SUMMARY
In Rwanda the Hutu regimes of Kayibanda and Habyarimana (from independence until 1994) promoted the interests of the Rwandan ethnic Hutu majority at the expense of the minority Tutsis. Tutsis were systematically discriminated against, and the civil administration and the army were composed almost completely of Hutus. Both leaders espoused virulent Hutu nationalism as their ideology, and massacres of Tutsis were carried out at times from 1959 and onwards, oftentimes when the government attempted to rally support in times of crisis, such as when the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais; Rwandan Patriotic Front), an organization composed mainly of Tutsis, began its rebellion in 1990.
Massacres increased in number towards the end of Habyarimana’s regime and culminated in the Rwandan genocide of 1994; whose main instigators were Rwandan government soldiers, the elite units of the Presidential Guard, and the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias. All these branches of organized armed fighters are seen as being parts of the Government of Rwanda and are thus included (up until the fall of the regime in late July 1994) in UCDP data as extensions of the Government of Rwanda. In the coding of the genocide the killings perpetrated by these different branches are attributed to the ‘Government of Rwanda’ actor as a whole.
The Rwandan genocide did not only target members of the Tutsi minority, but also struck the Hutu opposition parties, commonly referred to as ‘Hutu moderates’. These individuals, mostly members of political parties, did not support the Hutu nationalist agenda which Habyarimana’s party and the proponents of ‘Hutu Power’ espoused and were thus targeted as they were deemed to be a danger to the regime’s interests. The reasons for targeting the Tutsi minority are many, based both on history, myths, and the political agenda of the early 1990s. The Tutsi had been the feudal kings of Rwanda before independence, Hutu (and Tutsi) mythology presented the Tutsi as racially superior, and Tutsis were also seen as being FPR collaborators, bent on toppling the Hutu regimes, to name but a few motives.
The Rwandan genocide took place in the context of the Government of Rwanda's intratstate armed conflict with the FPR, which had begun in 1990. A peace agreement, the Arusha Accords, was signed in 1993, and was supposed to pave the way for a power-sharing government and far-reaching institutional reforms in Rwanda to create a country for both Hutus and Tutsis. The Habyarimana government and other extremist political forces in Rwanda however continuously stalled the implementation of the agreement so as not to lose their grip on power. When President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down (by whom has never been discovered) in April of 1994 the remaining government, now dominated by Hutu extremists, gave the order to target the Tutsis and the Hutu moderates, so as to destroy any threats to their power and to abort the implementation of the power-sharing institutions of the Arusha Accords. In a way then the Rwandan genocide was the political elite’s manipulation of ethnic categorizations and fears in an attempt for political survival.
That ordinary Rwandan peasants and youths, as well as government soldiers and militias, could be made to perpetrate mass-scale killings is commonly explained by factors specific to the Rwandan context, comprising such explanations as a tradition of obedience to leaders coupled with an extremely effective bureaucracy, illiteracy and a lack of education allowing people to believe propaganda regarding the evil nature of the Tutsis and the righteous nature of the Hutus, institutionalized desensitization to violence through decades of violent repression, and finally, the spoils to be gained from those murdered. Large campaigns of incitement, for example by popular ‘Hutu Power’ radio broadcasts, also served to affect the attitudes of Rwandan society.
Tactics employed during the Rwandan genocide vary greatly, to an extent depending on what branch of the Government of Rwanda was responsible. Door-to-door killings carried out by soldiers and militias were common, as were the setting up of roadblocks where anyone thought or proven to be a Tutsi were murdered. In the case of the targeting of Hutu moderates, lists of names circulated among the killers, who simply visited the houses of those listed and murdered those selected. Whilst the Presidential Guard and the Rwandan army carried guns and grenades, peasants and Interahamwe militias most often made use of cutting and stabbing weapons, such as the machete, and grenades to dispose of their victims.
The Hutu regime was ousted in the summer of 1994 by the FPR, which took up the government seat of Rwanda. This new government and its soldiers in turn began to persecute the Hutu population, killing thousands in what are commonly referred to as revenge killings. The FPR denies that it had proclaimed a strategy of striking back at those responsible for (and those who took part in) the genocide, but nevertheless the FPR's soldiers, when in government, attacked Hutu civilians with deadly outcomes.
