confederations, were openly pushing the PLC towards restarting the war by early 2025. They perceived an opportunity given the degradation of Ansarallah’s capabilities from US airstrikes and the weakening of its allies in the Axis of Resistance, as exemplified by the collapse of the Iran-backed Government of Syria earlier in the year. Other factions were considerably more cautious of renewed fighting, given the uncertain outlook for direct international involvement, which the PLC has been heavily reliant on in earlier rounds of fighting. The PLC's most powerful faction, the southern separatist STC, had long been more interested in strengthening its position vis-a-vis its rivals in the PLC in southern Yemen, which it envisions as part of a future independent South Yemen, than in military adventurism in northern Yemen where it had no interest. This divergence of interests was particularly evident in 2025, as the STC launched a military campaign against the PLC in order to capture the two easternmost governorates, rather than engaging in a common effort against Ansarallah.

International involvement

Most members of the coalition that backed the Forces of Hadi, which originally consisted of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, have gradually withdrawn from Yemen. Eritrea, whilst not a member of the coalition, sent soldiers embedded under the UAE contingent. As of 2025, only Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and UAE had soldiers fighting within the country.

Saudi Arabia has continued to maintain a considerable presence in Yemen, and have been an extremely important supporter of the Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council due to their reliance on Saudi airstrikes. Saudi Arabia has primarily backed the central authority of the PLC, first President Hadi and later PLC-chair Rashad al-Alimi, as well as the Islah and an array of tribal factions. Their forces have been backed by a small contingent from Bahrain, in particular along a buffer zone Saudi Arabia has set up inside Yemen along parts of its border.

UAE has been the other major backer of the PLC, though it has primarily supported rival factions to those backed by Saudi Arabia. UAE claimed to have finished its withdrawal of active fighting forces in February 2020, but reportedly continued to conduct occasional drone strikes to protect its interest in the country. It also continued to maintain some military bases, and has trained and financed several ostensibly pro-Hadi factions, most notably the STC, the National Resistance Forces (NRF) and Giants Brigades. As the pro-Hadi forces looked set to loose Marib in 2021, the UAE again stepped up its support for the coalition as its close allies in the Giants Brigade took a more proactive role in the fighting in eastern Yemen. After the STC uprising against the PLC in late 2025, Saudi Arabia launched strikes targeting a military base belonging to the UAE, while warning them about supporting the STC. In conjuncture with this the president of the PLC ordered all UAE forces to withdraw from Yemen, overriding opposition from the half of the leadership council belonging to UAE-backed factions. The UAE formally acquiesced to the request to withdraw, potentially ending its decade-long involvement in Yemen.

Sudan drastically reduced the number of troops in Yemen in late 2019, from 15,000 to 5,000. The forces from Sudan remaining in Yemen were aligned with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), meaning that Sudan's formal secondary warring support ended as the civil war broke out in Sudan between RSF and the government in 2023, despite a small Sudanese presence remaining in Yemen. The RSF participation in Yemen has been financed by the UAE.

The United States has provided support through airstrikes for the Forces of PLC against AQAP and against IS. US attacks on Ansarallah since 2023 has been related to the Ansarallah blockade of the Red Sea and is coded to the United Kingdom, United States - Yemen conflict.

There have also been allegations of officers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah commanding and training the forces of the Houthi government, though their participation in direct combat roles remained unconfirmed and denied by Iran. Whatever the truth of direct participation of Iran in the conflict, the Ansarallah government has received increasing amounts of material and political support from Iran during the conflict. Despite this, Ansarallah has never been nearly as close to Iran, or as dependent on Iranian support, as many other so-called Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or many of the factions within the Iraqi government’s Popular Mobilization Forces.