SUMMARY
The armed conflict between the South African government and the ANC (African National Congress) broke out in response to popular opposition against the apartheid system. ANC sought an end to white minority rule and establishment of an equal, democratic political system, and in 1961 it formed an armed wing, MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe; Spear of the Nation) and launched an armed struggle against the government. The armed conflict was active between 1981 and 1988, and ended with a negotiated settlement which brought about a democratically elected transitional government.
IN DEPTH
Apartheid, the ANC, and the launch of the armed struggle
Apartheid was instituted in South Africa in 1910, when the Union of South Africa was created, and became more firmly entrenched in 1948 as the NP (National Party) government rose to power. The apartheid system institutionalised racial segregation, restricting non-white population groups to assigned homelands (“Bantustans”) and residential areas and limiting their rights and access to services. Black South Africans were particularly marginalised under apartheid, as their political rights were limited to the Bantustans, outside of which they constituted a disenfranchised, cheap workforce. In response to this discriminating and segregating political system, numerous opposition organisations arose. Among them was ANC (African National Congress), initially founded as the NNC (South African Native National Congress) in 1912.
In June 1955, following growing discontent and unrest among those opposing the apartheid system, a “Congress of the People” was organised by ANC as well as Indian, Coloured and White opposition organisations. The Congress, drawing together a multitude of political and civil society groups, adopted the Freedom Charter which outlined goals and ideals for a democratic and equal South Africa. Its opening phrase declared that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white”. The Freedom Charter became the manifesto for the ANC and most of the anti-apartheid struggle over the coming decades. However, it also exacerbated tensions within the ANC between those who sought equal rights for all, and the ‘Africanists’ who felt the struggle should focus on Black rights and could not be fought in cooperation with other racial groups. In 1959, a faction of Africanists broke away from ANC and formed PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress).
On 21 March 1960, PAC organised protests against the pass laws which formed part of the apartheid system. In Sharpeville, near Johannesburg, the protests turned violent and police fired into the crowd, killing 69 people. In reaction to the Sharpeville massacre, ANC and PAC organised mass protests and strikes, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency, ban the African opposition groups and arrest their leaders. A year and a half after being outlawed, the ANC announced the beginning of the armed struggle with the launch of an armed wing, MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe; Spear of the Nation), on 16 December 1961. The declaration of the formation of MK was accompanied by a series of sabotage attack against targets associated with the apartheid system.
The formation of the armed wing was orchestrated by Nelson Mandela, the MK’s first commander in chief, and Joe Slovo of the SACP (South African Communist Party), which was closely affiliated with the ANC in the anti-apartheid struggle. Mandela managed to travel abroad and canvass support for the ANC’s struggle, initially eluding capture by South African security forces. However, in August 1962 he was arrested. A year later, on 11 July 1963, the hideout of MK’s leadership, situated in the Johannesburg suburb Rivonia, was raided by South African security police and most of its commanders captured. Together with Mandela, these leaders were tried (the ‘Rivonia Trial’) and most were jailed for long periods. The arrests of most of the leaders of the armed struggle constituted a serious blow to ANC and its activities inside South Africa. Over the following years, the organisation regrouped in bases outside the country, and a new military command was created.
For a long time, the ANC was cut off from South Africa’s borders; Namibia was controlled by South Africa, Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) was under white minority rule, Mozambique (as well as Angola) was still a Portuguese colony, and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had not yet reached full independence from British rule. MK was thus incapable of launching armed attacks inside South Africa. Attempts were made in 1967-68 to create a corridor through Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland through joint operations with ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), but these were unsuccessful. However, in the mid-1970s, the conditions for guerrilla struggle against South Africa improved. Political upheaval in Portugal in 1974 paved the way for the independence of Angola and Mozambique, under governments led by the old ANC allies MPLA (Movimento popular de libertação de Angola; Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and Frelimo (Frente de libertação de Moçambique; Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), respectively. This opened up the possibility for establishing camps in those countries, and launching cross-border attacks from Mozambique. Meanwhile, inside South Africa, a number of ANC leaders were released after long prison terms and began to re-establish an internal structure, aided by a general environment of strengthened popular anti-apartheid struggle.
