SUMMARY
The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in Mozambique came amidst a growing Islamist insurgency in the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado by Ahlu al-Sunna wa'l Jama'a (ASWJ), which had begun in 2017. ASWJ was active in the conflict Mozambique: Government in 2018 and 2019, before it swore allegiance to the IS on 24 July 2019.
Violence in Cabo Delgado rapidly escalated thereafter, with IS attacking and capturing many of the province's district centers in 2020 and early 2021, until a series of foreign interventions by nine African countries in mid-2021 vastly improved the security situation in some of the worst hit areas. The international interventions originally limited IS's ability to operate in its previous coastal strongholds, which in turn sent its fighters into new regions, where they continue to operate in small cells based in largely inaccessible jungle terrain. This forced the government and its allies to disperse its limited forces over a much larger area, weakening its hold of the areas from which IS had previously been dislodged, allowing their return to the coastal region in late 2022 and 2023. Most of the contributing countries withdrew their forces during the second half of 2024, though the biggest contributor, Rwanda, instead pledged to increase its contribution. While violence has drastically decreased from its peak in 2021, the insurgency has yet to be defeated and has been escalating in 2024 and 2025.
IN DEPTH
ASWJ pledges allegiance to IS
Indications of a potential IS presence in Mozambique first came May 2018, when a picture circulated showing presumed members of ASWJ holding an IS-flag and a statement that they would soon pledge allegiance to IS leader al-Baghdadi. Baghdadi soon thereafter referenced the existence of a “wilayah” (province) called Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which supposedly included Mozambique and DR Congo, on 22 August 2018. This marks the first stated goal of establishing an Islamic State in Central Africa. From May 2022, Mozambique was designated its own province in IS propaganda, separate from ISCAP.
On June 4, the first IS claim was released for Mozambique, in which it claimed that “the soldiers of the Caliphate were able to repulse an attack by the Crusader Mozambican army” in Mocimboa da Praia district of Cabo Delgado province. This was followed by an IS propaganda outlet publishing a video which purportedly showed ASWJ pledging allegiance to IS on 24 July 2019. At first, the nature of ASWJ's links to IS was uncertain, with different observers either dismissing any ties whatsoever, speculating on the entirety of ASWJ having become an IS affiliate, or only some parts of the group shifting allegiance. During 2019 and early 2020, the preponderance of evidence strongly indicated IS quickly became a fixture of the violence. IS insignia became a common sighting along with insurgents proclaiming their allegiance to IS to the population of captured villages, whilst no evidence has emerged of any split among the insurgents. The video published on 24 July 2019, which purportedly showed ASWJ swearing allegiance to IS, has therefore been used as the start date on which ASWJ merged with IS and thus become part of the Mozambique: Islamic State conflict.
The Islamic State as a territorial entity in Mozambique
Violence in Cabo Delgado rapidly escalated after ASWJ joined IS, with 2020 by far outstripping earlier years in intensity. Whereas ASWJ had mostly been engaged in one-sided attacks against remote villages, the targeting of security forces and urban centers increased relentlessly during 2020.
IS launched coordinated offensives against several district capitals in March and April 2020, leading to the temporary seizure of the district centers of Mocimboa da Praia, Quissanga and Muidumbe districts before withdrawing back into the bush. IS simultaneously stepped up the targeting of civilians in captured villages, often in connection to kidnappings and forced recruitment. One notable such event occurred on 7 April in Xitaxi village in Muidumbe district, during which at least 52 youth were executed, reportedly for refusing to join the insurgency. The offensive pushed further south than the conflict had previously been active, reaching Metuge district on the path towards Cabo Delgado’s provincial capital of Pemba. Here IS was driven back by government forces, which had received reinforcement of air support from the mercenary group Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). A government counter-offensive in June and July appeared to have limited the insurgency’s freedom of movement in the southern district of Quissanga by capturing an IS base outside of Ntessa village in early July.
These limited government successes failed in hindering IS from stepping up its activity further north however, with attacks succeeding in temporarily capturing Macomia town in late May and Mocimboa da Praia town yet again in late June and early August. Following the fall of Mocimboa da Praia town in August, IS retained control of the town for a year, beating back several government attempts to reach the town. This represented a departure from their previous tactics of quickly withdrawing from urban centers and demonstrated the increased confidence of IS in Mozambique. Following the seizure of Mocimboa da Praia, IS in Mozambique declared the town its capital. On 12 August, the day after the fall of Mocimboa da Praia, the Tanzanian government announced that they would launch an operation against IS militants operating along its border with Mozambique. Likely in response to this, IS launched its first recorded attack across the border into Tanzania on 14 October, thus expanding the territorial claim of its Central Africa Province to include Tanzania.
