SUMMARY
In order to describe the use of one-sided violence by the Al-Mahdi Army, it is important to acknowledge both the characteristics of the militia and the societal situation in Iraq following the defeat of the regime in the interstate conflict against the USA, the UK and Australia in 2003 and the intrastate conflict that erupted soon thereafter. It is also worth noting the decentralized structure of the Al-Mahdi Army, partly caused by its sudden growth, which meant that statements by the leadership were not always respected by local commanders.
The Al-Mahdi Army was originally established as a religious and social movement that quickly became popular among Shia Muslims in particular in poor neighborhoods of Baghdad and in southern Iraq. Thus, the Al-Mahdi Army started administrating its neighborhoods through the creation of social services but also acting as police and agents for self-proclaimed “protection” of the population. The leader of Al-Mahdi Army, Muqtada al-Sadr, did not openly condone one-sided violence, despite repeated claims of his opposition to foreign influence on Iraq and the call for the termination of the multinational support to the Iraqi government. Furthermore, al-Sadr repeatedly urged his followers to avoid violence against Sunni Muslims, even though such an approach sometimes seemed reversed by lower-level Al-Mahdi Army commanders. There have been reports of Al-Mahdi Army units attacking Sunni Muslims and seizing their belongings on the basis of a fatwa (religious edict) that allegedly stated that it is legal to seize the goods of those who oppose Ali’s caliphate, the main division between the Sunni and Shia faith.
As the Al-Mahdi Army tried to expand the territory under its control, it employed one-sided violence against critics, including businessmen and traditional leaders, in particular targeting Sunni Muslims or members of competing Shia Muslim political movements. Within the area controlled by the Al-Mahdi Army, one-sided violence was directed against the population in order to extract money but also to punish the opposition. At times, the Al-Mahdi Army executed members of the militia for inappropriate behavior.
Most of the one-sided attacks consisted of armed units attacking civilians in brief attacks using small arms. There were reports of the Al-Mahdi Army directing rockets and mortars against Sunni Muslim neighborhoods and occasional bombs at Sunni mosques, but most of the violence was in the form of executions of anything from a few to dozens of people at a time. At times, the Al-Mahdi Army allegedly set up roadblocks with the help of Al-Mahdi Army members within the Iraqi police and executed Sunni Muslims on the basis of their identity cards.
Al-Mahdi Army first became active as a one-sided actor in UCDP data in 2006, when the one-sided violence resulted in at least 25 civilian deaths. It is difficult to disaggregate the one-sided violence in Iraq during the year, in which it is believed that Al-Mahdi Army was substantially involved. Following a large number of unclear incidents, 25civilian deaths in a year could be observed on 23 November 2006, when at least 20 people were killed in attacks by Al-Mahdi Army on the Sunni Muslim neighborhood of Al-Azamiyah in Baghdad. The attacks were a response to bombings in the Al-Mahdi Army stronghold of Sadr City on the same day and consisted of mortars fired on residential areas and a market place.
