SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between AFC and VDP was primarily concentrated in the Nord and Sud Kivu provinces in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire). The violence was rooted in the broader conflict dynamics linked to the resurgence of the M23 rebellion that re-emerged in 2021, which led to the group’s territorial expansion in Nord Kivu. In response, the Congolese government increasingly relied on cooperation with a range of local armed groups, includingAPCLS, CMC and NDC-R many of which had previously been adversaries. These groups were reorganized into a broader pro-government coalition, the VDP (Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie), commonly known as Wazalendo. The alliance primarily aimed to counter M23 and allied forces, as well as limit Rwandan influence. In December 2023, during a period of shifting ceasefires, AFC was formed as an umbrella alliance including M23. The emergence of AFC marked an escalation in coordinated offensives against VDP positions, while VDP forces increasingly operated as local defense militias supporting state forces in contested zones. The conflict thus developed into a fragmented proxy war, with both sides competing for territorial control, strategic roads, and local influence.
The conflict was also shaped by long-standing local political and ethnic tensions in Nord Kivu, particularly involving land access, citizenship debates, and armed mobilization among communities such as Hunde, Nande, Nyanga, Tembo, Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi (often referred to collectively as Banyarwanda). The Nord Kivu province is situated in the eastern parts of DR Congo bordering Rwanda and Uganda. Much of the land in the Nord Kivu province is fertile and it is more densely populated than other parts of the country. Enmities between the communal groups in the area have a long history. Before colonization, these communities were governed differently in different chiefdoms. Under the colonial administration, these chieftaincies were absorbed by the new power. In some cases, chieftaincies were re-drawn into sectors sometimes importing new chiefs. The Belgians also made a distinction between the indigenous/autochthonous tribes of the area, who were entitled to holding land, and the foreigners, oftentimes being those of Rwandan descent (Hutu and Tutsi), who were not entitled to holding land. At the same time, all land belonged to the colonial power and they could expropriate customary land to lease or sell it to plantation-owners.
During the colonial rule, the plantation-owners needed labor on their farms. Labor workers were recruited in neighboring Rwanda to meet this demand. This new wave of immigration changed the ethnic balance in some areas of the Nord Kivu province. It is believed that 150 000 and 300 000 Hutu and Tutsi immigrants moved to Nord Kivu during the colonial period. After independence, these shifts have been one of the roots of conflicts in the area. While the indigenous communities have kept the customary power and the right over land, the Hutu and Tutsi have been more numerous and therefore a threat in a democratic DR Congo. Different laws regulating citizenship have granted or stripped the Hutu and Tutsi communities of their rights aggravating the situation. Under the Mobutu Zairianisation process, the big plantations were nationalized and then granted to close allies of president Mobutu. Hutu and Tutsi elite managed to buy land during this period and consequently managed to gain economic power.
Both AFC and VDP have drawn on these divisions in recruitment and mobilization. AFC has framed its actions in terms of protecting Tutsi populations and countering armed groups such as FDLR-FOCA, while VDP has emphasized resistance to perceived foreign influence, particularly from Rwanda, and defense of local autochtone communities and territorial sovereignty. Thereby the conflict can be seen as following the Hutu – Hunde and Nyanga in 1993 and Hutu-Tutsi violence in 1995, as well as in connection to the DR Congo (Zaire): Government conflict. AFC can trace their origins to M23, CNDP and RCD and similarly VDP can partly trace their origin to PARECO and Mayi Mayi militias which have previously been engaged in non-state conflict in eastern DR Congo.
The conflict between AFC and VDP was also connected to the Rwanda: Government conflict. AFC drew its main support from, and claimed to fight for the interests of, the Tutsi population of the two Kivu provinces. The group was supported by Rwanda, who has a Tutsi-led government. Rwanda used AFC as a means to retain influence in the region. AFC partly motivated the insurgency by claiming that the Tutsi population was threatened by other armed groups, including the Rwandan Hutu rebel group FDLR-FOCA, and by the government's policy. Meanwhile, VDP drew on some groups and movements whose main conflict issue was against Rwanda’s interference in the Kivus. Their members were multi-ethnic but the Hutu was one of the communities that had a prominent position in the alliance and therefore the conflict became mixed up with a conflict between Hutu and Tutsi that spanned the Central African region.
Both groups used propaganda spreading ethnic hatred to mobilize support. The AFC often played on the fear of genocide among the Tutsi population, and portrayed all non-Tutsi as potential FDLR-FOCA members. VDP, on the other hand, described M23 as a foreign movement with no interest in peace in the DR. Congo and with a final aim of Balkanizing, meaning dividing up, the country. Locally the conflict issues were about land and the control over local power. Both sides tell a story about being marginalized. Both groups were also connected to local elites and business interests as well as the control over resources have also spurred the conflict. The groups have attacked civilians perceived to be part of the other side in the conflict.
General tactics in the dyad include armed clashes involving small arms, targeted raids on villages, ambushes along roads, and periodic coordinated offensives to seize or defend territory. There have also been repeated allegations of violence against civilians by both sides, including killings, intimidation, and forced displacement. While AFC operations have at times involved more structured military offensives aimed at capturing territory, VDP forces have primarily operated as locally embedded militias conducting defensive operations and retaliatory attacks, often in fragmented and decentralized formations.
The violence that started in Nord Kivu spread to Sud Kivu in 2025 when AFC sought to take control of Bukavu and Uvira. In Sud Kivu, AFC operations extended into highland areas including Minembwe, where the group sought to consolidate influence in Banyamulenge-inhabited territories. The expansion into these areas was closely linked to local alignments, and AFC was joined by the Banyamulenge militia AFP-Gutabara, which provided local support and facilitated mobility in the highland terrain. VDP forces in Sud Kivu were supported by CNPSC-aligned units, which mobilized in response to the perceived expansion of AFC and allied Banyamulenge groups. The fighting in Sud Kivu was characterized by localized territorial contestation, with repeated clashes over control of strategic hills, transport routes, and population centres, further entrenching ethnic and community-based divisions in the region. AFC slowly expanded areas under its control.
The non-state conflict between AFC and VDP was first included in UCDP data in 2024. In July that year, more than 25 people were killed in clashes between the two groups in Nord Kivu province, DR Congo.
