SUMMARY
The history of Hamas-Fatah rivalry in essence dates back to the formation of Hamas at the beginning of the First Intifada in 1987. As the Intifada broke out, more or less spontaneously, several Palestinian factions, both secular and Islamic, struggled to harness the force of this violent maelstrom. Fatah, as the chief party of the PLO, was wary of other forces utilizing the Intifada and questioning its predominance. The rivalry became more evident following the start of the Madrid and Oslo processes in 1991 and 1993 respectively, with Hamas viewing concessions on Palestinian soil as being in opposition to the concept of Palestinian land being an Islamic waqf (holy land entrusted to Islamic sovereignty).
Hamas growing influence as a social, political and military force also challenged the predominance of Fatah, which took control of the Palestinian institutions of the PNA following the Oslo Accords (1993-1995). Part of these deals was the creation of Palestinian security forces with the mandate and mission to suppress militant attacks on Israel. The Fatah-dominated PNA took steps to curb such militancy (although some question the determination with which this took place), taking a heavy toll on the Oslo-opposed Hamas activities. Hamas members were routinely arrested or extradited to Israel, or tortured by Palestinian security forces, leaving many members bitter of Fatah.
Especially after the Second Intifadas high toll on Palestinian lives and infrastructure in 2000-2003 Hama's strength in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and the institutions within these localities, grew as opposition to Fatah's misrule of the PNA began to surface at an increasing rate. Opposition to Fatah's political dominance culminated in the ousting of the party from the PNA in January 2006 elections for the PLC, which Hamas won. Security in the Palestinian territories had begun to crumble even before these events, but the change in power in the PNA can still be seen as the determining event that blasted Fatah-Hamas relations to pieces. With the security forces of the PNA being almost completely constructed from Fatah-affiliated men, now nominally under the control of a Hamas polity that could not pay their salaries due to an international blockade, the rivalry burst into open confrontation throughout 2006.
To tackle Fatah's predominance within the security forces Hamas created its own paramilitary outfit, the "Executive Forces", placed under the authority of the Interior Ministry, which was controlled by Hamas. Hamas operatives and members of the Interior Ministry's "Executive Forces" took on, and were attacked by, Fatah-affiliated PNA security forces, AMB operatives and armed Fatah members. The Fatah-Hamas conflict thus is not one of radically opposed ideologies, but one of rivalry overpower and the role of representing the Palestinian people and struggle.
The split between Hamas and Fatah was further widened in 2007, when Hamas ousted Fatah from the Gaza Strip. Coordinated attacks on the security institutions controlled by Fatah led Hamas to a swift victory in the summer of 2007, effectively splitting the Palestinian territories into two entities. The Gaza Strip came to be controlled by Hamas, and the West Bank by Fatah, with two different administrations that both claimed that the other was illegitimate. The Fatah-dominated government in the West Bank received international endorsement, whilst the Hamas government was further isolated by the international community.
Hamas for its parts claimed that actions against Fatah were carried out not against the movement as such, but against a "coupist" current within it, which sought to oust Hamas and control the Palestinian administration. Supposedly, one of the leaders of this current was Mohammed Dahlan, a Fatah strong-man who was prominent in the Palestinian security forces. The take-over of Gaza was thus carried out in self-defense in Hamas view.
Fatah in turn claimed that Hamas had committed a coup, so as to grab power for itself. They supported this claim by pointing to the coordinated action taken by Hamas militants, deemed to be a sure sign that the whole thing had been meticulously planned.
Fatah - Hamas violence took the form of running street battles, attacks on demonstrations and funeral rallies, widespread kidnappings and killings of local commanders and relatively high-profile leaders of each organization. The violence had a "tit-for-tat" characteristic, with each incident taking place in response to an earlier one. The clashes had no real resemblance to actual warfare, but are more of sporadic firefights with light weapons between masked men. The absence of uniforms or any other identifying insignia (as is the case in many incidents), complicates the Fatah-Hamas dyad, through the difficulties this creates in attributing the violence to this specific dyad. How much of the violence was directed from above is also hard to ascertain, since attacks may be carried out by local commanders, as well as the lines of conflict being blurred by clan and family clashes within the communities.
The locales of the major outbursts of violence were the densely populated streets of Gaza City and Khan Younis, but violence also took place in West Bank cities, albeit with lower intensity.
Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007 there has been no notable violent activity in this dyad, and the two pieces of Palestinian territory remain divided between the two parties. Several Arab countries have attempted to reconcile Fatah and Hamas, but at the end of 2010 there had been no success in doing so.
The non-state conflict between Fatah and Hamas is first included in UCDP datasets in 2006. On 1 October that year approximately 9 combatants were killed in clashes in Gaza City, raising the death toll above the 25 battle-related deaths threshold.
