SUMMARY
Out of the public eye, in the shadow of the bloody civil war over government power in Angola, a low-scale armed conflict has been fought in the Angolan enclave Cabinda. FLEC (Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda; Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda), which has later split into several factions, sought independence for Cabinda from Angola. A peace agreement in 2006 with FLEC-R (FLEC–Renovada; FLEC–Renewed), one of the rebel factions, failed to resolve the conflict as FLEC-FAC (FLEC–Forças armadas de Cabinda; FLEC–Armed Forces of Cabinda) continued to wage armed struggle. In 2010 FLEC-FAC splintered again between the faction led by Alexandre Tati and the faction led by Nzita Tiago.
The conflict in Cabinda is notoriously difficult for the UCDP to monitor, as little reporting covers the enclave. In 2025, the conflict between the Government of Angola and FLEC-FAC-TN remained active. During the first half of the year, FLEC-FAC-TN released multiple statements about ongoing clashes in Cabinda, some of which included own admitted losses in clashes in the Necuto commune and near the Democratic Republic of Congo border. The group also claimed that the violence had spilled over into the DR Congo territory. However, the Angolan government denied reports of instability in the region.
IN DEPTH
Origins of the Cabindan insurgency
Cabinda is a small, oil-rich region, physically separated from the rest of Angola by a sliver of the DR Congo (Zaire). It produces around 60% of the country's oil revenues and is, thus, of great economic importance to Angola. The enclave first came under Portuguese control in 1885, when the Treaty of Simulambuco was concluded between the Portuguese and the local rulers of Cabinda. In 1963, when the independence struggle against Portugal had commenced, the Cabindan separatist organization FLEC (Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda; Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) was formed. However, it is important to note that - even then - the movement's aim was not primarily to achieve independence from Portugal, but rather to achieve Cabindan independence from the rest of Angola. The Cabindan rebels refer to the above-mentioned treaty, which they claim demonstrates that Angola and Cabinda were seen as different entities under colonial rule and that the two territories should, therefore, form separate states.
During the years preceding independence from Portugal, two of the three major independence movements in Angola, MPLA (Movimento popular de libertação de Angola; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and FNLA (Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola; National Front for the Liberation of Angola), began using Cabinda's dense forests as sanctuaries, thus making Cabinda the scene of heavy fighting between a number of parties. Compared to the three other independence movements in the country, FLEC was militarily insignificant and was not included in the independence negotiations. On 25 July 1975, a faction of FLEC, later to be named FLEC–FAC (Forças Armadas de Cabinda; Armed Forces of Cabinda), announced the creation of a provisional revolutionary government of Cabinda. The stated aim of the new government was to liberate the enclave from foreign domination, to organize free and democratic elections, and to install a central government before the date set for independence from Portugal, 11 November 1975. This, however, did not succeed. Fighting between FLEC and the MPLA government that seized power after independence has continued on and off ever since. The conflict is first registered in UCDP data in 1991, as that is the first year for which there is conclusive evidence of more than 25 battle-related deaths; however, it is not unlikely that the conflict reached this level of activity long before that.
Conflict actors and external involvement
The history of FLEC (Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda; Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) is characterized by constant fragmentation, and the rebels have, during the course of the conflict, split into a number of separate organizations. All attempts at reconciling the various factions have so far failed. The main reasons for the continuous splits within the movement appear to be personal rivalries, as well as disagreements over whether or not to negotiate with the government. In addition, the different factions have not been able to agree on the ultimate goal of the struggle: to continue fighting for independence at any cost or to settle for autonomy. From 1989 and onwards the two FLEC factions that have been active in the conflict are FLEC–FAC (FLEC–Forças Armadas de Cabinda; FLEC–Armed Forces of Cabinda), under the leadership of Henriques Tiago Nzita until his death on 3 June 2016 when he was replaced by his son Emmanuel Nzita wa Nzita, and FLEC–R (FLEC–Renovada; FLEC–Renewed), initially led by Jose Tiburcio Luemba, who was in 1997 replaced by Antonio Bento Bembe.
The opposing side in the conflict has, over the years, been the Angolan MPLA government. However, its outlook has changed somewhat during the course of the conflict. Early on, the MPLA under President Agostinho Neto established a Soviet-style one-party state, where Marxism-Leninism was the official ideology. After Neto's death in 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos came to power, and gradually softened the state ideology, officially abolishing Marxism-Leninism in 1990. In May 1991, a nominal multiparty system emerged. However, despite the holding of presidential elections in 1992 and the establishment of a government of national unity in 1997, MPLA has continued to dominate the political scene in the country, as the ruling power is concentrated in the hands of President dos Santos and his Council of Ministers. In September 2017, dos Santos handed the Angolan presidency over to Joao Lourenco, who also took over as president of the MPLA. The government has, throughout the conflict, opposed Cabindan independence while not entirely ruling out some kind of special status for the enclave.