A further development which would strengthen the ANC’s struggle and military capacity was the Soweto uprising in June 1976. Police shootings against a protest march against Black education conditions sparked nine months of upheaval and clashes between mobs and security forces, leaving hundreds dead and producing an exodus of thousands of young people, many of whom joined the ANC and began guerrilla training. This increased the numerical strength of MK, further improving its capacity for armed struggle. In the late 1970s, sabotage attacks into South Africa were again carried out, and in 1980 the security forces reported increasing guerrilla activity. In mid-1980, the ANC issued a call for an intensification of the guerrilla struggle, demonstrating their new strength by a highly publicised coordinated attack on Sasol (South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation) oil installations in June.
Armed conflict between ANC and South Africa (1981-1988)
Following a few years with an increase in sabotage attacks and sporadic clashes, the armed conflict between ANC (African National Congress) and the government of South Africa became active in 1981. At this time, ANC was led by Oliver Tambo, president of the organisation, and its armed wing MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe; Spear of the Nation) was led by Joe Slovo (Chief of Staff) and Joe Modise (Commander). The South African government was led by PW Botha, who had become Prime Minister in 1978. From 1981 onwards, ANC gradually stepped up its armed activity in South Africa, increasingly shifting its focus from sabotage to military targets. The increasing ANC activity was accompanied by South African raids against ANC targets in neighbouring countries.
From the announcement of the armed struggle in 1961, ANC had established good relations with Moscow and received substantial secondary support from the Soviet bloc throughout the conflict. In the early years, many MK fighters travelled to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to receive guerrilla training; from the late 1970s onward, most training was provided in camps in Angola. Military supplies were directed to ANC through Tanzania and Zambia, and later through Angola and Mozambique. ANC also gained strong moral support from international institutions such as the UN and the OAU (Organisation of African Unity); however, strong action by the UN was vetoed by the permanent members US, UK and France, and the OAU in practice provided only limited financial support. Significant financial support was given by the Scandinavian countries, but mainly for humanitarian purposes rather than for the armed struggle.
Apart from giving various forms of support to ANC, international actors also exerted pressure on the South African government by imposing sanctions. In 1977, western powers embraced a UN arms ban against South Africa. During the 1980s, with ANC and the OAU waging a campaign for comprehensive economic sanctions and Western patience with the slow pace of change in South Africa running out, increasingly strong sanctions were imposed by a range of countries and organisations. In the US, President Ronald Reagan, although sympathetic to the South African government and supportive of its policy of slow reform, was forced by popular opinion to exert pressure. Toward the end of the 1980s, the sanctions began to take a heavy toll on the South African economy.
The government of South Africa interpreted ANC’s guerrilla struggle as part of a “total onslaught”, which it claimed was orchestrated by the Soviet Union and aimed at establishing Black communist rule in South Africa. In response to this “total onslaught”, the government devised a “total strategy” which would counter these threats both through security measures and through political reform. Reform would be used to appease dissatisfied groups within the country, and security measures to counter the external threats. As part of the military strategy, South Africa attempted to undermine the left-wing governments of Angola and Mozambique by supporting UNITA (União nacional para a independência total de Angola; National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and Renamo (Resistência nacional moçambicana; Mozambican National Resistance), rebel groups fighting those governments. It also carried out direct military action against ANC targets in those countries and other neighbouring states accused of harbouring South African rebels.
During the first few years, the armed conflict between ANC and the government of South Africa took the form of sporadic guerrilla attacks on South African targets, and retaliatory raids by the government against ANC targets in neighbouring countries. In 1983, following pressure by the states providing support to it, ANC set up a formal MK headquarters in order to facilitate military cooperation. The headquarters – the Politico-Military Council (PMC) – was situated in Lusaka, Zambia, with local structures set up inside South Africa and in neighbouring states. While the new structure decreased the coordination between the political and military branches of the ANC, it also increased the capacity for internal activity and for coordinating the ANC’s struggle with the internal mass movement, which would prove important in the years to come.
