SUMMARY
The relations between HuM (Hezb-ul-Mujahideen) and JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) were very complex. On the one hand, HuM and JKLF issued joint communiqués reporting atrocities done by the GOvernment of India, participated in umbrella organizations (such as the All Party Hurryat Conference) and claimed that they fought a common struggle against the Indian occupation of Kashmir. On the other hand, and at a somewhat more local level, the two groups were at odds with each other, frequently contesting each other and turning to violence to settle rivalries. The reasons for this multi-layered relationship are plentiful – being mainly derived from the widely different objectives of the two groups with regards to the future administration of Kashmir. HuM is a religious-centric Islamic fundamentalist group, desiring a Sharia-based Kashmir, while JKLFis a secular, nationalist movement, claiming that a joint Muslim-Hindu Kashmiri identity exists. Further, while HuM’s objectives are to transform Kashmir into a province (or at least associate state) of Pakistan, JKLF’s main goals are the creation of a fully independent new state, that would eventually include not only Indian Kashmir but also Pakistani Kashmir. Beyond these ideological differences, there were also some potential tactical points of contention, with HuM, a newer (established in 1988) but better-equipped organization, with external support from Pakistan, contesting the older (established 1977), already entrenched JKLF in order to obtain and establish control over Kashmiri territory.
Incidents between HuM and JKLF follow this convoluted pattern of alliance-animosity. As an example, after HuM (supposedly) assassinated a JKLF leader, it claimed the action was the work of Indian security forces, while at the same time issuing a public statement together with JKLF denouncing the actions and atrocities of the Indian governmental troops, all in the space of a few days. The overall patterns of violence between HuM and JKLF are, however, consistent – most violence being relatively low level (especially when compared with the overall levels of violence in the province), with main tactics being ad-hoc small clashes between members of the two groups, especially in areas targeted by both groups. Targeted abductions and assassinations are also a tactic employed by both groups (one such event was the abduction and killing of Amjad, a top JKLF militant on 12 January 1994).
The balance of power between the two groups, while initially in the favor of JKLF, shifted significantly in favor of HuM throughout the 1990s. However, most of this shift did not occur on the battlefield, but was rather the result of ideological shifts towards Islamism within Kashmir’s population as well as better financing and organization of HuM. Further, conflicts inside JKLF, led to multiple splits in the organization, making it its abandon of the armed struggle in 1995. This played a significant role in the relative increase in the strength of HuM.
Geographically, the violence between HuM and JKLF has been limited to the Kashmir valley, in Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir State. As both groups were present throughout the province, incidents were widely distributed on the entire territory.
The non-state conflict between HuM and JKLF is first included in UCDP data in 1993, when clashes between the two groups first reached 25 battle-related deaths.
