SUMMARY
The non-state conflict between the Tuareg pro-government self-defense group GATIA and the Greater Sahara section (ISGS) of IS was fought in the context of the conflict between the latter and the Malian state, active from 2017 onward. Furthermore, this non-state conflict is also closely interlinked with the non-state conflicts IS-MSA and GATIA, MSA-IS.
Mali has been the scene of high levels of organized violence since the early 2010s. State-based conflicts in the country were to some extent a product of a lack of state presence in different areas, and over time, the conflicts as such served to limit state presence even further. Large section of the population thus found themselves living in extremely insecure surroundings, engulfed by armed conflict as well as ethnic mobilization and violence. In this context, the responsibility to provide security many times fell on non-state actors such as GATIA. GATIA was a pro-government militia based among the Imghad sub-group of the Tuareg people, which had emerged during the territorial conflict between separatist Tuareg rebel group CMA (initially MNLA) – with a support base within the Idnan and Ifoghas sub-groups of the Tuareg people – and the state. In the context of the high levels of organized violence in Mali, and with an expressed main aim to “work with the Malian government to bring stability to the country”, the group continued to exist even after the territorial conflict came to an end with the signing of a peace agreement in 2015.
When the Malian government became embroiled in a conflict with the Islamic State’s Greater Sahara wing in 2017, GATIA remained an important ally of the army, fighting alongside it against the jihadist organization in eastern Mali. It should be noted that when doing so, the violence recorded by UCDP is regarded as being part of that intrastate conflict. In addition to the fighting in the context of the state-based conflict, GATIA also faced IS on its own, in a non-state conflict. Furthermore, at times the group fought IS together with fellow pro-government militia, MSA, which was based among the Daoussak Tuaregs, and the latter also faced the jihadists on their own. These three non-state conflicts were all part of the same context, and thus closely interlinked. During long periods of time, GATIA and MSA were the main players in opposing GATIA in the eastern part of the country.
The escalating violence in eastern Mali in general, and Menaka region in particular, was also connected to – and fed into- ethnic tensions between the Tuareg and Fulani populations. IS viewed the Tuareg as GATIA and MSA supporters, and carried out one-sided attacks against their villages, which caused GATIA and MSA to step up activities even further. As IS suffered military set-backs at the hands of the militias, they often retaliated through targeted killings of important GATIA and MSA members, as well as further one-sided attacks on Tuareg villages.
The non-state conflict between GATIA and IS is first included in UCDP data in 2018. In late October of that year, one GATIA officer and seven others were killed by the detonation of an IED in the I-n-Guersammane area in Menaka cercle. With that, the conflict crossed the 25 fatalities threshold for the first time.