In 1984, the conflict was inactive due to low activity. That year, the operational capacity of MK suffered a major blow as South Africa and Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord on 16 March, promising not to allow rebels operating against the other from their own territory. Together with a similar agreement between Swaziland and South Africa signed two years earlier, this meant that a stronger support system would have to be created within South Africa, in order to wage the guerrilla struggle increasingly from within the country rather than from bordering countries. Another blow to the ANC’s armed struggle came as mutinies occurred in several MK camps in Angola, precipitating a crackdown on dissidents within the movement. However, increasing turmoil within the country paved the way for renewed escalation in the following years. Following the implementation in September 1984 of a new constitution, providing for representation of the Indian and Coloured population but not the majority Black population, South African townships erupted in violent unrest, featuring civilian mass protest, mob violence, targeted killings and government crackdowns. In July 1985, the government declared a state of emergency. ANC benefited from the unrest as many involved in the protests embraced the ANC struggle, and because the turmoil facilitated infiltration of MK fighters into South Africa.
In a speech in July 1985, ANC’s President Oliver Tambo called for broader involvement of the people in the struggle, urging them to make the country ungovernable in order to bring down apartheid. The conflict was again active that year, and the following year saw a further escalation. South African retaliatory raids into neighbouring countries also continued. At the same time, however, South Africa began to realize that the “total strategy” was failing, and the first tentative steps were being taken towards a negotiated solution of the conflict.
A peaceful settlement: from secret talks to all-party negotiations
Beginning in 1985, steps toward the initiation of negotiations were taken. On 28 January 1985, a government spokesman stated that South Africa would be willing to negotiate with ANC (African National Congress) if it abandoned its armed struggle. Although no official negotiations would take place for several years, as both sides demanded a number of concessions before talks could be possible, this marked a change of position by the government which had previously rejected the notion of negotiating with the rebels. The same year, talks attracting much attention were held between ANC leaders, including President Oliver Tambo, and representatives of South African business organisations. While these talks were not recognised by the government, they aimed at exploring common ground and the possibility for a future negotiated transition. Similar unofficial but highly publicised talks between ANC leaders and representatives of the white South African community were held on several occasions during the following years.
Outside the spotlight, a series of clandestine meetings between the imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela and government representatives was initiated, also in 1985. In November, Minister of Justice Kobie Cotsee paid Mandela a visit as he was in hospital recovering from an operation, initiating a period of secret talks aimed at assessing the possibility for, and paving the way for, future negotiations. Although the talks were unofficial and did not involve the official ANC leadership, Mandela was early on able to send word to the exiled ANC leaders, informing them that the meetings were taking place and getting their support for continuing the talks. Secret talks between Mandela, who was eventually moved to a small house located on the prison grounds so the talks need not be held in his cell, and government representatives continued until 1990. In July 1989, Mandela met with President PW Botha for the first time, in what was described as a non-political meeting. Prior to this meeting, Botha had modified the government’s position on talks, demanding no longer that the ANC renounce violence but only that they declare themselves prepared to “contribute to a peaceful settlement”.
In August 1989, PW Botha resigned and was succeeded as president by FW de Klerk, who immediately embraced a position more conducive to negotiations and recognising the ANC as a prospective negotiation partner. The new president realised that a negotiated settlement had become a necessity; South Africa was reeling from internal violent upheaval, and from economic crisis as a result of the internal instability and externally imposed sanctions. At the same time, the end of the Cold War reduced the fears of a communist “total onslaught”. Around the same time as FW de Klerk assumed office, the ANC outlined proposals for negotiations, tabled as the Harare Declaration on 21 August. The negotiation framework was backed by the Frontline States, the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN. The conditions set up for the initiation of talks were i) release of all political prisoners, ii) unbanning of anti-apartheid organisations, iii) withdrawal of security forces from the townships, iv) ending of the state of emergency, and v) abolishment of apartheid legislation. In December, de Klerk met with Mandela to discuss the possibility for negotiations.
In a speech on 2 February 1990, President FW de Klerk announced the legalisation of the ANC as well as SACP (South African Communist Party) and PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress), and that Nelson Mandela would soon be released. He declared that the government was ready to begin negotiations with representatives of the black population, with the goal of establishing a democratic and equal political system. Mandela was released on 11 February, and on 2 March he was elected Deputy President of the ANC (in effect making him the acting president, as President Tambo was convalescing abroad after a stroke; in July 1991, Mandela was elected as president and the debilitated Tambo received an honorary position). While moving closer to establishing formal negotiations, however, the ANC refused to completely abandon the armed struggle, a step demanded by the government. Following his release from prison, Mandela reasserted the commitment to the armed struggle, as the conditions which led to its adoption still remained. Despite this, the first substantive negotiations between the ANC and the government took place in May, resulting in a joint declaration of intent to end violence and begin negotiations, the Groote Schuur Minute. A second round of negotiations was held in August. During these talks, the Pretoria Minute was signed, reaffirming the commitment to peaceful negotiations and including a suspension (though not a full abandonment) of ANC’s armed struggle.