Violence against Hutu civilians continued even after government power had been more or less consolidated by the FPR. From 1995 the Government of Rwanda fought a military campaign against Hutu rebels, comprised of members of the former Rwandese army, former Interahamwe members, and Hutus who had fled the FPR's take-over of government power. During this campaign, the Government of Rwanda targeted villages, settlements and groups thought to be connected to the Hutu rebels. In April 1995, in a particularly violent instance, the Rwandan army killed over 4000 people in Kibeho refugee camp in the southwest of the country.
In Rwanda the Hutu regimes of Kayibanda and Habyarimana (from independence until 1994) promoted the interests of the Rwandan ethnic Hutu majority at the expense of the minority Tutsis. Tutsis were systematically discriminated against, and the civil administration and the army were composed almost completely of Hutus. Both leaders espoused virulent Hutu nationalism as their ideology, and massacres of Tutsis were carried out at times from 1959 and onwards, oftentimes when the government attempted to rally support in times of crisis, such as when the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais; Rwandan Patriotic Front), an organization composed mainly of Tutsis, began its rebellion in 1990.
Massacres increased in number towards the end of Habyarimana’s regime and culminated in the Rwandan genocide of 1994; whose main instigators were Rwandan government soldiers, the elite units of the Presidential Guard, and the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias. All these branches of organized armed fighters are seen as being parts of the Government of Rwanda and are thus included (up until the fall of the regime in late July 1994) in UCDP data as extensions of the Government of Rwanda. In the coding of the genocide the killings perpetrated by these different branches are attributed to the ‘Government of Rwanda’ actor as a whole.
The Rwandan genocide did not only target members of the Tutsi minority, but also struck the Hutu opposition parties, commonly referred to as ‘Hutu moderates’. These individuals, mostly members of political parties, did not support the Hutu nationalist agenda which Habyarimana’s party and the proponents of ‘Hutu Power’ espoused and were thus targeted as they were deemed to be a danger to the regime’s interests. The reasons for targeting the Tutsi minority are many, based both on history, myths, and the political agenda of the early 1990s. The Tutsi had been the feudal kings of Rwanda before independence, Hutu (and Tutsi) mythology presented the Tutsi as racially superior, and Tutsis were also seen as being FPR collaborators, bent on toppling the Hutu regimes, to name but a few motives.
The Rwandan genocide took place in the context of the Government of Rwanda's intratstate armed conflict with the FPR, which had begun in 1990. A peace agreement, the Arusha Accords, was signed in 1993, and was supposed to pave the way for a power-sharing government and far-reaching institutional reforms in Rwanda to create a country for both Hutus and Tutsis. The Habyarimana government and other extremist political forces in Rwanda however continuously stalled the implementation of the agreement so as not to lose their grip on power. When President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down (by whom has never been discovered) in April of 1994 the remaining government, now dominated by Hutu extremists, gave the order to target the Tutsis and the Hutu moderates, so as to destroy any threats to their power and to abort the implementation of the power-sharing institutions of the Arusha Accords. In a way then the Rwandan genocide was the political elite’s manipulation of ethnic categorizations and fears in an attempt for political survival.
That ordinary Rwandan peasants and youths, as well as government soldiers and militias, could be made to perpetrate mass-scale killings is commonly explained by factors specific to the Rwandan context, comprising such explanations as a tradition of obedience to leaders coupled with an extremely effective bureaucracy, illiteracy and a lack of education allowing people to believe propaganda regarding the evil nature of the Tutsis and the righteous nature of the Hutus, institutionalized desensitization to violence through decades of violent repression, and finally, the spoils to be gained from those murdered. Large campaigns of incitement, for example by popular ‘Hutu Power’ radio broadcasts, also served to affect the attitudes of Rwandan society.
Tactics employed during the Rwandan genocide vary greatly, to an extent depending on what branch of the Government of Rwanda was responsible. Door-to-door killings carried out by soldiers and militias were common, as were the setting up of roadblocks where anyone thought or proven to be a Tutsi were murdered. In the case of the targeting of Hutu moderates, lists of names circulated among the killers, who simply visited the houses of those listed and murdered those selected. Whilst the Presidential Guard and the Rwandan army carried guns and grenades, peasants and Interahamwe militias most often made use of cutting and stabbing weapons, such as the machete, and grenades to dispose of their victims.
The Hutu regime was ousted in the summer of 1994 by the FPR, which took up the government seat of Rwanda. This new government and its soldiers in turn began to persecute the Hutu population, killing thousands in what are commonly referred to as revenge killings. The FPR denies that it had proclaimed a strategy of striking back at those responsible for (and those who took part in) the genocide, but nevertheless the FPR's soldiers, when in government, attacked Hutu civilians with deadly outcomes.