The degree of foreign involvement in the Cabindan conflict has, over the years, been significantly lower than in the conflict between the MPLA government and UNITA. However, when MPLA received support from thousands of Cuban troops in the 1970s and 1980s, around 2000 of them were stationed in Cabinda. Their task was mainly to protect oil installations from attacks by FLEC, as well as by UNITA, who has also been active in the enclave. The various FLEC factions initially received logistical support from Zaire, which had its eyes on Cabinda's oil, but after President Neto of Angola and President Mobutu of Zaire signed an agreement to improve the relations between the states, this source of support dried up. No new foreign help was forthcoming until in the late 1980s, when Zaire once more initiated contact, supplying FLEC–R with both weapons and rear bases. FLEC–FAC, for its part, received similar support from Congo-Brazzaville. This support remained constant until 1997, when the regimes in both Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville were overthrown, with Angolan support. The downfall of these regimes considerably weakened the rebels.
Despite the fact that the government forces throughout the conflict have been military superior, it has not been able to completely defeat the secessionist movements, which are reported to have massive popular support in the enclave. Thus, a low-scale guerrilla conflict has been active on and off since Angola’s independence. Both FLEC–FAC and FLEC–R have relied heavily on armed ambushes on government troops. Moreover, they have targeted both oil installations and foreign companies active in the enclave. In addition, kidnappings have become an increasingly common way for the rebels to attempt to obtain international attention and revenue from ransoms.
Developments on the battlefield and at the negotiation table
Negotiations have taken place on and off during the 1990s, and from 1994 to 1997, the governments pursued a strategy aiming first to sign truces with the different rebel groups and subsequently hold a conference with all parties to work out a new formula for provincial autonomy. A ceasefire was eventually signed with FLEC–R (FLEC–Renovada; FLEC–Renewed) in 1996, but no understanding was reached with FLEC–FAC (FLEC–Forças Armadas de Cabinda; FLEC–Armed Forces of Cabinda). In spite of continuing negotiations between the government and FLEC–R, no middle ground could be found regarding the status of the territory and fighting resumed in early 1997. Thus, the government's strategy of negotiating with the rebels was stuck, which led to a new focus on military offensives, aiming to weaken FLEC–R and FLEC–FAC enough to force them back to the negotiating table. By late 2001, after a plea from President dos Santos for the rebels to end hostilities in order for negotiations to be held, exploratory talks were indeed initiated with the government and FLEC–FAC. However, these exploratory talks failed to secure a continued dialogue.
After a relatively calm couple of years, fighting escalated in 2002. As UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, had been killed in February, and a ceasefire had been agreed with UNITA, the government was able to focus its attention on Cabinda. 30 000 more troops were deployed in the enclave, and in October, a large-scale offensive was launched. By the end of the year, it was reported that the main bases of both FLEC–FAC and FLEC–R had been destroyed. The 2002 offensive was conducted amidst growing international concern regarding the civilian Cabindan population. Over the years, there have been numerous allegations of abuses, mainly committed by the government troops, but also by the rebels. Due to the isolation of the enclave, these allegations have often been difficult to substantiate, but in 2002 and 2003, reporting on the issue increased from within the enclave. Local human rights activists reported that any FLEC attack on Angolan government troops is followed by violent reprisals on the village closest to the location of the attack. Furthermore, there are reports of systematic rape of Cabindan women as well as frequent summary executions and murders.
Amidst continued FAA (Angolan armed forces) offensive, renewed attempts at conflict resolution were made in 2003. Following exploratory talks, the government and FLEC–FAC met in Paris in February. The government delegation presented a proposal for a peaceful settlement to the conflict, in which Cabinda would remain an integral part of Angola, but where the enclave would receive an increased budget and where FLEC–FAC soldiers would be integrated into the armed forces. The rebels dismissed the proposal, later accusing the government of double-dealing, as they claimed that the government representatives had offered the same deal to FLEC–R. In the following years, no tangible results were reached on the diplomatic front. An attempt in 2004 to merge the two factions, in order to facilitate dialogue, soon collapsed. A united FLEC was announced and a Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (CFD), including Cabindan civil society groups and local Catholic Church representatives, launched; however, in 2005 the unified FLEC split again due to disagreements on the negotiations.
