SUMMARY
Since the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt, which started in 2011, the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula has deteriorated significantly. In November 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) and became part of it. The dyad of Government of Egypt and IS falls under the territorial conflict “Egypt: Islamic State” and the conflict became active for the first time in 2015.
After eight consecutive years of violence, 2023 saw no recorded fatalities.
IN DEPTH
Background
Following the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt, which started in 2011, the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula began to deteriorate significantly. During the 2011 unrest, the Egyptian authorities lost control over large parts of the Sinai as the local population revolted. The population – many of which were Bedouins – had historically been severely discriminated against compared to the rest of Egypt. While Egyptian security forces managed to restore at least a tentative calm in the region, little was done to address the socio-economic grievances among the Sinai population. The security situation in the peninsula deteriorated again in 2013, following the military’s ouster of President Mohammed Morsi. A number of different jihadist groups took advantage of the weakened security structure in the area and strengthened their positions, and stage attacks against security forces and public administration institutions. The use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and targeted assassinations was frequently reported; in response, government troops carried out a number of larger crackdowns in the Sinai Peninsula, resulting in high death tolls. However, in most cases, the incidents of violence were reported to be involved unknown militants/terrorists/gunmen, which meant that the UCDP could not attribute many violent events to a particular dyad.
Some of the attacks in the Sinai Peninsula in 2013 were, however, assigned to a new extremist Islamist outfit called Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, but the violence was not included in UCDP data for 2013 due to lack of a stated goal of incompatibility. This changed in 2014, as it was possible to ascertain that the group indeed had a stated political purpose (for more information about this, see Government of Egypt - Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. Consequently, the conflict over government in Egypt was restarted in 2014, after being inactive since the 1990s. Clashes between security forces and members of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis took place throughout 2014, with a clear majority of events taking place in the Sinai Peninsula. In the face of the escalating Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis insurgency, the Egyptian President General Abdel Fateh al-Sisi announced a three-month state of emergency and curfew in the Sinai in late October 2014. The president also instructed the security forces to intensify the counter-insurgency operations.
Declaration of Wilayah Sina
In late June 2014, the Islamic State (IS) announced that it had established a caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq. The leader of the group, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was appointed “caliph.” Sharia law was imposed in areas under its control, and governors (wālī, or wulāt in plural) were appointed for different geographical locations. On 10 November 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis made a formal pledge of allegiance (bay’ah) to the IS leader al-Baghdadi. The decision to pledge loyalty to IS was most likely motivated by a desire among the Sinai militants to procure more recruits, weapons, funding, and training. On 13 November 2014, al-Baghdadi accepted the bay’ah from groups based in Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt. Following this, IS announced the creation of Wilayah Sina, or “Sinai Province.” The merger of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and IS was a highly symbolic move, as it allowed IS to establish a presence in the most populous - and historically one of the most influential - Arab country.
As the new Wilayah Sina was created from an already established armed outfit, IS became involved almost immediately in low-intensity clashes with the Government of Egypt. As Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis had such close connections to its area of operation – many of its members were drawn from the Bedouin community – Wilayah Sina also provided IS with a branch that was capable of adapting to local circumstances. The Egyptian IS branch was, for example, able to navigate the tribal politics in the Sinai, which allowed the group to at least coexist with and sometimes even cooperate with local communities. Furthermore, Wilayah Sina was – much like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis – able to capitalize on the resentment generated among the Sinai population by the heavy-handed counterinsurgency tactics, which included mass arrests, extrajudicial killings, and the destruction of homes by the Egyptian security forces. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Wilayah Sina did not have widespread local support; a large majority of the Sinai population was opposed to the existence of IS on the peninsula.