Violence against Hutu civilians continued even after government power had been more or less consolidated by the FPR. From 1995 the Government of Rwanda fought a military campaign against Hutu rebels, comprised of members of the former Rwandese army, former Interahamwe members, and Hutus who had fled the FPR's take-over of government power. During this campaign, the Government of Rwanda targeted villages, settlements and groups thought to be connected to the Hutu rebels. In April 1995, in a particularly violent instance, the Rwandan army killed over 4000 people in Kibeho refugee camp in the southwest of the country.
In 1996-1997, one-sided violence attributed to the Government of Rwanda extended beyond Rwanda’s borders into the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), where large-scale military operations were carried out in the context of the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and the continued presence of Rwandan Hutu armed groups in eastern Congo. During the advance of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), supported by Rwandan government forces, numerous refugee camps in eastern Zaire were attacked and destroyed. In several locations, including Tingi-Tingi and camps in South Kivu, remaining refugee populations were killed during military operations. Victims included sick and wounded individuals, women and children, and unaccompanied minors. In some cases, civilians were killed with close-range weapons, and bodies were disposed of in mass graves or rivers. Survivors of earlier attacks were in some instances pursued and killed in surrounding areas.
During the same period, Rwandan government forces also carried out violence against civilians inside Rwanda in the context of counter-insurgency operations in the northwest. During large-scale search operations in Ruhengeri province, civilians were rounded up and killed by gunfire or beaten to death following attacks by armed groups. At the same time, killings of returning refugees were reported inside Rwanda, including families who had recently returned from eastern Congo and were targeted shortly after arrival.
Following the outbreak of the Second Congo War in 1998, the Government of Rwanda became militarily involved in support of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), operating alongside Congolese rebel forces in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. During this period, one-sided violence against civilians continued in the context of military operations and reprisals against communities accused of supporting the Government of DR Congo (Zaire), Mayi Mayi militias, ALiR or other armed groups. Civilians were frequently targeted during village sweeps, market attacks, and retaliatory operations in North and South Kivu. In several incidents, entire villages were attacked after accusations of collaboration, resulting in killings, destruction of property, and the burning of civilian homes. Similar incidents occurred in Maniema and surrounding areas, where civilians were killed during operations following clashes with armed groups.
In the early 2000s, Rwandan military involvement in eastern Congo persisted but gradually declined in intensity following regional peace agreements. Nevertheless, sporadic one-sided violence continued to be recorded in connection with counter-insurgency operations against armed groups such as the ALiR and later the FDLR. Civilians were killed during search operations and reprisals in areas suspected of harbouring armed elements, particularly in border regions.
From the mid-2000s, one-sided violence attributed to the Government of Rwanda became less frequent but continued in the context of ongoing operations against the FDLR in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. During joint operations with Congolese government forces, civilians were at times killed during village-clearing operations and attacks in areas perceived to support armed groups. In several incidents, entire communities were accused of collaboration and subjected to lethal force during military operations.
In 2009, large-scale joint operations by Rwandan and Congolese forces against the FDLR were reported in North Kivu, during which civilians were killed in attacks on villages suspected of hosting armed elements. In some cases, women, children, and elderly persons were among the victims, and sexual violence and destruction of property were also reported.
In the mid-2010s, a small number of incidents of one-sided violence were recorded inside Rwanda in the context of local security enforcement operations.
From 2022 onwards, the Government of Rwanda has again been reported as militarily involved in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in cooperation with the March 23 Movement (M23), and later the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), in their conflict with the Congolese government. During this period, Rwandan forces have operated alongside these groups in North Kivu, particularly in Rutshuru territory, where military operations have repeatedly been accompanied by violence against civilians. Hutu civilians have been killed in the context of operations targeting individuals perceived to be associated with the FDLR. Civilians have also been forced to carry military equipment and subsequently killed during or after such operations, and villages have been attacked during ongoing fighting between armed actors.
Across the entire period since 1996, one-sided violence attributed to the Government of Rwanda has thus been closely linked to its sustained military involvement in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where operations against armed groups have repeatedly resulted in civilian deaths, particularly in areas perceived to support opposing forces. Inside Rwanda, such incidents have been significantly less frequent after the mid-1990s but have continued to be recorded sporadically in connection with local security enforcement operations.
The Government of Rwanda first became active as a one-sided actor in UCDP data in 1990, when the one-sided violence resulted in at least 25 civilian deaths. The threshold was reached in October that year when over 1400 civilians were killed in attacks.
