SUMMARY
Animosity between the Alawites (Lebanon and Sunnis (Lebanon) communities in Lebanon dates back to at least the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990. Whilst the Sunni community in Lebanon is one of the three dominant sects in the political life of the state (the other two being Christians and Shiites), the Alawites are a small minority with no direct electoral influence. This small minority resides mainly in the north of Lebanon, in the city of Tripoli, and close to the northern border with Syria.
Despite its small numbers the Alawites (Lebanon of Lebanon played a relatively prominent role during the Lebanese civil war; at least in the city of Tripoli. Many Alawites (Lebanon in the north and in Tripoli sympathized with the pro-Syrian Arab Democratic Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party during the civil war, and these two organizations thus had a prominent presence in Tripoli. These two pro-Syrian parties mainly aligned themselves against the Christian-Maronite side during the civil war, but also ended up fighting against the Sunni Tahweed movement, which was anti-Syrian during most of the civil war. This conflict can perhaps be said to be the beginning of the armed conflict between these two communities. In addition, the Tahweed movement had relatively strong links to the Syrian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was crushed by Bashar al-Assad’s father in 1982.
More recently, the split in the north and in Tripoli was also influenced by Sunni resistance towards Syrian control of Lebanon from 1990-2005. Sunni political groups, such as the Future Movement, were key in expelling Syrian forces from the country in 2005, following the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Due to sectarian links between the Syrian regime, which under Assad has been dominated by the Alawites, and the Alawites in the north of Lebanon, sectarian tensions thus increased further.
There are, however, more recent roots for the conflict that erupted in parallel with the Syrian civil war. As a consequence of the increasingly sectarian and communal civil war in Syria, pitting mainly the majority Sunni community against the Alawite-dominated government, Lebanon, and especially the north, have been flooded with Sunni refugees from Syria. This, in combination with the fact that the Lebanese group Hezbollah has given active support to the government of Syria, has served to increase sectarian tensions in Lebanon. These tensions take the form of large parts of the Sunni community supporting the rebels in Syria, whilst Hezbollah and the Alawites have mainly supported Bashar al-Assad.
The conflict that erupted between the Alawites (Lebanon and Sunnis (Lebanon) communities thus appear to have both historical and more recent roots.
The fighting that began in 2012 was concentrated in the northern city of Tripoli, which contains a relatively large number of Alawites. The bulk of the fighting stands between two contiguous neighborhoods: Jabal Mohsen (Alawite-dominated) and Bab al-Tabbaneh (Sunni-dominated). The fighting mainly takes on the character of street clashes and gun and RPG-fire between these two areas.
It is important to note that categorizing this conflict as Sunni versus Alawite is a simplification, as these two groups are no solid political or organizational blocks. It is likely that fighting to some degree is coordinated via stable organizations, such as the Tawheed movement, the Future Movement, and Alawite political groups. There appears to, however, exist incompatibilities that can be said to be traceable to the sectarian divide mentioned here.
The non-state conflict between Alawites (Lebanon and Sunnis (Lebanon) in Lebanon is first included in UCDP data in 2012. The conflict became active sometime between the second and fourth of June, when continuous clashes in Tripoli killed at least 14 people, pushing the toll above 25 battle-related deaths.
