SUMMARY
The conflict taking place in the north-western Indian state Punjab saw the Indian government fighting a number of Sikh insurgent outfits aiming for the establishment of a Sikh state, Khalistan (“Land of the Pure”). The conflict became active in 1983 and throughout its duration displayed much violence, generating high death-tolls. Following large counterinsurgency-operations, the government pronounced the insurgency defeated in 1993.
IN DEPTH
Background to the conflict
The roots of the armed insurgency in Punjab can be traced to the interaction of several factors: a sense of economic deprivation within the Sikh ethnic community, unmet demands for the devolution of central power, and manipulation of religious identities - compounded by the decision of the Indian government to harshly enforce a military solution to the growing intercommunal tension in Punjab in the late 1970s. These factors contributed to the rise of a militant Sikh movement in the late 1970s, which initiated an armed secessionist struggle against the Indian state in October 1981. Among other issues of contention were also those of water-supplies to Punjab and a few neighbouring states and of land transfers.
A demand for greater autonomy under a reformed federalist India had been articulated already through the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, adopted by the Sikh political party Akali Dal in 1973. This demand got a more extreme interpretation in the early 1980s, when the organised militant outfits publicly voiced their preference for confrontation rather than negotiation with the Indian government. At the onset of the armed conflict, the insurgents stand on the territorial incompatibility was the establishment of a separate Sikh state. This demand was put forward in religious terms, in a call for an independent Khalistan, (“Land of the Pure”). The insurgents, however, were deliberately vague on which territory would be included.
From the very beginning, the Sikh insurgents agitating for an independent state were a highly factionalised movement. Factional alignments that were continually established and dissolved made it difficult to separate the armed activity of the different outfits, hence they are jointly referred to as "Sikh insurgents" or merely the "Khalistan movement."
Start of the conflict and developments in the early 1980s
The onset of the armed conflict between the Sikh insurgents and the Government of India can be traced to a clash between armed Sikh activists and police in October 1981. This confrontation, however, followed in the wake of ethnic polarisation and brutal incidents of intercommunal violence between Sikhs and other ethnic groups in the late 1970s. From 1983 violence between the Sikh insurgents and governmental forces escalated markedly in Punjab, rising to the level of at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, and led to the imposition of Presidential rule in October 1983.
During the early 1980’s, large-scale demonstrations against the government were launched by some elements among the Sikhs. Attempts at talks were made, but these generated no real progress in settling the issues of contention.
A distinct point in the conflict came with the government’s “Operation Blue Star” of June 1984, when the government of Indira Gandhi sent the army into Amritsar’s Golden Temple. The operation aimed to flush out the militants who had barricaded themselves in the Sikh holy shrine, and it caused numerous casualties. This event gave rise to heavy criticism of the government from the Sikh community, and it is widely considered a fact that the operation was the reason behind the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October the same year by Sikh members of her bodyguard. Following the murder of the Prime Minister fierce anti-Sikh violence erupted which had to be quelled by the army.
The conflict after “Operation Blue Star” of 1984
Murdered Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was immediately succeeded by her son, Rajiv Gandhi and in 1985 he and the moderate Sikh leader Harchand Singh Longowal of the Sikh political party Akali Dal, signed an agreement. The agreement stipulated that Chandigarh, which was the capital of not only Punjab, but also of the neighbouring state Haryana, would go to Punjab only. The agreement also announced the creation of a tribunal to look in to the contested issue of water supplies to Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. The Akali Dal promised that the demands made in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution were not contrary to the Indian constitution, but rather focused on relations between the central government and the states; that it aimed to “provide greater autonomy to the State with a view to strengthening the unity and integrity of the country”. Moreover the agreement stipulated an investigation into the anti-Sikh riots that took place following the murder of India Ghandi. While the agreement did address the several questions that had spurred the conflict prior to “Operation Blue Star” (for more information on this event, see the section headed “Start of the conflict and developments in the early 1980s”), it was not endorsed by the militants, and Longowal was murdered a month subsequent to its signing. The land-transfers stipulated by the agreement were to take place early in 1986, but this never happened and in April a Sikh group called the Panthic Committee proclaimed the Sikh state Khalistan (“Land of the Pure”) from the Golden Temple in Amritsar.
