SUMMARY
In the context of the Sendero Luminoso's ("Shining Path") armed conflict with the Government of Peru the group also made use of one-sided violence (see Peru: Government. One-sided violence perpetrated by the Sendero Luminoso can be traced to two interlinked sources. Firstly to the general doctrine of the “people’s war” and secondly to the tactics employed by the group to control territory and the population inhabiting the territory.
The concept and ideology of the “people’s war” entailed that the use of mass violence was a core tactic in the movement’s revolutionary plan, as dictated by the “Gonzalo Thought” of the Sendero Luminoso leader Guzmán. Abimael Guzmán argued that mass violence was necessary in order to “substitute one class for another”, thus providing an ideological framework for annihilating anyone who refused the new revolutionary order. A party slogan is telling in this respect; “Blood will not drown the revolution, but water it”. In general Guzmán’s ideology was reminiscent of a prominent theme in Maoism; the cleansing nature of revolutionary violence. Following this doctrine the Sendero Luminoso, throughout its armed conflict, targeted and killed missionaries and aid workers, trade union leaders, peasant activists and people deemed to in general be supportive of the existing government and its structures.
On a more tactical level Sendero Luminoso's one-sided violence aimed to control territory through ‘cleansing’ it from non-revolutionary elements. When capturing and holding territory the Sendero Luminoso would often (above murdering local government officials and other symbols of the state) kill alleged informers, spies and any civilians deemed to be collaborating with the government, police, security forces or local anti-communist militias. In addition to direct targeting in armed attacks the Sendero Luminoso became infamous for setting up so-called “popular trials”. These were in essence mock-trials where Sendero Luminoso cadres would round up, ‘put on the stand’ and execute or beat prominent citizens, ‘anti-revolutionaries’ or people they knew were unpopular in the area (such as cattle-rustlers or landlords).
These two sources of one-sided violence, combined with armed struggle against soldiers and police, make up the core of the “people’s war”. In essence the general strategy was one of making the country ungovernable so as to secure the downfall of the –in the group’s view- illegitimate government.
The bulk of attacks and “popular trials” committed/set up by the Sendero Luminoso were located in the rural areas that the group controlled, where the reach of the central government was weak. The amount of territory held by the movement has however fluctuated dramatically over the years, meaning that incidents of one-sided violence have taken place over a wide-spread area of Peru. Throughout the armed conflict the group has however had an especially strong presence in the Apurímac, Ayacucho, Chanchamayo, and Huallaga areas, where many incidents of one-sided violence have taken place. But attacks have also taken place in urban settings, such as in the capital city Lima. In attacks on civilians the group mainly makes use of small arms and knives/machetes.
Sendero Luminoso first became active as a one-sided actor in UCDP data in 1989, when the one-sided violence resulted in over 25 civilian deaths, although the group committed acts of one-sided violence before this year. The threshold was reached in early June of that year when Sendero Luminoso killed 2 civilians near Huancavelica village.