The last weeks of 2020 saw increased IS activity around the Afungi peninsula in Palma district, where several of Africa’s largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects are centered. This was followed by a large-scale attack on Palma town, the largest nearby town where many of the projects' employees are based, in late March 2021, temporarily overrunning much of the town. This was reminiscent of the early 2020 attacks on Mocimboa da Praia, seen as a precursor to its occupation in August 2020. The attack on Palma and the surrounding villages was extremely brutal, with over 740 civilians being killed, often by beheading. Hundreds more were reported missing following the attack. Government forces were blamed for failing to protect the civilian population, as many of its under-equipped and poorly trained soldiers fled the town when they heard of the insurgents’ approach. The showing was particularly damaging in contrast with how they managed to protect the large gas facilities outside the town, from which the fleeing civilians were kept from seeking refuge. The military forces protecting the facilities reportedly refused to offer any aid to the town, or even resupply for the small DAG private military company that operated a few helicopters that attempted a limited rescue operation for civilians under siege inside a hotel in the town.
The attack on Palma caused fears for the future development of Mozambique's LNG extraction, on which the country's government had pinned much of its hope of further economic development on, even heavily indebting itself against future proceeds. These LNG projects located in the conflict zone were previously estimated to peak at around 43 million tons per year, or about 10% of the global supply in 2019, and composed the three largest LNG projects in Africa. The projects themselves have contributed to the problems in the region, according to local reports, by forcibly relocating villages with limited compensation, and by having failed to create much anticipated jobs for the impoverished local population. Following the Palma attack, the largest investor, Total, declared the attacks constituted a force majeure and suspended work on the projects. The attack also caused serious concern in the region, making clear to neighboring countries that Mozambique was failing to contain the insurgency on its own.
International intervention
Soon after the attack two international interventions began taking shape. One was a multilateral force with combatants from five Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania), and supportive roles from several more (Dr Congo, Malawi and Zambia). The force was called the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and originally consisted of around 700 soldiers which began deploying in late July. A second force, independent of SADC, of around 1,000 soldiers, were sent from Rwanda in early July following a bilateral agreement. The Rwandan contingent quickly helped change the dynamic of the conflict, forcing the insurgents to retreat and capturing Mocimboa da Praia in early August 2021. By late 2022, the Rwandan contingent had reportedly grown to 2,500 soldiers, and the SADC forces to around 2,000. The SADC mission ended in July 2024, with only Tanzania retaining any substantial forces in the districts across from its own border. The Rwandan contingent also remained and expanded during the year.
The international intervention appears to have greatly limited IS's ability to operate in its previous coastal strongholds, and has forced it to shift back to hit-and-run tactics from its forest bases. IS's capacity for large-scale offensive operations appears to have at least been temporarily diminished. While this has greatly improved security in much of Cabo Delgado, and has contributed to the conflict becoming much less deadly after 2021, the insurgency moved away from areas with a strong military presence into surrounding areas which was previously relatively safe from insurgent attacks. Palma district, the center for gas extraction in Cabo Delgado, has gone from being one of the most heavily affected districts by the insurgency into one of the safest, largely due to a heavy presence of Rwandan troops. The improved security situation led to Total, the biggest investor in the gas extraction in Mozambique, which declared force majeure and withdrew its personnel after the March 2021 attack on Palma town, declaring its intent to return to Mozambique during 2024 (later postponed until 2025).
Districts in southern Cabo Delgado, as well as the neighboring Niassa and Nampula provinces, have instead faced repeated incursions by mobile insurgent groups since late 2021. Niassa, to the west of Cabo Delgado, was attacked in November and December 2021. From May 2022, insurgents began launching attacks into southern Cabo Delgado, hitting Meluco district in May, followed by attacks into the districts of Ancuabe, Chiure, Mecufi and Montepuez during the summer, before hitting Nampula province, to the south of Cabo Delgado, in September. Attacks renewed in southern Cabo Delgado in October, before moving westward from Chiure into Namuno, Montepuez and Balama districts during November. While the main force of insurgents moved back north towards the end of the year, smaller bands continued attacks in the southern districts of Montepuez and Meluco until March 2023.
