SUMMARY
The Bangladeshi political landscape has been dominated by high levels of intolerance, electoral violence and confrontational behavior ever since independence. Typically a number of reasons are given for this high level of violence, both historical (and structural) and transient (specific to each electoral cycle). One such structural reason for the violence is the legacy of the Bangladeshi fight for independence. As such, after independence, individuals connected to the military turned into politicians without changing their approach to dispute management, leading to a number of coups and violent overthrows of power. Further, mechanisms for managing disputes did not change even as democracy was re-established in the 1990s, with democratic governments frequently using the army as a means of maintaining domestic security. Another structural reason for the violence is the high levels of poverty and very low levels of literacy (Bangladesh has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world, at little over 50%, and one of the lowest GDPs in the world). This encourages violent behavior as a traditional means of electoral campaigning is inefficient, and levels of discontent are high. The culture of electoral and political violence has been self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing, as the usage of violent demonstrations (hartals) proved efficient, leading to significant changes in the Bangladeshi polity, including the return to democracy in 1991. Further, the electoral system creates power vacuums through the demand that a caretaker government takes over 90 days before each election, thus allowing for more violent behavior.
Typical tactics employed during periods of electoral violence are so-called ‘hartals’ and ‘bandhs’, large-scale street protests and industrial strikes. ‘Hartals’ are typically called upon by various politicians as a means of campaigning or intimidating the opposition. They frequently run out of control and degenerate into arson, beatings, large-scale destruction of property and even targeted attacks (such as acid throwing and bombings). Both the main parties, the Awami League and BNP (Bangladeshi Nationalist Party) use such large-scale strikes, and the level of violence is at times sufficiently high to require the intervention of the army. Mobilization occurs from the central level, as campaign messages incite to violence, typically being very radical in nature (one of the main slogans employed during the 2001 elections was ‘throw the rascals out’). Furthermore, violence does not cease with the end of the elections, but typically continue as the losing parties do not accept the results of the elections.
Geographically, violence has been spread out around Bangladesh, where the two parties contest elections. Big cities (such as Dhaka or Chittagong) have, however, more often been the scene of the more extreme forms of violence, as parties have a larger presence and can mobilize larger groups of people.
The non-state conflict between the supporters of Awami League and the supporters of BNP is first included in UCDP data in 2001, as violent clashes in August that year, a result of electoral violence, resulted in over 25 battle-related deaths.