Following the collapse of the united front, former FLEC–R leader António Bento Bembe negotiated with the government, and a peace agreement was signed on 1 August 2006. While Bembe claimed to be negotiating on behalf of CFD, a majority of the member organizations rejected the accord, stating that Bembe had no negotiating authority as he had been dismissed from his position in February. Many went as far as to say that Bembe was, in fact, on the government's payroll. The accord stipulated a blanket amnesty, a ceasefire, a reduction in the number of Angolan armed forces in Cabinda, and the reinsertion of the former rebels into society. Furthermore, it called for some local self-governance and “special status” for Cabinda. In return, the rebels recognized Angola as a unitary and indivisible state. Implementation of the agreement proceeded in 2007, with Bembe installed as Minister without portfolio and members of the CFD sworn in for other government positions. Moreover, in June 2007, the Angolan government claimed that the integration of the FLEC forces into the Angolan army and national police had been concluded.
However, the agreement failed to end the conflict in Angola. It is commonly held that it is only FLEC–FAC that can be seen as a credible military force at present. As that faction rejects the agreement, most analysts are skeptical concerning the future impact of the peace accord. It was evident that the integration of former rebels was limited to FLEC–R members. The Angolan government has admitted that FLEC–FAC rebels are still infiltrating Cabinda from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and it has maintained a strong military presence in the province. FLEC-FAC has continued to claim attacks targeting Angolan troops in Cabinda. In the period between May and August 2011, the Angolan armed forces (FAA) and FLEC–FAC clashed in the forests in the Tshela territory, Bas-Congo Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In August, DR Congo (Zaire) sent its military forces to the area to restore calm.
After a few years of intermittent fighting, the conflict was active in 2016 and 2017. In 2018, it became inactive as FLEC-FAC-TN asked the government to open a channel for negotiations with the group during the year. In February 2019, however, the group instead announced the resumption of the "intensive armed struggle" in Cabinda after several members of the group were arrested, and once again, the conflict became active.
Reporting on Cabinda and coding problems
One of UCDP’s main sources for its data is formed by newswires and newspaper articles found in the online database Factiva. Factiva carries over 10 000 different newswires, newspapers, and other sources, and has global coverage. With a specific search string and a specific set of news sources tailored for each conflict, UCDP aims to get the best news coverage of conflict events possible. While coding the conflict in Angola, UCDP relies on All Africa, Reuters, Agence France Presse, Xinhua, Associated Press, and BBC Monitoring services. The latter source picks up local newspapers, television, and radio broadcasts and translates them into English. Using these sources, UCDP usually feels confident. It captures all aspects of a conflict. In a second additional stage in the coding process, the coder turns to other types of material available, such as newly published books and case studies, journals as Africa Research Bulletin and Africa Confidential, and reports by NGOs as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and International Crisis Group.
While most conflicts around the world receive relatively good media coverage, enabling UCDP to feel confident that it has covered at least the majority of events taking place, this is not the case for the conflict over Cabinda in Angola. This conflict is not covered extensively in mainstream media sources, which makes it difficult for UCDP to get a sense of what has transpired in the conflict during the course of the year. One of the reasons for the poor news coverage is that there is no independent reporting from the region. Therefore, UCDP is often unsure about the number of fatalities in the conflict, which makes it difficult to determine whether or not it is active in a given year. UCDP tries to mitigate this weakness by using different sources, such as Ibinda, a Portuguese newswire, and various other NGO reports that focus on the region. Furthermore, other indications of ongoing fighting, such as the flow of refugees into the neighboring Republic of Congo and troop deployment to the enclave, are also taken into account when determining if the conflict is active in a certain year. Despite this, it remains difficult to gather complete information on the conflict in Cabinda.
Keeping this in mind, in 2022 fighting continued between FLEC-FAC-TN and the Armed Forces of the Government of Angola deeming the conflict active.
In the early months of the year, FLEC-FAC-TN released statements informing that they would launch both a military and a diplomatic offensive as well as boycott the elections in August of that year. They also stated they were after independence, not self-determination. On the other hand, in February the Angolan government publicly admitted the existence of military actions in Cabinda and acknowledged that security on the border with the Republic of Congo "inspired a lot of care". By the end of the year, however, the Government again refused that there was instability in the Cabinda region.
In terms of War Comunicados, it appears that FLEC-FAC-TN engaged in several attacks against FAA in the municipalities of Belize and Buco Zau. They also reported two attacks from FAA in Congo (very close to the borders of Buco-Zau and Belize). One of the attacks in Congo was confirmed by Congolese media. Meanwhile, FLEC-FAC’s activities were not significant in 2022 and took place in the municipality of Cacongo. FLEC-FAC-TN kept making calls to the EU, the Pope and other allies to support Cabinda’s fight.