The geographical spread of the insurgency has forced Mozambique and its allies to spread their own forces thinner, threatening the tenuous security that had been established in districts such as Muidumbe, Macomia and Mocimboa da Praia, where insurgents began returning in force during the second half of 2022. These three districts became the center for insurgent activity in 2023, even as the international coalition that had first established security there made plans to withdraw by the summer of 2024.
2024 started with increased IS activity, with the group participating in a global IS campaign called ‘kill them wherever you find them', leading in particular to a renewed focus on one-sided violence. Whereas state-based violence between IS and the government decreased slightly in 2024 compared to 2023, one-sided violence perpetrated by IS in Mozambique almost doubled and non-state violence between IS and the Naparama also increased. Macomia and Mocimboa da Praia remained at the center of the insurgency in 2024. The insurgency also returned to the southern districts of Ancuabe and Chiure between January and May, and again in November. The insurgency continued to spread violence to new areas in 2024, forcing security forces to spread out ever thinner, especially given the withdrawal of forces by most foreign backers. In 2023, 9 districts saw fatal violence involving IS, whereas 13 districts did so in 2024. In 2025, 15 districts in three provinces were effected by lethal violence. Violence involving IS, both statebased and one-sided, increased sharply in 2025, though it remains well below the peak in 2021. Fighting between IS and government forces in 2024 and 2025 was particularly fierce in Macomia district, where a series of attacks by IS in 2024 on the district centre caused Mozambican and Rwandan forces to launch a major offensive against IS bases in Macomia's coastal region and the large Catupa forest. The fighting continued throughout 2025, as despite government success in capturing some bases, they appeared unable to hinder IS from returning to set up new ones in the same areas.
Participating forces
By mid-2021, IS was estimated to have between 1,500-4,000 active members in Mozambique, many of whom had been forcibly recruited. This number reportedly dropped 500 or less during 2022, and possibly as low as 300 during 2023, with many members reportedly returning to civilian life due to a lack of supplies. The government attempted to entice members of the group to surrender by publicly stated offers of amnesty. It is unknown how many accepted the offer or what happened to those that did. Child soldiers were first reported to have been used during the assault on Palma on 24 March 2021, though attempts to recruit minors had been reported earlier. Most members of the group belonged to the local Mwani and Makua communities, though there has been reports of a sizable contingent of foreign fighters, especially Tanzanians. Tanzanians have widely been reported to have heavily featured among the groups leaders, often thought to mainly be former members of a militant group that Tanzanian authorities cracked down on in Kibiti district in 2017, causing many of its members to flee to Cabo Delgado and join the insurgency there. Not all of IS members in Mozambique were fighters, however, as the group was reported by escapees to have built up a logistics network with porters, mechanics, nurses and communications specialists to support its operations. Many of its members, especially within the support network, were forcibly recruited. The group also often kidnapped women into sexual slavery as 'wives' to the insurgents.
The police were originally the main government fighting force in Cabo Delgado, with the counterinsurgency effort led by the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR). Internal divisions in the security forces, especially between the underfunded army and the UIR, hampered its response to the insurgency, however. By early 2021, the main responsibility for security in Cabo Delgado was shifted over to the army, an organization that has been underfunded for decades and largely suspect in the eyes of the government due to the inclusion of former Renamo militants in its ranks. The government has also relied on private military companies (PMCs) to boost its capacity. First it employed the Russian Wagner Group in 2019, which however failed to improve security and withdrew after rapidly suffering several defeats to the insurgents, before turning to the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) in 2020. DAG provided significant aid to the military by providing them with some air support, though it was insufficient to be more than a road block for the insurgents, and its mission ended after the fall of Palma town in March 2021.
The government has also increasingly employed village militias, particularly in areas inhabited by the Makonde ethnic group, which has traditionally had strong ties to the state as the area from which Frelimo originated. Most militias were formally under the command of the police, though some have reportedly been mobilized directly by the ruling Frelimo party, and thus answer directly to the president. In November 2023 they were legally integrated as a branch of the armed forces as the Local Forces. In late 2022, a new armed popular movement called the Naparama emerged in opposition to IS, outside of the control of the state or ruling party, thus sparking a non-state conflict.
IS continued the practices, previously perpetrated by ASWJ, of targeting civilians through wide-spread one-sided killings, forced displacement, forced recruitment and kidnapping girls and women (see IS - Civilians). The conflict displaced as many as half the population of the affected areas, some 600,000 people by the end of of 2020. Many people began returning home in the later parts of 2021 as the security situation improved, though displacement instead picked up in new areas and areas where displaced people had previously returned home, following the dispersal of violence.