In 1986 Julio Riberio was made Police Chief and Sidharta Shankar Ray was made Governor of Punjab. These two took up a very harsh counter-insurgency policy, which remained in force until 1989. Following the dissolution of the Punjabi state government in 1987, Riberio and Ray were in charge of the state. However, their methods proved unable to stop the insurgency, and reportedly made martyrs out of militants rather than weakening them.
By 1988 the government of Rajiv Gandhi made attempts to instigate negotiations with the Sikh insurgents - at least those prepared to reject the use of violence. However, parallel to these attempts, the government also amended the constitution to make it easier to declare a state of emergency; thus further extending its powers over the events in Punjab.
In May 1988, the state-government of Punjab launched “Operation Black Thunder” targeting the Golden Temple in Amritsar, which some of the militants again used as a planning- and co-ordination centre. “Operation Black Thunder” took the form of a siege during which water and electricity was cut off from the whole temple-complex, and attacks were conducted. The siege lasted for 10 days, following which the rebels surrendered.
By 1989 the Sikh insurgents appeared to be on the defensive: increasingly marginalised geographically, in terms of cadre strength, and in their relations with a war-weary civilian population. Some of the pro-militant underground outfits therefore decided to adopt a more active non-violent political role. In the subsequent general elections in Punjab these groups won a majority in parliament. The Indian governments feeble approach to the escalating violence in neighbouring Kashmir (for more information on the conflicts regarding Kashmir, see India-Pakistan and India (Kashmir)) strengthened the perception that the government had left the initiative with the rebels.
The early 1990s and the end of the conflict
During 1990 the rebels regained much of the territory and influence won by the Indian government during the preceding years, and violence escalated to unprecedented levels. Violence reached a peak in October 1991 and forced the Indian government into action. The army was subsequently re-deployed in Punjab. The main objective of the army at this time was to prepare the grounds for the general elections that were due in February 1992, at which point parliamentary sanction of Presidential rule would come to an end. The Sikh insurgency movement almost unanimously decided to boycott the elections, and enforced its stand through widespread violence and intimidation, which reduced voter turnout to 20%. The militants, however, were discredited in the eyes of the civilian population, and even though the state government subsequently installed lacked political legitimacy, it managed to return some degree of normalcy to Punjab - ending six years of direct central rule.
Violence, however, was bound to continue for as long as the militants controlled weapons and territory. The Indian government thus launched massive counter-insurgency operations, heavily criticised by human rights observers, which ultimately put the Sikh insurgents on the defensive. The violence as well as the daily death toll decreased dramatically during 1993, and by the end of the year the Punjabi Police Chief declared that the insurgency had been defeated. This is the last year coded as active by UCDP.
Briefly on the Indian approach
Throughout the conflict, the attitude of the Indian government has varied. It has been noted that the Agreement of 1985 between Harchand Singh Longowal of the Sikh party Akali Dal and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (for more information, see the section headed “The conflict after “Operation Blue Star” of 1984”), while a failure, nonetheless was important as it dealt with issues that former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had considered non-negotiable. The 1980’s also saw harsh counterinsurgency measures being taken and the behaviour of the Indian forces was strongly criticised.
Later on, the government’s approach changed from a policy of accommodation, such as in late-1989 and early-1990, to a policy of military confrontation. Later that year preparatory talks were held to start negotiations between the parties, and one of the Sikh leaders met to talk with high representatives of the Indian government. No substantive results emerged from this initiative. In general, attempts to find a political solution remained deadlocked partly due to the insurgents unwillingness to compromise on their secessionist stance and the Indian governments repeated attempts to harshly enforce a military solution to the problem. The conflict between the Sikh insurgents and the Indian government was also infected, and possibly made more intractable, by the latter's political rivalries with neighbouring Pakistan. The Indian government on several occasions blamed Pakistan for aiding the insurgents, though Pakistan rejected these allegations.
