SUMMARY
After the fall of the Taleban government in 2001, defeated by the warlords of the umbrella group called the Northern Alliance and the US-led coalition, a number of Afghan warlords, politicians and strongmen began a scramble for power within the new institutions of the state. In the northern parts of Afghanistan one such rivalry flared between the Uzbek warlord Rashid Abdul Dostum and his Jumbesh-i-Milli Islami (also known as Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami against the Tajik General Ustad Mohammed Atta, his Jamiat-i-Islami (also known as Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and his ally Defence Minister Fahim, between 2002 and 2003. These two leaders had been allies in toppling the Taleban, both being commanders in the Northern Alliance.
Both the Uzbek and the Tajik ethnic groups are large in numbers in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, prompting the aforementioned leaders of these two groups to squabble over influence over this region. The conflict was accentuated in 2002, when the central Government of Afghanistan promoted both men to the rank of general, calling into question who was predominant in the region. Dostum’s and Atta’s rivalry also had historical roots, with the two fighting each others’ armies over Mazar-i-Sharif already in 1993.
Clashes first erupted in 2001, soon after the fall of the Taliban regime, when Atta’s forces controlled Dostum’s former stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif. The situation worsened and escalated into a non-state conflict in 2002, as Dostum attempted to reassert authority in the north, viewed by the aforementioned as being his sphere of influence. Though not an elected leader of the provinces which he claimed pre-eminence over, Dostum had ruled parts of the north as his own fiefdom between approximately 1994 and 1997.
Fighting in 2002 began in early February and continued throughout the entire year, taking place mainly around Mazar-i-Sharif (Balkh province) and in the Samangan and Sar-i-Pul provinces. Clashes during 2003 occurred in the same area, but also spread to Faryab province, which had been largely spared from violence during 2002. Fighting during 2003 also took place during the entirety of the year, but was especially fierce in October. Violent clashes occurred also in 2004, but did not reach the level of a non-state conflict.
Clashes between the two parties involved not only light weapons such as machine guns, but also heavier weaponry such as mortars, rockets, and tanks. The fighting mainly centered on conquering territory held by the other party, driving out opponents from villages and small towns surrounding the main price; Mazar-i-Sharif.
Throughout the fighting several ceasefires were struck, often being mediated by the central government, ISAF or by the UN forces that were present in the northern areas of Afghanistan. These ceasefires were however prone to breakdowns and were often violated, being followed by renewed clashes. Violence slowed towards the end of 2003, as relatively successful efforts were made to disarm and demobilize many of the fighters loyal to the two belligerents, while simultaneously promising the two influential seats in the central government in Kabul. Another explanation for the decrease in violence might have been Dostum’s attempts to polish his image for the presidential elections of 2004, in which he won approximately 10% of the vote.
The non-state conflict between Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami is first included in UCDP data in 1992. Clashes throughout December of that year resulted in over 50 battle-related deaths. A few inactive years followed as well as some years with low levels of violence. In 2002, violence resurfaced and clashes took place on a larger scale between the two groups where over 100 battle-related deaths were recorded.