The Sinai Insurgency
The first large-scale operation conducted by IS against Egyptian security forces occurred on 29 January 2015, as Wilayah Sina militants launched a multi-pronged attack on an army base in the coastal town al-Arish, killing around 30 soldiers. Wilayah Sina was described as one of IS’ most effective branches in the period 2015-2017. Making use of the rugged terrain of the Sinai Peninsula, the group was able to successfully fight the far better equipped and numerically superior Egyptian Army. In 2017, it was estimated that IS in the Sinai was comprised of around 1000-2000 fighters, as compared to the roughly 20 000 Egyptian troops deployed to quell the insurgency. However, unlike IS branches in, for example, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, Wilayah Sina had not been able to capture any major urban settlements as of 2017. It should be noted that Wilayah Sina was still attempting to implement the same type of extremist Islamist governance as seen in other IS-held territories, despite the lack of control over towns or cities. IS’ Egypt-branch maintained most of its bases in the Sinai’s inaccessible mountain areas; from there, it could launch attacks against the Egyptian security forces along Sinai’s more densely populated northern coast, particularly around the towns al-Arish, Sheik Zuwaid, and Hasna.
During the period 2015-2017, there were no radical changes in the nature of the IS insurgency in Egypt. A large majority of the Wilayah Sina attacks included IEDs (improvised explosive devices), SVBIEDs (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices), suicide bombers, rocket attacks, and ambushes. The group would rarely engage in large-scale battles with the Egyptian Army and instead rely on hit-and-run-style attacks. As exemplified by the aforementioned attack in al-Arish in January 2015, Wilayah Sina was capable of relatively complex attacks, which on many occasions, included diversions and multiple assaults. In response, Egyptian forces made frequent use of airstrikes and attack helicopters to repel and respond to IS attacks; both airstrikes and special forces were deployed to raid known IS hideouts and camps. While the vast majority of the conflict events involving IS took place in the Sinai during 2015-2017, the group occasionally carried out attacks elsewhere in Egypt. As in previous years, the UCDP was not able to attribute a large amount of the conflict events in Sinai to a particular dyad. This was mainly a consequence of the fact that Sinai harbors several armed groups and the generally poor quality of the reporting of events there.
In connection to its insurgency in Egypt, IS has also conducted a large number of attacks against soft targets, such as Coptic Christian churches, and against civilians in its areas of operations. The group was responsible for several high-profile attacks against civilian targets, including the bombing of Metrojet Flight 9268 on 31 October 2015, the Palm Sunday bombings on 9 April 2017, and an attack against a mosque in al-Rawda on 24 November 2017. IS attacks against soft targets severely hurt Egypt’s vital tourism industry. For more information about these types of attacks, please consult IS – Civilians.
Egyptian security forces continued to fight IS militants in the inaccessible Sinai peninsula throughout the period 2015-2020. In early 2018, Egypt launched "Operation Sinai 2018," a large military offensive, to dislodge IS from the Sinai. Despite the offensive, IS continued to carry out attacks against both military and civilian targets, mainly in the areas around Arish and Shaykh Zuwayd, throughout 2018. Though the last army statement about "Operation Sinai 2018" was published in March 2019, the clashes continued in the rest of 2019.
The IS insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula continued in 2020, and the conflict kept being active for the sixth consecutive years. Throughout the year, the Government of Egypt organized significant offensives, and IS continued to carry out attacks against both military and civilian targets. Locals from the Sinai Tribal Union participated in the clashes on the government side and became one of IS' targets in the peninsula.
In 2021, the conflict intensity reached its lowest point in the history of Egypt: Islamic State conflict until then, signaling the group's waning strength in the region. The tribes' armed support contributed significantly to the government's counterinsurgency efforts. Throughout the year, the group maintained its presence mainly in Bir al Abd, Al Arish, Ash Shaykh Zuwayd, and Rafah towns of the northern Sinai.
In 2022, the Egypt: Islamic State conflict saw an increase in intensity compared to 2021. IS continued to carry out attacks against the [Government of Egypt] (/#actor/121), including a rare attack on mainland Egypt wich claimed the lives of 3 Egyptian soldiers. Furthermore, locals from the Sinai Tribal Union were involved in the clashes on the government's side and thus, they were among the targets of IS' operations in the peninsula. The tribes' armed support contributed significantly to the government's counterinsurgency efforts.
In 2023, there were no recorded fatalities.