Meanwhile, improving relations and the beginning of negotiations between ANC and the government came against the backdrop of increasing factional, mainly “black-on-black” violence in the townships and in Natal province. Much of the violence pitted ANC-aligned groups against the Zulu organisation Inkatha, and escalated after the latter transformed into a political party, IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party), in July 1990. This factional violence became a major obstacle to the peace process during the following years, and there were strong allegations that elements of the security forces were complicit in aiding and directing the fighting in order to undermine the negotiations. The relationship between ANC and the government on several occasions soured as ANC accused the government of failure to act, or even complicity, in relation to the violence. During 1991, negotiations took place in an attempt to end the factional violence, and meetings between ANC and IFP delegations resulted in a joint peace strategy, which soon broke down. In September 1991, a National Peace Accord drafted by the government, ANC and IFP was signed by 31 political and civil society groups; however, this failed to put an end to the violence.
Meanwhile, the negotiation process between ANC and the government moved forward. During 1990 and 1991, the government implemented most of the demands outlined by ANC in the 1989 Harare Declaration and agreed under the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes. In 1991, a compromise solution was agreed for the drafting of a new constitution, whereby all-party negotiations would lay down the basic principles and a democratically elected body would then finalise it. In June, another major stumbling block was removed as the two sides reached agreement on the process of release of political prisoners. Once the major hurdles in the relationship between ANC and the government had been removed, and with at least formal agreement on trying to end the factional violence (in the form of the National Peace Accord), all-party negotiations began in December 1991. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was made up of delegates of nineteen political groups and tasked with drafting an interim constitution which would then be finalised and approved by an elected assembly, in line with the compromise solution. A number of important political players, however, boycotted CODESA; they included PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) and the right-wing Conservative Party.
Serious problems hit the peace process as CODESA collapsed in June 1992, following a massacre of ANC supporters in Boipatong township near Johannesburg. ANC claimed IFP was responsible, and accused state security agents of complicity. ANC withdrew from CODESA and tabled a list of demands related to the government’s handling of the continuing factional violence. Attempts to resume negotiations were at first rejected by the ANC, but in September Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer (chief negotiators for the ANC and the government, respectively) held a series of talks culminating in a Record of Understanding signed by Nelson Mandela and de Klerk on 26 September. The agreement addressed the factional violence and other main obstacles to a resumption of negotiations, and affirmed the parties’ position on an interim constitution and a transitional unity government. In April 1993, multiparty negotiations resumed, this time attended by delegations from 26 political groups. IFP, PAC and the Conservative Party (CP) initially took part, but soon withdrew. Despite their withdrawal, the constitutional negotiations continued, and on 18 November the multiparty negotiation delegates announced agreement on an interim constitution.
The interim constitution provided for a proportionally elected National Assembly and a Senate representing the nine provinces. There would be a Government of National Unity made up of the parties gaining at least 5 % of the vote; the president would be elected by the National Assembly, and there would also be at least two Deputy Presidents. The National Assembly and the Senate were together responsible for establishing the final constitution, which would have to enshrine a number of principles drawn up in the constitutional negotiations. The interim constitution also included a clause on amnesty for politically motivated crimes committed during the conflict. The elections were held on 26-29 April 1994, following a last-minute decision by IFP to participate. ANC won the elections with nearly two-thirds of the vote, the previously ruling National Party receiving around 20 % and IFP 10 %. As a result, these three parties formed a transitional Government of National Unity, with Mandela becoming president.
The interim constitution had assigned the transitional government the task of dealing with the practicalities of the amnesty clause. In 1995, it passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, which called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to handle amnesty applications and establish a full historical account of the conflict. The TRC completed its work and tabled its report in October 1998, after handling 7000 amnesty applications and taking some 21 000 testimonies. Although the TRC concluded that the struggle against apartheid was morally just and attributed most of the crimes to the government, it also documented serious human rights abuses committed by ANC and other liberation movements.
